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Between 1775 and 1783, as the United States struggled 
for independence, the Congress evolved a military system that 
was to influence American military policy profoundly for more 
than a hundred years. Put together with more patches than 
the clothing of Washington's soldiery at Valley Forge the 
system made use of the two different types of troops that 
were traditional in the Anglo-Saxon world--militia and stand­
ing or regular forces. The two appeared to be incompatible 
when employed together, and the result was a kind of military 
chaos that prolonged the war, added unnecessarily to its 
expense, and might have led to its loss. In discussing these 
matters, which form the background of the present study, it 
will first be necessary to examine the two kinds of organiza­
tions themselves and the attitudes which become associated 
with them.
The Militia and Its Separate Development 
The first colonists had brought the militia with them
1
2from England, where its roots were embedded deeply in the 
tribal antiquity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.^ In its native, 
or generalized form, it placed the obligation to perform 
military service on all men within the fighting ages. In the 
time of Queen Elizabeth I the institution was modified so 
that the primary obligation to serve rested upon a relatively 
small group selected from the militia at large. The members 
of this group were formed into bands in each shire, given 
special training, and ordered out as units in the defense of 
the realm. With the exception of the London companies, the 
"trainbands" collapsed during the Civil War of 1642-49, and 
the Cromwellian government of the following decade relied on 
its own "New Model" or "Independent" army. After the restor­
ation of the Stuarts in 1660 the militia was reconstituted 
and reorganized. Though the bands were retained, the troops 
in the future were to be raised and maintained by the prop- 
erty-holders in each locality. Thus a wealthy man might be 
required to support one or more horsemen in proportion to his
One authority notes that in England "an organized 
militia existed from the earliest times, and was never en­
tirely displaced by the transplanted Norman feudal forces." 
Oliver L. Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace 
(New York, 1937), 3. Hereafter cited as Spaulding, United 
States Army. In a broader sense it may be pointed out that 
the military institutions of all primitive peoples, including 
the American Indians and undoubtedly also the Anglo-Saxon 
groups that overran England following the departure of the 
Romans, were based upon the two essential foundations of the 
English militia system of historic times; (1) the universal 
obligation to serve, and (2) the requirement that each person 
furnish his own arms.
3holdings. As one writer notes, the strength of the militia 
was no longer based upon the population of a county but upon 
the value of the property therein.%
in early America the sparse population and lack of 
established wealth dictated a return to the undifferentiated 
form of the English system. In most colonies the obligation 
to serve was placed upon all men within certain age groups 
ranging from about sixteen to fifty or sixty. These citizen- 
soldiers were formed into companies and drilled several days 
a year. Every man was required under penalty to provide his
o
own arms, an ancient and characteristic feature of all mili­
tia systems. When Indians or other dangers threatened, the 
companies were embodied as units and sent to the field.
Since the militia was considered to be a weapon of local
O
Archibald Hanna, Jr. presents a brief and excellent 
summary of the development of the English militia system in 
"New England Military Institutions, 1693-1750" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, Yale University, 1950), 
See his pages 7-10 in particular. Hereafter cited as Hanna, 
"New England Military Institutions."
3
Data on colonial militia laws dating from the ear­
liest period may be found in: Ibid,; Harry L. Harris and
John I. Hilton, A History of the Second Regiment, N.G.,
N.J.; Second N.J. Volunteers. Spanish War; Fifth New Jersey 
Infantry; Together with a Short Review covering Early 
Military Life in the State of New Jersey (Paterson, 1908), 
hereafter cited as Harris and Hilton, New Jersey National 
Guard; Emmons Clark, History of the Seventh Regiment of New 
York, 1806-1889 (New York, 1890), hereafter cited as E. 
Clark, Seventh Regiment; and William P. Clarke, Official 
History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State 
of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia. 1910).
4defense,4 colonial governors and commanders were usually re­
luctant to order the companies to march far from their homes. 
The demands of hearth and farm dictated that continuous tours 
of service be limited to about three months or less.
In addition to the ordinary militia, most colonies 
also maintained special "volunteer” companies of artillery, 
cavalry, and sometimes infantry. These organizations pos­
sessed a unique legal status in that they were usually created 
by individual enactments of the colonial legislatures. The 
resulting charters or authorizations usually conferred special 
privileges on the companies and sometimes placed them entirely 
outside the general militia system. In the latter case they 
were called "independent" companies. Such units generally 
took orders only from their own immediate commanders and from 
the governors. In practice the distinction between the terms 
"volunteer" and "independent" was apparently often ignored, 
and the two came to be used interchangeably. Since the vol­
unteer companies were required to clothe themselves in uni­
forms or "regimentals," they were also referred to as 
"uniform" companies.
The volunteer component satisfied two basic needs of 
the times. It provided organizations in which men of a mar­
tial turn could pursue their interests further than the
^The militia in England had always been considered 
an arm for home defense. Though it might be marched from 
one county to another, it could not be employed in foreign 
service. Spaulding, United States Army, 3.
5ordinary militia with its limited facilities for training 
permitted. It also provided all of the artillery and cavalry 
of the militia. These special arms could not be formed in 
the standard component because of the high cost of horses and 
field pieces. The volunteers, generally men of means, could 
afford these military ornaments, which lay far beyond the 
resources of the average militiamen. As might be expected 
from these circumstances, the volunteers were by every stand­
ard of comparison greatly superior to their more plebian
5
brothers in arms.
The most venerable of all the volunteer companies was
"The Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company" of Boston,
which was established in 1638,^ In New York City, the first 
such organization was formed prior to 1710, and by 1755 the 
number had reached six. In 1772, when William Tryon, "a 
military character," was governor, the New York legislature 
authorized a total of nine companies for the state,^ One of 
the more famous of the volunteer units, though it was not 
organized until late colonial times, was "Paddock’s Artillery 
Company" of Boston, General Henry Knox, the most capable
^For further discussions of the superiority of the 
volunteer militia see below pages 343-45,
^Francis S, Drake, Life and Correspondence of Henry
Knox, Major-General in the American Revolutionary Army
(Boston, 1873), Appendix, 1^6, Hereafter cited as Drake, 
Knox*
”^E, Clark, Seventh Regiment, 22-24,
6artilleryman of the Revolution, and many of his colleagues 
received their training in this organization.® In colonial 
days a few volunteer units might be found not only in the 
cities mentioned above but also in most others, and they be­
came quite numerous after the Revolution.
As time passed the generalized English militia system 
that had been transplanted to America developed independently 
in directions determined by the nature of the new environment. 
Its relationship to the state, for example, underwent signif­
icant modification. In England the control and supervision 
of the troops was vested in representatives of the Crown, 
namely the lord lieutenants of the counties.9 In America 
this centralization of authority became a casualty of geog­
raphy, history, and British colonial policy. The same factors 
that resulted in thirteen separate colonies also produced an 
equal number of militias each formed under a different law. 
From the beginning both the British intendants and the colon­
ists themselves appear to have recognized the provincial 
character of this system. Troops became completely identi­
fied with the colonies to which they pertained, and no real 
effort was made to establish unified control.^0
®Drake, Knox. Appendix, 126.
^Hanna, "New England Military Institutions," 9-10; 
Spaulding, United States Army. 3.
^®An East New Jersey Law of 1698, for example, 
actually precluded the compelling of militiamen "to go forth 
/"outJ of his own country, much less out of this Province,
7At the same time, the Americans began to look upon 
their militia as the very antithesis of the national troops 
that England kept in America. Taken as a whole it repre­
sented provincial interests, and it was subject to provincial 
control. In any showdown with the mother nation it could no 
doubt be utilized against the national regulars. The truth 
of this last concept was convincingly demonstrated in 1775 
when the Revolution began. The colonial call to arms was 
directed to the militia, and the response for the moment was 
all that could be desired. This dramatic demonstration of 
the advantages of troops subject to local authority left a 
lasting impression on American military thought. Those 
favoring the rights of the states found any military system 
that placed control of large armed forces in the hands of 
the central government completely unacceptable.
The provincialism characteristic of the American 
militia had other important consequences. Each of the 
thirteen separate systems tended to follow its own indepen­
dent development. By the time of the Revolution marked dif­
ferences in such features as age of obligation, tactical 
organization, and exemption policy had arisen. The existence 
of such variations and the failure of the militia during the
into foreign Ports Parts?_J7 in time of War, or Peace, 
unless in case of a sudden Invasion, or by special Act of 
General Assembly.” Harris and Hilton, New Jersey National 
Guard. 28. Such laws as this made unified control and com­
mand impossible.
8war itself led to demands for reform, and these in turn to 
new conflicts over the extent of the military powers of the 
federal government. Since uniformity and efficiency could 
be imposed only from the top, the anti-nationalists opposed 
all really effective reform bills on the theory that they 
tended to build up the prerogatives of the central govern­
ment.
The colonials also found it necessary to modify the 
English system of mobilization. Under British practice the 
militia companies were normally ordered up for service as 
units. A s  one writer shows, this procedure proved to be 
inconvenient if not entirely impracticable in New England.
The colonies of that area had to provide troops for two major 
purposes, the protection of the frontiers and offensive oper­
ations against the French. To meet the former need it was 
necessary to keep forces, in the field throughout the entire 
year. Since the frontiersmen also had their own work to do, 
they could not undertake the task on a continuous basis, and 
the frontier companies could thus be embodied as units only 
for short periods during emergencies. To solve the problem 
without causing major disruption either on the frontier or 
in the interior communities the New England governments 
stopped mobilizing units as such and began to raise men for 
frontier service from the militia at large, usually by
^^Hanna, "New England Military Institutions," 17-19.
9levying small draft quotas on the companies,
Between 1700 and 1748 the New England colonies were 
called upon to provide troops for six different expeditions 
against French objectives in Canada and the Caribbean, Since 
the militia could not properly be employed in foreign service, 
the authorities found it impolitic to impress complete units.
Again they raised the men, usually as volunteers, from the
13militia at large. Thus in both frontier defense and the 
colonial wars the New England militia was converted from a 
fighting force to a system of mobilization. It, of course, 
retained its training functions and responsibilities,^^ 
Judging from the state militia laws of a later period, this
conversion also occurred in the remaining sections of the
15country. This is not to say that complete units were not 
still ordered out on occasion for local use during short­
lived emergencies.
The Regulars
The differences between regular or standing troops 
and the militia were both clear and numerous. Regulars were 
enlisted for periods reckoned in terms of years rather than 
weeks or months, and they were constantly embodied. Their
^^Ibid,. 65-74, 112-13, 
l^Ibid,. 117-43,
l^ibid.. 19,
^^See below pages 98-99, 319-23,
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training was continuous, and they were supplied with arms, 
uniforms, equipment, and pay by the state. All of these 
factors contributed to military efficiency of an excellence 
seldom if ever attained by the militia. Indeed from the 
point of view of discipline, training, and general combat 
readiness, the militia was an organization of amateur sol­
diers. The regulars were professionals.
In the Anglo-Saxon military tradition the national 
troops both in England and in America were always regulars. 
This arrangement resulted not only from the superior effi­
ciency of standing troops but also from the traditional con­
cept already mentioned that precluded the use of militia in 
either distant service or offensive operations. As national 
troops, regulars in theory, though not invariably in prac­
tice, were recruited directly by the central government. In 
the United States the major departure from this rule occurred 
in Revolutionary days and for a short time thereafter when 
the responsibility for actually procuring men was passed to 
the states.
A Great Foq--the Militia Myth 
During much of American history the popular belief 
that the militia was infinitely superior to the regulars has 
lain like a giant fog over the problems of military policy.
^^At a later time the United States also utilized
"national volunteers."
11
This myth rested upon several timeworn foundations. During
early colonial days the colonists had been forced to look
only to themselves for protection against the Indians that
surrounded them like the waters of some dangerous sea. The
farmer and the villager in moments of danger laid aside the
plow and the awl and took up the musket. Composed thus of
the people themselves, the good yeomen and the good burghers,
the militia was eminently respectable. In looking at such
troops the public looked at itself. In looking at regulars
it saw drunks, gamblers, brawlers, and unproductive consumers
of the public treasure that seemed to have come from lost
17worlds never visited by ordinary citizens. Such refuse was 
hardly human, and it could possess neither solid virtues like 
courage nor high ideals like patriotism. The militiaman 
fought for hearth and country, and the regular for lucre to 
pursue his hideous vices.
If these intrinsic differences were not enough to 
demonstrate the superior fighting qualities of the militia, 
incontrovertible proof could be found in history. General 
Braddock, the archetype of the professional officer, and his 
British regulars had been destroyed at the battle of the 
Monongahela by a handful of militialike French partisans and
l^This view was partially correct. See below pages 
155-56, However, the composition of the army reflected not 
only its attractions for the “riffraff** but also the repug­
nance it excited in the “respectable,** This is to say that 
the latter by not enlisting helped to perpetuate the low 
over-all quality of the troops.
12
a few Indians. The peerless New England militia had butchered 
another column of regulars in the retreat from Lexington and 
Concord and turned back the massed strength of the British 
army at Bunker Hill. And so on for the few other battles, 
such as King’s Mountain, in which the American militia did 
not suddenly find that it had urgent business elsewhere as 
soon as the first shot was fired by the enemy.
By 1776 the Philadelphia Evening Post was prepared to
philosophize on the subject:
If we search for the cause of this superior bravery in 
the people of a countz^, compared with what are called 
regular troops . . . /we find that the latte^ have no 
principle, either of honor, religion, public spirit, 
regard for liberty, or love of country to animate them.
. . . Discipline only gives the officers the power of 
actuating them; and superior discipline may make them 
superior to other troops of the same kind /other regu- 
lar_§7 not so well disciplined. Thus discipline seems 
to supply in some degree, the defect of principle. But 
men equally armed and animated by principle, though with­
out discipline, are always superior to them when only 
equal in numbers; and when principle and discipline are 
united on the same side, as in our present militia, 
treble the number of mere unprincipled mercenaries, such 
as the regular armies commonly consist of, are no match 
for such a militia.18
Dozens of similar statements glorifying the militia 
might be cited. To refer to only a few of them, in the 
spring of 1777 the Executive Council of Pennsylvania an­
nounced that only "the vigorous manly efforts" of a few val­
iant militiamen had saved Philadelphia during the winter.
^^Philadelphia Evening Post. 30 Mar. 1776 as quoted 
in Frank Moore, Diary of the American Revolution; from News­
papers and Original Documents (New York, 1863) I. 213-14.
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In the summer of 1779, President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania
thought that all the lessons of history proved that a good
militia was the best safeguard against invasion and that "the
enemy should stand more in awe of them than three times the
19number of standing troops." In 1785 General John Sullivan, 
who knew better, wrote that a little extra training would 
make the militia almost as formidable as the great standing 
army of Prussia.
The truth of the matter is that many editors and 
politicians, as well as some military figures, had seized 
upon a pitifully small number of facts, misinterpreted them, 
and reached a false generalization. In a large majority of 
the actions in which the state troops participated during the 
Revolution they misbehaved miserably. Many battles, such as 
Camden and Guilford Court House, were lost when the supposed­
ly unconquerable militiamen fled, and some commanders, such 
as Daniel Morgan at Cowpens, placed them in advanced posi­
tions with federal troops, or Continentals as they were 
called, in the rear to prevent any unplanned r u n - a w a y . ^ l
^^From quotations contained in Hugh Jameson, "The 
Organization of the Militia of the Middle States during the 
War for Independence" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, 
of History, University of Michigan, 1936), 233-34. Here­
after cited as Jameson, "Militia of the Middle States."
20Otis G. Hammond (ed.), Letters and Papers of Major- 
General John Sullivan. Continental Army (Concord. 1930-39). 
Ill, 392-93.
^General Nathaniel Greene used similar tactics with 
considerably less success at Guilford Court House.
14
Furthermore, militiamen seem to have been born deserters, 
and the American armies melted away like the snows of winter 
whenever farm tasks became urgent, camp life grew monotonous, 
or battles approached.
In addition, the rationale used to demonstrate the 
superiority of the militia in the battles upon which its 
reputation rested was faulty. The failure of the British 
regulars at the Monongahela did not result from their inade­
quacies but from the faults of their leader. General Braddock 
did not understand the principles of wilderness warfare, and 
he obstinantly refused to be enlightened. In the retreat 
from Lexington and Concord the British troops marched stoic­
ally through what amounted to one great defile some sixteen 
miles in length, withstood a heavy running fire from unseen 
marksmen almost the entire distance, and never completely 
lost their discipline.^2 This remarkable performance went 
unnoticed in the general applause given the wraiths who had 
sniped at them from the cover of woods, hedges, rocks, and 
houses. At Bunker Hill the blame again rested on the^British 
commander, who threw away his men in hopeless frontal attacks 
on prepared positions.
^^he column of Colonel Francis Smith, which made 
the march to Lexington and Concord and which bore the brunt 
of the initial American onslaught, broke formation; but it 
was attempting to re-form under heavy American fire and the 
threats of its officers when Earl Percy’s relieving troops 
arrived. After Percy assumed command, the combined force 
never faltered though the American action continued unabated. 
Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, ed. John R.
Alden (New York, 1952), I, 44-50.
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These facts were not lost upon some critics, partic­
ularly military leaders and observant civilians connected 
with the army. As a result a body of opinion that had no 
illusions regarding the militia developed early in the Revo­
lution, Washington himself did not hide his disgust with the 
over-all performance of the militia when he commented,
We must . . .  on every exigency have recourse to the 
Militia, the consequences of which, besides weakness and 
defeat in the field, will be double or treble the neces­
sary expense to the public. . . . they are commonly 
twice as long in coming to where they are wanted and re­
turning home, as they are in the field; and must of 
course for every days real service receive two or three 
days pay, and consume the same proportion of provisions.
On another occasion he stated that he had never witnessed "a
single instance than can countenance an opinion of Militia
24or raw troops being fit for the real business of fighting.”
In 1777 after watching a British force occupy Philadelphia
without a fight, Elias Boudinot, Washington’s "Commissary of
Prisoners," wrote
We have mustered from the whole State /of Pennsylvania^/ 
by exerting every Nerve about 4000 Men, who as soon as a 
Gun was fired within % of a Mile of them would throw 
down their arms & run away worse than a Company of Jersey 
Women. I am Confident one regiment of English Troops 
/regulars/ would drive the best 5000 in the State.
23Letter to the President of Congress, 15 Mar. 1779, 
John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.). The Writings of George Washington 
(Washington, 1931-1944), XIV, 244.
24"Circular to the States," 18 Oct. 1780, Ibid.. XX,
209.
Letter to Elisha Boudinot, 3 Sept. 1777, George 
Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot. Patriot and Statesman. 1740-1821 
(Princeton, 1952), 42-43.
16
General Henry Knox thought that militia would be 
virtually useless in any effort to retake Philadelphia by 
storm. They had already broken before the enemy in two major 
actions, and it was known that "they will not stand within the 
range of a cannon-ball."^^ William Bryan, a North Carolina 
brigadier, disgustedly resigned his commission in April 1779 
because the state’s militia had only "a faint resemblance to 
a military f o r c e . That Bryan had spoken the truth was 
made abundantly clear by the misbehavior of the North Caro­
lina troops at Guilford Court House. The state government, 
humiliated by the incident, finally recognized that its 
troops were something less than invincible and ordered every 
man who had run away during the battle to enlist in the Con­
tinentals for a y e a r . 28
Unfortunately, the group which abjured the fallacious 
beliefs making up the militia myth was always a minority.
The extent to which the majority actually believed the legend 
is not known. One would not think that experienced politic­
ians could have been so thickheaded, but the reasoning proc­
esses of otherwise intelligent men were frequently stultified 
by the inflexible demands of party doctrine. Furthermore,
^^Drake, Knox. 137.
^^From a quotation contained in Allen Nevins, The 
/toerican States During and After the Revolution. 1775-1789 




many officeholders must have recognized the great political 
value of giving lip service to the popular opinion. Washing­
ton, apparently speaking of the people as a whole, thought 
that only the credulous who “easily swallowed every vague 
story in support of a favorite hypothesis" actually believed 
the myth, and a recent writer who has looked into the matter
agrees.29
Another Miasma— Fear of Regulars 
The fear of regular troops was also deeply embedded 
in the historical background of the English people. Perhaps 
it was even older than the War of the Roses in which both 
sides had employed large numbers of mercenaries, a term which 
was to become synonymous with regulars in America. During 
the early period of colonization, the British at home looked 
upon standing troops with particular aversion. The Petition 
of Right of 1628 contained demands that the king refrain from 
quartering soldiers in private homes and that he not declare 
martial law in peacetime. Following the Revolution of 1688 
the Parliament in the Bill of Rights made the raising of 
standing forces illegal without the consent of that body.
The famous Mutiny Act of the same period brought about a 
condition in which the army had to be renewed each year by 
special legislative enactments.
Jameson, "Militia of the Middle States," 235. He 
also quotes Washington’s remark on page 235.
18
By the end of the eighteenth century American states­
men appealed not only to these sanctions and the experiences 
that lay behind them but also to others more distant in time 
and place. History books had been conned for examples show­
ing the dangers and perfidities of standing troops, and from 
the information thus gathered another vast generalization 
had been created. Nothing other than standing armies had 
brought about the demise of virtually every fallen government 
in history. By early Constitutional days states’ rights poli­
ticians looked upon this generalization as being an indisput­
able law of nature.30
Even more important in the formulation of these atti­
tudes was the experience of the colonies themselves. After 
the French and Indian War the British "military office" in 
America had become an enormous agency with long bayonets that 
reached into many important spheres of colonial civil life.
If enforced various unpopular policies of the home govern­
ment, controlled Indian trade, and made recommendations upon 
many matters of a non-military nature, such as the raising 
of funds in the colonies. Indeed the commander in chief be­
gan to outshine the colonial governors in authority and 
31splendor. The colonists could hardly have failed to remark
3^See below page 254-55 (comments of John Randolph).
3^Clarence E. Carter, "The Significance of the Mili­
tary Office in America," in The American Historical Review. 
XXVIII, No. 3 (April, 1923), 475-88 passim.
19
either this growth in the power of the military or the 
threat to civil government that it constituted.
As the break with Great Britain approached, the 
danger of regulars was dramatized by clashes between groups 
of colonials and British troops. One such incident, the 
Battle of Golden Hill, occurred in New York City in January 
1770, Though the soldiers beat off the clubs of the' citizens 
without firing, they had faced the townspeople with arms in
09
their hands. In the Boston Massacre of the same year, the 
redcoats used their muskets, killing five members of a large 
mob. Though agitators had produced the first affray and the 
mob itself the second, these facts were lost in the general 
condemnation of the troops.
In another triumph of bad logic this fear based upon 
experiences with British regulars and upon the troubles of 
other nations going all the way back to ancient Rome was 
rapidly transferred to American regulars. As early as Janu­
ary 1776, Sam Adams, one of the most influential revolution­
ary leaders, wrote that a
standing army, however necessary it may be at some times, 
is always dangerous to the liberties of the people. 
Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a body dis­
tinct from the rest of the citizens. They have their 
arms always in their hands. Their rules and their dis­
cipline is /iic7 severe. They soon become attached to 
their officers and disposed to yield implicit obedience 
to their commands. Such a power should be watched with
^^Nevins, American States. 51-52.
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a jealous eye.^^
The attitude exhibited in statements such as this became a 
keystone of states* rights military policy. In the period 
with which this study is concerned there was, of course, a 
body of contrary opinion. As in the case of the militia 
myth, however, it represented the belief only of a small 
minority. Indeed, not all of those who spoke out against 
the militia were willing to speak in favor of regulars.
The Dual System of the Revolution 
The American colonies had been created separately, 
usually by groups of divergent social, religious, and 
political philosophy, and they had followed separate lines 
of development. Though this provincialism made cooperation 
difficult, the New England colonies, which formed to a 
certain extent a geographic and social entity, had banded 
together for military defense in the New England Confedera­
tion of the seventeenth century. However, British attempts 
at the outbreak of the French and Indian War to enjoin com­
bined action on the part of all the colonies had failed at 
the Albany Conference. In the decade following that war, the 
colonies had been brought closer together by their resistance 
to British commercial restrictions. At the end of this per­
iod they formed the First and later the Second Continental
33Quoted in Merrill Jensen, The New Nation; A 
History of the U. S. During the Confederation. 1781-1789 
(New York, 1950), 29.
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Congress for joint opposition to British rule. These agencies 
had few real powers, but the second served as the central 
governing body during part of the Revolution, It was suc­
ceeded after a few years by the Confederation Congress, which 
was little stronger.
In these inter-colonial governments authority was 
divided between the central congress and the states. On the 
whole the latter were stronger than the former. In the mili­
tary realm they were able to invalidate, usually by failing 
to provide the men, all efforts to create strong federal 
military forces. At the same time American folklore as em­
bodied in the militia myth and the fear of regulars dictated 
that the militia be a part, preferably the predominant ele­
ment, in the armies of the revolt. These factors might have 
led logically to the employment of militia alone, but the 
provincial troops early in the conflict demonstrated their 
inability to carry the load. There was, on the other hand, 
never any question of placing full reliance on regular 
troops.
The original military forces of the Revolution were 
raised and controlled by several of the new state governments, 
if they may be termed that for purposes of simplicity. Fol­
lowing Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts called on its 
New England neighbors for assistance, and they made a deter­
mined effort to embody thirty thousand militiamen. During 
this undertaking swarms of New England troops descended on
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Boston, where the British army waited behind its fortifica­
tions.34 Unfortunately the militiamen soon showed a tendency 
to return home almost as fast as they had come. Under these 
circumstances Massachusetts, pointing out that the troops 
represented several colonies, asked the Congress to take 
c h a r g e . I n  June (1775) that body assumed authority over 
the forces at Boston, took them into its pay, and appointed 
George Washington commander in chief.
On 21 July of the same year Congress authorized 
Washington to enlist his command up to twenty-two thousand 
men. Since recruiting proceeded slowly, the commander in 
chief was forced to order out five thousand militiamen to 
make up deficiencies.3? As enlistments continued to lag 
throughout the year— only sixteen thousand were on the rolls 
and only thirteen thousand present for duty in January 1776—  
he again compensated for the shortage by calling on the 
militia.33 The dual system, having been established in this 
manner, continued in use throughout the war, the federal
Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United 
States (Washington, 1917), 1-2. Hereafter cited as Upton, 
Military Policy.
^^Nevins, American States. 608.
^^Upton, Military Policy. 3.
37lbid., 6.
38Spaulding, United States Army. 39. Upton gives 
the number on the rolls as 10,500 rather than 16,000. 
Military Policy. 10.
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forces being supplemented by levies on the state troops as 
the need arose.
Meantime Congress had taken two additional steps 
that had contradictory effects. In July 1775, anticipating 
the difficulty of keeping the federal army up to strength 
it had recommended to the states that the then completely 
disorganized militia be reconstituted along its original 
lines.39 in October, it had directed that the federal regi­
ments be numbered in a single Continental series^® and placed 
the selection and arrangement of the officers directly under 
the control of Army Headquarters.^^ These moves were appar­
ently intended to emphasize the national character of the 
troops. Thus Congress worked with one hand to preserve the 
militia and with the other to strengthen and further federal­
ize the Continentals. The joint product of both hands tended 
to perpetuate the dual system.
Though the militia was reconstituted, the effort to 
integrate the Continentals rapidly floundered. In December 
1776, with recruiting problems multiplying, it was decided 
that the necessary men might be obtained by appealing to 
provincial interests and loyalties. The Continental regi­
ments were therefore renumbered into state "lines,” and the
^^Upton, Military Policy, 8.
^^Spaulding, United States Army. 39.
^^Upton, Military Policy. 4.
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federal promotion list for officers was abandoned in favor
42of state lists. Under the Articles of Confederation, 
Congress relinquished to the states most of its remaining 
responsibilities relative to the troops. The states were 
thus made responsible for recruiting, arming, and equipping 
the regiments assigned to them. The Congress retained only 
the power to determine the number of men required and to 
assign each state its quota.Washington complained that 
he sometimes did not know whether he was commanding one army 
or thirteen.
The dual system thus comprised quasi-federal troops 
in the Continentals and state troops in the militia. Its 
defects included such weaknesses as the following:
(1) The militia brought in to supplement the Contin­
entals could be held no longer than a few months. As a 
result of these short terms Washington was faced with 
the annual task of disbanding most of one army and rais­
ing most of another. This dangerous process had to be 
accomplished in the presence of the enemy, and it was so 
time consuming that the commander in chief was frequently 
forced to remain inactive for long p e r i o d s .45
(2) The constant arrival and departure of the militia 
was costly and wasteful. A large part of the time two 
separate sets of men had to be kept under pay, one group 
going home and another coming to camp. With the continual
42spaulding, United States Army, 70.
43Article IX.
44washington to John Sullivan, 17 Dec. 1780, Fitz­
patrick, Writings of George Washington, XX, 488.
45upton, Military Policy. 10-12, 14, 18-19. The 
reference quotes Washington and General Nathaniel Greene.
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rotation of troops and the average militiaman’s larcen­
ous fingers, it was virtually impossible to prevent the 
large scale disappearance of muskets and other equip­
m e n t . M e n  seldom stayed in camp long enough to build 
up much resistance to disease, and new arrivals were 
highly susceptible to every kind of garrison illness.47
(3) Though the militia was capable of turning in good 
performances on occasion, its record, as already noted, 
was largely one of inefficiency, desertion, refusal to 
fight, and misbehavior in the face of the enemy. These 
faults were due primarily to lack of training and dis­
cipline.
(4) The militia mobilization system was cumbersome, 
slow, and ineffective. It did not function satisfactor­
ily in a single case out of some eighty-three investi­
gated by one writer,, who estimates that fifty percent of 
the militia population of the Middle States found ways
to avoid service.48
(5) As a result of faulty recruiting policies and 
other factors, the Continentals were almost invariably 
some thirty to fifty percent understrength.49
From the beginning the federal regiments and the militia
were forced to compete for men. The outcome was a bounty
war which finally saw one state giving militia recruits one
thousand dollars in excess of all allowances offered to
Continentals.50 After 1777 Continental soldiers enlisted
for long terms began to desert to the militia to take
4&William Addleman Gance, The History of the United 
States Army (New York and London, 1942), 19.
47upton, Military Policy. 15.
48jameson, "Militia of the Middle States," 134-35,
77-78.
57-58.
49upton, Military Policy. 13, 27, 34, 40, 47-48, 
SOibid., 48.
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advantage of such benefits.51 Aside from the monetary in­
ducements, many, if not most, potential soldiers preferred 
the militia because of its shorter terms and easier discip­
line.^^
The consequences of all this were lost battles, un­
necessarily heavy casualties, and the general disruption of 
life on the home front as the revolving militiamen constantly 
picked up and laid down their workaday occupations. The 
public purse was squandered to little advantage, and the 
waste of manpower was appalling. The United States employed 
from time to time a total of almost four hundred thousand
men to combat British forces that never exceeded forty 
53thousand. Though this comparison does not take into ac­
count British replacements, which would have increased the 
British total, it does indicate that the American military 
requirement was several times that of the enemy.
The Post-War Problem
Three great military lessons were to be found in the 
history of the American armies during the Revolution. The 
first of these was that the dual system had failed, the 
second that the traditional militia organization had fur­





federal troops had proven their superiority. Unfortunately 
these lessons could not be considered apart from their wider 
implications. The over-riding political questions of the 
day were concerned with the division of powers between the 
federal government and the states. Any effort to place com­
plete reliance on federal forces, or even to strike a more 
favorable balance between such troops and the militia, would 
threaten the military rights of the states. Any measure to 
reform the militia by federal action would have the same 
effect.
Thus the entire problem of military policy was thrown 
into the arena of popular politics. Those who favored exten­
sion of the powers of the central government advocated large 
standing forces and the federalization of the militia. The 
anti-nationalists opposed both of these solutions and de­
manded that full reliance be placed on the old, poorly organ­
ized militia. In the resulting Congressional conflicts, the 
regulars and the militia faced each other again and again on 
the uncertain battlegrounds of partisan politics. The effect 
on military legislation was disastrous. Almost every military 
measure that ran the gantlet of Congress was hacked to pieces. 
Only the American love for compromise permitted any to sur­
vive the ordeal, and they came through the line so changed 
that their sponsors hardly recognized them.
Both sides brought forward strong arguments to sup­
port their positions. The anti-nationalists ceaselessly
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referred to the militia myth and the danger of regulars.
The nationalists pointed to the failures of the militia 
during the Revolution and ridiculed the idea that standing 
troops might turn against the government and the people.
But these were not the only factors that influenced the solu­
tion. The chronic lack of funds with which to support mili­
tary forces and the public disinterest in military affairs 
except in time of crisis played important roles. It was 
also necessary to consider and provide for practical military 
needs stemming from the Indian threat and foreign danger.
The study which follows will investigate the attempts 
to solve the problems of military policy during the formative 
period of 1783-1800. It will begin with the immediate post­
war moves to establish an adequate federal army and to reform 
the militia. It will then take up the renewal of these 
efforts in the early Constitutional period with chapters 
being devoted to the regulars and others to the militia. In 
the treatment of the latter the infamous "Uniform Militia 
Act of 1792" will be analyzed in detail. This act poses 
many special problems in itself. Though its rough, trip 
through Congress has been described by Brigadier General John 
M, Palmer, his coverage is relatively b r i e f . T h e  present 
study will attempt to supplement Palmer's pioneer work with 
a broader investigation that will;
54john Macauley Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven,
1941).
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(1) Describe the entire militia reform movement of 
the era both before and after the passage of the act.
(2) Provide as much detail as the limited information 
permits on the legislative history of the act including the 
content of the several antecedant bills, the points of view 
of the two sides in the debates, and the provisions of the 
act as finally passed.
(3) Evaluate the effects of the act on the militia
system.
In the last regard it may be noted that Palmer and other 
writers have assumed that the measure had no practical effect 
whatsoever. Yet no report on the implementation of the 
measure in the laws of the states exists, and much of the 
history of the militia after 1792 is virtually unknown. A 
knowledge of both these subjects is essential to the evalu­
ation of the act itself. In.order to fill in these gaps a 
comparative analysis of the new state laws will be presented 
for what is believed to be the first time. An excursion will 
also be made into the history of the militia as organized 
under these laws, covering such matters as the defense of the 
Southwestern frontier, the crushing of rebellions, and the 
effort to organize the several standby detachments and 
associations of the period.
CHAPTER II 
THE REGULARS UNDER THE CONFEDERATION
As the war drew to a close in the spring of 1783 
Congress found itself forced to face the military problems 
of peace. For awhile these consisted primarily of frontier 
defense, the supposedly imminent occupation of the British 
posts in the Northwest, and the protection of commissioners 
that were to be sent among the Indians. In 1786, as the law 
makers still struggled with these matters, a first class 
crisis that appeared to require the intervention of Congress 
arose in Shays Rebellion. For a moment it seemed that law, 
order, and even government itself, tottered in the balance. 
Meantime, the militias of rival states marched against each 
other in several disputed areas. East Tennessee, The Susque­
hanna Valley, and Vermont.^ While the fighting could hardly 
be called serious, it dramatized the weaknesses and the 
failures of the Confederation.
Under the circumstances, the Congress drifted from 
expedient to expedient. It was clear that military forces
^See below pages 120-24, 128-33.
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were urgently required,but there was a difference of opinion 
as to how they should be raised. Many powerful influences, 
including constitutional reservations, the growing fear of 
standing armies, and the lack of funds, militated against 
the formation of a federal force. On the constitutional 
issue, the states' rights or anti-national bloc denied that 
Congress had the authority to raise its own troops in time 
of peace by demands on the states. The nationalists thought 
that to deny this right was to undermine the very foundations 
of the Confederation, They tried ceaselessly to put through 
bills that would provide a regular army. Indeed, both sides 
viewed every military measure in terms of control. Would it 
leave the ultimate disposition of the troops in the hands of 
the states or the Congress?
Some of the events of demobilization seemed for a 
moment to prove that regular troops were indeed a threat to 
law and liberty, as the anti-nationalists had been preaching. 
During the spring and summer the spirit of mutiny rocked the 
main army at Newburgh, a small scale revolt occurred in 
Philadelphia, and a military order having vaguely aristo­
cratic features was formed throughout the country. The 
greatest of these threats was the Newburgh conspiracy, an 
effort on the part of the officers to force a settlement of 
the half-pay question. Realizing that they must act before 
the army was disbanded, they petitioned Congress to commute 
the half-pay pensions, which had been promised them in the
3 2
dark days of 1778, to lump-sum payments.
As that body hesitated, an anonymous writer in the 
famous Newburgh addresses suggested that the officers meet 
to consider measures to carry their appeal from "the justice 
to the fears of government." As events developed more than 
one citizen must have thought that there was indeed a lion 
inside the soldier*s clothing. The letters were thought to 
be part of a plot to overturn the government, and it was 
rumored that the officers intended to establish a military 
dictatorship. With fears mounting, Washington by adroitly 
seizing control of the meeting, which was held on 15 March 
1783, neutralized the danger. A week later. Congress, thor­
oughly frightened, passed a commutation act.^
Though the conspiracy was settled peacefully, it re­
inforced fears of violent action by the discontented soldiery 
of the main army.^ Their pay had long been in arrears, and 
a settlement would have to be made immediately because they
2one of the most complete accounts of the Newburgh 
conspiracy is contained in Louis Clinton Hatch, The Adminis­
tration of the American Revolutionary Army (New York, 1904), 
142-178, and the "addresses" are reproduced therein on pages 
197-209. Hereafter cited as Hatch, Revolutionary Army. The 
commutation act may be found in Worthington C. Ford and 
Gaillard Hunt (eds.), Journals of the Continental Congresses. 
1774-1789 (Washington, 1904-37), XXIV, 206-210, under date of 
22 March 1783. Hereafter cited as W. C. Ford and Hunt, JCC.
O
For an example of the apprehensions that were felt 
see letter of The North Carolina Delegates to the Governor 
of North Carolina, 1 Aug. 1783, E. C. Burnett (ed.). Letters 
of Members of the Continental Congress (Washington, 1921-36/, 
VII, 246-47. Hereafter cited as Burnett, Letters.
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were clamoring for immediate discharge from the service.
While everyone wondered where the necessary money was coming 
from, Washington warned the men he would tolerate no disorder, 
directed each brigade to post special guards, and began as­
signing only general officers as officer of the day, a task 
performed in the past by field officers. As the discontent 
increased there were several incidents so serious that the 
participants were tried for mutiny or wilful disobedience of 
orders, convicted, and sentenced to a hundred lashes each.^
A few moments before the cauldron exploded, the prob­
lem was settled by half-measures that played upon the over­
whelming desire of the men to return home. The “war men" 
were permitted to leave the Army with the understanding that 
their furloughs would become discharges as soon as the war 
ended officially. On their departure from camp, they were 
given three months pay in six months certificates and promised 
the remainder later. “The Financier," Robert Morris, hardly 
got this pittance delivered to Newburgh in time. As a 
special mark of the favor of Congress, the men were permitted 
to take their arms with them.^ This concession greatly
^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 22 Apr. 
1783, John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.). The Writings of George Wash­
ington (Washington, 1931-1944), XXVI, 350-51; General Orders, 
Apr. 16, Apr. 18, Apr. 22, May 11, May 17, 1783, Ibid.. 327, 
336, 354, 424, 439-40.
^General Orders, 2 and 6 June 1783, Ibid.. 463-64, 
471; Washington to the Superintendent of Finance, 3 June 
1783, Ibid.. 466-67.
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alarmed some observers. Colonel John Land wrote Governor 
George Clinton of New York that "such a number of Old Veter­
ans (whose minds are much soured) turned loose, with arms in 
their hands, and under no restraint will doubtless become a 
great terror, to the inhabitants.”^ This point may have re­
ceived recognition in the decision to march the men back to 
their states in organized groups under the control of of­
ficers. The "three year men," who could not claim discharge, 
were kept on as the only force in being.
The mutiny of the Pennsylvania recruits in June was 
a reminder of what could have happened on a large scale at 
Newburgh. Some eighty new soldiers, angry because their pay 
was long overdue and desiring a settlement of accounts, 
marched from Lancaster to Philadelphia, where they were 
joined by about two hundred soldiers from the garrison. Sur­
rounding the state house, where both Congress and the state 
executive council were meeting, they sent a curt note to the 
latter threatening "to instantly let in these injured soldiers 
upon you" if their demands were not met within twenty minutes. 
Congress, after being forced to look for several hours at 
fixed bayonets and guarded doors, departed precipitately for 
Princeton. The revolt was finally quelled without bloodshed 
when the council called for the militia and the Congress
^Hugh Hastings (ed.). Public Papers of George Clin­
ton. First Governor of New York, 1777-95. 1801-04 (Albany. 
1904), VIII, 163, Hereafter cited as Hastings, Clinton 
Papers.
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ordered Washington to send a large force of veterans from 
the main army
When dangers of armed intervention faded with the 
disbandment of the army, many fastened their fear of the 
military on the Society of the Cincinnati. This organization 
of army officers had appeared during the days of the Newburgh 
conspiracy. Though it was partly fraternal and partly chari­
table, its rules provided for the transmission of membership 
by primogeniture. This feature and the known nationalistic 
orientation of the officers immediately brought it under 
violent attack. Many feared that it would result in a mili­
tary aristocracy, that it would be used to force a change in 
the form of government, and that it would serve as an agency 
to press the financial demands of the members. Though the 
first two of these fears were greatly exaggerated if not en­
tirely groundless, the third probably had some basis in fact. 
The general condemnation forced the officers to abandon the 
hereditary feature, but the society continued to excite ap­
prehension and suspicion for years.®
^Hatch, Revolutionary Army. 181-87; Emory Upton, The 
Military Policy of the United States (Washington, 1917), 64. 
Hereafter cited as Upton, Military Policy.
Bjohn Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the 
United States (New York, 1901-14), I, 167-76; Merrill Jensen, 
The New Nation; A History of the United States During the 
Confederation 1781-1789 (New York, 1950), 261-62. Hereafter 
cited as Jensen, New Nation. Contemporary opinion of the 
Cincinnati may be found in Elbridge Gerry to Stephen Higgin- 
son, 13 May 1784, Burnett, Letters, VII, 522; Henry Knox to
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That the threats of 1783 strengthened the fear of 
regulars and affected military legislation for years, there 
can be no doubt. The most dramatic proof of this is to be 
found in the debates prior to the army reduction of April, 
1787. At that time, the lack of funds with which to pay the 
troops recalled the dangers of 1783. In urging the reduction 
Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, pointed out this fact, 
and it became a primary consideration in the passage of the 
measure.9 The unfair treatment that the army had received 
in pay matters during both the war and the demobilization does 
not appear to have materially affected the reaction against 
it. Only a few "army men," such as Alexander Hamilton and 
General Henry Knox, attempted to excuse the mutinous activity 
and related excesses.
The continuing lack of funds played a determinative 
role in the military policy of the Confederation to the end.
It was urged time and again as a reason for not raising regu­
lars or for raising fewer than were needed. David Howell, a 
Congressman from Rhode Island, wrote in April 1784 that "the
Washington, 19 Mar. 1787, Francis S. Drake, Life and Corres­
pondence of Henry Knox. Major General in the American Revo­
lutionary Army (Boston. 1873). 148. hereafter cited as Drake, 
Knox; Jefferson's "Observations on Demeunier’s Manuscript," 
Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
(Princeton, 1950-56), X, 49-51. An interesting retrospect 
view is contained in General John Cochrane, "The Centennial 
of the Cincinnati," American Historical Register. IV, No. 3 
(May 1796), 276-284. The writer alleges that the order was 
"designed to counteract the influences of the treasonable 
cabal" of the officers at Newburgh.
^See below page 81.
37
plans for a peace establishment are contracting to a less 
scale as the prospect of a Continental impost v a n i s h e s . "10 
In 1785 recruiting was suspended because no money was avail­
able, and in 1787 the failure of the states to meet a special 
requisition for funds elicited Pinckney's comparison with 
conditions in 1783 and the subsequent reductions, as mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph. Much of the time Congress was 
far from able to support the small force it kept in the Ohio 
country. In the summer of 1786, for example, when these 
troops were destitute of stores, the Board of Treasury was 
unable to meet the Secretary at War’s urgent application for 
one thousand dollars to send ammunition.
The efforts of the nationalists to shore up the shaky 
financial understructure were unsuccessful but they warrant 
examination because of the role the army itself played.
Their scheme called for the establishment of an income for 
Congress that would be independent of the doubtful largess
of the states and for the assumption of the public debt by
1 9the Union. In the spring of 1783 they revived in a new 
form the once defeated plan for import:taxes as a means of 
providing the income. After the measure had been pushed
lOfetter to Deputy Governor of Rhode Island, 12 Apr. 
1784, Burnett, Letters, VII, 492-93.
^^Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, 18 June 1786, Ibid.. 
VIII, 393.
l^Hamilton to Washington, 9 Apr. 1783, Ibid., VII,
129.
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through Congress, they urged the army to join with other 
public creditors in working for its success in the states.
As Gouverneur Morris outlined the strategy in a cynical let­
ter to Knox, "The army may now influence the Legislature and 
if you will permit me a metaphor from your own profession 
after you have carried the post the public creditors will 
garrison it for y o u . A t  one stage Hamilton thought that 
fears of overt action by the army might force the states 
toward favorable d e c i s i o n s . I n  view of the dissatisfaction 
at Newburgh at the time this point might have impressed many.
The sword, as in most cases, had two edges. In the 
states, particularly in New England, the very fact that the 
measure might benefit the officers aroused opposition. It 
was thought that they had in effect extorted both the half­
pay and the commutation from a reluctant Congress. Massa­
chusetts for the moment declared herself opposed to the tax 
on the basis that she disapproved the acts.15 she finally 
came around as did all states except Rhode Island. The lack 
of the single ratification, of course, caused the failure of 
the measure.
Although anti-nationalist sentiment predominated for 
a while, it met a serious challenge in the military counter-
l^Letter of 7 Feb. 1783, Ibid.. VII, 34-35.
l^Hamilton to Washington, 17 Mar. 1783, Ibid.. 87.
l^Hatch, Revolutionary Army. 193-94.
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part of the forces that were gradually pushing the states 
toward Alexandria, Annapolis, and Philadelphia. The inability 
of the states to protect their frontiers, to cope with domes­
tic disturbances, and to provide themselves with military 
supplies led to demands for federal assistance. In 1785 the 
problems of frontier defense finally produced a few regulars 
for use in the Northwest, where land sales were soon to be 
opened. Congress, however, hardly able to support this small 
force, did little to assist Virginia in the defense of Ken­
tucky or Georgia in her constant squabbles with the Creeks,
In 1787 it refused to take action on a Georgia resolution 
that would have obligated the Union to punish Indians making 
war on any of the s t a t e s . T h i s  difference in treatment 
between sections can be attributed to the fact that the Union 
owned the land in the Northwest and the states owned it in 
the South,
There were two primary examples of the need for 
federal aid during insurrections, Shays Rebellion in Massa­
chusetts and the troubles in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, 
in 1788. Although Congress had neglected the requests for 
frontier protection, it did all in its power to assist 
Massachusetts safely through the Shays crisis.Unfortun­
ately its efforts were unsuccessful, and the insurgents were
^^See below pages 88-89,
l^See below pages 66-84.
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finally put down by state troops. In the Luzerne riots, 
which were an outgrowth of the new state movement in the 
Wyoming Valley, Congress ordered that a detachment of Con­
tinental troops detour through the area on their march to 
the West, When they got as far as Easton, they found that 
the state had been able to disperse the rioters.
Requests to borrow arms, supplies, and equipment were 
continually received by Congress. Between 1785 and 1787 
South Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Massachusetts 
applied for artillery, Georgia for cavalry small arms and two 
small field pieces, and Virginia for various stores to be 
used in the West. After approving South Carolina's request, 
which was the first received. Congress decided that further 
dispersion of its meager supplies would adversely affect the 
public safety and urged the states to procure their own 
equipment. The Secretary at War refused even to recommend 
the sale of the needed material to Virginia. However, the 
frontier danger in Georgia became so serious that Congress 
broke its own rule in that single case.^^
The Best Laid Plans (1783)
Though the time, tense with the apprehensions already
1 A
See below pages 125-26.
C. Ford and Hunt, TO, XXVIII, 352-53, 395-96; 
XXIX, 805-06, 808, 867-68; XXXII, 137-39; XXXIII, 530-31. 
Massachusetts Resolves 1786 June Sess., 19. The Virginia 
Delegates to the Governor of Virginia, 24 Dec. 1786 and 
19 Feb. 1787, Burnett, Letters. VIII, 524-25, 543.
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described, was less than propitious, Congress began thinking 
of a military peace establishment in the spring of 1783. It 
was natural that Hamilton’s special committee, which had been 
set up to investigate the matter, should have requested 
Washington’s suggestions.^0 After consulting with several 
of his officers, the commander in chief on May 2 submitted 
his famous "Sentiments on the Peace Establishment."^ Al­
though this document and the final plan of the committee 
preserved the dual system with both of its components, the 
regular force and the militia, discussion of the latter will 
be reserved for a later chapter.
Washington approached the question of regulars with 
caution that reflected his understanding of the public tem­
per. A large standing army in time of peace, the "Sentiments" 
declared, "hath ever been considered dangerous," Fortunate­
ly, it continued, our requirements for such a force were not 
great because of our distance from Europe. All we needed 
were men sufficient to garrison the frontier posts, to guard 
the public magazines, and to prevent surprise attack. Four 
regiments of infantry and one of artillery, the total strength
^^Hamilton to Washington, 9 Apr. 1783. Burnett, 
Letters. VII, 131-32.
^^The "Sentiments" may be found in Fitzpatrick, The 
Writings of George Washington. XXVI, 374-98.
^^ee Chapter III.
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being 2631 men, would be sufficient for these purposes.
That this force constituted the absolute minimum 
necessary to perform the several missions is clear from 
Washington's suggestions as to its disposition. The infantry 
would be scattered in some twenty small detachments down the 
Ohio and along the great wilderness line that formed the 
northern, western, and southern frontiers. No posts, not 
even those in the most dangerous Indian country, would con­
tain more than two hundred men, and half would be garrisoned 
with thirty or less. The artillery would be utilized to re­
inforce the several detachments with firepower as might be 
required, to garrison West Point, the most important of the 
forts, and to guard the public magazines.
Washington no doubt anticipated that even this
miniscule and divided force would rouse the doctrinaires to
instant and vociferious objection. Nevertheless it is hard
to see how it could conceivably pose a threat to liberty and
the public safety. The posts were so widely separated and
the travel so difficult that Washington himself said two
general officers would be required to carry out the. necessary 
25inspections. It might be added that these two unfortunates 
would never be at rest from their journeys.






He also recommended the establishment of three 
arsenals, one each in the Southern, Middle, and Eastern 
States, and the formation of military academies at engineer 
and artillery posts. These would not only train officers 
for the two special branches but would also supply replace­
ments to fill vacancies in the infantry. He was not certain 
whether it would be possible, presumably for financial 
reasons, to establish manufactories and laboratories at the
moment. If not, he suggested that the arsenals be equipped
Of\
to repair arms and equipment and to cast cannon.
On 18 June the committee submitted its own report 
which recommended a slightly larger force of regulars than 
Washington had s u g g e s t e d . i t  also contained a closely 
reasoned exposition of the right of Congress to raise and 
maintain its own military forces in time of peace. This was 
directed at the constitutional scruples of the anti-nation­
alists who had seized upon a somewhat vaguely worded clause 
in the Articles to demonstrate the opposite. Though the 
clause may seem clear enough today, Hamilton and the com­
mittee no doubt realized that no national force was likely 
to be voted as long as their opponents clung to their forced 
construction of its meaning. The exposition itself is a
^ Ibid.. 395-98.
C. Ford and Hunt, JÇÇ, XXV, 722-45. The text 
of the report is entered under 23 Oct., the day on which it 
was considered.
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typical Hamiltonian plea for nationalism, and though restrict­
ed to the field of defense it may well represent one of the 
more significant constitutional analyses of the era.
The exposition first raised the constitutional issue, 
then disposed of it at length, and finally urged the practi­
cal advantages of a national force on the assumption that 
such was entirely legal. The constitutional argument devolved 
around the fourth clause of the sixth Article which precluded 
the states from maintaining forces in time of peace except 
with the permission of Congress. This clause, the report 
said, should not be loosely interpreted to mean that the 
states alone were responsible for defense in peacetime. In­
deed the reverse was true, for the clause actually placed 
restrictions on the states. Its purpose was to prevent their 
maintaining forces which might in the opinion of Congress 
disturb the tranquility of the Union. On the other hand it 
did not contain a single word which was "directory to the
OO
United States" with regard to the maintenance of forces.
The report then pointed out that a subsequent clause, 
the fifth in the ninth Article, specifically empowered 
Congress to raise and keep up such troops as it thought 
necessary. This second clause, which was general in nature, 
was not restricted by any mention of war and peace. However, 
for the sake of further elucidation, let the two clauses be
^^Ibid.. 723.
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interpreted to mean that the Union would be responsible for 
the armed forces in time of war and the states in time of 
peace. Such an interpretation would not permit the Union to 
create an army until after the need for one had already 
arisen. In view of the long period of training required to 
whip recruits into shape, it could not be assumed that the 
intent of the Articles was so improvident. When this is ad­
mitted it follows that Congress is at liberty to raise and 
maintain such forces as it judges "requisite for the Common 
safety." This principle being so important to the national 
welfare, the Congress should put aside any doubts as to the 
meaning of the first clause unless a majority of the states
on
should follow a different interpretation.
Having shown that the central government had the 
authority to maintain troops, the report then amassed an 
imposing array of reasons that it should do so rather than 
leave affairs in the hands of the states. Certain aspects 
of the defense problem that were national in character, such 
as the protection of lands lying outside the original claims 
of any state, required national forces. If the frontier 
fortifications were to form a mutually supporting system, 
they should be planned by a central agency, If defense were 
left to the states, those with large western claims would 
necessarily keep up large forces and others little or none.
^%bid.. 723-24.
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In effect this would confide "the safety of the whole to a 
part," which would be unable to afford as many troops as the 
common welfare might require. Large forces in the hands of 
a few states might also by arousing the apprehensions of the 
remainder destroy the harmony of the Union. A single estab­
lishment would be cheaper than thirteen separate establish­
ments. Finally the commander in chief, the secretary at war, 
and other experienced officers who had been consulted recom­
mended that the establishment be placed under the national
government.30
The committee’s plan for the regular army reflected 
the nationalism of the exposition, a firm knowledge of the 
lessons of the Revolution, and relatively advanced military 
thinking in certain other respects. The force should con­
sist, the report said, of four regiments of infantry and a 
corps of artillerists and engineers with a total strength of 
3034 officers and men. In order to avoid the well-remembered 
pitfalls of short enlistments, the men should be enrolled for
six years service with the provision that they serve to the
31end of any war occurring within their term.
The force should be raised directly by the central 
government rather than by the states as had been the practice,
30lbid.. 724-25.
3^Ibid.. 725-27, 732-33, 738. The corps of artiller­
ists and engineers would be known as the Corps of Engineers 
and would consist of a regiment of artillery and a corps of 
artificers.
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The proposed method would eliminate the difficulties in ap­
portioning the officers and filling vacancies which had 
existed under the old system. It would also end the practice 
whereby the states in competing for enlistments raised the 
price of men by offers of bounties and extra pay. It would 
thus be cheaper and the United States would not have to pay 
for extravagance or mismanagement over which it had no con­
trol.^2
From a technical point of view the most advanced 
proposal concerned mobilization. The companies would con­
tain 64 privates with the understanding that they be re­
cruited to 128 in time of war. When this occurred, the
number of officers and sergeants would remain the same but
33the corporals would be doubled. This solution to the 
transition from peace to war constitutes a very close ap­
proach to the concept of "the expansible standing army" 
advanced by John C. Calhoun some forty years later. The 
chief difference lies in the fact that under the committee’s 
plan the general staff would be dispensed with in peacetime. 
Under Calhoun’s plan its existence in peace was considered 
essential to the efficient expansion of the troops when war 
came.




such forts, arsenals, and arms manufactories as might be 
required. While it opposed the establishment of military 
academies as such, thus going counter to Washington's judg­
ment, it suggested that professors of mathematics, chemistry, 
natural philosophy, and drawing be attached to the corps of 
artillerists and engineers. The infantry, it thought, would 
acquire military knowledge best in the actual performance of 
its duties. According to the estimate, the expense of the 
complete establishment in peacetime would be $359,530 per 
year from which might be subtracted $131,950 representing 
the materiel produced by the manufactories. The net cost 
would therefore be $227,580 a n n u a l l y .^4
This important report was not called up at once for 
a variety of reasons, including its unpalatable taste in some 
mouths, the thinness of representation in Congress, and cir­
cumstances connected with the move to Princeton.Meantime, 
the nationalists, who needed all the assistance they could 
get, moved that Congress invite Washington to Princeton in 
order to obtain his further advice in the matter. Though the 
opposition of Rhode Island forced them to delete any mention 
of the purpose of the invitation, they got the resolution
34ibid.. 738, 732-33, 740.
^^See Hamilton to George Clinton, 27 July 1783, 
Burnett, Letters. VII, 238, re the thinness of representa­
tion. The report was left in Philadelphia by mistake and 
was not reclaimed until 11 Aug. Charles Thompson to the 
President of Congress, 11 Aug. 1783, Ibid.. 256 footnote.
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t h r o u g h , A  few days later they won a more complete victory, 
despite the resistance of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, 
when Congress agreed to a special committee to discuss the 
subject with the commander in chief during his visit.
When the General was received by the body on 26 
August, the mien of the President might have given observers 
some premonition as to the immediate future of the peacetime 
army, for "Boudinot, remaining seated and wearing his hat, 
to indicate the preeminence of the civil power, made a short 
address . . , after the manner of a speech from the T h r o n e .  
However, the address, which had been prepared by the commit­
tee, consisted of congratulations and the expression of a 
desire that Washington confer with the committee.^9
The next day Theoderick Bland of Virginia moved that 
Congress resolve itself into a committee of the whole to 
consider the extent of its powers with respect to a peacetime 
establishment. The Rhode Islanders immediately attempted to 
shift the emphasis of the inquiry to the question of whether 
Congress had any such powers at all. Their amendment and a
36w. C. Ford and Hunt, JCÇ, XXIV, 452; President of 
Congress to Washington, Burnett, Letters. VII, 243; B. C. 
Steiner, Life and Correspondence of James McHenry. Secretary 
of War under Washington and Adams (Cleveland. 1907). 56-57.
3?W. C. Ford and Hunt, XXIV, 492-96.
38ceorge Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot. Patriot and 
Statesman (Princeton, 1952), 131-32.
39lhe speech and Washington’s reply are in W. C.
Ford and Hunt, C^, XXIV, 521-23.
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subsequent motion by Hugh Williamson of North Carolina that 
the house simply take up the question of the peace establish­
ment were both lost. Although many states split their votes 
on the first of the two roll calls, the second showed the 
New England States opposing the motion and the Southern and 
Middle States favoring it.^O It will be noted that a vote 
against the second motion was to some extent a vote against 
federal action and vice versa.
Further action was slow and indecisive. On 10 
September the special committee presented a report that con­
sisted primarily of Washington’s comments on the plan of 17 
June. He compared it with his own, concluded that the two 
would cost about the same, and agreed that the states should 
transfer their rights regarding appointment and promotion of 
officers to Congress. No discussion ensued and for the time 
being Congress turned to other business. Finally the commit­
tee dusted off the report and presented it again on 23 
October. After a long discussion the committee of the whole 
agreed to the principle that the United States should main­
tain "some garrisons" in time of peace. This auspicious 
start unfortunately led to nothing. The committee spent the 
next day in further talk, obtained leave to sit again, and 
then used the time set aside for this purpose in making ar­
rangements for the reception of the Dutch ambassador.
40lbid.. 524-26.
41lbid.. XXV, 548-51, 722-45.
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Perhaps the basic cause for the failure of the plan 
lay in the constitutional objections it had aroused. Congress 
seemed to face a problem that was insoluble under existing 
circumstances. If it interpreted the military provision of 
the Articles in its own favor, as James Madison wrote, it 
would increase the "paroxism of jealousy” that existed in the 
states,42 This jealousy was directed against any measure 
that would tend to strengthen the federal government, and 
many viewed the army as part of a general program directed 
toward this end, Stephen Higginson, a delegate from Massa­
chusetts, no doubt expressed popular opinions when he com­
mented that:
There are those among us who wish to keep up a large 
force, to have large Garrisons, to increase the navy, 
to have a large diplomatic Corps, to give large Sal­
aries to all of Our Servants, Their professed view is 
to strengthen the hands of Government, to make us re­
spectable in Europe, and I believe, they might add to 
divide among Themselves and their Friends, every place 
of honour and proffit,43
Though Hamilton had disposed of the constitutional question 
on the narrow ground of the military clauses, his cold logic 
made little impression upon attitudes that were essentially 
emotional. The opponents of the plan maintained their con­
stitutional scruples and continued to parade their tender
42Letter to Edmund Randolph, 17 June 1783, Burnett, 
Letters. VII, 190,
4^Letter to Samuel Adams, 20 May 1783, Ibid,, 167,
See also Clinton to Washington, 14 Oct, 1783, Hastings, 




However, the opposition was by no means limited to 
such objections. Both in Congress and out many had "an 
unconquerable aversion" to anything resembling a standing 
army in peace.45 Some thought the expense would be too 
great, a sentiment particularly strong in New England, where 
the question of commutation was causing such an uproar. Many 
of the landless states did not wish to help pay for the pro­
tection of settlements on lands wrongfully claimed, so they 
thought, by other states.4& Even Washington's intervention, 
which actually began with his plea for nationalism in the 
famous circular letter of 8 June 1783,47 probably hurt as 
much as it helped. If he lent the "Sunshine" of his name to 
the plan, wrote David Howell, it would be evidence that the 
greatest man in the world was "but a man."48
^^See, for example, Samuel Holten to Samuel Adams,
14 Aug. 1783, and David Howell to Thomas C. Hazard, 26 Aug. 
1783, Burnett, Letters, VII, 263; VIII, 842.
45samuel Osqood to John Adams, 14 Dec. 1783, Ibid., 
VII, 415.
4&David Howell to Thomas C. Hazard, 26 Aug. 1783, 
Ibid., VIII, 842.
47ihe letter, which called for the adoption of "a 
proper Peace Establishment" among other things, may be 
found in Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington, V, 
483-96. For its unfavorable reception in Virginia see the 
footnote on page 491 thereof.
48Letter to Thomas C. Hazard, 26 Aug. 1783, Burnett 
Letters, VIII, 842-43. The citation also includes a denunci­
ation of the circular letter.
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Another Struggle on the Constitutional Question
By the following spring the need for some solution 
to the problem had become more urgent. It seemed likely 
that garrisons might have to be sent to take over the fron­
tier posts held by the British at almost any time, and men 
would certainly be required to protect the commissioners 
planning to visit the Indians in the Northwest. Most of the 
troops retained in service, less than seven hundred at Fort 
Pitt and West Point, were Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
men engaged during the war at twice the Continental pay.
If they were kept on. Congress out of fairness to those two 
states would have to assume the extra expense, an action 
which it had so far refused to take. Meantime, the enlist­
ments of many of the men would soon expire in any event.
Those who wanted to establish a federal army found 
little to encourage their hopes. Hamilton, Madison, and 
other nationalist leaders were no longer in Congress, and 
fears of constitutional infringements and regular armies 
continued to hang like a black cloud over New England. To 
make matters worse, a new champion of the rights of the 
states, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, appeared out of all 
this darkness to bring light to the halls of Congress. With 
two states, Delaware and Georgia, absent the nine votes re­
quired to pass military measures seemed impossible of attain­
ment, and a new complication had arisen in the changed
54
attitude of New York.
The State was engaged in two land controversies of
long standing, one involving western territory also claimed
by Massachusetts and the other the Hampshire Grants, where
the Vermonters were attempting to form a separate state. In
order to occupy these areas, or at least the first of them.
New York had in 1783 requested Congress to permit it to
49raise five hundred troops. At that time Hamilton, the 
leading New York delegate, by ignoring his instructions had 
prevented the request from affecting action of the peace 
establishment.50 xn 1784, however, the state importuned 
Congress to act on the measure before taking up plans to 
deal with the military problems of the Union itself. It 
also bitterly opposed the interim use of the existing troops 
with their large complement of Massachusetts men to garrison 
the posts because two of them, Oswego and Niagara, lay in 
the first of the disputed areas.51
In contrast to New England, the Southern and Middle 
States preferred to rely upon a federal army rather than the 
militia. With very minor defections, they voted as a bloc
^^Hastings, Clinton Papers. VIII, 108.
^^Hamilton to Clinton, 3 Oct. 1783, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton (Federal ed., New 
York and London, 1904), IX, 388-94.
51Discussions of New York's attitudes may be found 
in Hugh Williamson to James Duane, 8 June 1784, Burnett, 
Letters, VII, 346-47, and in Gerry to Jefferson, 24 Aug. 
1784, Ibid.. 587-88.
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on each question, achieving much more unity than the New 
England group. Their leadership appears to have been con­
centrated in the Southern delegations and included such men 
as James Monroe of Virginia, Jacob Read of South Carolina, 
and Hugh Williamson of North Carolina. They took the posi­
tion that the right of Congress to raise troops was explicit 
and that it could not be given up without endangering the 
Union.
On 6 April a special committee consisting of Gerry, 
Howell, Ephriam Paine of New York, and Arthur Lee and John 
Francis Mercer of Virginia, presented a report that con­
tained two main recommendations. Preparations should be 
made to occupy the posts with 350 of the troops in service 
as an interim measure, and 896 men should be raised for 
three years to replace them in the garrisons and to carry 
out other frontier duties. The states should "furnish" the 
new men according to quotas levied on each. Though the 
terminology of the report was not specific, it was obviously 
based on the assumption that Congress had the power to demand 
or requisition troops in peacetime.
The report must have surprised those who were not 
accustomed to seeing a cannon set off without any powder. 
Howell had been the arch foe of federal armies in the last
52williamson to the Governor of North Carolina,
30 Sept. 1784, Ibid.. 594.
53w. C. Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXVI, 201-07.
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session, and Gerry was to play the same role in the present 
one. Lee and Mercer had never been known as either national­
ists or army men, and Paine placed his state’s request for 
troops first. Howell and Mercer, however, appear to have 
moderated their views as indicated by their subsequent atti­
tudes,^^ and Lee, who was a member of the Indian commission, 
may have found his own skin of more concern than his scruples. 
These three, of course, constituted a majority of the commit­
tee .
The report was taken up on 25 May, and after some 
twenty roll call votes action was finally completed on 3 June. 
Proceedings were frequently interrupted by the efforts of the 
New Yorkers to call up their own measure and by those of 
Gerry and his colleague;Francis Dana to exonerate Massachu­
setts and New Hampshire from the extra expense of their 
troops. The gentlemen from Massachusetts were also prodigal 
with amendments to insure that any troops be raised by 
"recommendation" to the states rather than by "requisition" 
on the states. These two words may require some explanation 
because they reflected the two different constructions of the 
military provision of the Articles. The first implied that 
Congress had no power to exact troops from the states, and 
the second that it did.
During the consideration of the report those favoring
54Howell’s activities will be mentioned in the fol­
lowing pages. Mercer seconded several motions calling for a 
federal force. Ibid.. XXVII, 432-33, 436.
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a federal army presented two milder substitutes for the com­
mittee's plan. The first of these, which was submitted by 
Howell, provided simply for the raising of 450 men for three 
years. This was a compromise proposal in two respects. It 
stood half-way between the 896 men recommended by the commit­
tee and none at all, and since it did not contemplate the 
use of any of the troops in service it eliminated some of 
New York's objections. The second, which was moved by 
Edward Hand of Pennsylvania, differed only in that the number 
of new men was set at 896. A third substitute proposed by 
Monroe was similar to the committee's plan in requiring the 
use of the old troops but called for 700 new men instead of 
896.55
Howell's substitute was the first to be voted upon. 
Dana, a foe of Federal troops regardless of the number, no 
doubt recognized its compromise attractions and the resulting 
possibility of passage. In any event he unsuccessfully moved 
an amendment which would have required Congress to dismiss 
the new men on the request of five states. With the addition 
of only one state. New England could have determined the fate 
of the troops. He need not have gone to this trouble. The 
army bloc at the time intended to hold out for the larger 
number, and New York remained implacable. As a result, the 
plan, which obtained the votes of only New Hampshire,
S5lbid.. 428, 499.
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Connecticut, and Maryland, suffered a perhaps undeserved 
fate. Meantime Hand's proposal also failed for the moment 
on a straight vote between the two blocs with New York join­
ing New England.
On the 26th, Read renewed Hand's resolution,5? but 
the big event of the day was Gerry's doctrinaire attack on 
the whole concept of federal troops. There was a difference 
of opinion in Congress, he said, as to whether that body had 
the authority to requisition troops in time of peace. A 
construction of the Articles permitting the requisition of a 
few men could be logically extended to include any number. 
Such a construction when coupled with the power to borrow 
money would constitute a real danger to the states. The 
standing armies that would result were unrepublican, "danger­
ous to liberties," and "destructive engines for establishing 
despotism." Because of its isolated location the United 
States had no need for such troops. It should instead rely 
on the "well regulated and disciplined Militia" provided by 
the "plan of the Confederation." In any event the power of 
Congress to requisition was so doubtful that the delegates 
should consult their constituents before exercising it. 
Having delivered himself of these inspiring sentiments, he 




the states for the raising of any troops that might be im­
mediately necessary. As soon as he had finished South 
Carolina moved the previous question, which was carried by 
a straight vote of seven to four. Read’s motion was then 
lost when the four New England states were joined by New 
York in voting against it,^8
The plans of the committee and of Monroe calling 
both for the temporary use of the troops in service and for 
the raising of new forces were then considered. The former 
never came to a vote, but the latter was the subject of a 
hot fight that consumed all of one day and part of a second. 
In an apparent effort to make the bill more palatable to 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire the house finally approved 
with only one dissenting vote an amendment favoring those 
states in the matter of the extra pay of their troops.
Though this important concession had been denied many times 
in the past, the two states did not come around. To the 
contrary Gerry found a method to preserve the advantage and 
at the same time dispose of the seven hundred fédérais in 
the bill. Realizing that he could not obtain the nine votes 
necessary to delete the pertinent clause, he simply moved 
that it stand, and thereby placed the burden of the ballot 
on the opposition. The seven hundred men and with them the 
crux of Monroe’s plan fell on the roll call. Though Gerry
58lbid,. 433-35,
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could take only Massachusetts and New Hampshire with him 
against his own motion, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New 
York divided with the result that the army bloc mustered only 
six votes. On the next vote the,first part of the plan, that 
providing for the use of the existing troops, and the pay 
amendment went down together.
With the failure of Monroe’s motion the army men 
apparently decided that nothing could be accomplished. They 
thus joined in a new plan presented in two separate motions 
to discharge the existing troops except eighty to guard the 
stores at Fort Pitt and West Point and to recommend that four 
states, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 
raise a total of seven hundred men from their militia for 
one year’s service. These states were selected because they 
were the "most conveniently situated." Connecticut and New 
York were to furnish 165 men each; New Jersey, 110; and 
Pennsylvania, 260. The plan was opposed only by New Jersey, 
which did not think the terms under which the men were to be 
raised consistent with its militia law, and by New York, in­
tractable to the last.G^ Gerry's victory was not complete, 
however, for the house beat down two amendments relating to
S^Ibid.. 436, 499-502, 512-17, 519-20. 
GOibid., 520, 526-27, 530-31, 538-40. 
Gllbid.. 520-24, 536-40.
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the pay of the New Hampshire and Massachusetts troops.
The defeat of the resolutions which would have pro­
vided a federal army hardly reflected the majority opinion 
of Congress. An analysis of 14 key roll calls in which the 
two sides lined up against each other discloses some inter­
esting facts in this respect. Out of 154 possible votes,
15 were thrown away as the result of divisions in the delega­
tions and 139 were cast. Of the latter, the New England 
position on the several questions obtained 51 and that of 
the army bloc 88. Nor was the vote of New York, which was 
cast twice with New England and eleven times with the other 
side, decisive in a single case. All of this is to say that 
Congress adopted neither Gerry's apprehensions nor his solu­
tion. The latter, however, was forced on it by the voting 
rules of the Confederation. When the army bloc realized that 
it could never obtain the nine votes required, it simply 
bowed to realities. As Hugh Williamson sorrowfully wrote, 
"The minority however would not recede and we had recourse 
to a poor expedient, but the only one remaining, viz; To 
calling on certain States for Militia. The inefficacy and 
expense of this measure may probably give rise to better
ones."63
The solution was probably the worse that could have
G^Ibid.. 520-23. .
6^Letter to the Governor of North Carolina, 30 Sept. 
1784, Burnett, Letters. VII, 594.
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been devised. The experienced troops were not only dis­
charged, but they could not be re-enlisted. Two of the four 
states designated to raise the new men had bitterly opposed 
the plan, and it seemed likely that either or both might 
refuse to raise their quotas. This they could do without 
subjecting themselves to serious criticism, for the law had 
used the fatal word "recommend." Furthermore the force to 
be raised was by no stretch of the imagination a national 
force. Not only was it limited to four states, which had 
been selected because of their proximity to the area of 
operations, but the commander was to be selected not by 
Congress but by Pennsylvania, the state furnishing the 
largest quota.
New York made no effort to raise its quota, and the 
other states delayed in taking measures to provide theirs. 
According to Governor George Clinton, who had been the moving 
force behind New York's drive for its own troops, the recom­
mendation had not been received until after the state legis­
lature had adjourned. Since it was then too late in the 
season (July) for the troops to be used, he had not thought 
the matter urgent enough to call the lawmakers back.^^ In 
mid-August both New Jersey and Pennsylvania passed acts for 
the voluntary enrollment of their quotas, and in October
^^Clinton to Arthur Lee, Richard Butler, and Oliver 
Wolcott (the Indian commissioners), 13 Aug. 1784, Hastings, 
Clinton Papers, VIII, 333.
63
the Connecticut legislature approved measures that Governor 
Matthew Griswold had taken to comply with the recommenda­
tion.^^
A Few Quasi Regulars (1785)
By 1785 plans for the sale of public lands in the 
Northwest had added a new element to the military problem. 
Though Congress expected huge profits, several difficulties 
would have to be removed before the money could be expected 
to pour in. Squatters were already moving on to some of the 
choice lands, to the great peril of the anticipated revenues, 
and the enthusiasm of prospective buyers of cautious mind was 
dampened by the Indian threat. Furthermore, it would be 
necessary to guard the surveyors when they were sent out.
Many thought that the protection of the land from intrusion 
and the settlers and surveyors from tomahawks would require 
a better army than that already in service.Meantime, the 
financial squeeze was becoming more severe, and most of the 
military problems of the previous year continued.
The committee appointed to consider these matters 
went directly to the point in its report delivered late in
^^New Jersey Acts. 1784 Aug. Sess., Chapter XXXVII;
J. T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders (eds.). Statutes at Large 
of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), XI, 354-56; Connecticut, 
Journal of the House of Representatives. 19 Oct. 1784, 169 
(Microfilm Collection of State Records, Library of Congress, 
Connecticut, A l b ,  Reel 2, Unit 4).
66w. C. Ford and Hunt, XXVIII, 88, 223-24.
James Monroe to Jefferson, 12 Apr. 1785, Burnett, Letters, 
VIII, 90.
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February. It set the military requirement at fifteen hundred 
men for three years and recommended that they be raised by 
requisition on all the states.Congress, finding all this 
too much to swallow in one dose, broke the report down into 
several parts. On April 1 it dealt a blow to the hopes of 
the committee by reducing the force to seven hundred. A few 
days later on April 7 it voted down a motion by William 
Ellery of Rhode Island and Rufus King of Massachusetts that 
the troops be raised from the militia as in 1784. Only four 
states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Rhode 
Island, favored the motion.
The most troublesome question, as in the past, con­
cerned the Constitutional issue. This time, however, it was 
solved more on the basis of practical expediency than on that 
of dialectics. It was generally agreed that "requisition” 
was applicable only when exercised on all the states. How­
ever, the probability that the surveyors would soon need 
protection did not permit time to assemble quotas at large. 
Thus the apparent urgency of the situation dictated that the 
men be raised from the four states nearest the area in which 
they were to be employed. This in turn dictated that they 
be raised by "recommendation." Though many of the national­
ists felt that continued neglect might diminish the power of 
"requisition," they were forced to give way to a logic they
&7w. C. Ford and Hunt, XXVIII, 88-89. The




On April 7 and 12 Congress, avoiding the bitter 
battles of 1784, recommended that the four states furnishing 
the militia of that year also furnish the contingent of 1785. 
The same quotas were established, and it was hoped that many 
of the troops in service would continue in the new force. 
Upton refers to the new army as regulars,and indeed they 
were in one very important sense, the long term of enlist­
ment. However, like the Continentals of the Revolution, 
they were raised and officered by the states, and since the 
word "recommended" had been used their very existence de­
pended upon the states.
As in 1784 the states were slow in implementing the 
recommendations. Some of the legislatures not being in 
session, only Connecticut had passed the necessary legisla­
tion by July, and in that month Congress instructed Colonel 
Josiah Harmer, commander of the militiamen of 1784, to use 
his "best endeavors" to keep .in service the Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey men, whose terms were expiring, until their states
^^These problems are discussed in Monroe to Jeffer­
son, 12 Apr. 1785 and Monroe to Madison, /8?/ May 1785, 
Burnett, Letters. VIII, 90, 115-16.
C. Ford and Hunt, JÇÇ, XXVIII, 241, 247-48.
The resolution of 7 April provided that "it be recommended 
to the states hereafter named" to furnish the men. That of 
12 April named the four states.
^^Upton, Military Policy, 69.
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had acted.Pennsylvania finally put a bill through in 
September and New Jersey in late N o v e m b e r . N e w  York ig­
nored the whole affair for the moment. Meantime the lack of 
funds had become so critical that on 2 November Congress re­
quested the states to suspend recruiting until 1 March 1786. 
With all this confusion it may be surprising to learn that 
about four hundred of the men were actually recruited in 1785 
and about 180 in 1786. All except a small detail at West 
Point were marched to the Ohio country.^4
"A Little Rebellion" (1786-87)
In 1786 Congress was driven to uncharacteristically 
strong military measures by a “little rebellion" in Massa­
chusetts. The uprising began in the late summer as debtors 
who had been losing their land by foreclosures devised a 
scheme to save themselves from jail and ruin. Under the 
leadership of Daniel Shays, Luke Day, and others, they fell 
in armed parties upon the courts which had been handing down 
foreclosures against them. Soon several western counties 
were in what appeared open revolt. On 29 August a force 
estimated at fifteen hundred closed the court at North­
hampton. At Worcester a week later a party seized the 
courthouse the night before the justices were to arrive.
'7%. C. Ford and Hunt, jœ, XXIX, 560.
^^Mitchell and Flanders, Statutes at Large of Penn­
sylvania, XII, Chap. 1171, p. 15-16; New Jersey Acts. 1785 
Oct. Sess., 212-13.
74w. C. Ford and Hunt, JCÇ, XXIX, 866; XXXIV, 578.
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At Springfield on 26 September about eleven hundred insur­
gents forced the judges to adjourn after three days of near 
violence. Thereafter the commander of the government forces 
that had been gathered had been forced to release his men as 
a condition to the dispersion of the insurgents. Similar 
"outrages" were repeated at Great Barrington, Cambridge, and 
other places during October and November. In early December 
after again forcing the adjournment of court at Worcester, 
the insurgent leaders planned a march on Boston. The citi­
zens of that city trembled, for it had long since become 
apparent that the uprising was not to be taken lightly. The 
"regulators," as the disaffected preferred to call themselves, 
were composed to a large extent of veterans of the Revolu­
tion, well versed in fighting. Organized into military units 
and wearing sprigs of hemlock in their caps, they had looked 
truly formidable as they paraded on court d a y s . ? 5
The state authorities were able to do little to 
restore justice to its proper dignity. Proclamations did 
not seem to work, and the militia could not be relied upon 
in the affected counties. Much of it was following the rebel 
leaders, and when commanders managed to raise troops their
"^^Excellent accounts of the closing of the courts 
and the entire progress of the rebellion are contained in 
Marion L. Starkey, A Little Rebellion (New York, 1955);
Robert J. Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution 
(Providence, 1954); and Charles Martyn, The Life of Artemas 
Ward. The First Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolu­
tion (New York. 1921).
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loyalty left much to be desired. At Springfield many of 
General William Shepard’s men tore the white cards that 
served as the emblem of government from their caps, replaced 
them with the badges of rebellion, and fell in with the in­
surgents. At Great Barrington one of the justices, testing 
the reliability of his defenders, suggested to General John 
Patterson that the troops favoring the sitting of the court 
line up on the right of the road and those opposing it on 
the left. When the order was given, nearly eight hundred 
out of one thousand men went to the left. Until January the 
government with its forces either unwilling to fight or 
ready to desert seemed to command more snowstorms than 
completely reliable battalions. A nor’easter prevented the 
descent of the insurgents on Boston, and another a few days 
later took a heavy toll of their fortitude as they marched 
back to their homes.
As the intelligence of rebel successes and government 
paralysis began to pour in. Congress gave its imagination 
free rein. Fears that the government of the state, indeed 
all government, might be overthrown, that the very founda­
tions of property might be destroyed, and that British 
"influence" was operating behind the scenes, circulated like
^^Starkey, A Little Rebellion. 29, 39, 59, 80, 104- 
05, 108. Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution. 
144.
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77specters among the delegates. Many of these cloudy 
apprehensions, which would have amazed the insurgents, were 
based on the reports of General Henry Knox, whom Congress 
itself had dispatched to the scene of conflict in late Sep­
tember. Whether or not Knox had misevaluated the seemingly 
modest intentions of the insurgents, he could point to the 
probability of some real trouble at Springfield. This town 
contained the federal arsenal, and the latter in turn con­
tained some seven thousand stands of new small arms, thirteen 
hundred barrels of powder, large quantities of shot and shell, 
and a few field pieces.^8 if the rebels should seize these 
stores, their power and the consequent danger would be im- 
measureably increased.
The defense of the arsenal posed an immediate mili­
tary problem that seemed almost insoluble. Since Congress 
had no troops to send, Knox had arranged with Governor James 
Bowdoin for the use of the local militia, but General 
Shepard's inability to protect the courts had not been re­
assuring. Indeed, it was likely that only the agreement by 
both sides to disband their troops had saved the stores on
7?See, for example, letters from Henry Lee to 
Washington, Oct. 1 and 17, 1786, Burnett, Letters. VIII,
474, 486; and letter from Edward Carrington to the Governor 
of Virginia, 8 Dec. 1786, Ibid.. 516.
"78Joseph Parker Warren, "The Confederation and Shays 
Revellion." The American Historical Review. XI (Oct. 1905- 
July 1906), 44. Hereafter cited as J. P. Warren, "Shays 
Rebellion."
70
that occasion. Meantime, they were unguarded, it being
feared that the raising of a detachment would incite the
79rebels to action. With this heavy care and many general 
misgivings, Knox, Bowdoin, Rufus King, who was one of the 
Massachusetts delegates to Congress, and other state offi­
cials 'met in Boston about 8 October to decide what measures 
should be taken to meet the crisis.
While part of the work of the conference can only be 
conjectured, Knox reported many details to Congress. It was 
agreed, he wrote, that the stores at the arsenal should not 
be removed. To do so would not only require as large a 
force as to protect them in place, but it would also be a 
sign of weakness that would encourage the rebels. At the 
same time, it would be difficult to assemble men to form a 
guard without alarming the insurgents. If the state should 
attempt to raise the force, it would be impossible to preserve 
secrecy in the legislature, which was composed of "a variety 
of characters.” On the other hand, the effort might be 
veiled behind a troop request from Congress. He added that 
five hundred federal troops should be placed at the arsenal 
and recommended that the army be augmented to fifteen hundred
men.80
^^Knox to President of Congress, Sept. 20 and 28 and 
Oct. 3 and 18, 1786, W. C. Ford and Hunt, JÇÇ, XXXI, 675-76, 
698-700, 751-53, 886.
B^Knox to President of Congress, Oct. 8 and 18,
1786; Ibid.. 875, 886-88.
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While this is as far as the Secretary's written 
reports go, it seems almost a certainty that the conferees 
concoted a more detailed plan. They could hardly have 
failed to ask themselves one question: Under what pretext
could Congress request the raising of the troops? Fortunate­
ly the answer was not difficult to find, for it had been 
known since spring that the Indians were growing more hostile 
on the frontiers. In June, Knox had told Congress that fif­
teen hundred men would be required to protect the line from
81Fort Pitt to the Mississippi, and now he undoubtedly had 
all available information on recent developments. King men­
tioned the possibility of an Indian war to Gerry while he was 
in Boston at this time, and on his return to Congress, he 
played an active role in steering the troop request through
on
Congress. It may or may not have been a coincidence that 
the fifteen hundred men Knox suggested in the report were 
precisely the number he had recommended in the summer for 
employment against the Indians.
There is more doubt as to whether the question of 
direct federal intervention was discussed at the conference. 
From beginning to end this matter was treated with great 
caution. It was felt both in Congress and out that a request 
for such assistance should properly originate in the state
B^Knox to President of Congress, 21 June 1786, Ibid., 
XXX, 346-47.
L. Warren, "Shays Rebellion,” 48.
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legislature, Bowdoin for reasons involving both secrecy and 
the temper of the lower house was hesitant to broach the 
subject. In December, apparently long after the fact, Edward 
Carrington of Virginia wrote that the Massachusetts delegates 
had made a verbal application to Congress without the consent 
of the legislature.83 The last body itself did not pass a 
resolution mentioning the matter until February after the 
members sympathetic to the insurgents had been thoroughly 
browbeaten. This measure, forced through the lower house 
only with great difficulty, simply requested the governor to 
inform Congress that the state was successfully suppressing 
the rebellion but that it would count on federal assistance 
in case of any emergency. Apparently some of the resistance 
to the measure came from government supporters who opposed 
federal interference as a matter of principle.84
Soon after his return from the conference, Knox 
prepared new reports for Congress concerning the Indian 
troubles. Almost providentially letters had recently arrived 
from the frontier describing new and greater dangers. Major 
William North, inspector of the federal troops, had written 
on 23 August and again on 15 September concerning conditions 
in Kentucky and impending Indian attacks. Knox submitted 
these letters on 16 October and three days later he sent up
B^Letter to the Governor of Virginia, 8 Dec. 1786, 
Burnett, Letters, VIII, 517.
84j. p. Warren, "Shays Rebellion," 61.
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additional papers from Colonel Harmar, the federal commander. 
The intelligence was truly alarming and might in itself have
justified army increases.
With all these reports concerning the Indians and the 
rebellion before it, Congress faced the crisis with courage 
and resolution that had long been absent from its chambers.
On 20 October, a committee composed of Charles Pettit of 
Pennsylvania, Henry Lee of Virginia, Charles Pinckney, John 
Henry of Maryland, and Melancthon Smith of New York presented 
a dramatic review of the Indian danger. The disaffected 
tribes of the Northwest were gathering in the Shawnee towns 
to form a league against the United States, Their strength 
was expected to reach one thousand fighting men when all the 
dissatisfied groups had been drawn in, and their war parties 
had already begun to move against the settlers. The temper 
of the Indians both in the North and South together with the 
efforts being made by Great Britain and Spain to incite them 
against the United States all pointed to the probability of 
a general Indian war,^^
The committee then recommended that a new force of 
1340 men be raised for three years for the defense of the 
frontier and that it be united with the old troops to form a
C, Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXXI, page 891 footnote. 
The letters from Major North and the Indian danger in gener­
al are discussed in J, P. Warren, "Shays Rebellion," 51-55,
®^W, C. Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXXI, 891-93.
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legionary corps of 2040. According to the quotas suggested 
by the committee, almost all of these Indian fighters would 
be enlisted in New England, Massachusetts would furnish 660, 
almost half of the total; New Hampshire, 260; Connecticut,
180; and Rhode Island, 120. Only the cavalrymen would come 
from other areas with Maryland and Virginia providing 60 
each. With unaccustomed unanimity Congress approved these 
recommendations, and requested the several states concerned 
to raise the troops as rapidly as possible, calling special 
sessions of their legislatures if necessary.8?
The next day the same committee rendered a secret 
report recommending that the new troops be employed in 
Massachusetts. The report first buried the constitutional 
questions involved under the doctrine of necessity. The 
Massachusetts General Court, it said, would undoubtedly 
defeat any effort on the part of the governor to formally 
request federal interposition. However, such interposition 
was necessary to protect the arsenal, put down the insurgents, 
and prevent civil war. Under such circumstances the United 
States was "bound by the confederation and good faith" as 
well as by "friendship, affection, and sound policy" to help 





It was not, however, the report continued, expedient 
that Congress assign such a reason for the raising of the 
necessary troops. Fortunately the intelligence from the 
frontier had provided grounds to authorize the augmentation 
on an entirely different basis, as the committee had recom­
mended the day before. Since the new troops were to be 
raised in the Eastern States, they could easily be used in 
Massachusetts before they were marched to the western coun­
try. In a second show of unanimity Congress agreed to the 
report and placed the matter under injunction of secrecy.^9
It completed this series of bold measures by author­
izing the Board of Treasury to borrow $500,000 to support 
the new troops. In order to stimulate leaders it placed a 
requisition on the states for both the principal and the in­
terest, the quotas to be paid in by 1 June 1787. Then re­
membering its war and postwar experiences with unpaid troops 
it passed a strange resolution that warned the monied class 
not to be dilatory in taking up the loan. Congress had taken 
"the perilous step" of arming men whose fidelity depended 
upon the prompt payment of their wages, it read, only on the 
understanding that the "money-holders in the State of Massa­
chusetts and the other States" would make every effort to
put up the money.90
89Ibid., 896 and footnote on same page.
9°lbid.. 893-94, 896.
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Congress, reflecting the general concern that mili­
tary preparations would cause the insurgents to move, 
apparently intended that the secrecy injunction be strictly 
observed. However, secrecy had its drawbacks and the ruse 
was more or less transparent anyhow. The state governments 
could be expected to act more rapidly in raising the men and 
money if they had full knowledge. Soon the delegates were
leaking the real purpose of the augmentation to their gover- 
91nors. In Massachusetts when Governor Bowdoin went before
the General Court to ask for the troops, he solemnly acted
92out the farce. No one was deceived. The country members
laughed upon learning that the men were to be employed
93against the Indians.^ Even in far off Paris, Thomas Jeffer­
son, though not completely aware of the seriousness with 
which Congress looked upon the rebellion, easily saw through 
the camouflage. It was "a new idea,” he wrote, to raise an 
army in the East for the purpose of fighting the Shawnee in
the West.94
9^See, for example, Charles Pettit to the President 
of Pennsylvania, 23 Oct. 1786, Burnett, Letters. VIII, 491; 
Edward Carrington to the Governor of Virginia, 8 Dec. 1786, 
Ibid.. 517-18.
92j. P. Warren, "Shays Rebellion,” 56.
93Qerry to King, 29 Nov. 1786, Charles R. King (ed.). 
The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King. Comprising His 
Letters. Private and Official. His Public Documents, and His 
Speeches (New York. 1894-1900), I. 197.
94Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, 20 Dec. 1786, 
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. X, 620.
77
Although all states except Maryland soon passed laws 
to raise their men, recruiting got underway slowly. The 
immediate difficulties lay in the lack of money to begin 
enlistments and the inability of Congress to provide the 
required food, clothing, and shelter. Virginia and Connec­
ticut dealt with the first problem by putting up funds them­
selves,^^ and the Massachusetts General Court authorized the 
treasurer to borrow h 2500 for the purpose.97 Rhode Island 
and New Hampshire waited expectantly for the central govern-
go
ment to advance the necessary cash. Meantime the Board of 
Treasury, responsible not only for finding the supplies but 
also for floating the Continental loan, began what was to 
prove a long and fruitless search for willing contractors 
and liberal "money-holders."
In Massachusetts, where the bulk of the troops were 
to be raised, the warpath was strewn with unusually large
95Knox to President of Congress, 12 Feb. 1787, W. C. 
Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXXII, 39; Massachusetts Resolves. 1786 
Sept. Sess., (30 Oct. 1786), 124-26; Rhode Island Acts and 
Resolves. 1786 Oct. (2) Sess., 8-9; Laws of Virginia. 1786 
Oct. Sess., 11. The Connecticut act is mentioned in the 
Journal of the Lower House. 30 Oct. 1786 (Microfilm Collec­
tion of State Records. Library of Congress, Connecticut 
A l b ,  Reel 2, Unit 5). A search of the session laws failed 
to reveal the New Hampshire act.
96Knox to President of Congress, 12 Feb. 1786,
W. C. Ford and Hunt, XXXII, 40.
97Massachusetts Resolves. 1786 Sept. Sess. (Oct. 30, 
1786), 124-26.
98Knox to President of Congress, 12 Feb. 1786,
W. C. Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXXII, 40.
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boulders. The loan opened by the treasurer brought little 
or no response. Finally in December General Henry Jackson, 
who had been appointed to raise and command the men, began 
recruiting on the doubtful strength of money pledged to be 
paid later. By the end of the month he had enlisted only 
seventy men. He suffered further embarrassments in January 
as the state government, stung into action by another court 
closing, began to raise a large force of its own. The 
wealthy men of Boston opened their purses for this project, 
and recruits, knowing they would be paid, turned out by the 
thousands.with prospective soldiers showing such a heavy 
preference for the state service, Jackson’s contingent grew 
even more slowly. While it is not the purpose here to inves­
tigate the failure of the Massachusetts "money-holders" to 
support Jackson, it is likely that they had more confidence 
in the ability of the state to repay its obligations than 
in that of the Congress.
By 21 January, when the state troops under General 
Benjamin Lincoln began their move against Shays, it is un­
likely that more than a fifth of the 1340 federal troops had 
been enlisted. This was not enough to be a factor in a 
campaign involving thousands, and they were not employed, 
though for other reasons. Knox, dissatisfied with Massachu­
setts' failure to assist with funds, overruled suggestions
99j. p. Warren, "Shays Rebellion," 57^59.
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that the men from that state be placed at Lincoln’s disposal. 
On February 9, after the rebels had been dispersed, he fin­
ally ordered the Connecticut and Massachusetts forces to 
Springfield but limited their use to the defense of the ar­
senal. The Massachusetts men were to move only when the state 
provided them with supplies. Colonel Daniel Humphreys, 
Washington’s former aide-de-camp, and the Connecticut troops 
reached that town on February 24. The Massachusetts contin­
gent, not receiving the required aid from the state, did not 
m a r c h . T h e  final strength returns showed that Massachu­
setts eventually raised about 300 men, Connecticut about 150, 
and Virginia its complete quota of 60. New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Maryland did not enlist a single man.101
This debacle was due primarily to the financial em­
barrassment of Congress. Everything depended upon the success 
of the loan, and this in turn depended upon the way in which 
the states met the requisitions for its repayment. Only 
Virginia, which placed a tax on tobacco, took any action at 
all, and the resulting revenue was not likely to be enough 
to meet her entire quota. As a result, none of the "money- 
holders,” not even those of Boston, showed the least interest 
in subscribing money. Without the loan it was virtually
lO^Ibid., 60-62; Massachusetts delegates to the 
Governor of Massachusetts, 21 Feb. 1787, Burnett, Letters, 
VIII, 544.
l^lj. p. Warren, "Shays Rebellion," 65.
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impossible to let contracts to feed and clothe the men after
1 r\n
they were raised. Knox and the Board finally prevailed 
upon Robert Morris and Jeremiah Wadsworth to undertake the 
business on a contingency basis. In February the unwilling 
purveyors decided that the cost of patriotism was too high 
for their pocketbooks. They withdrew, and no further con­
tracts were a r r a n g e d . ^03
Meantime, matters were made even worse by the failure 
of the states to pay the general requisition of the preceding 
August. As a result the Board informed Congress on 7 Febru­
ary that it would be unable to meet the payment on the for­
eign d e b t . 104 This announcement of virtual bankruptcy, 
though not unexpected, forced Congress to review its enlist­
ment program. The only question seemed to be which would
vanish first, the program or the insurgents, for it seemed
desirable for psychological reasons to delay the revelation 
of weakness as long as possible. Fortunately Lincoln’s 
legions had already completed their epic march through the 
blizzard and the black night to Petersham, and the stunned 
insurgents were running to cover in adjacent states. On 14 
February, presumably after news of this success had arrived,
lO^Board of Treasury letter, 7 Feb. 1787, W. C, Ford 
and Hunt, JÇC, XXXII, 32-34.
103j, Warren, "Shays Rebellion," 57-59.
104gQard of Treasury letter, 7 Feb. 1787, W. C. Ford
and Hunt, JCC, XXXII, 32-34.
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Charles Pinckney moved that further enlistments be suspended. 
Two days later a special committee appointed to consider both 
the motion and the Treasury letter recommended that a decision 
be deferred for the moment, but Pinckney renewed his resolu­
tion on the nineteenth when the report came up for considera­
tion.1^5 argued that the rebellion had been crushed and 
that the states had not complied with the requisition for 
funds to support the troops. It would be folly, he continued, 
to raise men who could not be "paid cloathed nor fed." At the 
end of the war we had managed "to get rid of an armed force 
without satisfying its just claims," but it would be danger­
ous to repeat the experiment.
When Rufus King of Massachusetts arose to oppose the 
suspension perhaps he heard again for a moment the lost echos 
of Gerry’s voice condemning standing armies and reflected 
upon the irony of his own position. According to Madison he 
made a "pathetic" appeal that the enlistments be continued 
for several weeks more. There was no assurance, he said, 
that Lincoln’s success had been complete. Furthermore, the 
punitive measures the state government might take, particu­
larly in disfranchising the insurgents, would no doubt arouse 
public sympathy for those affected. If Congress stopped 
enlistments under these circumstances, it would appear that
10%. c. Ford and Hunt, JÇC, XXXII, 57, 61-64.
106Madison’s "Notes of Debates in the Continental 
Congress," W. C. Ford and Hunt, JCC. XXXIII, 719.
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she had abandoned the state government and disapproved its 
measures. This might encourage the disaffected to create 
new disturbances. It should also be realized, he continued, 
that rebellion might occur anywhere with the result that 
other states would be asking support in the same strain as
Massachusetts.107
What King really wanted was the shadow not the sub­
stance of the federal army, as his further comments disclosed. 
Congress could grant Massachusetts this indulgence, he said, 
without inconvenience to itself. Even though the enlist­
ments were not suspended, few men would enter the federal 
service while the state itself was still recruiting. It was 
natural that men should prefer to serve at home and receive 
their pay rather than to be sent to Ohio to fight Indians
for nothing.108
Pinckney rejoined sharply that Massachusetts in 
adopting such stringent punitive measures should be left 
alone to bear the consequences of its own misconduct. Madison 
spoke strongly in support of King. After admitting that the 
Confederation did not expressly authorize Congressional in­
terference in the internal affairs of the states, he said 
that he would not examine the question at the moment. Having
thus disposed of the pangs of conscience by ignoring them, he
iO^Madison's "Notes . . .," Ibid., 719-20.
lOSMadison's "Notes . . .," Ibid.. 720.
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repeated most of King’s arguments. These must have been 
effective for in the roll call that followed, the motion to 
suspend was lost, and the matter was placed under injunction 
of secrecy for two months.109 When it was turned up again 
early in April a new committee recommended that the act for 
raising the men be repealed and that those already enlisted 
be retained for use on the frontier. The Congress decided 
to retain only the two companies of artillery raised in Mass­
achusetts and directed that they be marched to Springfield 
to replace the Connecticut troops there. Only Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island opposed this solution with New York divid­
ing. H O
Thus Congress, which had boldly grabbed for its sword 
at the moment of danger, never got it out of the sheath. It 
had seen the peril, though perhaps in overcolored tones, and 
had acted with resolution that will bear favorable comparison 
with the initial movements of the government at the time of 
the Whiskey Rebellion. Its efforts had been defeated by the 
lack of funds and by the failure of the states to support the 
strong measures that seemed to be required. Its consequent 
inability to influence the outcome of the rebellion was a 
dramatic demonstration of its weaknesses. In stopping the 
enlistments, as one writer puts it, "it seemed to be letting
lO^Madison’s "Notes . . .," Ibid.. 720-22.
^1%. C. Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXXII, 153-54, 158-60.
84
slip its last actual hold on p o w e r . T h e  men who would 
soon be meeting in convention at Philadelphia hardly failed 
to remark these facts.
Though Congress had made use of the Indian threat as 
part of the stratagem, it had not manufactured the evidence. 
The danger was actually serious enough to have justified the 
raising of the troops for frontier defense along. This, of 
course, is not to say that Congress in view of financial 
conditions could have been brought to raise them for that 
purpose. Fortunately by the time the enlistments were sus­
pended the danger had temporarily abated.
Some More Ineffective Plans (1787-89)
After a short remission the Indian trouble flared up 
again in the early summer of 1787 and continued through the 
following year. The main scenes of action were Kentucky and 
the Georgia frontier. The former was constantly ravaged by 
raids, and the situation in Georgia became so threatening 
that fortifications were begun at Savannah itself. However, 
there was also danger in other quarters. North Carolina and 
the Cherokees engaged in another of their never-ending quar­
rels over land, and out of the dim woods of the Northwest 
came a threatening letter from Joseph Brant, the Iroquois
P. Warren, "Shays Rebellion," 65.
^^^bid. , 53-55, 66.
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c h i e f t a i n . H e  had formed a confederation of all the 
tribes of the area and in their name demanded a settlement 
of the boundary question on the Ohio line. The Congress met 
these dangers by renewing the army, by making vague plans to 
send out large forces to restore order, and by undertaking 
to make general treaties with the Indians in both the North 
and the South. Its job was made infinitely more difficult by 
the failure of Georgia and North Carolina to cooperate fully.
In the new army act, which was passed on 3 October 
1787, Congress in effect extended the act of April 1785 for 
another three years. The same states--Connecticut, New Jer­
sey, New York and Pennsylvania--were directed to raise seven 
hundred men for that period according to the old proportions. 
It was, of course, hoped and expected that many of the veter­
ans of the original force would re-enlist.ll4 since the 
terms of the Massachusetts artillerymen still had about two 
years to go, the over-all composition of the array remained 
unchanged.
By the middle of June 1788, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania had enrolled a total of 250 men, less than 
half the number required of them. The New York legislature, 
as usual, had delayed in acting, but through a mistake the
113lbid., 66-67. Though the letter from Brant was 
dated 18 Dec. 1786 it was not submitted to Congress by Knox 
until 18 July 1787. W. C. Ford and Hunt, TO, XXXII, 
footnote page 369.
11%. C. Ford and Hunt, TO, XXXIII, 596-97, 602-03.
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recruiting of the state’s quota had gotten off to an unwonted- 
ly fast start. The officers with the troops, unaware of the 
neglect of the legislature, busily began to re-engage their 
men and sent a party back from Fort Harmar to raise more at 
home. The party soon returned empty-handed except for news 
indicating the extra-legal status of the re-enlistments.
Though New York apparently never legalized the enrollments. 
Secretary Knox was able to relieve the officers of their em­
barrassment. As he reported to Congress, the soldiers engaged 
were mostly foreigners and they had continued in the service 
of the United States "without any regard for the quota of any 
particular state." Thus they might be retained.
As formerly, the army was inadequate to meet special 
threats. When Virginia applied for aid in the defense of 
Kentucky in the summer of 1787, Knox reported that fifteen 
hundred additional men would be required to fully protect the 
Western territory. Since financial considerations precluded 
their being raised he recommended that a treaty be made with 
the Shawnee and other Wabash groups and that fifteen hundred 
militia be drawn from Kentucky and Pennsylvania for offensive 
operations in case the Indians would not come to terms. Any 
such expedition whould be commanded by the commanding officer 
of the United States troops. Congress approved the recommend­
ations but reduced the militia force to one thousand, all to
ll^Ibid., XXXIV, 236-38.
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be taken from Kentucky.
At the same time Knox reported on the dangers to be 
apprehended from Brant's confederation. It had become so 
threatening that the United States would have to either fight 
or make a treaty settlement. If the former were the case, 
the lack of funds would require that the militia be employed, 
and the campaigns would cost about two million dollars. He 
recommended that a general treaty be made with the tribes in­
volved and that money be provided to extinguish their land 
claims. Payments should be made even in cases in which own­
ership had passed to the United States by prior treaties. In 
October Congress approved these recommendations after expand­
ing them to include the Southern Indians.
The difficulties with Georgia and North Carolina arose 
over the interpretation of the constitutional provisions re­
lating to Indian affairs. At the time the two states were 
engaged in land disputes with the Creeks and the Cherokees, 
and large scale war seemed certain unless the United States 
intervened. However, under the Articles the central govern­
ment could deal only with Indians not subject to the govern­
ment of a state, and in these cases it was prohibited from 
infringing the "legislative right of any state within its own 
limits." The Creeks were an independent tribe, not a part of
li^Ibid., XXXII, 327-31, 370-76, XXXIII, 385-87.
ll^Ibid., XXXIII, 388-91, 478-80, 611-12, 665-66,
696, 701-13.
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Georgia, but the state exercised legislative jurisdiction 
over the disputed area. The same conditions existed with 
respect to North Carolina and the Cherokees. Knox in a 
report of July 1787 suggested that the states might be pre­
vailed upon to cede the lands to the United S t a t e s .
When the matter came under consideration, the Georgia 
delegates moved that Congress call upon their state to make 
every effort to preserve peace and that Congress itself as­
sume the responsibility of punishing any tribe of Indians 
making war on any of the states. A special committee attri­
buted the danger of war to the encroachments of the two 
states, and made a long analysis of the constitutional ques­
tion, arriving at conclusions that favored the power of the 
Union. It then levied a scathing attack on the Georgia 
motion. It could not, of course, be the purpose of the 
Georgia delegates to imply that Congress was bound to send 
its forces out and recall them, to make war and peace, as 
that state might wish. To the contrary the delegates must 
have meant that wars against independent tribes should be 
conducted by the Union, at least in cases in which its forces 
were employed. But the power to make war clearly implies the 
right to examine into the justice of the reasons for which 
the war is to be fought. In this particular case the reasons 
were hardly just. Whatever might be the interpretation of 
the motion, however, the problem could best be met by the
. 366-68.
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measure proposed by the Secretary of War. The report closed 
with several recommended resolutions, including one covering 
the land cession, but they do not appear to have been acted
upon.
Meantime, the Southern Department was included in 
the plans for general treaties as noted above. When the 
Creeks refused to make peace and continued their incursions. 
Congress in the summer of 1788 finally resolved to inform 
them that continued refusal would result in the sending of 
United States troops to the frontier, and Knox drew up a 
plan for that eventuality. Every effort should be made, he 
reported, to terminate the conflict in a single campaign. 
Since no United States troops could be shifted from the Ohio, 
the alternatives were to employ large bodies of militia or 
to raise a special force of United States troops. The latter 
was to be preferred as being both cheaper and more efficient. 
Twenty-eight hundred men, organized into three regiments of 
infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a corps of artillery, 
would be required for nine months. They might be apportioned 
as follows: Georgia, 1050; South Carolina, 840; and North
Carolina, 910. Since this plan comprehended about five times
as many troops as were then in service it is small wonder
120that it aroused little enthusiasm in Congress.
ll^Ibid.. 407-08, 455-62.
120lbid.. XXXIV, 253, 268-69, 327, 362-65.
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These plans were like the last ineffectual blows of 
a broken sword. The militia of Kentucky was not called out, 
at least not for great operations under a Continental com­
mander, and the twenty-eight hundred regulars did not magic­
ally appear to march off through the Southern forests after 
the elusive Creeks. Congress made one or two more final 
feeble parrys in the late summer of 1788 when it toyed with 
the idea of federal interposition to protect the Cherokees 
from further encroachments by North Carolina and again 
planned to hold militiamen in readiness for use against the 
Northern Indians.
l ^ Ibid.. 342-44, 369-71, 412-14, 478-79.
CHAPTER III
THE MILITIA UNDER THE CONFEDERATION
After the war, interest in militia activities reached 
a new low in most places, but leading military thinkers 
nevertheless brought forward plans to recast the militia 
system on new principles. Though the need for change had 
become evident during the war. Congress ignored the sugges­
tions of the reformers. Meantime, as the Indian pressure 
increased south of the Ohio, the quasi-military state of 
Franklin was organized as a defense measure, and it expended 
its short life in endless battle with the Indians and with 
the mother-state. North Carolina. Its history illustrates 
two of the characteristic military phenomena of the era; the 
leading role played by the militia in new state movements and 
the use of troops by rival states in contests over land own­
ership and jurisdiction. These phenomena were also present 
in varying degrees in the new state movements and land con­
flicts in the Wyoming Valley and the Hampshire Grants.
Darkness with a Few Centers of Light 
Frederick von Steuben, former inspector general of 
the Continental Army, attributed the nationwide lack of
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interest to the inadequacies of the state laws and the failure 
to enforce them. Among the most important of the former, he 
wrote, was the fact that a militiaman could save money by 
absenting himself from musters. He showed that the total 
annual fine for this offense in Pennsylvania was a few shill­
ings less than the several day’s income lost during attend­
ance, and his finding probably applied to most states. Few 
militiamen would willingly sacrifice the money, he continued, 
when the training they received was so ineffective. They 
could look with nothing but indifference upon such a "busi­
ness” that had no "pleasing or professional features."^
The lack of enforcement was noted in the spring of 
1785 by Richard Dobbs Spaight, a delegate to Congress from 
North Carolina. Few of the states, he wrote, had organized 
and armed their militia and fewer still had taken steps to 
procure military stores. These remarks certainly applied 
to New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and North Carolina. In New 
Hampshire in early 1785, many field officers had been ap­
pointed, but they had neglected to nominate company officers. 
Despite the energetic efforts of General John Sullivan, first
^Frederick von Steuben, "A Letter on the Subject of 
an established Militia, and Military Arrangements, addressed 
to the Inhabitants of the United States," Parts I and II, 
Connecticut Courant and Weekly Intelligencer, Mar. 22 and 29, 
1785.
^Letter to James Iredell, 10 Mar. 1785, E. C. Burnett 
(ed.). Letters of Members of the Continental Congress 
(Washington, 1921-36), VIII, 64. Hereafter cited as Burnett, 
Letters.
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as senior officer of the militia and later as president of 
the state, the disorganization persisted. In the spring of 
1787 the field officers of five regiments requested the 
postponement of a scheduled review because of the "deranged"
O
condition of their commands. In the summer of the same
year, when some difficulties occurred in a cavalry unit, the
confusion was reflected in a letter from one of the officers
to President Sullivan:
Sir I fancy you think the Field Officers of the third 
Regiment of Light Horse, either regardless of their duty 
or Ignorant of it--so far as it Respects my self I am 
willing to confess the latter but the former I cannot— I 
therefore beg your Excellencys patience while I say some­
thing on a subject with which I am unacquainted. . . .  A 
Commission is all I have received, and this has had its 
weight for I was as much Puzzeled to know what to do with 
it as a clown is with his hat and hands on his entering 
into Genteel Company--I therefore stood gaping, but feel­
ing a strong inclination to do something and not knowing 
what— I have been running round and round like a puppy 
after its tail--I flew to my Colonel for direction but 
found him in as bad or worse situation then myself--to 
my Majr and it was no better— 4
In Massachusetts in 1786 the militia laws were ignored 
on a wholesale basis. General officers were not making re­
turns, units were not electing officers, and commanders were 
failing to muster and train their units. Many towns had not 
laid in and kept up the required ammunition supplies. Gover­
nor James Bowdoin, after receiving complaints of these
^Otis G. Hammond (ed.). Letters and Papers of Major- 
General John Sullivan, ContinentiT Army ("Collections of New 
Hampshire Historical Society," Vol. XV, Concord, 1930-39),
Part III, 386-92 , 412.-13 , 431-32, 440-41, 520 , 525. Here­
after cited as Hammond, Sullivan Papers.
^William Page to President John Sullivan, 4 June 
1787, Ibid.. 530-31.
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conditions, issued public orders requiring their correction. 
His "measures . . .  to revive the military spirit" included 
specific instructions to each rank of officers from generals 
down to captains.5
North Carolina apparently had not laid in the neces­
sary military stores. In 1786 the assembly directed that a 
battalion be raised in the eastern part of the state for 
service against the Indians on the Cumberland. The commander 
faced almost insurmountable supply difficulties in getting 
his men to their destination. He charged that he had been 
furnished only a fraction of the provisions required for the 
march of four hundred miles "through a wilderness and in a 
strange State where no supplies could be had either on public 
or private credit." Nor could he have paid cash, for the 
quartermaster had refused to issue him a single shilling. He 
furloughed his men in Kentucky, which was on his necessarily 
round-about route, so that they could work to earn provisions 
for the rest of the trip. After long delays and many vicis­
situdes the troops finally reached Nashville in October 1787, 
ragged, hungry, and greatly reduced in numbers.^ They looked 
so little like fighting soldiers that the Cumberlanders couJd
^"Public Orders respecting the Militia," given at the 
Council Chamber in Boston, 14 Aug. 1786, Connecticut Courant 
and Weekly Intelligencer. 21 Aug. 1786.
^Samuel C. Williams, History of the Lost State of 
Franklin (Johnson City, Tennessee, 1924), 121, 148, 170-171, 
173-74. Hereafter cited as Williams, Lost State.
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take little comfort in their presence, and the Indians must 
have yawned.
Examples such as the above could no doubt be multiplied 
indefinitely, but though they described the prevailing condi­
tions they do not tell the whole story. Here and there a 
few energetic men did their best to put the militia on a 
sound footing, and in several places interest ran high among 
militiamen at large. General Sullivan is an excellent example 
of the military enthusiast. He made public addresses in New 
Hampshire extolling the importance of the militia and urged 
his listeners, many of whom had been avoiding service by the 
payment of the fines, to start attending musters. He in­
spected the troops assiduously, did all possible to insure 
that deficiencies were corrected, and published regulations 
for the light horse. After becoming chief executive of the 
state he urged improvements in the militia laws and continued 
to give much time to reviews and other militia matters. He 
was one of the first to suggest that military training be 
made a part of the curriculum of schools. Though he was un­
able to overcome all the inertia and disinterest that existed, 
his influence undoubtedly greatly decreased both the number 
of clowns, to use the word of the puzzled officer, and the 
number of disorganized units.^
^Hammond, Sullivan Papers. Part III, 385-93, 399- 
407, 412-13, 432-37, 441, 456, 460-62, 479-81, 493, 525-26, 
552, 600.
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Among the places that the military spirit needed 
little fostering were some sections of the frontier and New 
York City. The Franklin troops in East Tennessee were un­
doubtedly the best on the continent, and those of Washington 
County in southwestern Virginia were also excellent. Gover­
nor Patrick Henry told the legislature that the latter had 
awed the Indians into friendship and referred to the county 
as a "nursery of soldiers."® In New York City the interest 
of the townsmen in militia activities greatly impressed ob­
servers in 1787. It was reported than an experienced officer 
had been employed at a large salary to supervise training and 
that about eight hundred men were enrolled in independent 
companies. These last were completely uniformed, well dis­
ciplined, and commanded almost entirely by Continental veter­
ans. They paraded on Sundays "with bold presumptions steps. 
Martial music. Swords and guns as though they were determined 
to take Heaven by force and arms. Gold epaulets could no 
longer be obtained in the city because young officers had 
bought up the existing stocks.
Q
W. P. Palmer and others (eds.). Calendar of Vir­
ginia State Papers (Richmond, 1875-1893), IV, 34.
^Nicholas Gilman to the President of New Hampshire, 
7 Nov. 1787, Burnett, Letters, VIII, 676.
^^William Pierce to Sullivan, 24 May 1787, Hammond, 
Sullivan Papers, Part III, 528.
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The Need for Reform
The need for reform of the militia system stemmed both 
from its inherent weaknesses and from its lack of uniformity 
in the states. Most important among the former were inadequa­
cies related to training and mobilization. The lack of uni­
formity was most serious in the provisions regulating member­
ship and in those determining organizational structure. Both 
the weaknesses and the variations may be illustrated by the 
analysis of a sample of the militia laws covering six northern 
and middle states— Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.^^ It is likely that 
the defects in the laws of the remaining states were equally 
marked.
Membership in the militia of any state was dependent 
upon one's age and occupation. In the six states in the 
sample, the ages of obligatory service ranged from sixteen to 
forty-five on one extreme and from eighteen to fifty-three on 
the other. In two of the states men finishing their service 
in the "trainbands," or ordinary militia, were required to 
serve in "alarm list" companies until they were sixty.
^^The several acts may be found in the state session 
laws and collections as follows; Connecticut, 1782 May Sess., 
585-99; Delaware, 1785 June Sess., 57-66; Massachusetts, 1785 
Jan. Sess., 219-30; New Hampshire, 1786 June Sess,; New Jer­
sey, 1780 Oct. Sess., 39-54 (Microfilm Collection of State 
Records, Library of Congress as follows: Connecticut, B 2,
Reel 1, Unit 8; Delaware, B 2, Reel 1, Unit 3; Massachusetts,
B 2 a:b. Reel 3, Unit 3; New Hampshire, B 2, Reel 1 a. Unit 5; 
New Jersey, B 2, Reel 4, Unit 2.) J. T. Mitchell and Henry 
Flanders (eds.). Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania (Harris­
burg, 1896-1915), X, 144-73 (act passed 20 Mar. 1780).
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One state exempted only four occupational groups, the others 
from thirteen to twenty-two. Variations of these types were 
unfair to large groups that were compelled to serve in some 
states, while their counterparts in others went free.
The primary organizational differences were no less 
striking. Two states, as already noted, divided their troops 
into two groups, the "trainbands" and the "alarm list"' units. 
The former were composed of men under forty and were intended 
for general service. The latter, made up of the older men, 
were used only as a reserve for home defense. One state re­
tained the obsolescent institution of the "county lieutenant," 
a man of rank much higher than the title indicates, who served 
as the' head of the militia in his territorial division. In 
one state the highest tactical unit was the battalion; all 
of the others had brigades and two had divisions. The number 
of men in a company might be as few as 24 in one state and 
as many as 125 in another. Though all but one of the states 
provided for independent corps of artillery and cavalry, the 
sizes of these units, their proportions to the infantry, and 
their organization into higher units were far from uniform. 
Variations such as these seriously handicapped the operations 
of combined forces. For example, a combat task that could be 
performed by a company from one state might require a battal­
ion from another.
The laws prescribed two basic types of mobilization 
procedures. In three states the men of each company were
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divided into eight classes by the drawing of lots. When 
troops were required, the classes were called out in rota­
tion, and their members assembled at central points, where 
they were formed into new units. In case of emergencies the 
governors of these states were also authorized to embody 
complete units. In the remaining three states, quotas for 
the divisions or brigades were established by the governors, 
and these were broken down at each organizational level until 
the companies were reached. The company commanders then de­
tached the number of men required to fill their allocations. 
In both the class and the quota method the troops were 
rotated after no more than about two months service. Both 
this short term and the slow and cumbersome procedures of 
the two methods were disabling defects. Though the method 
involving the embodiment of complete units produced troops 
fairly rapidly, it was not the preferred procedure in the 
states in which it was authorized.
The effectiveness of training was to a large extent 
dependent upon the number of training periods and the penal­
ties for enforcing attendance. None of the states required 
more than seven muster days per year, and the average for 
the group was five, hardly enough to turn out practiced 
soldiers. The average fine for absence at company musters 
was about six and a half shillings, and only two states pro­
vided higher fines for the same delinquency at regimental 
musters, these being ten shillings in each case. It has
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already been noted that men in most states could save money 
by staying away from training and paying the fines.
The ability of the states themselves to correct the 
weaknesses in their laws was severely limited. It is not 
conceivable that they should have arrived at uniformity either 
by accident or by design, and the extent to which they could 
have increased such things as the number of training days and 
the size of fines hardly promised much improvement. In the 
case of the training days, for example, as will be shown in 
the following section, economic considerations alone would 
have precluded really effective revisions.
In any event, the states as a whole did not seem dis­
posed to undertake the impossible. Between 1783 and 1789 only 
five passed new general militia acts, and these did little 
more than make minor adjustments in the old ones.^^ In some 
cases postwar legislation actually worked to the detriment 
of efficiency. Thus Pennsylvania completely abolished company 
musters, and reduced the fine for absence at battalion mus-
1 O
ters.^ The nature of the problem, the failure of the states 
to make even minor improvements, and the fact that new 
theories of militia organization were evolving seemed to 
indicate the need for federal action.
^^The states were New Hampshire (1786), New York 
(1786), North Carolina (1786), Vermont (1787), Virginia 
(1785).
l^Mitchell and Flanders (eds.) Statutes at Large of 
Pennsylvania, XIII, 41-44 (act passed 22 Mar. 1788).
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The Reformers and Their Failures
All of the radical new plans for the reform of the 
militia reflected an equally new understanding of certain 
aspects of the militia problem. It had been learned during 
the war that four or five days* training each year did not 
make good soldiers and that a few well-trained men were worth 
many times their weight in raw troops. It had also been 
realized that fewer men were required for defense than had 
formerly been thought necessary. What was the need, asked 
von Steuben, of trying to keep up hundreds of thousands of 
militiamen when England had been able to send no more than 
forty thousand men against us at one time and when no country 
was capable of sending a larger number?^^ Finally it ap­
peared that it was not economically feasible to attempt to 
make properly trained soldiers out of the great mass of the 
militia. Four hundred thousand men, the entire labor force 
of the country, could not be mustered the requisite twenty to 
thirty times a year without suffering losses of income that 
would affect not only themselves but also their communities.
All of these considerations pointed to the basic con­
clusion that the militia defense should rest primarily upon 
a relatively small and highly trained corps formed from the 
militia at large. According to the authors of the several
l^von Steuben, "Letter . . .  to the Inhabitants of 
the United States," Part II, Connecticut Courant and Weekly 
Intelligencer, 29 Mar. 1785.
102
new plans this select body of troops might be organized in 
any of several ways. Washington advocated the formation of 
a special “light company” in each regiment. Hamilton and 
his committee on the peace establishment, which was dis­
cussed in the preceding chapter, suggested that “trainbands” 
be set up in the cities and incorporated towns. Von Steuben 
called for the organization of a federal or Continental mil­
itia and Knox for the establishment of a military class com­
posed of younger men. All thought that the select corps 
should be armed and equipped at the public expense.
Each of these plans except von Steuben’s provided 
that the general militia be made uniform in all the states 
and that it be utilized as a reserve. Von Steuben took issue 
with the whole concept of universal service. In his opinion 
it was neither necessary nor worthwhile to subject all men, 
many of whom did not possess the necessary physical and 
mental qualities, to the heavy and expensive training neces­
sary to make good soldiers. “It would be as consistent to 
say that every man should be a saiilor,” he wrote. His sys- 
tem^5 was devised to provide a pool of trained reserves in 
another way, as will be shown later.
Washington's plan was contained in the “Sentiments 
on a Peace Establishment” which he had prepared for Hamilton’s 
committee in the spring of 1783. He was familiar with the
^^Von Steuben, “Letter . . .  to the Inhabitants of 
the United States,” Part I, Ibid.. 22 Mar. 1785.
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several concepts mentioned above and proposed two of them, 
the Continental militia and the age-class as alternative 
solutions. He apparently preferred the light companies for 
reasons of expediency» As compared to the other two possi­
bilities, they would be "most consistent with the genius of 
our Countrymen and perhaps in their opinion more consonant 
to the spirit of our Constitution.Whatever these ringing 
words may have meant, he no doubt realized that their forma­
tion would create almost no derangement in the existing mili­
tia, As Brigadier General John M. Palmer has pointed out, 
the officers for the most part would remain undisturbed in
their jobs and hence would not raise major objections to the 
1 7change.
The plan proposed that the light companies be formed 
either by voluntary enlistment or by the draft, that they be 
organized into "particular Battalions or Regiments," and that 
the period of service be not less than three nor more than 
seven years» The training of the companies should consist 
of from twelve to twenty-five musters per year, including 
some battalion, regimental, and brigade meetings. The gener­
al militia, according to the plan, should be viewed as an arm 
for use only as a last resort» It need not meet for musters
IGjohnC. Fitzpatrick (ed.). The Writings of George 
Washington (Washington, 1931-1944), XXVI, 390-91.
17john M, Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven, 1941),
26-27.
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more than once or twice a year. In order to provide uni­
formity thoughout the military system, Congress should draw 
up codes and regulations for use by both the militia and the 
standing forces. It should also appoint an inspector general 
to supervise the execution of the regulations in the states.18
A question arises as to whether Washington intended 
the light companies to be composed only of men in the younger 
age groups. Unfortunately this point is not at all clear 
from the exposition in the "Sentiments," The difficulty of 
interpretation results from an introductory paragraph lauding 
the superior military qualities of men between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-five. This is followed by the three sug­
gested ways in which the select corps might be formed:
(1) By the establishment of a Continental militia, 
"selecting every 10th 15th or 20th Man from the Rolls of 
each State. . . ." (no reference made to age).
(2) By the organization, presumably into special 
units, of "all the Men fit for service between some given
Age and no others, for example between 18 and 25. . . ."
(3) By the formation in each regiment of a light com­
pany composed of the "best Men" (no reference to age).19
On the one hand it would appear that the use of other 
qualifications--"every 10th 15th or 20th Man" and the "best 
Men"— in solutions (1) and (3) would over-ride or eliminate 
the age qualification contained in the introductory paragrajph. 
The fact that solutions (2) and (3) would be more or less




identical if the age qualification applied to the latter 
reinforces this conclusion. In this respect the young men 
in solution (2) would have to be organized into units on a 
local basis, and such units would presumably be elements of 
the battalions or regiments of the general militia.
On the other hand, the uniform militia bills pre­
sented a few years later in the First and Second Congresses 
provided for the organization of light companies as in solu­
tion (3), and these were to be formed from the younger age 
group. It is a reasonable assumption that the proposal went 
back to Washington's plan. If this were the case, the possi­
bility that the contemporary understanding of Washington's 
ideas left no doubt as to his real meaning cannot be ignored. 
The importance of the interpretation placed on the matter 
will appear later when the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 is 
discussed. Though Washington's plan was studied by Hamilton's 
committee in 1783, it was not presented to Congress at that 
time or at any other time during the Confederation.
The plan of Hamilton's committee was submitted in 
1783 as part of its report on the peace establishment.
Though the plan adopted the ancient term "trainbands" and 
talked about cities and incorporated towns, the arrangement 
was not as bizarre as it might seem at first glance. On 
close examination the trainbands appear to have been only a 
variation of Washington's light companies. The main differ­
ence was a difference in strength. The committee's plan
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limited membership in the bands to one-fiftieth of the militia 
in any state, or to about eight thousand men over-all. Wash­
ington’s companies would have contained about forty thousand. 
The further differences resulted from the one to fifty ratio, 
which made it impossible to form the bands in the regiments 
at large. A regiment could have provided only about one-fifth 
of a band. Indeed the ratio dictated that the units be estab­
lished only in centers of population as the plan provided.
The apparent purpose of the committee in establishing such a 
low ratio was to limit costs. It estimated that the expense
of the eight thousand men would be less than sixty thousand
20dollars per year.
The plan further provided that the bands be composed 
of volunteers, that the men be engaged for eight year terms, 
and that they serve for three years after being called to 
active duty in wartime. It set the training requirement for 
these units at twenty-four musters annually. The plan also 
divided the general militia into a corps of married men and 
a corps of single men and specified that the former be mus­
tered six times a year and the latter nine times. In case 
the state were invaded, units of both corps or either, with 
no preference, would be ordered to the field and held in 
service for a year before rotation. Members of either corps
^^Worthington C. Ford and Gaillard Hunt (eds.). 
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington, 
1904-37), XXV, 742-43'. Hereafter cited as W. C. Ford and 
Hunt, JCC.
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might volunteer for the trainbands,^
This plan appears to have received little attention. 
Washington read it and commented that any of the methods he 
had suggested would suit the American genius better, dis­
tribute military knowledge more widely, and afford more 
equable protection to all parts of the c o u n t r y , W h e n  Con­
gress took up the committee’s proposals it apparently con­
fined itself to the recommendations dealing with standing 
23troops. It will be remembered that this last subject had 
aroused much interest and that there was a pressing and ob­
vious need for some solution. On the other hand, no one 
seemed to be interested in the militia, and only the more 
thoughtful appreciated the need for reform.
Von Steuben produced his plan some time prior to March 
1784 and began to publicize it in 1785 in a "Letter on the 
Subject of an established Militia, and Military Arrangements, 
addressed to the Inhabitants of the United States," The tim­
ing coincided closely with the formation of a new Congression­
al committee to study the militia problem. The plan provided 
that seven legions of three thousand men each be formed from 
the whole militia. Each legion, as the name indicates, would 
contain the appropriate complements of infantry, artillery, 
and cavalry to form a well balanced combat team. Although 
this idea was not entirely new at the time, it represented
^ Ibid,. 741-42, ^%bid,. 551,
23lbid,. 744-45,
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advanced military thinking. Von Steuben suggested that two
of the legions be raised in New England, three in the Middle
24States, and two in the South. It has been said that he 
anticipated the "corps area" organization of the twentieth 
century in making these territorial divisions,^5 but as far 
as his own development of the concept is concerned this 
conclusion may well be viewed with caution.
The plan further provided that service in the legions 
be voluntary, that enlistments be stimulated by bounties, and 
that only men between eighteen and twenty-four be accepted.
The training of the troops would consist of thirty-one musters 
per year. The men would be armed by the public and they 
would retain their arms when their enlistments expired. It 
was estimated that the entire expense of the establishment, 
presumably including the cost of the arms, would be about 
$315,000 per y e a r . ^ &
The plan also outlined a staggered system of enlist­
ment for the initial recruitment. One-third of the men in 
each company would be engaged for two years, one-third for 
three, and one-third for four. As the terms of these groups
■^^ Von Steuben, "Letter . . .  to the Inhabitants of 
the United States," Part I, Connecticut Courant and Intelli­
gencer. 22 Mar. 1785.
25j. M. Palmer, America in Arms. 29-31.
26von Steuben, "Letter . . .  to the Inhabitants of 
the United States," Parts I and II, Connecticut Courant and 
Intelligencer. 22 and 29 Mar. 1785.
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expired they would each be replaced with three year men.
When the system had become established the legions would 
always contain two-thirds veterans and one-third recruits.
At the end of each year, seven thousand well-trained and
completely armed men would be added to an ever increasing 
reservoir of soldiers.
The Congressional committee mentioned above was ap­
pointed on 7 February, but it apparently did little work be­
fore it was discharged on May 1 6 . Meantime, von Steuben's 
letter had caused the running of no ground swells of enthus­
iasm in favor of militia reform, and there is no indication 
that it influenced either the committee or Congress. After 
the discharge of the committee, the matter was referred to 
the Secretary at War, who did not report until March 1786.^^
Secretary Henry Knox in his report recommended that 
the whole militia be divided into three groups on the basis 
of age— the advanced corps, the main corps, and the reserved 
corps— and that all of these be organized into legions. The 
advanced corps, composed of young men from eighteen to twenty 
years, would be armed, uniformed, and equipped at the expense 
of the other two corps. It would receive six weeks training 
annually at special encampments, and when its members gradu­
ated to the main corps they would, like Steuben’s legionnaires,
'^^ Ibid.. Part I.
C. Ford and Hunt, TO, XXVIII, 90-91.
^^Ibid.. XXX. 117.
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take their arms with them. The main corps, composed of men 
from twenty-one to forty-five, would attend only four mus­
ters per year, but it was expected that the annual infusions 
of highly trained and spirited young men would constantly 
improve its military qualities. The reserve corps, made up 
of the remainder of the men under sixty, would undergo no 
training.30
Fighting forces would be formed by draft on the ad­
vanced and main corps. The reserved corps would be required
to furnish men only in case of actual invasion. In order to
establish a uniform system of mobilization, each company in 
each of the corps would be divided into sections of twelve 
men each. When troop requisitions were received, each sec­
tion would be assigned a quota. The members of the section
might hire from their number the men to perform the required
service. If this proved impossible the required men would 
be peremptorily detached, and the members would be assessed 
to pay them the going rate. The men drafted might be held 
in service as long as three years at one time, and men from 
the advanced corps, but apparently not those from the main 
corps, might be required to serve outside their own states 
for as long as a year at a time.31
30Henry Knox, "A Plan for the General Arrangement of 
the Militia of the United States," 28 Mar. 1786, folio u A 




The scheme, according to Knox, would make little 
demand on the time of the regular working population. Only 
the advanced corps would receive extensive training, and 
young men of the age group involved would not have entered 
upon their full economic life. In most cases, it would be 
found that they were engaged in learning farming or some 
trade, and the losses incident to the encampments would not 
fall upon them but upon their parents or masters. Since 
their services during the period of apprenticeship resulted 
in large profits to their "tutors," the latter would suffer 
no great hardships.^2
Though this elaborate plan involved heavy expense, 
it was deceptively self-supporting. Each section of the main 
and reserved corps would be assessed $24.00 per year to pro­
vide arms, clothing, and equipment for the advanced corps 
and to pay the expenses of its encampment. According to 
Knox’s estimates this tax, if it may be called that, would 
provide each advanced legion with an annual income of $52,000, 
which was about $3,000 more than the estimated expense. While 
all of this did not sound alarming, except perhaps to those 
who would have to pay the assessments, the some 45,000 young 
men in the age bracket would constitute fifteen legions. The 
total income of the advanced corps would then be $780,000 
annually and the total expenses $735,000, staggering sums to 




On 4 April a "grand committee" was appointed to con­
sider the plan, and after long delays it finally rendered a 
favorable report. The plan would place the militia on a 
"formidable footing," and it should be recommended to the
O A
states for adoption. At this stage the matter was permit­
ted to rest. According to Henry Lee of Virginia, who per­
sonally favored the plan, it had so little chance that it 
was not thought worthwhile to bring it up for decision.
"We lament the indifference which pervades our country on 
this important subject," he wrote.
The failure of Congress to act favorably on the 
plans may be attributed to the high costs, to the public 
indifference, and to the lack of any military threat alarm­
ing enough to transmute this lack of interest into concern. 
Even if these factors had not been present, it is doubtful 
that Congress would have been able to do much. While its 
authority to raise standing troops in time of peace was at 
least subject to interpretation, its powers respecting the 
militia had no more body than the echo of a musket shot. 
Indeed a close reading of the Articles indicates that it had
33%bid. Also see above page 37.
3%. c. Ford and Hunt, JCC, XXX, 151, footnote;
XXXI, 642.
35Letter to James Madison, 19 Oct. 1786, Burnett 
Letters. VIII, 489.
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no such powers whatsoever. It could, of course, recommend 
some plan to the states, but its past recommendations on 
military matters had been notoriously ineffective.
East Tennessee; Sparta in the Wilderness
By the end of the Revolution about twenty thousand 
people lived in East Tennessee along the Wautaga, Holston, 
French Broad, and Nolachucky rivers. The Kentucky communi­
ties were expanding and colonists had begun to move into 
the Cumberland region near Nashville. As the settled areas 
grew, the Indians struck back furiously to prevent further 
encroachments on lands they considered their own. The con­
flict that followed continued without interruption for years. 
When the mother-states neglected to send aid, separatist 
movements developed in all three areas. That in East Ten­
nessee resulted in the ephemeral state of Franklin. Under 
constant assault from both internal and external foes, it 
became a kind of Sparta in the wilderness, whose history dif­
fers more in intensity of action and completeness of devel­
opment than in basic form from that of the other two regions.
The Franklin movement began in the late spring of 
1784 when North Carolina ceded its western lands to the 
Union, a move apparently dictated by the desire to escape 
the ever mounting costs of their d e f e n s e . W h e n  news of
36john Haywood, The Civil and Political History of 
the State of Tennessee, from its Earliest Settlement up to 
the Year 1796 (2d ed.. Nashville. 1891). 148-49. Hereafter 
cited as Haywood, Civil and Political History.
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the cession arrived, the East Tennesseans looked upon them­
selves as lost men. Though North Carolina had never been a 
strong reed, the national government was just as weak and 
even more remote. Meantime, a period as long as two years
might be consumed in the transfer of sovereignty, or so it 
37was thought, and the frontiersmen could take little comfort 
in a provision of the cession act designed to maintain North 
Carolina's jurisdiction during this interim. If she had not 
aided before, they could hardly expect her to send assistance 
at the very time she was surrendering her claim. To make 
matters worse she began her withdrawal by stopping payment 
to the Indians for land purchased from them and sold to the 
Tennesseans. The Indians soon set out to collect from the 
settlers, and they accepted lives in lieu of the promised
goods.38
The frontiersmen thus cut adrift realized that their 
salvation rested upon their own arms. Acting as rapidly as 
the urgency of the situation seemed to require they formed 
an association for mutual defense and soon expanded it into 
a formal government.89 The militia played a leading role in 
the establishment of the new state, and military figures
37lbid., 149.
^^williams. Lost State. 64, 74-75, 82, 339.
^^Though land speculators played an important role 
in Franklin, it is believed that the interpretation of the 
reasons for its formation as given above in the text will 
stand the closest scrutiny.
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dominated its political life from beginning to end. Unfor­
tunately, North Carolina repealed the cession act within a 
few months and attempted to reassert its sovereignty. The 
Franks, as contemporary writers referred to them, did not 
readily return to the fold. They did not expect North Caro­
lina to furnish more military aid than she had in the past, 
and they remembered other grievances, the high taxes North 
Carolina had assessed and her failure to provide adequate 
criminal courts.Though they kept their militia, the best 
in America, almost constantly in the field against the In­
dians, they hesitated to employ it with full effectiveness 
when the conflict with North Carolina became critical.
That the militia was the fountainhead of political 
action in the separatist movement there can be no doubt.
The movement began with county conventions composed of two 
men from each militia company. These conventions selected 
delegates to a combined assembly, and there is no reason to 
think that they went outside their own ranks in making the 
selections. The combined assembly established the associa­
tion and adopted articles which provided for a second as­
sembly to formulate detailed plans for government. Again 
the delegates were to be chosen by the compa nie s.T he 
significant point up to here is not that the conventions
40williams, Lost State. 63-64. 
41lbid.. 29-31.
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were composed of militiamen--everyone was a militiaman--but 
that the companies were the basis of representation.
After a formal constitution was finally adopted in 
November 1785, political representation no longer rested in 
the military, but the state took its essential character 
from its political leaders, most of whom were men of martial 
mind and background. John Sevier, the state’s premier sol­
dier, was made governor, and out of thirty-eight other lead­
ing Franks listed by Samuel C. Williams the great majority 
had distinguished military backgrounds. At least seven had 
served in the colonial militia prior to the Revolution, and 
of these four counted service all the way back to Lord Dun- 
more’ s War, At least twenty-two fought in the Revolution, 
most of them as officers, and ten were present at King’s 
Mountain, All but nine of the entire group of thirty-eight 
held high political office in the state, and many also held 
important militia appointments. Thus the group provided 
both brigadier generals, the adjutant general, four county 
colonels, two second colonels, and various officers of
AO
lesser rank.
During its short existence the state sent out at 
least six large expeditions and numerous small parties 
against the Indians, From 1786 to 1788 it attempted to 
set up a military combine with Georgia for a joint attack
^^bid,. 289-329, ^^Ibid,. 102-03, 211-14, 217,
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on the Creeks. Though that state was hesitant, it finally 
passed an act raising four thousand men for the campaign and 
authorizing the governor to call on Franklin for fifteen 
hundred more. Before the army took the field, however. Con­
gress sent peace commissioners to the Creeks, and the 
Georgians backed out of the arrangement.^4 Aside from this 
abortive alliance and the caissons full of sympathy and es­
teem that were regularly received from Georgia, the Franks 
had to rely on their own resources. They made bullets from 
lead obtained locally, manufactured powder from saltpeter 
found in the soil of caves, and replenished their supply of 
horses by raids on the Indians.45
The excellence of the Franklin troops may be attri­
buted to several factors. Their military tradition encom­
passed years of Indian fighting and included the masterpiece 
of the American militiaman, the battle of King’s Mountain. 
They had much greater opportunity to practice their art than 
the militia of most other areas. Even more important was 
the quality of their leaders. First among these was Governor 
Sevier, perhaps the greatest of American militia commanders, 
who led most of the large expeditions and who is said to have
44williams, Lost State. 106-07, 111, 113-14, 173, 
177-82, 191-93; James G. M. Ramsay, The Annals of Tennessee 
to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Reprinted ed.. Kings- 
port, Tennessee, 1926), 395-96, 414, Hereafter cited as 
Ramsay, Annals of Tennessee.
^^illiams. Lost State, 257.
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fought thirty-five battles throughout his long career with­
out suffering a single defeat. Others included William 
Cocke and Daniel Kennedy, who were the two brigadiers, and 
Major Augustus Enholm. The last, a native of Holstien, ap­
pears to have been a kind of frontier Steuben. Veteran of 
campaigns with Francis Marion and Henry Lee and former ad­
jutant general of Georgia, he served as adjutant and drill-
master.
The Franklin militiamen were horsemen who fought on 
foot. Riding into the Indian country after a band of maraud­
ers, they left their mounts with holders as they approached 
the enemy and fell upon his village or camp. Over the scene 
of carnage that usually followed rang the famous Sevierian 
battle cry "Here they are! Come on, boys!" After the last 
Indian warrior had fallen or fled, the militiamen took 
scalps, gathered the Indian horses, destroyed the crops, and 
put the village to flames. If ammunition were low or damaged 
by weather, they relied heavily upon tomahawks during the 
attack. One such occasion, the tomahawkmen captured a vil­
lage with little assistance except a few preliminary rounds 
from several small field pieces.^7
Despite his esprit de corps, aura of professionalism, 
and efficiency in close quarter combat, the Franklin soldier
46lbid.. 309-10.
4?Ibid.. 224, 257, 291; Haywood, Civil and Political 
History. 195, 198-99.
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was not immune to attacks of poor discipline, the familiar 
malady of the American militiaman. When his blood raced 
with anger after some Indian foray he turned the tomahawk 
and the knife upon women, children, the aged, and friendly 
Indians alike. Though Sevier condemned these atrocities, 
he was not able to control them. One day when he was absent 
from the command, John Kirk, a captain in the "Battalion of 
Bloody Rangers," murdered Corn Tassel and several other 
friendly Indians who had walked in under a flag of truce. 
Kirk and his men replied insolently to Sevier’s remonstran­
c e s .48 Indiscipline was also reflected in the rare but not 
unknown refusal of the militiamen to follow their leaders.
North Carolina did not have the military capability 
of sending troops against Franklin, nor was it likely that 
public opinion would have supported such a measure. Under 
these circumstances it made conciliatory moves designed to 
assault the new state from within. Formerly under North 
Carolina law there had been no local centralization of con­
trol of the western militia. Now the assembly, legislating 
as though the Franklin government did not exist, formed the 
disaffected counties into a single district and appointed a 
brigadier general to over-all command.49 This legislation 
and reforms in other fields were partially successful in
48Haywood, Civil and Political History, 195-96; 
Williams, Lost State, 213, footnote.
^^Williams. Lost State, 38.
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undermining the Franks, and old-staters together with many 
lukewarm new-staters placed themselves under the leadership 
of Evan Shelby, Joseph Martin, and John Tipton, all of whom 
advocated reunion with North Carolina,
A second militia, loyal to North Carolina and com­
manded by officers appointed by its assembly, soon made an 
appearance. In many places it existed as an extra organiza­
tion alongside the Franklin militia, but its main centers 
lay in the northeast where old-state sentiment was the 
strongest and the Indian threat the weakest.Efforts by 
the North Carolina loyalists to establish county courts and 
other agencies of local government soon led to clashes with 
the Franklin authorities. These began as raids in which 
informally constituted bodies of armed men attempted to 
seize or displace new-state officials. Retaliation in kind 
followed, and in the last years of the Franklin regime the 
two sides engaged in a kind of warfare marked by the forcible 
seizure of property, the imprisonment of rival leaders, raids 
on the courts, and frequent head-crackings.^l Sevier appears 
to have deliberately attempted to foment war with the Indians 
to distract attention from this conflict and to rekindle the 
enthusiasm of his adherents. Williams thinks that such mo­
tivations lay behind some of his efforts to organize the
^%bid.. 135, 190. Ramsay, Annals of Tennessee,
338, 340, 351, 356, 389.
^^Williams, Lost State. 143, 163, 198-99.
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joint Georgia-Franklin attack on the Creeks.
The growing friction culminated in February, 1788, 
in a pitched battle between small forces commanded by Sevier 
and Tipton, the old-state commander of the militia of one 
of the Franklin counties. The battle apparently resulted 
more from the personal animosities of the two leaders than 
from the formal policies of the two states, and it is there­
fore extremely doubtful that the men of either side were 
legally embodied. Sevier, who seems to have been lacking 
in enthusiasm for internecine warfare, delayed his attack 
and as a result suffered what may have been the only defeat 
in his career when Tipton unexpectedly received numerous 
reinforcements. The engagement was not hard fought. It
took place in a blinding snowstorm, and many on both sides
53fired into the air to avoid inflicting casualties. The 
dissolution of the Franklin government came rapidly after 
this battle, and soon many of its leaders were taking the 
oath of allegiance to North Carolina. However, a truncated 
"lesser Franklin," composed of the exposed southern region 
of the state as originally constituted and led by Sevier, 






The Wyoming Valiev: Pennamites, "Wild Yankees."
and Half-share Men
The conflict over the Wyoming Valley in northern 
Pennsylvania began in colonial days. Connecticut claimed 
this area under its charter of 1662, and in 1754 the Connec­
ticut Susquehanna Company purchased the land title from the 
Iroquois. When the company began to send colonists into 
the territory, Pennsylvania struck back with armed force.
The resulting "Pennamite-Yankee" wars of 1769 and 1775 left 
the settlers in possession, and Connecticut assumed juris­
diction of the region during the Revolution, organizing it 
into Westmoreland County. After the war Pennsylvania asked 
Congress to settle the quarrel under the provisions of Ar­
ticle IX of the Confederation. At Trenton in December 1782 
a Congressional tribunal awarded jurisdiction to Pennsylvania 
but left the question of the land titles undecided. Since 
Connecticut acquiesced in this decision, the company and the 
colonists were left to stand alone.
The Pennsylvania assembly, strongly influenced by 
land speculators, sent militia in the spring of 1784 to take 
over the territory. When these troops encountered the
^^Allen Nevins, The American States During and 
After the Revolution. 1775^789 (New York. 1924). 583-85. 
Hereafter cited as Nevins, American States.
5Glbid., 586; Julian P. Boyd, "Attempts to Form New 
States in New York and Pennsylvania," New York State Histor­
ical Society Proceedings. XXIX (1931 ) ,’”258-59. Hereafter 
cited as Boyd, "Attempts to Form New States."
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settlers, bloody clashes ensued, and the fighting continued 
throughout the summer. Though the Yankees were driven off, 
the Pennsylvania council of censors, which was not dominated 
by the speculators, bitterly criticized the campaign for the 
sufferings it had caused, for the money it had cost, and for 
the violation of the Articles of Confederation it was thought 
to r e p r e s e n t . A s  a result, the Pennsylvania government re­
stored the holdings of the settlers pending investigation 
and adjustment of the titles.58
Meantime, the company, its movements clothed in se­
crecy, had begun to foment a new-state movement as the surest 
way to protect its interests. The primary requisite for 
success was some kind of military force to resist the Penna- 
mite troops. To meet this need the company directors at a 
meeting in July 1785 planned the formation of a private mil­
itia. They resolved that "able-bodied and effective men" 
reporting to Wyoming and placing themselves at the disposal 
of the company’s representatives for three years should be 
given a half-share of land. Though the minutes of the meet­
ing contain no mention of soldiers and fighting, this offer 
constituted a call for troops and was intended as such.59
57«Action of Council of Censors," 11 Sept. 1784, 
Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., XVIII, 640-41.
58fjevins, American States. 279 , 588.
^^Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., XVIII, 105-08; 
Boyd, "Attempts to Form New States," 260.
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During this period of preparation the company also opened 
negotiations with Ethan Allen; and, after an appropriate 
number of shares had been transferred, groups of armed Green 
Mountain Boys soon arrived on the sce ne .Al len , an old 
hand at state making, addressed some bellicose advice to 
the settlers: "crowd your settlements, add to your numbers
and strength, procure firearms and ammunition, be united 
among yourselves. . . .  I will not give up my interest to 
usurpers, without trying it out by force of arms."^^
Leadership of the separatist movement rested in the 
hands of a standing committee of four, including Allen and 
John Franklin, one of the more radical se tt ler s.When 
Connecticut ceded its western claims to Congress in May 
1786, interest in the movement rapidly gained momentum. By 
this time the "half-share militia" had been enlisted to 
about six hundred men. The Pennsylvania claimants had few 
kind words for the recruits that were obtained. Those given 
shares in one area, they said, "were universally given to 
thievery" and to "disimulation, intrigues, and bad morals.
^^Boyd, "Attempts to Form New States," 260.
Glquoted in Julian P. Boyd, "Connecticut’s Experi­
ment in Expansion, The Susquehannah Company, 1753-1803," 
Journal of Economic and Business History. IV (1931-32), 67.
^^The Committee was appointed on 17 May 1786. 
Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., XVIII, 109.
G^Boyd, "Attempts to Form New States," 261; Nevins, 
American States, 589.
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Pennsylvania, now thoroughly alarmed, attempted to 
head off a crisis by passing some legislation. In September 
1786 it erected the territory into Luzerne County and in 
March 1787 confirmed the claims of all Yankees who had held 
land prior to the Trenton decision. Both of these measures 
tended to undermine the new-state movement, and Franklin 
bitterly opposed them. Finally in September 1787 he ordered 
the half-share men to assemble under arms,^^ Riots and dis­
turbances followed, continuing into the summer of 1788, The 
main incident involved the seizure of Timothy Pickering, 
who had been sent by Pennsylvania to organize the new county 
and quiet the "wild Yankees,"
At this point Pennsylvania, having no troops readily 
available, requested the aid of Congress, As already re­
lated, that body ordered a detachment of federal troops then 
marching to the Ohio to detour through the county. Their 
assistance was not, however, required, A. proclamation is­
sued by the state for the arrest of Franklin and others had 
brought the rioting to an end. On 11 August the executive 
council was able to report that Colonel Pickering had been 
released, that some of the leading rioters had been jailed, 
and that one of the most notorious, a man named Dudley, had 
died of wounds. This ended the new state movement for the
^^Boyd, "Attempts to Form New States," 262, The act 
of March 1787 may be found in Pennsylvania Archives, 2d Ser,, 
XVIII, 660-64,
C, Ford and Hunt, XC, XXXIV, 351, 408,
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moment, though there was a revival of the activities of the 
Susquehanna Company in 1795.
The Hampshire Grants; the Yorkers
In September 1782 Vermont renewed an old quarrel with 
New York by attempting to extend its jurisdiction over New 
York adherents living in Windham County in the Hampshire 
Grants. When they resisted, it condemned several of- them 
"to banishment not to return on pain of death and confisca­
tion of estate,” and fined others large amounts. New York, 
led by Governor George Clinton, immediately fallied to the 
defense of the Yorkers. First it attempted to get Congress 
to intervene, and that body on 5 December called upon Vermont 
to desist and threatened to send troops if she failed to 
comply.However, the federal army, which was composed 
primarily of New Englanders, could not be relied on for such 
an undertaking, and on Washington’s warning the project was 
hastily dropped.
Soon thereafter the New York legislature directed its 
delegates in Congress to obtain authority from that body for
^^Ibid., 351, 353-56, 408; Boyd, "Attempts to Form 
New States," 263.
C. Ford and Hunt, JÇÇ, XXIII, 765-66, 769. A 
general discussion of the New York-Vermont conflict may be 
found in Nevins, American States, 579-583.
^^George Washington to Joseph Jones, 11 Feb. 1783, 
Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington. XXVI, 121- 
24. See also the New York Delegates to the Governor of New 
York, 9 Dec. 1782, Burnett, Letters. VI, 557.
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the state to raise five hundred standing troops. In the or­
iginal directive to the delegates it was stated that the 
troops would be used to occupy the Western posts upon their 
evacuation by the B r i t i s h . T h e  purpose was subsequently 
expanded to include "the preservation of the fortresses on 
all the frontiers of this State, and the protection of its
citizens," a phrase which could be construed to include the
70Yorkers in Windham County.
One writer has assumed that from the beginning New
York intended to employ at least part of the five hundred
71men against Vermont. This was probably not the case. Any 
force sent from New York, as the same writer shows, would 
have to pass through either Massachusetts or Bennington 
County in Vermont. The former favored the Vermonters and 
could be expected to deny passage, and the latter had proved 
to be unsafe fighting ground for New York troops since their 
first invasion of Vermont in 1 7 6 9 . It may be noted in 
this respect that in the phase of the conflict now being 
considered New York did not make a single effort to send
69Eliakim Persons Walton (ed.), Records of the Gov­
ernor and Council of the State of Vermont (Montpelier.
1876), III, 278. Hereafter cited as Walton, Records of 
Vermont.
70W. C. Ford and Hunt, XXVII, 379-81; Walton,
Records of Vermont. Ill, footnote page 278.
^^Editorial Comments of Walton in Records of Ver­
mont, III, 277-79, 319, 323, 325.
72Walton, Records of Vermont. Ill, 279, 315.
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militia across either area. The state would hardly have 
sent standing troops, taken raw from the militia, to carry 
out an operation it would not entrust to the militia itself. 
A more likely interpretation is that New York utilized the 
requests to impress Congress with the seriousness of its 
intentions in an effort to force that body to intervene. 
Whatever may have been the purpose, the requests became en­
tangled in the plans for a federal peace establishment and 
were rejected every time they were brought forward,
Meantime, Governor Thomas Chittenden and the Vermont 
authorities had refused to comply with the admonition of 
Congress, They arrested several Yorker leaders who returned 
to Windham County on the heels of the resolution of 5 Decem­
ber and ordered out troops to oppose the two companies of 
Yorker militia that took up arms in the ensuing altercation. 
At the last moment the matter was temporarily settled by a 
truce agreement,74 February of the following year (1783) 
the legislature undertook measures to re-form the army, 
which had been disbanded during the preceding session. It 
resolved that a military force be raised for the defense of 
the frontier in "the ensuing Campaign," a euphemism for the 
threat from New York, appointed a board of war consisting of 
eight militia officers, and accepted a committee report
73See above pages 54, 56,
74walton, Records of Vermont. Ill, 252-53,
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fixing the military requirement at five hundred men. Though 
the assembly ordered that a bill be drawn in accordance with 
the report, there is no indication that the men were ever
raised.75
By the early summer of 1783 it was clear to Governor 
Clinton that Congress did not intend to enforce its warning 
to Vermont. His only means of protecting the Yorkers lay in 
the militia. Since troops could not be sent from New York, 
for reasons already discussed* the entire job would have to 
be done by the loyal militia in Windham County. On 24 June 
he advised Colonel Timothy Church, Yorker militia commander 
in that county, to call out his regiment and meet force with 
force in case Vermont attempted to compet submission from 
the New York adherents. He tempered these instructions, 
however, with an admonition to avoid a military showdown if 
this could be done without sacrificing the safety of the 
Yorkers and their property. The letter contained several 
references to the possibility that Congress might soon set­
tle the conflict.76
Encouraged by Clinton's advice to Colonel Church and 
still expecting aid from Congress, the Yorkers declared 
their intention to resist any effort to execute the Vermont 
laws.77 Meantime, during the October session of the Vermont
75ibid.. 267-69. '^ I^bid-. 280.
77ibid.. 297.
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legislature, the governor, the council, and the assembly 
met in grand committee four times to consider the growing 
emergency. During the course of these deliberations the 
committee ordered that two companies of fifty men each be 
raised from the militia to assist the civil power in sup­
pressing the insurrection. The troops were to serve for six 
months unless sooner discharged. The committee also directed 
General Samuel Fletcher to hold his brigade in readiness to 
assist and instructed Colonel Benjamin Wait, the commander 
of the special force, to treat Yorkers who submitted with 
consideration rather than severity.78
With both sides having set their courses, the con­
flict began in earnest. During November and December the 
New York adherents, operating in small parties, kidnapped 
two prominent Vermonters, one of them the former lieutenant- 
governor, and forcibly prevented the arrest of one of their 
own chiefs. The Vermont authorities retaliated by promptly 
jailing two influential Yorkers, William Shattuck and Charles 
Phelps, both of whom had been permitted to remain at large, 
though the first was under sentence of death for treason and 
the second under indictment for the same offense. Discon­
certed by this move, sixteen leading Yorkers petitioned Ver­
mont to halt such seizures and to restrain Colonel Wait’s 
troops "from marching to the support of the government" until
7Glbid.. 298-99.
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a compromise could be worked out.?9
Governor Chittenden rejected the petition, and the 
conflict continued. The showdown came in January. Through­
out the month, the government sent out small groups of 
militia to arrest Yorker conspirators, if they may be called 
that. Angered by these raids, a party of about twenty 
Yorkers attached the headquarters of the Vermont commissary- 
general in Brattleboro, wounded one officer, and carried off 
another. The next day the high sheriff and two hundred mil­
itiamen set off in pursuit. The posse found a large party 
of Yorkers assembled at Guilford apparently determined to 
resist. However, they fled without firing a shot as the
posse approached.80
A few days later, another large force was sent out 
to disperse some forty Yorkers who had gathered south of 
Guilford near the Massachusetts line. The Yorkers fired 
one volley, wounding a sergeant, and hastily retreated into 
Massachusetts as the Vermonters returned the fire.81 At 
about this time, Ethan Allen arrived at Guilford with three 
companies of reinforcements from Bennington County and 
promptly announced that if the town did not submit he would 
"lay it as desolate as Sodom and. Gomorrah."8^ These gentle
79lbid., 302-03. 8 0 ^ ^ ,  ^ 303-05.
81lbid.. 305-06.
B^Howland E. Robinson, Vermont, A Study of Indepen­
dence (Boston and New York, 1892), 240,
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words appear to have completed the work of the posse. It 
soon marched back to Brattleboro, where it was dismissed, 
except for a small guard to conduct prisoners to Westmin­
ister for trial.83
Throughout February parts of two companies were sta­
tioned in Guilford and neighboring towns. Though a party 
was sent into Massachusetts to seize Daniel Shepardson of 
Guilford, who had accepted a New York commission as magis­
trate, the primary mission of the force was to prevent the 
return of the Yorkers who had fled the posse. Toward the 
end of the month the assembly directed the discharge of all 
but twenty-seven men of the two companies, and this small 
guard was retained in service for only a few weeks l o n g e r . 8 4  
The military phase of the conflict came to an end 
early in March with a final burst of action. On the fifth, 
the guard, commanded by Lieutenant Elijah Knight, fired on 
a Yorker lieutenant who was attempting to return to Vermont. 
Unfortunately, the volley hit and killed his traveling com­
panion, Daniel Spicer of Bernardsville, Massachusetts, who 
had not participated in the insurrection. Knight, who feared 
the incident might bring the Yorkers pouring out of Massachu­
setts, got off a hasty letter to Chittenden and called on 
nearby towns for additional militia. When he began to
8%alton, Records of Vermont, III, 306.
84%bid.. 306-08, 311.
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receive rumors of "an army coming from Massachusetts to 
avenge the death and reinstate the Yorkers" he hurriedly 
withdrew to Brattleboro and ordered out more reinforcements.®^
The assembly, which seems to have shared Lieutenant 
Knight’s apprehensions, took strong measures to deal with 
the crisis. On the ninth it conferred upon General Fletcher 
full authority to call out such militia as he might think 
necessary from all the brigades of the state and dispatched 
him to Windham County to take charge. On the same day it 
instructed the governor to request Governor John Hancock of 
Massachusetts to grant warrants for the apprehension of 
Yorkers who had fled to that state. In writing Hancock, 
Chittenden charged that a small number of Massachusetts citi­
zens had aided the Yorkers, and in response Massachusetts on 
the twenty-sixth issued a proclamation commanding its citi­
zens to remain strictly neutral. Meantime, Knight’s fears 
had proven groundless, for the army from Massachusetts did 
not materialize. Within a short time, Fletcher dismissed 
all the militia that the lieutenant had called up and by the 
end of the month it was possible to discharge the twenty- 
seven guardsmen.®®
When the New York legislature met in the spring of 
1784 it had to face the fact that the state had been unable 
to protect its citizens in Windham County. The legislature
G^lbid., 311. ^^Ibid.. 312-14.
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began to pelt its delegates in Congress with instructions 
apparently intended to obtain Congressional intervention.
In March it ordered them to press Congress for a decision 
concerning jurisdiction in the Hampshire Grants, a matter 
which had been held in abeyance since early in the Revolu­
tion. In April and again in May it directed them to renew 
the state's request for authority to raise five hundred 
troops.87 When Congress neglected to act, New York was 
forced to reluctantly concede Windham County and the Yorkers 
to Vermont.
87ibid.. 316-18, 320-21, 323.
CHAPTER IV 
FEDERALIST MILITARY POLICY
The adoption of the Constitution in 1788 and the 
formation of the new government represented only a partial 
victory for the nationalists. The old conflicts involving 
the division of powers between the central government and 
the states raged unabated. In the realm of military policy, 
the change intensified the anxieties of the anti-national­
ists, for the Constitution had strengthened the military 
powers of the central government. It vested the right of 
command in the chief executive, who was much more capable 
of rapid and decisive action than the war boards and commit­
tees of the Confederation. It indirectly provided that 
federal armies should be commanded by officers named by the 
President, confirmed by the Senate, and commissioned in the 
name of the central government. No longer would the leaders 
of the regular troops of the United States be selected by 
the several states. Finally, and perhaps most important of 
all, the Constitution in conferring tax powers directly on 
the central government rendered the array more or less inde­
pendent of the voluntary generosity of the states in meeting
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requests for funds. The effect was to eliminate the possi­
bility that the states might veto army measures by refusing 
to provide money.
By about 1793 formal political parties began to 
emerge from the embryonic alignments of the earlier years of 
the republic. The federalists embraced the military doc­
trines of the old nationalists and the Republicans those of 
the old anti-nationalists. The currents that determined 
American military policy thus continued to flow in the same 
directions but perhaps at somewhat greater speeds. From the 
first unmistakable appearance of the party system until the 
end of the period under consideration the Federalists main­
tained a majority in the Senate. The Republicans controlled 
the House during the Third and Fourth Congresses, and the 
Federalists maintained a precarious sway in that body during 
the Fifth and Sixth.
Federalist military policy called for the establish­
ment of adequate standing forces and for the federalization 
of the militia. Though the public sentiment was still not 
ready for such measures, this is not to say that they were 
completely impracticable. The Federalists did succeed in ' 
pushing through a watered down militia bill in 1792,^ and 
during the Indian crisis of 1790-94 the Congress, pressed by 
successive disasters on uncharted battlefields in the North-
^The passage of this act is discussed in Chapter VI.
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western forests, finally raised enough regulars to retrieve 
a cause that appeared almost hopelessly doomed. But the 
Federalists, who sometimes possessed the capacity to look 
down the gunbarrel at a fact, were finally forced to acknow­
ledge that their policy despite its partial success was 
unpopular, and hence politically unsound.
The result of this realization was a brilliant im­
provisation by Alexander Hamilton, who devised the "provis­
ional" army. This was a federal force to be organized and 
trained in time of peace and to be called up only as future 
contingences dictated,. It was apparently designed to meet 
democratic fears of suppression and bankruptcy in that it 
would remain scattered, unembodied, and unpaid until the 
moment of need. The. Hamiltonian concept, however, did not 
completely escape the basic political disability of standing 
troops, that is their federal character. Provisional armies 
differed little from regular armies in the cloudy mazes of 
Republican military ideology.
The Republicans favored complete reliance on the 
militia. Whatever the military necessity they opposed every 
measure to increase the standing forces. Their intransigency 
appears to have been entirely doctrinaire and completely 
divorced from reality. One suspects that rather than raise 
a single regular they would have fed every militiaman in the 
nation into the great Indian maw that had ground down on 
Harmar and St. Clair. Yet behind this unreal world of
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doctrine lay a greater reality that only good Republicans 
could sense. Indians were no more dangerous than house cats, 
but regular armies were lions that first devoured the sus­
tenance of the people and then the people themselves. Nor 
was the eye that could see the lion completely aberrant. 
During the French crisis of 1797-1800 the great beast for a 
fleeting moment stalked out of the inner jungle into the open 
where all could see him.
It was unfortunate that the battle of military prin­
ciples had to be fought out during a period teeming with 
military threats. Until 1794 there was constant Indian 
warfare on the Northwest frontier and the Indian menace was 
never absent in the Southwest. American ships at sea were 
beset first by the Algerians and the British and later by 
the French and their Spanish allies. From 1797 to 1800 full 
scale war with France was considered a possibility, and 
during these years a naval war was actually fought. Mean­
time domestic disturbances were rife. The Whiskey Rebellion, 
a revolt of some magnitude, occurred in 1794, and Fries* 
Rebellion, a minor uprising, in 1799.
The history of the military legislation during the 
Indian troubles is a story of compromise and delay. Troop 
estimates were frequently cut to meet Republican objections, 
and armies were diluted with large numbers of militia to 
satisfy Republican principles. Most military acts were 
passed long after the military necessity had become apparent.
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Men were then hastily raised and sent into action with little 
or no training. The tragic outcome in at least one case-- 
St. Clair’s defeat— was a wilderness battlefield piled high 
with the dead. The strange mixture of Republican fears, 
ideals, and unworldliness that diluted every military bill 
was as deadly as the arrow and the tomahawk. Nor were the 
Federalists completely blameless. President Washington and 
Secretary of War Henry Knox themselves were not always able 
to use wisely the ragged and understrength armies that Con­
gress permitted them.
When the whiskey rebels got out their guns and scythes,
p
a large force of militia was sent against them. The failure 
to use regulars disproved the flaming words of every anti­
nationalist who had ever referred to the army as the suppres­
sor of the people. There may be some reason to believe that 
the President in employing militia wished to avoid the Repub­
lican vilification that would have inevitably followed the 
appearance of federal troops on the scene. However, this is 
primarily an academic question, for the few regulars in ser­
vice could not be withdrawn from the Northwest. In any event 
the army remained inculpable, and this outcome was almost as 
important as the crushing of the rebellion. Militia was also 
used against Fries though a few companies of regulars were
^he military measures taken during the Whiskey 
Rebellion are discussed on pages 380-84.
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indirectly involved.^
The compromise and confusion that characterized mili­
tary policy during the Indian troubles continued into the 
great French crisis. Each party presented a military program 
in line with its doctrines, and both programs— or major por­
tions of them— were enacted. The Federalists obtained small 
immediate army increases, a "provisional” army, some special 
volunteer associations, and an "additional” army, only a 
part of which was ever raised. The Republicans obtained a 
detachment of militia that was to be held in readiness for 
the President's call. The efficacy of a system comprising 
so many different types of troops was open to serious ques­
tion. Indeed, the job of keeping the enlistment roles 
straight must have been an extremely difficult task in it­
self.
The French crisis precipitated the most virulent 
party struggle in American history prior to the election of 
1860. Large parts of the population, particularly in the 
Republican centers, had demonstrated their sentimental at­
tachment to the principles of French democracy by the forma­
tion of Jacobin clubs. Republican editors denounced the 
administration and its policies in terms of unsurpassed 
bitterness and contumely. It was hardly surprising that 
many Federalists feared revolution on the French model with
3
See below pages 384-86.
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guillotined heads for the wealthy and social anarchy for all. 
Their military program was devised not only to meet the 
French threat but also the domestic danger, whether it may 
have been real or illusory.
In their turn, the Republicans feared the use of 
force to put down liberty and freedom. For years they had 
cried lion at every rustle in the brush. Now for once the 
lion was actually upon them. Many lost their voices as it 
skulked nearer, but a small band of devoted and intrepid 
men— actually only two or three--continued to sound the 
warning. They lashed out at what they viewed as Federalist 
efforts to suppress opinion, to overawe parliamentary re­
sistance, and in the resulting milieu of fear to raise great 
armies for uses that could only bring ruin to democrats. 
Fortunately, the needs of French diplomacy, which dictated 
a settlement, and the good sense of President John Adams, who 
escaped the snares of the ultras in his party, put out the 
fuse an inch or two before it reached the explosive.
Naval policy is, of course, an element of military 
policy. As a part of the military programs of 1794 and 1797- 
1800 naval legislation was a favorite Federalist project.
As usual the Republicans resisted to the full extent of their 
ability. They succeeded in paring down administration naval 
estimates, refused to give the incomparable frigates of the 
naval war credit for their successes, and denied that navies 
had any defensive value whatsoever. Nevertheless the
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Federalists succeeded in laying the foundations of the 
American navy.
Initial Military Legislation and the First 
Army Increases (First Congress!
When the new Congress met in its first session dur­
ing the summer of 1789, its major task was to organize the 
government under the Constitution. In the military realm a 
war office had to be established and some interim provision 
had to be made for an armed force. Almost perfunctorily the 
Congress passed bills to accomplish both these purposes. In 
the Act of 7 August 1789 it set up the Department of War as 
an executive agency, provided it with a secretary and a chief 
clerk, and outlined their duties.4 in the Act of 29 Septem­
ber 1789 it laid claim to the standing troops of the Confed­
eration, required them to swear fealty to the Constitution, 
and bound them to the federal articles of war, which for the 
moment continued to be those of the Confederation. The only 
material change lay in the fact that henceforth the officers 
would be appointed by the central government rather than the
states.5
Under this law the new government came into posses­
sion of one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artil­
lery. The total authorized strength of these units, which




included the troops raised under the act of 3 October 1787 
and the Massachusetts artillerymen of 1786, was 840 men, but 
they actually contained no more than about 670 at the moment. 
Since the men had been enlisted for only three years the 
terms of some were beginning to expire.^ Though the act 
made no provision for re-enlistments, it would be in force 
only to the end of the next session of Congress, a fact 
which presupposed additional legislation in the near future. 
Meantime, the act also authorized the President to call out 
the militia as might be necessary for the defense of the 
frontier.
Before the enlistments of the troops in service ex­
pired the rapidly developing Indian troubles made the first 
army increases necessary. In early 1790, as the second 
session of the Congress convened, Georgia appeared to be 
the main center of disturbance, but the entire frontier was 
restive. In his opening address on 8 January the President 
made only passing reference to military problems, but four 
days later he sent up a confidential report from Secretary 
Knox outlining the situation on the southern and western 
frontiers. So important was the subject considered that the 
secretary himself appears to have hand-carried the documents 
to the Senate and probably also to the House of Representa-
^American State Papers, Military Affairs. I, 5-6. 
Hereafter cited as State Papers, MA.
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tlves.7
In the Senate all of this alarmed the extreme and 
dyspeptic democrat from Pennsylvania, William Maclay. "In 
now came General Knox with a bundle of communications," he 
wrote. "I thought the act was a mad one, when a Secretary 
of War was appointed in time of peace. The man wants to
O
labor in his vocation." And indeed Maclay had some reason 
for apprehension, for the secretary’s report stated that the 
Creeks had refused recent peace overtures. If they contin­
ued their forays on the frontier settlements an army of 5040 
men at a cost of about $1,152,000 for one year would be re­
quired for offensive operations to bring them to terms.
Even if a war with these Indians did not materialize, the 
army should be augmented to 1680 men to protect the frontiers 
from Georgia to Lake Erie, to keep squatters off the public 
lands, and to facilitate the survey and sale of the lands.9
The House had appointed a committee on military af­
fairs following the President’s s p e e c h , and on 25 March it 
finally passed a bill for the defense of the Southwestern 
frontier. The content and legislative history of the measure
^Annals, 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 973, 1091.
%. S. Maclay (ed.). The Journal of William Maclay, 
United States Senator from Pennsylvania. 1789-91 (New York, 
1927),171. Hereafter cited as Maclay, Maclay.
^American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 59-80. 
Hereafter cited as State Papers, lA.
l^Annals, 1 Cong. 2 Sess., 1095.
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are hidden behind the closed doors of that body^ and the 
reticence of the Senate, which did not permit its debates to 
be reported until years later. Fortunately the choleric 
gentleman from Pennsylvania kept no secrets from his journal, 
particularly in the case of standing armies, which like all 
good democrats he abhorred. According to his account the 
bill provided for sixteen hundred men for three years.
In the Senate, where the bill was under consideration
13for almost a month, the "flamers," as Maclay called those 
favoring standing troops, "blazed" away day after day. Their 
numbers included Pierce Butler and Ralph Izard of South Caro­
lina, Rufus King and Philip Schuyler of New York, and Oliver 
Ellsworth of Connecticut. At first they drew "frightful pic­
tures" of the distress in Georgia, but unfortunately James 
Gunn of that state arrived fresh from home in the middle of 
the debate. He denied the allegation that fifty Indians had 
been raiding the state, announced that all was at peace with 
the best prospects of continuing so, and declared that he 
should vote against the bill.^^ With the ground thus cut
l^ Tbid., 1476. When the bill was called up in the 
House on 25 Mar. the galleries were cleared. The only 
indication that it was passed on that day is found in the 
fact that it was received by the Senate on 26 Mar. Ibid., 
995. Maclay, Maclay. 219.
l^Maclay, Maclay, 219, 238.
was actually considered on ten different days. 
Annals. 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 995-96, 998, 1000, 1001.
l^Maclay, Maclay. 233-34.
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from beneath them, the proponents of the measure discovered 
that the people of Kentucky were carrying on “a dangerous 
and dreadful conspiracy" with the Spaniards. It would be 
perilous to give the frontiersmen arms for their own de­
fense, said King, because they might turn them against the 
United States.
However, all of the "flamers" were by no means on 
the one side. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, one of the 
principals of the old Lee-Adams states* rights junto of the 
Confederation Congress, dusted off his famous set speech on
the dangers of standing armies and entertained his listeners
] f\with a rendition of particular virtuosity. Maclay himself,
a tenacious debater, made several fierce little speeches in
the tenor of Lee*s, "wipe/il/ King hard" for the aspersions
he had cast on the Westerners, and demanded to see the infor-
1 7mation upon which the charges were based. To these attacks, 
Izard blandly replied that standing troops should not be
1 Afeared and that he would like to have ten thousand of them, 
remarks that must have left Maclay empurpled and coughing.
On April 16, the Senate reduced the number of men 
from sixteen hundred to one thousand but immediately upped 
the figure to twelve hundred on the motion of Ellsworth. 
Maclay, who had voted for the reduction on the theory of the
l^ibid.. 234. l^Ibid.. 233.
^^Ibid.. 227, 234-35. ^^Ibid.. 239.
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fewer the better, turned purple again. Ellsworth’s motion 
was completely out of order, he wrote, and furthermore "No 
man ever had a more complete knack of putting his foot into 
a business than this same Ellsw ort h.Another crisis arose 
when the clause limiting the act to two years was struck, 
apparently because it conflicted with the enlistment term 
of three years. According to Maclay, the bill then called 
for a permanent standing army. As a result of the operation 
of the Mutiny Bill, which had to be renewed each year, he 
added, not even Great Britain had such a thing. The Con­
stitutional clause limiting appropriations to two years had 
been designed to bring about the same effect in this country. 
The heavy-footed Ellsworth replied that there was a distinc­
tion between enlisting men for three years and appropriating
20their pay for three years.
On April 21 the Senate passed the bill as amended to 
provide twelve hundred men. The fact that no roll call ap­
pears in the Annals probably indicates heavy sentiment in 
favor of the measure. Under the rules, roll calls were re­
corded when requested by one-fifth of the members, and Lee 
and Maclay would undoubtedly have demanded one if they had 
been able to muster the necessary s u p p o r t . T h e  House
l^Ibid.. 234-35. % b i d .. 236-38.
21Annals. 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 1001. Under the date 
of 21 Apr., Maclay wrote "A standing army was the avowed 
doctrine, and on the question Lee, Wyngate, and myself 
arose. I openly declared my regret that there were not
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concurred in the Senate amendment two days later, and the
oo
act became law on 30 April.
The supporters of the measure had been severely em­
barrassed by Gunn's assertion that the Georgia frontier was 
quiet and likely to remain so. This statement reinforced 
the belief of Maclay and a few others that the Georgia danger 
had been put forward simply as an excuse for building up the 
army. We must have an army, sneered the Pennsylvanian, "for 
fear the Department of War should lack e m p l o y m e n t . "^3 This 
was not an entirely fair criticism. The administration’s 
estimate of the Georgia situation was based partially upon 
a letter from the Governor of Georgia to the United States 
Commissioners to the Creeks and a report of the commission­
ers themselves. The former, dated 4 October 1789, contained 
a return of the depredations of these Indians. Since the 
renewal of hostilities in 1787, they had killed, wounded or 
carried away 131 whites and 120 blacks. During the same 
period they had stolen 763 horses and 884 cattle, destroyed
enough of us to call the yeas and nays." Maclay, Maclay,
239. It is not clear, however, as to whether he was re­
ferring to the vote on his motion to restore the limiting 
clause or to the final vote on the bill.
^^Maclay, Maclay, 240. The bill is mentioned only 
once in the House proceedings in the Annals. This is in the 
entry for 25 Mar. already cited in footnote 11 above. The 
text of the act is in Annals. 1 Cong., 2222-25.
23
Maclay, Maclay. 233, and also 221.
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24387 hogs, and burned 89 houses. The report of the commis­
sioners, written on 20 November 1789, stated that the Indians 
had refused to make a treaty, that eight posts each gar­
risoned by one company of troops would be required for de­
fensive protection, and that 4250 men would be necessary if
25offensive operations were decided upon.
Colonel Gunn’s statements themselves were much more 
questionable than the administration’s actions. Perhaps 
the Indians had been quieter than usual for a month or two 
before he left Georgia. However, such periods of comparative 
peace were not unusual, and they were always followed by new 
outbursts. Gunn was only the first of a long line of fron­
tier Congressmen to disclaim the need for regulars to defend 
their own settlers. As it developed later, this curious 
stand was based upon the frontier preference for militia, 
an attitude that dove-tailed neatly with states’ rights 
military doctrine. Gunn may well have had this fact in mind.
Harmar’s Defeat (First Congress, Third Session) 
Following the passage of the Act of 30 April 1790 
the center of military activity shifted from Georgia to the
George Walton to the Hon. B. Lincoln, C. Griffin, 
D. Humphreys, Esqurs., Commissioners, & c., State Papers. 
lA. I, 76-77. The inclusive dates for the return are not 
given, but from the context of the accompanying letter the 
period apparently begins in 1787 and extends to 4 Oct.
1789.
^^The Commissioners to Secretary of War, State 
Papers. lA. 78-79.
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Northwest. By July it had become clear that Governor Arthur 
St, Clair*s effort to put an end by negotiation to the con­
stant raids had failed. The administration, with the army 
newly strengthened and the frontier militia straining with 
eagerness, decided to carry the fighting to the Indians. 
General Josiah Harmar, the federal commander in the North­
west, was selected to command the major attack, which was 
to be directed against the Indian villages on the Maumee.
Knox admonished him to take every precaution to insure suc­
cess, to conduct the expedition in "the most perfect manner," 
and to move rapidly and decisively
Late in September as Harmar reviewed his little army 
at Fort Washington, near the tiny settlement of Cincinnati, 
he must have wondered how one could take precautions and 
move rapidly with such "a motley collection of short-time 
soldiers." Many did not even know how to put flints in the 
hammers of their muskets, others had enlisted only for free 
transportation to the Ohio c^jntry, and almost all were 
clumsy and apathetic. The general was undoubtedly filled 
with misgivings as he ordered his militiamen forward about 
24 September and followed a few days later with the handful 
of regulars.
^^James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S . 
Army. 1783-1812 (Princeton, 1947), 49-52% Hereafter cited 
as Jacobs, Beginning of U. S. Army.
'^^ Ibid.. 53.
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Meantime, back at Mount Vernon, the President was
also visited by forebodings. Rumors blown out of the West
by some ill wind caused him to wonder whether victory really
marched with his commander. On 19 November he wrote Knox:
I expected little from the moment I heard he was a 
drunkard. . . . And I gave up all hope of Success, as 
soon as I heard that there were disputes with him 
about command.
The latter information is from report only ; but the 
report of bad news is rarely without foundation. If 
the issue of this Expedition is honorable to the Con­
certera of it, and favorable to our Arms, it will be 
double pleasing to me; but my mind, from the silence 
which reigns, and other circumstances, is prepared for 
the worst. . .
At the very moment that the great soldier’s military 
intuition was thus working overtime, an express from Fort 
Washington was riding eastward with the news he feared. On 
October 19 one of Harmar’s columns had been cut to pieces as 
it marched carelessly down a wilderness trail, and three 
days later a poorly conducted attack on a village had ended 
in a second disaster. The casualties of the campaign amounted 
to more than one-seventh of the total strength of the force.
A board of inquiry which met later did not, however, attri­
bute the failure to either the bottle or the command troubles. 
It white-washed Harmar completely— his personal conduct was 
"irreproachable," the troops were properly organized, the 
order of march was adapted to the country, the battle plans
^®John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.). The Writings of George 
Washington (Washington, 1931-44), X ^ I , 156.
29Jacobs, Beginning of U. S. Army. 57-60.
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were judicious, and so on. It did note that some of the 
general’s orders were improperly executed and adduced pages 
of evidence reflecting on the behavior of the militia, which 
constituted almost eighty percent of the c o m m a n d . ^0
On 8 December 1791, the President in his second 
annual address had prepared the way for later announcements 
by telling Congress that he had authorized the expedition
but that the result was not yet k n o w n . By the following
32day rumors of defeat were circulating, and on the four­
teenth the President sent up General Harmar’s report, which 
had arrived the day before.^3 Maclay was more concerned 
about the implication of the affair than the heavy losses.
The war had been undertaken without the consent of Congress, 
he wrote, and its purpose was to serve as a pretext for 
raising more troops.^4
His fears were realized on 24 January when the Presi­
dent transmitted a big bundle of papers from Knox including 
a plan for further operations in the Northwest with twelve 
hundred regulars, five hundred rangers, and thirteen hundred 
’’levies” or volunteers, and a request for another regiment
30%he report of the board is in State Papers. MA. I, 
20-36. The board’s findings will be found on page 30 and 
criticisms of the militia on almost every page.
3lAnnals. 1 Cong., 3 Sess., 1729.
S^Maclay, Maclay, 339.
3^Annals. 1 Cong., 3 Sess., 1734, 1800. State 
Papers. lA. I, 104-06.
^^Maclay, Maclay. 339, 378.
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of regular t r o o p s . T h r e e  days later these documents were 
followed by another bundle, fortunately much smaller, de­
scribing more Indian depredations, this time on the Muskingum 
near M a r i e t t a . O n  11 February the House cleared the gal­
leries and locked itself up, apparently to consider all these 
reports.37 On the twelfth it sent a bill to the Senate add­
ing the new regiment and making other provisions for the
38defense of the frontier. As passed by that body, the 
measure finally became the act of 3 March 1791.39
Since the House sat behind closed shutters and the 
Senate deliberated without the aid of its reporter, no in­
formation concerning the debates is available except a few 
words from Maclay. The amendments were longer than the bill, 
he would vote against the augmentation, and this army raised 
to fight Indians would be used "to awe our citizens into 
submission." Thomas Fitzsimons, a member of the House from 
Pennsylvania, had been overheard declaring that "one thousand
35gtate Papers, lA. I, 107-21. The plan is on page 
112 and the troop requirement on page 113.
36lbid.. 121-22.
37Annals. 1 Cong., 3 Sess., 1962, 1967. See also 
Howard White, "Executive Influence in Determining Military 
Policy in the United States," Reprint from the University of 
Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. XII, Nos. 1-2 
(1925), 100. Hereafter cited as White, "Executive Influ­
ence."
3QAnnals. 1 Cong., 3 Sess., 1757. 
39lbid.. 1757, 1761, 1771, 1774, 1967.
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men would avenge the insults offered to Congress.'* Maclay 
thought that in speaking of ’’insults'* Fitzsimons had meant 
the opposition in the states to the excise tax.^^
The new act^l not only provided the new regiment 
(for three years) raising the strength of the army to 2128 
men, but it also authorized the President to appoint a major 
general, to engage a body of militia horse, and to raise up 
to two thousand levies for six months. These last troops 
would be enlisted as volunteers, and the President would 
organize them into units and appoint their officers. General 
Emory Upton writes that the act thus provided an entirely 
new type of troops and laid the foundation for the volunteer 
system of Civil War fame.42 In case the new regular regiment 
could not be completed in time for the planned campaign, the 
act permitted the President to call out ordinary militia or 
raise more levies to meet the deficiency.
St. Clair’s Defeat (Second Congress,
First Session)'
Plans for the new campaign were pushed rapidly for­
ward. On March 4, the day after the act became law. Governor 
St. Clair was appointed to fill the position of major
4®Maclay, Maclay. 384.
4lAnnals, 1 Cong., 2350-53.
4%mory Upton, The Military Policy of the United 
States (Washington, 1917), 79. Hereafter cited as Upton, 
Military Policy.
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g e n e r a l , 43 and on the twenty-first Knox sent him a letter of 
instructions. His command was to consist of the old 1st 
Regiment, which would be enlisted to full strength, the new 
2nd Regiment, or as much of it as could be immediately 
raised, and about two thousand levies. Since some troops 
would remain at posts along the Ohio, the field force would 
contain about three thousand men. With this little army,
St. Clair was to advance on "the Miami village," establish 
a strong post there, and garrison it with about twelve hun­
dred men, which would be sufficient to curb the Indians of 
the area. If the Indians resisted this intrusion on their 
very hearths, as seemed likely, it was presumed "that dis­
ciplined valor would triumph over the undisciplined Indians." 
The force was to be prepared to move by 10 J u l y .44
All of this was more easily said than done. Delays 
and difficulties mounted rapidly. Many of the troops coming 
from the East, did not arrive at Fort Pitt until late in 
August, and low water held up their passage down the Ohio to 
Fort Washington.45 Most of them did not look like good 
material from which to make heroes of the republic. Accord­
ing to one writer, they contained an unduly heavy proportion 
of poverty-stricken Irish immigrants, work-broken farm boys
43jacobs, Beginning of U. S. Army, 69.
44%nstructions to Major General Arthur St. Clair,
21 Mar, 1791, State Papers. lA. I, 171-74.
^^State Papers. MA, I, 37.
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and apprentices, and men who seemed to have spent most of 
their lives in grog-shops, jails, and brothels.There 
was also a shortage of arms and equipment, and a large part 
of the available stock of many essentials was damaged.^7 
The problem of supplying the army in the wilderness was al­
most unsurmountable because of transportation difficulties, 
an inefficient quartermaster, and a crooked contractor.^8 
Finally on 17 September, more than two months later than 
planned, the army, numbering less than twenty-three hun­
dred,^9 led by an aging and gouty general, and composed of 
untrained and incompetent men, moved out into the forests to 
carry fire and terror to the Indians,
The events of the summer and fall bore an almost 
uncanny resemblance to those of the previous year. Again 
the President seems to have suffered an attack of forebodings 
brought on this time by the lateness of the fighting season.^ 
The re-enactment of familiar events continued on 25 October, 
when he told Congress that the operation was underway. Two 
days later he sent up a characteristically large package of 
papers from Knox, reporting two "successful" campaigns of
47state Papers, MA, I, 37.
48jacobs, Beqinninq of U. S. Army, 80, 119-20.
49state Papers, MA, I, 37.
50jacobs, Beqinninq of U. S. Army, 86.
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the summer, the minor operations of General Charles Scott 
and Lieutenant Colonel James W i l k i n s o n , A s  Congress exam­
ined these documents, St. Clair, having just finished hang­
ing two deserters and a murderer and ailing from a new attack 
of gout, was approaching the upper Wabash. On 4 November, 
the Indians fell upon his poorly guarded camp, butchered his 
army, and sent the survivors fleeing in disorder toward 
safety in the South. “Disciplined valor" had failed. Out 
of some 1400 men engaged on the bloody field, 657 were killed 
and 271 wounded.Fortunately, the 1st Regiment was in the 
rear pursuing some militia deserters and protecting a supply 
train, or most of it would probably have been hacked up too.
As Sto Clair commented:
I am not certain „ . . whether I ought to consider the 
absence of this regiment from the field of action, as 
fortunate or otherwise. I incline to think it was for­
tunate; for, I very much doubt whether, had it been in 
the action, the fortune of the day had been turned; and 
if it had not, the triumph of the enemy would have been 
more complete, and the country would have been destitute 
of every means of defense.53
On 12 December, the President reported the disaster to 
C o n g r e s s . Many members must have been puzzled and stunned.
5^Annals, 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 12, 19, 146. The text 
of the report is in State Papers. lA, I, 129-35.
52jacobs, Beqinninq of U. S. Army. 96, 115.
53state Papers. lA. I, 137-38.
54Annals. 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 242. The text of the 
report is in State Papers, lA. I, 136-38.
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Elias Boudinot wrote about a new express from the West, 
which confirmed the horrors--hundreds killed and wounded, 
those who could not run away left on the field to die, and 
female camp-followers butchered. "It is on the whole a most 
mortifying & perplexing affair, and I am at a loss to know, 
what steps are proper to retrieve it." The session would be 
prolonged, he thought, and filled with great debates.
Soon puzzlement gave way to criticism of the way the campaign 
had been planned and conducted. According to Timothy Pick­
ering, the estimates of both the strength of the enemy and 
the quality of the federal troops had been erroneous. He 
wondered why experienced officers had made the mistake of 
leading such an obviously unfit army into the field. The 
original intent, he thought, had been to send a force so 
strong that the Indians would not dare fight. This force, 
however, had not been completed to full strength.
A committee of the House of Representatives appointed 
to investigate the affair concluded that the chief causes of 
the disaster were the delays in the passing of the Act of 
3 March 1791, the delays resulting from gross inefficiency 
and mismanagement on the part of the quartermaster and the
J. Boudinot (ed.). The Life. Public Services. 
Addresses and Letters of Elias Boudinot. L.L.D.. President 
of the Continental Congress (Boston. 1896). II. 81.
S^Octavius Pickering and C. W„ Upham, Life of 
Timothy Pickering (Boston, 1867-73), III, 23.
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contractor, and the "want of discipline and experience in 
the troops." The committee in its summary of the action 
also noted that the attack first fell upon some militia 
companies occupying positions in advance of the main body 
and that these units fled though the rest of the army..
"This circumstance threw the troops into some disorder, 
/from/ which, it appears, they never recovered during the 
action. . . . "  The committee also completely exonerated St. 
Clair,5' a verdict that has not withstood the test of his­
tory.
The public was inclined to agree that much of the
RQ
fault lay with Congress.However, it would appear in 
retrospect that Washington himself must bear a heavy part of 
the responsibility. For a man who had complained so loudly 
about untrained troops during the Revolution, the President 
seems to have been strangely forgetful in 1791. How could 
men raised after 3 March be trained and sent hundreds, of 
miles into a wilderness for a campaign to begin on 10 July? 
Even if Washington had thought these miracles could be ac­
complished through the agency of such poor magicians as St. 
Clair and Knox, who had lost much of his earlier driving 
force, he certainly should have delayed the operation for 
another year after midsummer had passed. It was time and
57state Papers. MA. I, 36-39. The report was made 
on 8 Dec. 1796.
58jacobs, Beqinninq of the U. S. Army. 118.
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poor military judgment that laid the piles of bones along 
the Wabash. Perhaps Congress in delaying to provide troops 
made the first mistake, but it was within the power of the 
President to have partially corrected it.
From a greater perspective, however, the fault was 
a larger one. Pickering was correct in his statement that 
the administration had underestimated the strength of the 
Indians. What had been needed was not two or three thousand 
men but five or six. Belatedly the President and Knox, who 
had never considered such a force as necessary in the North­
west, began to broaden their thinking. On 11 January 1792 
they sent’ Congress the heaviest of all bundles of documents 
up to that time. Spread out over sixty-three pages of the 
State Papers, the reports cover the causes of the Indian 
troubles, the efforts that had been made to arrive at a 
peaceful settlement, and the military preparations that pre­
ceded the defeat. They attributed the disaster to the lack 
of sufficient good troops early in the year, to inadequate 
training, and to the lateness with which the operation got 
underway. They recommended another campaign and the raising 
of three additional regiments to make the strength of the 
army 5128 men.^^
On 25 January, after several days of secret discus­
sion in the House, James Madison introduced a bill to give
59state Papers. lA. I, 139-202. The plan will be 
found on pages 198-202.
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the administration the augmentation it had asked for.^0 On 
the twenty-sixth, with the doors open for the first time on 
army debates, the committee of the whole took up the measure. 
The opponents of the new regiments called the Indian war 
unjust, claimed that militia was superior to regulars in 
frontier fighting, and ridiculed the contention that five 
or six thousand men were needed to put down a "handful of 
Indian banditti." Furthermore, they continued, 5128 regu­
lars would cost more than one million dollars per year.
Where was the money to come from? The excise was neither 
popular nor productive, and the impost was already as high 
as prudence dictated. A move to delete the regiments failed 
thirty-four to eighteen, and on 1 February the bill passed 
by the almost equally comfortable margin of twenty-nine to 
nineteen.About nine administration supporters voted 
against the measure and about eighteen for it. It would 
appear that some members of the government party distrusted 
the administration’s war policy. The opposition split ten 
and ten.G2
In the Senate the new regiments barely escaped the 
scalping knife, being expunged on one day and restored on 
another with close votes in each case. After much loss of
^^Annals, 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 327-29, 337. The text 
of the bill is on pages 80-82 of the Senate proceedings.
GlAnnals, 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 337-343, 354-55.
62white, "Executive Influence," 101 and footnote 
page 105. He calls them Federalists and Republicans.
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time as both houses insisted upon minor changes, a conference 
committee finally ironed out the disagreements, and the bill 
became the "Act for making further and more effectual pro­
visions for the protection of the Frontiers" of 5 March 1792. 
The act provided that the existing establishment--the two 
regiments of infantry and the battalion of artillery— be 
brought up to strength, that three additional regiments be 
raised for three years, and that one of these include a 
squadron (four troops) of dragoons in lieu of one of the 
battalions of infantry. It authorized the President to 
organize all five regiments and the artillery as he should 
judge expedient, transferring men from corps to corps. It 
also empowered him to call into service such cavalry as he 
might think necessary for the defense of the frontiers and 
to employ up to twenty thousand dollars’ worth of friendly 
Indians for the same purpose. The cavalry might be raised 
for any period the President wished, and he would appoint 
its officers.
The Frontier War and Hamilton’s Financial Program 
(Second Congress, First Session)
According to the best estimates some $675,000 would 
be required to put the act into effect. As the House began 
to look for these "additional supplies" it touched off one
Annals. 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 80-85, 88-94, 98-99, 
428-30, 432-33. The text of the act is on pages 1343-46 
of the reference.
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of the most curious series of events in the history of Aneri- 
can military and financial legislation. The sequence began 
on 7 March 1792 with a motion that the House call upon the 
Secretary of Treasury to report the best means of raising 
the funds. During the debate on that day and on the eighth 
Hamilton’s friends vigorously defended the propriety and 
constitutionality of such a method of procedure. The opposi­
tion took the stand that it would interfere with the right 
of the House to originate money bills. If the procedure 
were adopted that body could do no more than approve or dis­
approve measures that had been originated by the Secretary. 
Fears of Hamilton and of "Ministerial management" lay behind 
this argument, as more than one speaker disclosed. The 
motion was passed by the close vote of thirty-one to twenty- 
seven.^^
By this time three elements of Hamilton’s financial 
program--the Bank of the United States, the assumption and 
funding of the national debt, and the excise tax--had already 
been written into law. Meantime he had submitted earlier in 
the session (on 5 December 1791) a "Report on the Encourage­
ment of Manufactures" calling for protective tariffs on many 
articles that could be produced in the United States.65 The 
request from the House provided an excellent opportunity to 
further some of the principles recommended in the report.
6^Annals. 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 437-52.
65jbid.. 227.
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On 16 March he sent up papers outlining three ways in which 
the additional supplies might be r a i s e d . T h e  government’s 
interest in the United States Bank might be sold, the money 
might be borrowed, or the import duties might be raised.
He advised against the first two solutions and 
pushed the third. The value of the bank stock could be ex­
pected to rise, and loans should be resorted to only in 
"great emergencies." On the other hand, he continued, an 
increase in the duties would not only provide the necessary 
funds, but it would also "tend to second and aid this spirit" 
of manufacturing then prevailing. It would also operate to 
restrain the excessive consumption of foreign products and 
thus prevent future embarrassment in the settling of trade 
balances. The report then outlined new schedules of specific 
and ad valorem duties with the latter being set at the high 
rates of ten and fifteen percent. These new taxes were to 
be permanent, and the proceeds were to be utilized first to 
pay the interest on the public debt, second to defray other 
existing appropriations, and last to support frontier de- 
fense.^7 This is to say that only the surplus would be 
applied to the purposes of the new army act.
Since this might be insufficient, Hamilton then 
recommended a temporary increase of two and a half percent
^^American State Papers, Finance. I, 158-161.
6?Ibid.
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ad valorem on certain goods. The increase would be used for 
the prosecution of the Indian war, and it would lapse when 
the war had been brought to an end and all expenses relating 
to it had been liquidated. Meantime, the proceeds of. this 
increase would have to be anticipated by a loan. In closing 
the report, he added in reference to the permanent increases 
"It will not have escaped the observation of the House, that 
the duties which were suggested in the Secretary’s report 
. . . /on encouragement of manufactures/ are, for the most 
part, included among the objects of this report."^8
A bill framed in accordance with the recommendation 
was introduced on 11 April. John Francis Mercer of Maryland 
raged to his feet and consumed one entire day of debate with 
condemnations of the measure. The House had asked the Secre­
tary of the Treasury to devise ways and means for the defense 
of the frontier. It had gotten a plan calling for "a per­
petual tax," a system of encouraging manufactures, "an entire 
provision for the public debt, past, present, and to come," 
and an increase of the sinking fund.69
GGjbid.
69Annals, 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 349-54. The dating of 
Mercer’s speech is difficult. It is entered in the Annals 
under 27 Jan., a day on which the military bill was consid­
ered. Yet it refers to the details of Hamilton’s plan, 
which was not presented to Congress until 16 Mar., eleven 
days after the passage of the military act. White thinks 
the speech should have been entered under a Mar. date.
White, "Executive Influence," 102. However, it seems ap­
propriate to place it with the Apr. debate re Hamilton’s
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We have been officially, I suppose informed that the 
money for the War Department is almost expended; that 
the preparations for the Western expedition must stop, 
unless we pass the bill immediately; and thus with the 
tomahawk suspended over our heads we must give up to 
administration the dearest interests of the people, 
and sacrifice the most sacred rights of the Constitu­
tion.70
The government party did not attempt to defend the 
bill against these just charges. They pointed out, however, 
that "The predominant feature of. . . . /the bil]J7 was its 
nationality," for it treated all states fairly. It laid 
duties on cotton and hemp that virtually amounted to exclus­
ion. As a result those products of the South would always 
find a ready market for use in the manufactures of the North. 
After some amendment the bill was carried thirty-seven to 
twenty, and it passed the Senate with further amendments a 
few days later. Thus did one of Hamilton's fondest projects 
ride through Congress on the coat-tails of an army measure.71
The Republicans Attack General Wayne's Rear 
(Second Congress. Second-Session)
Whatever his motives in ordering the earlier opera­
tions, the President seems to have profited from the lessons 
of their failures. Now he painfully selected a new commander 
from a list of all general officers in the United States
recommendations, Mercer, who now represented Maryland, had 
represented Virginia in the Confederation Congress.
7QAnnals. 2 Cong., 1 Sess,, 350.
71lbid., 569-72, 131-32. The text of the act is on 
pages 1364-70 of the reference.
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except those too old or too ill to serve. His choice,
General Anthony Wayne, did not completely please him--Wayne’s 
reputation for economy was bad and he was "vain, easily im­
posed upon; and liable to be drawn into s c r a p e s . "^2 The 
results were to prove that no one except the Indians could 
have profited from a different selection. On 27 December 
1792 under authority granted him in the recent act Washing­
ton issued an executive order organizing the expanded army 
into a legion consisting of four sublegions each with its 
complements of foot, artillery, and horse.
Though St. Clair had marched off six months after 
the passage of the act authorizing his troops, Wayne was 
permitted plenty of time to prepare for the new campaign, 
principally because the administration was trying to nego­
tiate a peace. Before he began his advance he spent one 
winter in camp near Pittsburg training his men and another 
at Fort Greenville on the borders of hostile country harden­
ing them. They were composed of the familiar misfits, but 
this treatment appears to have turned them into excellent 
soldiers. In addition, they were better armed, clothed, 
supplied, and paid than St. Clair’s men had ever been. In 
July 1794, the legion, which was greatly understrength, was 
reinforced by eleven hundred mounted volunteers from Kentucky.
^^Washington’s "Opinion of the General Officers," 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of George Washington. XXXI, 510.
/^ state Papers. MA, I, 40-41.
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In August, Wayne and his troops crushed the Indians at 
Fallen T i m b e r s . 74 The victory was a triumph of leadership, 
preparation, and regular soldiers, which made up the greater 
part of the army. A comparison of results with the failures 
of Harmar and St. Clair should have convinced the most 
seasoned defenders of the militia that the regulars were in­
finitely superior. But, of course, it did not.
Meantime, while Wayne had been preparing to fight 
Indians in Ohio, enemies in Philadelphia were sniping at his 
rear. On 28 December 1792, John Steele of North Carolina 
began a move in the House to take away more than half the 
strength of the army. His plan would retain the two old 
regiments to garrison the forts and use local militia to 
make about five expeditions per year against the Indians, 
instead of the "one solitary fruitless attempt" the regulars 
had been making. Steele’s main objections to the present 
establishment were its expense and its ineffectiveness. He 
blamed the War Department on both counts. In four short 
years this "alarmingly expensive and useless Department" had 
imposed burdens on the people that had risen from $137,000 
in 1789 to an estimated $1,171,719 for 1793. The latter sum 
was more than double the amount required to support the re­
mainder of the government. Meantime these enormous
Jacobs, Beginning of U. S. Army, 124-175 passim. 
The information concerning the Kentucky volunteers is from 
Upton, Military Policy, 83.
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expenditures had led only to "vain projects of folly and 
ambition, without a prospect of guaranteeing a peace." The 
truth was that militia were much superior to regulars in 
Indian fighting, and they cost less than a fourth as much.^5
Steele's speech led to long discussions?^ of the 
relative merits of regulars and militia. Militia knew the 
terrain, moved rapidly without trains and baggage, and had 
proven their worth at Bunker Hill, Cowpens, Trenton, and in 
many other actions. On the other hand a force of regulars 
with all its impedimenta creeping through the forests after 
Indians was like “an elephant in chase of a wolf." Another 
reason for the superiority of militia was that it was com­
posed of substantial free-holders. The regulars who had 
been sent into the field had been collected "from stews and 
brothels and from the most unprincipled of their species." 
The Indians had despised them and "shot them down like wild 
turkeys." In another swipe at the administration it was 
noted that these troops had been given shoes that wore out 
in three days, uniforms that did not cover their bodies, and 
food unfit for dogs.??
The government party viewed Steele’s speech, and no 
doubt many of those that followed, as direct censures of the
?^Annals, 2 Cong., 2 Sess., 762-65.
76jhe matter was debated on 28 Dec. and on 2, 3 and 
5 Jan., Ibid.. 762-68, 772-801.
77ibid., 764-67, 781-82, 796, 800.
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administration and both houses of Congress. They defended 
the regulars, pointed to the disabilities of the militia, 
and explained away the disasters of Harmar and St. Clair as 
resulting from the use of inadequate numbers of raw and un­
disciplined troops. When the vote was taken, Steele’s motion 
that a committee be appointed to bring in a bill to reduce 
the army was rejected thirty-two to twenty-six.
The Crisis of 1794 (First Session.
Third Congress]
The summer and fall of 1793 was marked by the appear­
ance of new threats that rapidly developed into a first class 
military crisis. In June the British Government, then at war 
with France, began an attack on American shipping engaged in 
trade with France and the French West Indies. Soon hundreds 
of American vessels had been captured, others were ordered 
to heave to for boarding and search, and sailors were seized 
from the decks and impressed into the British service. By 
the time Congress convened on 2 December indignation against 
thv British ran high in the shipping centers and throughout 
the East. If this were not enough trouble, the Algerian 
pirates had sent eight corsairs into the Atlantic to prey on 
our c o m m e r c e .79 All of these problems produced the adminis-
7%b i d .. 766-67, 775, 777-779, 788, 802.
79john Bach McMaster, A History of the People of 
the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War ■
(New York, 1901-14), II, 166-71.
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tration’s most formidable defense plan up to that time.
This new military program reached Congress piecemeal 
and by several routes. On 2 December in his address on the 
opening of the session the President pointed out the neces­
sity of general preparations for defense and called for the 
procurement of additional arms and military s t o r e s . O n  
December 16 and 24 he sent up reports on the Algerian situa­
tion that suggested the need of naval f o r c e s . O t h e r  pro­
posals calling for army increases and an embargo on foreign 
trade originated later with Hamilton. Meantime, it became 
clear that the Republicans had a program of sorts of their 
own. They supported the use of militia in lieu of additional 
regulars as a general preparedness measure and for the de­
fense of the frontier. Many of them also favored drastic 
retaliation on British trade, and Madison early in the 
session (3 January 1794) introduced resolutions calling for 
increased duties on certain imports from Great Britain, 
restrictions on British shipping, and other discrimina­
tions.8%
House committees were soon at work on the parts of 
the program outlined by the President in his address and in
QO
the "Algerine reports," and by the first of April both the
^^Annals, 3 Cong., 1 Sess., 12.
81lbid.. 143, 148. , 155-56.
S^Ibid., 154-55 (navy), 448-51 (fortifications),
467 (military stores and arsenals).
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House and the Senate had passed acts providing:
(1) For the fortification of twenty-one principal 
ports and harbors from Georgia to M a i n e . 84
(2) For the procurement of six frigates and for the 
enlistment of crews to man them.85
(3) For the establishment of several arsenals (three 
or four) and for the purchase of arms, ammunition, and mili­
tary stores to the total value of $340,000.86
On 9 May a fourth act providing three hundred and fifty can-
87non to arm the seacoast works became law. While most of 
these measures had aroused little opposition in the House, 
the committee of the whole had considered the Algerian re­
ports on five different days before finally approving a 
preliminary resolution and referring it to a committee.^ 8 
Meantime, on 8 March, as the House labored with 
these several matters, Hamilton outlined his own ideas in a 
brotherly letter to the President. The situation, he said, 
was so critical that vigorous measures should be devised to 
deter our enemies from attacking or provoking us. The more 
important ports should be fortified, the President should be 
given the authority to lay an embargo on shipping as he
G^Act approved 20 Mar. 1794, Ibid.. 1423-24.
®^Act approved 27 Mar. 1794, Ibid.. 1426-28. The 
act was to cease when peace was made with Algiers.
®^Act approved 2 Apr. 1794, Ibid., 1428-29.
B^Ibid.. 1444-45.
®^The reports were considered by the committee of 
the whole on 24, 26, 30, and 31 Dec. 1793. The resolution 
was approved and the committee appointed on 2 Jan. 1794. 
Ibid.. 148-49, 152-55.
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might think necessary, and twenty thousand "auxiliary troops" 
should be raised.89 The letter was written before the for­
tification bill had been passed, and the embargo was no 
doubt suggested as a less objectionable alternative^^ to 
Madison's proposals, which were completely out of line with 
the Federalist favoritism for Great Britain.
The auxiliaries, as Hamilton described them, would 
be a new species, a cross between regulars and militia, as 
yet unknown to American military history. They would be 
enlisted for two years, and if war broke out with any Eur­
opean power during that period they would be required to 
serve for four years upon the same terms as regulars. Mean­
time, however, they would remain unembodied except for 
forty days per year, which would be utilized for training. 
During this training period they would receive the same pay 
and rations as regulars. They would also be furnished with 
arms and accoutrements by the government with the proviso 
that the equipment be surrendered at the expiration of their 
enlistments. The great advantage of this new breed of dog 
and cat was its cheapness. Hamilton estimated that the
Letter of 8 Mar. 1794. Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.). 
The Works of Alexander Hamilton (Federal ed.. New York and 
London, 1904), X, 64-65. Hereafter cited as Lodge, 
Hamilton.
*^^ This is also White's opinion, "Executive Influ­
ence," 109.
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twenty thousand men would cost only $350,000.91
Hamilton suggested that the President might want to 
give the plan "some Executive impulse," advice that Washing­
ton apparently ignored. Howard White notes that the adminis­
tration adopted new legislative tactics at this point. 
Whereas formerly army increases had been openly advocated by 
the administration, they were now introduced by members of 
Congress with no indication of their real s p o n s o r s h i p .9%
Thus Hamilton’s proposal for auxiliaries as well as later 
proposals derived from it found their way into one or the 
other of the two houses in the form of resolutions presented 
by administration backers. For the first time the Republi­
cans had a majority in the House, and as White continues, 
they bitterly resented what they called "executive dicta­
tion. "93
On 12 March Theodore Sedgewxck of Massachusetts 
introduced several resolutions that might have been written 
by Hamilton’s own pen. These proposed that fifteen thousand 
of the Auxiliary troops" be raised and that the President be 
authorized to lay the embargo. The resolutions relating to 
the auxiliaries departed from Hamilton’s letter only in the 
five thousand man reduction in numbers, in an additional
^^Lodge, Hamilton, X, 64-65.
^^hite, "Executive Influence," 106-07.
^^ Ibid.
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provision concerning the officers, and in several minor 
changes. The officers would be appointed by the President, 
but Hamilton had probably intended this. The required serv­
ice after the beginning of war was reduced to three years, 
the number of training days was set at twenty-four per year, 
and the pay for training was raised to fifty cents per day,^^ 
some five times that of regulars.
As Sedgwick explained, the purpose of the resolu­
tions was to prepare the United States for war and for retal­
iation against the probable enemy’s most vulnerable spot, its 
North American dominion. The auxiliary troops would provide 
an excellent striking force for this second purpose, and 
when they were available for a blow the enemy would no doubt 
treat us with more caution. The Republicans would probably 
object to such a force because of their fear of standing 
armies. He would like to point out that militia were of no 
use in "retaliation,” that is in offensive operations. Their
terms of service were too short, and in addition their cost
in wages and wasted equipment was too high. Meantime, since 
the auxiliaries would remain scattered and unembodied unless
war broke out, it was impossible that they should be a threat
to the liberties of the p e o p l e .95
Though Sedgwick’s plan was considered by the commit­
tee of the whole on six different days, the Annals do not
9^Annals. 3 Cong., 1 Sess., 500-01.
95ibid.. 501-04.
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record the debate. Republican opposition must have run high 
because on the last day the House approved a vague resolu­
tion that measures should be taken “to render the force of 
the United States more efficient," It referred the resolu­
tion to a select committee headed by Sedgwick,which on 
27 March recommended:
(1) An additional corps of artillery (eight hundred 
men) for seacoast defense.
(2) A detachment of eighty thousand militia, the 
troops to be apportioned among the states and held in readi­
ness to march at “a moments warning,"
(3) An additional force of men to be raised only 
after the outbreak of any war between the United States and 
an European p o w e r ,97
It will be noted that this report marked a complete 
break with the suggestions of Hamilton and Sedgwick. The 
dog-cat hybrid which Hamilton had called auxiliaries was 
apparently replaced by some dogs (the additional troops) 
and some cats (the militia detachment). There is no evi­
dence that the committee intended the former to be anything 
other than regulars. The issue was thus clearly stated, for 
the report presented a choice between what the Federalists 
preferred (the regulars) and what the Republicans preferred
9^The days were Mar, 17 to 21 and Mar, 24, Ibid., 
523-24, 526-28,
^^Ibid,. 534-35, The report also recommended that 
measures be devised to bring the existing troops up to 
strength. However, a bill to encourage the recruiting serv­
ice had already been reported on 24 Mar, It was lost on 6 
May when the two houses disagreed on amendments. Ibid,. 
525-26, 528, 560, 88, 93, 642-43,
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(the militia). The report added an element, the additional 
artillery, that Hamilton had not mentioned.
On 31 March the House set the number of the addition­
al troops at twenty-five thousand, removed the proviso that 
they not be raised until after war began, and approved all 
the resolutions.98 a  week later Sedgwick*s committee, to 
which the resolutions were referred, reported bills covering 
the artillerists and engineers, the detachment of militia, 
and the additional troops.99 The first two of these were 
passed by both houses with several minor changes.100 They 
provided for 764 additional artillerists and engineers and 
authorized the President to require the governors to hold 
eighty thousand militia in readiness. The act providing 
the latter would remain in effect for only one year and 
thence to the end of the next session of Congress.101
The third of the measures, which was much more con­
troversial, was not called up until 19 May. On that day the 
section providing for the twenty-five thousand men was 
struck, and the bill was voted down.l^^ Two days after this 
defeat the President transmitted papers describing disturbed
98Annals, 3 Cong., 1 Sess., 556-58.
99ibid.. 561.
lOOibid., 603, 86-87, 90-92, 642.
lOlsoth acts became law on 9 May. Ibid.. 1444-46. 
10%lbid., 709-10.
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conditions on the Ohio— a party of British troops was thought 
to be encroaching on United States territory^^^--and within 
a week a Senate select committee reported the bill in a sec­
ond form giving the President discretionary power to raise 
up to ten thousand men during the recess of C o n g r e s s . 104 
James Monroe, then a Senator, commented wryly that the 
alleged British action had been seized as a pretext for 
pressing the increase and feared that the measure would 
pass. The decrease in the number of troops and the discre­
tionary feature would make it more acceptable, and with the 
President’s enormous influence it might even clear the
House.105
Part of Monroe’s apprehensions were realized on 29 
May when the Federalists pushed the measure through the 
Senate by a vote of twelve to eight.106 The next day the 
Republicans in the House turned the discretionary feature
lO^Annals. 3 Cong., 1 Sess., 103. 713. State Papers.
lA, I, 480, On the previous day (20 May) the Secretary of
State had complained to George Hammond, the British minis­
ter, that J, G. Simcoe, the Lieutenant Governor of Upper 
Canada, and three companies of British troops had marched 
to the rapids of the Miami to build a fort. Ibid.. Foreign 
Affairs. I, 461-62.
^^ "^ Annals. 3 Cong., 1 Sess., 109, 111.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, 26 May, 1794,
Stanislaus Murray Hamilton (ed.). The Writings of James 
Monroe, Including a Collection of His Public and Private 
Papers and Correspondence Now for the First Time Printed 
(New York and London, 1898-1903), Ï', 297.
lO^Annals. 3 Cong., 1 Sess., 112-13.
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into a liability rather than an asset. As William B. Giles 
of Virginia put it, the bill ought to be entitled "A bill 
authorizing the President to pass a law for raising ten 
thousand men." According to Madison, the Constitution had 
wisely provided that one branch raise armies and another 
command them. If the President were given the power to per­
form the first function as well as the second, he might 
assemble troops for the sole purpose of building "influence." 
The Federalist work-horses, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, 
Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, and Sedgwick, defended the 
bill vigorously, but their efforts were unavailing. It was 
rejected fifty to thirty-two.
The Senate still, however, would not admit defeat.
Its next opportunity came from the House in the form of a 
bill "for the more effectual protection of the Southwestern 
frontier." This was a Republican measure authorizing the 
President to embody up to ten thousand militia from the
Southern States for offensive operations against the Creeks
108and Cherokees. The Federalists of the upper chamber with 
some Republican help approved amendments that struck the 
militia section and substituted one authorizing an additional
lO^Ibid.. 735-39.
^^®The bill was reported in the House on 20 May 
and passed without discussion on 29 May. Ibid.. 710, 730,
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regular regiment to be raised in the South.109 %he Republi­
cans in the House had by now begun to view the whole affair 
as a giant conspiracy to force a large standing army on the 
people. As Giles commented, fifteen thousand men had first 
been proposed, next twenty-five thousand, then ten thousand, 
and now when all had failed this regiment of one thousand 
was brought f o r w a r d . M o s t  of the speakers opposing the 
amendments were from states with exposed frontiers, and each 
thought the militia was much superior to standing troops in 
Indian warfare. According to Thomas P. Carnes of Georgia, 
the regulars stationed in his state had performed no other 
service than to prevent the militia from pursuing Indian 
raiding parties across the line.Ill Following these attacks 
the House refused to concur with the Senate in the substitu­
tion by a vote of forty-two to twenty-six.
The bill was lost when the conference committee
113failed to find any common ground. On the last day of the 
session (9 June) Rufus King, who had been one of the Senate 
conferees, made a final effort to put through the regiment. 
The bill he introduced provided that the troops be raised 
only if the President did not think it desirable to transfer
lO^Ibid.. 117, 123-25. The bill was passed by the 
Senate on 6 June. Ibid.. 126.
llOlbid.. 775. l U lbid.. 775-78.
ll^Ibid.. 779.
ll^Ibid.. 128-29, 131, 781-82.
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one of the existing regiments to the Southwestern frontier. 
Despite this discretionary feature, which the bill had lacked 
in its original form, the Senate, pressed by last minute 
business, rejected the measure on the second reading.
Meantime the Congress had passed a thirty day embargo 
that stemmed from Sedgwick’s original resolutions. However, 
the act departed from his suggestions in that it directly 
prohibited sailings instead of leaving the actual imposition 
of the restriction to the President. It was subsequently 
renewed for an additional m o n t h . I n  summing up the re­
sults of the session, the Federalists could thus list suc­
cesses for all parts of their program except the additional 
auxiliaries or regulars. The Republicans had succeeded 
fairly well also. Though some of them had deserted the 
party ranks on occasion, the embargo was a step in the way 
of the commercial restrictions they desired. Furthermore it 
was applied by Congress, as they wished. They had also at­
tained two other important objectives. They could take 
credit for dealing with the foreign threat in the provision 
of the militia detachment. And they had been able to stave 
off the persistent efforts of the Federalists to increase
ll^ibid.. 131-32.
Joint resolutions approved 26 Mar. and 18 Apr. 
1794. Ibid., 1482-83. Late in the session. Congress did 
pass an act (approved on 4 June) permitting the President 
to "lay, regulate, and revoke" embargoes during the recess 
of Congress. Ibid.. 1450.
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the army.
With the exception of a few poorly digested estimates 
concerning the Southwestern frontier, the Federalist troop 
requests from 1790 through 1793 were not only extremely 
modest but they were also keyed to real needs and dangers. 
Suddenly in 1794, however, there was a change. Though Hamil­
ton and the administration privately discounted the possi-
117bility of a foreign war, troops were demanded in numbers 
many times larger than ever before. It was at this point 
that the close interrelationship between Federalist political 
and military philosophy began to emerge. A strong army could 
be employed to enforce the law and to suppress auch dangerous 
dissidents as whiskey rebels, sans-culottes. and other dis­
satisfied economic and ideological groups.
The Army Continued (Second Session.
Third Congress]
By the time that the second session of the Third Con­
gress convened on 3 November 1794, the measures of the admin­
istration had been marked with complete or partial success. 
The militia that had been sent against the whiskey insurgents 
was putting down the rebellion. John Jay was hard at work 
negotiating a settlement with Great Britain, and Wayne had
116White suras up in similar fashion, "Executive 
Influence," 110-11, 114.
ll^Hamilton, for example, assured Hammond, the 
British minister, that the United States would not go to 
war to defend its shipping.
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crushed the Indians, In his opening address, most of which 
was devoted to the Pennsylvania affair, the President did 
not refer once to the trouble on the seas which had resulted 
in the defense program of the first s e s s i o n . N o r  did his 
subsequent messages and reports seem as alarming as in the 
past. Wayne's army, he told Congress, should be brought up 
to full s t r e n g t h , a n d  measures should be devised to pre­
vent unruly settlers from encroaching on Indian lands. 
"Harmony reign/e^" between the United States and France, 
an envoy had been sent to Spain to complete certain discus­
sions with that country, and the prospects for a settlement 
with Algeria were favorable. Nothing could be communicated 
on our relations with Great Britain until the outcome of 
Jay's negotiations were known.
To many Republicans it must have appeared that the 
millennium had.arrived or that it had at least approached 
close enough to permit a partial disbandment of the army.
It took a House committee appointed on 8 December and
l^^Annals. 3 Cong., 2 Sess., 787-792.
ll^The President to the Congress, 25 Nov. 1794,
Ibid.. 796. State Papers. MA. I, 68.
120ihe President to the Congress, 30 Dec. 1794, 
Annals. 3 Cong., 2 Sess., 807. The letter transmitted a 
report from Secretary Knox that suggested ways in which the 
control might be effected. Ibid., 1400-1402.
12lThe President to the Congress, 28 Feb. 1795,
Ibid.. 841-42.
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composed entirely of Republicans— Henry Dearborn of Massa­
chusetts, John Nicholas of Virginia, and John Smilie of 
Pennsylvania^^^— only seven days to bring in a report call­
ing for substantial military cuts. The success of General 
Wayne, the report said, made it possible to reduce the army 
to two regiments and the corps of a r t i l l e r y S u c h  a 
demobilization, of course, would have destroyed the legion, 
both by the loss of troops and by the elimination of the 
cavalry. When the report was called up on 21 January 1795, 
Sedgwick, Murray, and other Federalists, refusing to believe 
that all military threats had disappeared, carried the House 
with them on a resolution to request the advice of the Ex­
ecutive on the number of troops required to defend the
f r o n t i e r s . 1 ^ 4
On the twenty-sixth the President sent up a report 
prepared by Timothy Pickering, the new Secretary of War, 
which advised against any reductions whatsoever. The victory 
in the Northwest, Pickering wrote, had not yet resulted in a 
general peace in that region. Thé defense of the Southwest 
Territory and Georgia, based upon a few regulars supported
122ibid., 968.
123%he report was rendered on 15 Dec. 1794.
"Reports of Select Committees of the House of Representa­
tives," I, 342-43, MS, National Archives, Washington, D. C,
^^^Annals, 3 Cong., 2 Sess., 1122-25.
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by the militia, had not been adequate. Finally, the sea­
coast could not be left unguarded, and the fortifications 
being erected would absorb most of the artillerists and 
e n g i n e e r s . Though this summary of the situation was not 
strongly drawn, it apparently convinced some Republicans of 
the dangers of premature disarmament and gave the Federal­
ists the stimulus they needed to resist any reduction.
When the committee report was debated on 2 and 3 
February, the Federalists had things their own way, presum­
ably as a result of the opposition's reluctance to challenge 
the administration, which now found its prestige greatly 
enhanced by the success of Wayne. Dayton immediately pro­
posed a substitute resolution which would continue the ex­
isting establishment for three more years. What they wanted, 
said the administration supporters, was the most convenient, 
effective, and inexpensive defense of the frontier. They 
denied that the threat in the Northwest had been completely 
eliminated and that the prospect of a treaty with Great 
Britain justified reductions. That nation was notorious 
for its violation of t r e a t i e s , T h o u g h  several Republicans 
spoke they made no real effort to answer these assertions,
It thus surprised no one when the house rejected the report,
125gtate Papers. lA. I, 547,
^^^Annals. 3 Gong,, 2 Sess,, 1163-72,
127ibid,
186
adopted Dayton’s substitute, and directed a new committee
1 9ftto prepare a bill continuing the existing army.
When the bill was brought before the committee of 
the whole on 13 February, the Republicans with their fears 
of standing armies resurging proposed that the troops be 
employed only for the defense of the frontier. Peleg Wads­
worth of Massachusetts inundated this suggestion with sarcasm 
and ridicule. The militia of any county in New England could 
destroy the little army in an hour. "It had been said . . . 
that a party in the House wanted to employ . . . /i;^ as an 
instrument for executing the laws." He hoped it would always 
be used to prevent encroachments on the Indians and to put 
down insurrections but not for the ordinary enforcement of 
the law. "As to weakening the army for fear that it should 
enslave us . . .  it was like a man blunting his axe for fear 
that he should cut hit foot with it." After this attack, 
the amendment received only twenty-six votes,1^9 and another 
Republican motion which called for automatic strength reduc­
tions on the making of peace with the Indians was defeated
130by a similar vote. The next day the bill was passed 
without a roll call and after a few Senate amendments of a 





on 3 March 1795.^^^
Reductions (Fourth Congress. First Session)
By the time that the Fourth Congress convened in 
December 1795 the Indian war in the Northwest had been 
brought to a successful termination with a provisional 
treaty. Settlements had either been completed or nearly so 
with Algiers, England, and Spain. The formerly insurgent 
counties of Western Pennsylvania were tranquil, and through­
out the country agriculture, industry, and business pros­
pered. To use a military metaphor, there did not seem to 
be a faulty fuze in the whole ammunition dump. In view of 
the changed conditions, the President said in his opening 
address. Congress might want to review the military estab­
lishment. It should, however, remember that some difficul­
ties with foreign powers had not been completely resolved 
and that the frontier posts soon to be surrendered by Great
Britain under the new settlement with that country would
1 89have to be garrisoned. In a subsequent report of 3 
February 1796 the administration outlined the military re­
quirements for frontier defense and recommended that any 
decision to reduce the army be suspended for a month or two 
pending implementation of the treaties with Great Britain
131lbid.. 1233, 825, 827, 847, 1275. The text of 
the act is on pages 1515-19 of the reference.
^^^Annals. 4 Cong., 1 Sess., 10-14.
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1 33and Spain, On 14 March the Secretary of War in a second 
report held only that the army should not be reduced below 
its real--as opposed to its authorized--strength.^^^
On 25 March a House committee, heeding both the 
President's suggestion that the army might be reduced and 
his advice that the reduction not be too large, brought in 
a report that seemed to fill both requirements. It stated 
the obvious fact that fewer men would now be required on the 
frontier, noted that the actual strength of the army was 
only three thousand, and recommended that the authorized 
strength be set at this number. The reduced establishment, 
it went on, should consist of the corps of artillerists and 
engineers as already constituted and four small regiments 
of infantry, the dragoons of the legion being omitted. It 
also proposed that the office of major general be reduced 
to that of brigadier general.
Except as to detail the report was likely to please 
the great majority of both sides, for the Federalists had 
probably feared that the reduction would be larger and the 
Republicans that it would be smaller. As it happened only 
Murray and Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania openly opposed the 
reduction, and such thorough-going Federalists as James
133state Papers. MA. I, 112-13.
IS^Ibid.. 114.
l^^The text of the report is entered under the date 
of 11 Apr. 1796, Annals. 4 Cong., 1 Sess,, 905-06.
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Hillhouse of Connecticut and Robert Goodloe Harper of South 
Carolina favored it. The discussion, however, was marked by 
a flareup of party enmity. When Hartley urged all friends 
of the government and the Constitution to vote against the 
report, Giles hinted that the Federalists intended to use 
the troops against the people. "It was always better for 
Governments to rest upon the affections of the people than 
to be supported by terror," he said. Murray denied and 
ridiculed this charge. The militia, not the army, he pointed 
out, had been employed to quell the recent i n s u r r e c t i o n .
The Republicans for once did not fill the air with 
panegyrics for the militia. James Holland of North Carolina 
emphasized the sectional division on the issue. While the 
army was to be used on the frontier, representatives from 
that section wanted the reduction, but those from the sea­
ports, where there was no danger, wanted an increase.13? 
Though this irony was presumably directed against Murray, 
Hartley, and the Northern Federalists in general, it over­
stated their position. Indeed most of them had said nothing 
at all. On the other hand, Holland was no doubt correct in 
claiming that representatives from states with frontier 
problems did favor the reduction.
136lbid. . 907-09, 913. ^^’^Ibid.. 911.
ISBxhough there was no roll call on the reduction 
to back up this statement, states with Indian problems al­
most always preferred the militia to regulars. This point 
has already been noted on page 149 above, and it will be 
further developed in later sections.
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The reduction hinged not only on the decreased need 
for troops but also on the desire to cut spending. Albert 
Gallatin of Pennsylvania, who was beginning his long fight 
against military expenditures, estimated that the troop cut 
would save $600,000 a year.1^9 The next day in a debate on 
the United State Bank he charged that the national debt had 
increased more than five million dollars under the adminis­
tration. His figures showed that War Department expenditures 
had not been less than about twenty-five percent of the total 
budget in any year since 1792 and that in one they had ap­
proached forty p e r c e n t . W i t h  this attack in the wind, 
even the staunchest Federalists could not have been unaware 
of the political value of the monetary savings the reduction 
offered.
The committee of the whole approved the report with­
out a roll call, and the House ordered that a bill be brought 
in. This was subsequently passed with amendments that added 
two troops of light dragoons. The Senate, which did not 
have to listen to Gallatin's preachments on economy, demanded 
that four troops of dragoons and the major general be re­
tained and that the term of enlistment be set at five years 
instead of three.^41 The House rejected the first two
^^^Annals, 4 Cong., 1 Sess., 910.
140ibid.. 923-930.
141%bid., 913, 1025, 1264, 1293, 100, 1417, 1418.
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demands but accepted the third after Samuel Smith of Mary­
land had noted that the soldiers stayed on as farm laborers 
after discharge. The Westerners who preferred the short 
term did so, he said, because under the longer one they 
would receive fewer farm hands from the East, Subse­
quently the Senate surrendered on the dragoons and the House 
on the major general.143 with the passage of the act, which, 
segregated the troops according to branch of service, the
legion disappeared.144
A Surprise Attack (Fourth Congress.
Second Session)
In the second session of the fourth Congress, action 
on military measures was influenced by the continued decline 
of the military threats of past years, by momentary lack of 
interest on the part of the administration, and by the grow­
ing emphasis the Republicans placed on economy. The fron­
tier was quiet, the British had surrendered the Western 
posts, and only the attacks made by French cruisers on our 
ships trading with the West Indies disturbed the general 
tranquillity. With the military situation relatively stable 
and the act passed in the last session still new, the
14% b i d .. 1419-23.
143lbid.. 102, 105, 108, 111, 1428-30, 1462.
144%he act was approved on 30 May 1796. Annals,
4 Cong., 2926-31.
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President in his address to Congress hardly mentioned army 
a f f a i r s . 145 Thereafter, the administration was strangely 
silent as army measures were brought up in the House, Mean­
time a group of Republicans bent on saving money called for 
reductions in the army and in the military budget and gave 
the Navy as good a battle as any French frigate was likely 
to do.
The attack on the army was led by Gallatin and sever­
al of his closest followers. On 13 January 1797 a select 
committee appointed to recommend changes in the act govern­
ing the military establishment had rendered its report.
Though the committee contained a Republican majority, the 
report, which was relatively innocuous, gave no hint of what 
was to come. The dragoons, it said, should be abolished, 
the office of major general should be reduced to that of 
brigadier general, and to compensate for the loss of the 
horse troops each infantry company should be increased by 
eight men.^^G Unfortunately the committee had been forced 
to work without any statement of military requirements from 
the administration, a fact which was to cause much difficulty 
in the debates to come,
^45Annals. 4 Cong,, 2 Sess,, 1592-97, He did say a 
few words concerning the need for a navy and for improved 
militia legislation,
146%bid,. 1872-73, The committee had been appointed 
on 5 Jan,, and the text of the report will be found under 
date of 23 Jan, Ibid,, 1817-18, 1944,
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Gallatin and his followers thought that much more 
substantial cuts should be made. The frontier was secure, 
they said, and the British withdrawal from the Lake posts 
had removed the major threat to continued peace. Meantime, 
our imminent occupation of these stations would simplify 
the defense problem throughout the Northwest. If we were 
to profit by these improved conditions we should no longer 
maintain a wartime army. Instead we should return to the 
establishment of 1792, which contained no dragoons, a few 
artillerymen, and only two regiments of infantry. In any 
event, the real defense of the frontier should rest upon
the militia.147
Furthermore, the financial situation was such that 
army reductions were mandatory. Armies cost too much, said 
Gallatin, and the House was reluctant to raise money. He 
was not at all sure that the direct tax bill then under 
consideration— or presumably any other revenue measure—  
would pass. If this were the case retrenchments would be 
necessary, and substantial savings could be made nowhere 
except in the military establishment. Before the Indian 
war the average military expenditure had been $400,000 per 
year, during the war it had varied from about $1,000,000 to
147%he Republicans began this line of argument on 
23 Jan., when the report first became before the committee 
of the whole, and continued it as long as the subject was 
under consideration. See the comments of Williams, Ibid.. 
1952, 1954, 2068; Gallatin, Ibid.. 1956-57; 2070-71; 
Rutherford, Ibid.. 1961; and Nicholas, Ibid., 1959-60.
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$1,800,000, and since the war it had averaged almost 
$1,300,000, The great difference between the averages of 
the prewar and postwar years certainly indicated that cut 
backs were in order, the conditions on the frontier being
the same in both cases.^48
In answering these arguments, the Federalists were 
handicapped by the surprise nature of the attack and by lack 
of information from the administration. The challenge was 
so unexpected, Samuel Smith, the chairman of the select com­
mittee admitted, that he was not prepared to meet it.^ '^^
Not until the last days of the debate was Smith able to 
obtain a list of the positions that would be occupied and 
the garrisons required to man them.^^O The House sensed 
that this new plan had been, hastily prepared and doubted its 
efficacy. Gallatin with all the self-assurance of some prac­
ticed military planner announced that several of the posts 
with garrisons totalling a thousand men were u n n e c e s s a r y . ^^l 
Even William Findley, who had consistently supported admin­
istration military policies, said that the House "was groping 
in the dark. Every information which had been given, had 
rather been matter of opinion of individual members, and of 
the Secretary of War, than official; therefore, everyone was
148%bid., 1956-57, 1962, 1980.
149ibid.. 1953. ISOlbid., 2083.
1
î M d . , 2085.
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at liberty to exercise his own opinion."1^2
Before the debate began it was almost a foregone 
conclusion that the House would accept the committee’s 
recommendation to drop the dragoons. These troops had been 
employed in the Northwest to escort supply trains. Not only 
were they no longer required for such service, the supplies 
now being transported by water, but they were also the most 
expensive of all arms. However, resistance to their elimin­
ation rapidly developed when the select committee report was 
brought before the committee of the whole on 23 January.
The Secretary of War, James McHenry, had belatedly informed 
Smith that the troops should be retained for employment in 
Georgia.153 The army men. Hartley and Murray, and the 
Georgians, Abraham Baldwin and John Milledge, backed McHenry’s 
stand.154 However, they received little support, for the 
committee of the whole voted overwhelmingly to eliminate
the horsemen.155
On the same day the Republicans struck at the infan­
try when John Williams of New York moved that the regiments 
be reduced from four to two. It was at this point that 
Gallatin had criticized the House for failure to approve the 
direct tax bill. Several Republicans, including Williams,
IS^ibid.. 2093. ^^^Ibid.. 1945.
154ibid.. 1946, 1949-50, 1981-82. 
155ibid.. 1952.
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also implied that the committee was misleading the House by 
recommending an army larger than it could prove the need 
for, a reference to the lack of information from McHenry.
The House, however, was not yet ready for such a drastic 
reduction, and the motion received only twenty-five votes.^ "^^  
On the following day (24 January) the committee of the whole 
approved the abolition of the office of major general but 
rejected the addition of the eight men to each company, as
1 C.O
recommended by the report. Both actions were victories 
for the economizers.
Encouraged by this minor successes, the Republicans 
returned to the main attack. As the committee of the whole 
prepared to rise, Holland moved that the number of regiments 
be reduced to three. Without discussion, the committee re­
jected this compromise solution by the narrow margin of one 
v o t e . A f t e r  the committee had reported to the House, 
Gallatin seized the opportunity implicit in the near victory 
by again moving the reduction to three regiments.1^0 The 
long discussion that followed covered most of the ground 
already explored in the committee of the whole and a little 
new territory. A few voices— those of Robert Rutherford of 
Virginia and Holland--were raised in glorification of the 
militia, and the army men expressed amazement that frontier
15&ibid., 1952, 1955.
157ibid.. 1963. 158%bid.. 1969-70.
159ibid., 1970-71. IGOlbid., 1971.
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gentlemen, such as Gallatin and Vfilliaras, were so set on 
making the r e d u c t i o n . T h e y  no doubt well knew that the 
answer was to be found in party doctrines and principles.
When the motion finally came to a vote it carried forty-four 
to thirty-nine.162 Shortly thereafter Murray's motion to 
restore the dragoons was defeated sixty-four to eighteen, 
and the same select committee was directed to bring in a 
bill pursuant to the resolutions that had been approved.163
On February 3 when the bill was called up, the Feder­
alists launched a counterattack with a motion to strike the 
section providing for the reduction to three regiments.164 
After another long discussionl^^ the committee of the whole 
approved the motion by another close vote, forty-two to 
forty-one, and the House on 7 February went along with the 
committee fifty to forty-four.166 The bill as finally passed 
by both housesl67 left the army essentially the same, except
IGlibid., 1971-80. 162%bid., 1981.
IGSjbid.. 1981-82.
l^^Tbid., 2066. The motion was made by Joshua Coit
of Connecticut, who sometimes voted with the Federalists on
military measures and sometimes against them.
^^^The debate on the motion also consumed part of 
6 Feb., Ibid., 2066-74, 2079-89.
^^^Ibid., 2094.
^^^The House passed the bill on 8 Feb. and the Senate 
on 20 Feb. after an effort to restore the dragoons was voted 
down 17 to 15. Ibid.. 2095, 1545, 1551, 1553, 1554.
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for the abolition of the dragoons and the reduction of the 
major general. On 28 February the President vetoed the 
measure on the basis that the dragoons were a necessary part 
of the military e s t a b l i s h m e n t . H o u s e  failed to over­
ride the veto in a fifty-five to thirty-six vote, and a new 
bill without the objectionable feature was reported and 
passed.169
The debate on the measure reflected the rise of 
Gallatin as a dominant Republican leader. The old leader 
in the House, Madison, remained virtually silent, and indeed 
he voted with the Federalists for the passage of the bill 
after the infantry regiment had been restored. Gallatin 
disclosed himself as a man with a mission and with fresh 
ideas on military policy. His mission was the attainment of 
a blissful state of parsimony in army spending. Formerly 
the Republican abhorence of standing armies had been based 
almost entirely upon the belief that they constituted a 
danger to the people. Gallatin virtually ignored this old 
argument and hammered away almost exclusively at their high 
costs.170 Many Republicans followed his lead, and in future 
debates both he and they would continue to emphasize this
168ibid.. 2328-29.
169ibid.. 2330-32, 2352, 1567-70, 1572, 1573. The 
act became law on 3 Mar. 1797, Ibid., 2955.
170white also notes this shift in emphasis, "Execu­
tive Influence," 120.
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new line of attack.
Both the attack itself and the direction it took 
caught the Federalists by surprise. They suffered from be­
ginning to end from the failure of the administration to 
provide firm military requirements upon which to base their 
arguments. According to White, the President’s attention 
was concentrated on naval legislation, and McHenry simply 
did not keep a close watch on what was happening in Con- ‘ 
gress,^71 Though these explanations may be valid they do 
not tell the whole story. There was an almost brand new 
law on the books (that of 30 May 1796) when the Republicans 
made their move. Since this law had followed the end of 
the Indian war, what reason did the administration have to 
expect further legislation only a few months later, partic­
ularly when the military situation had not undergone any 
appreciable change? Once the attack had begun, the problem 
of furnishing the Federalist leaders in the House with the 
information they needed was complicated by the fact that 
radical new troop dispositions for the occupation of the 
British posts were under study.
On the other hand the administration recovered its 
aplomb after the full danger of the threat had become appar­
ent, The first vote on the reduction of the regiment was 




against. The army men thus picked up eleven votes, the 
gains coming not only from members who did not vote the 
first time but also from others switching their votes. The 
opposition total remained unchanged. It would appear that 
the influence of the executive had been brought to bear in 
some way or another,
At the same time that the economy-minded Republicans 
in the House were fighting the army they were also attempt­
ing to sink the navy. By February 1797 work on three of 
the six frigates authorized in 1794 had been discontinued 
in compliance with an act passed on 20 April 1796.^73 
Construction was still underway on the United States at 
Philadelphia, the Constitution at Boston, and the Constella­
tion at Baltimore, On 10 February 1797 a select committee 
brought in resolutions calling for the appropriation of 
funds to finish these last three vessels and equip them 
for sea. About $172,000 would be required for the finishing 
alone, and it was estimated that the cost of manning the 
ships would be about $220,000 per year,1^4 McHenry in con­
trast to his inaction on the army bill had cooperated fully
^^^hite analyzes the vote in more detail, notes 
that three men switched, and points to the possibility that 
two of them may have been affected by executive influence. 
Ibid,. 120-21,
'^^ A^nnals. 4 Cong,, 2891,
I'^ ^Annals. 4 Cong,, 2 Sess,, 2111-13,
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in the preparation of the report.^75
In the debate on the resolutions the Republicans 
argued that the costs were too great, that navies in general 
were too expensive, and that they were useless to begin 
with.176 Gallatin said flatly that the United States could 
not afford a Navy. Nor did it need one, for our commerce 
though unprotected had increased rapidly despite the depre­
dations of recent years. Actually, he went on, there was 
no connection between navies and the success of a nation’s 
shipping industry. Russia and Sweden had large navies but 
little commerce; the United States had no navy and a large 
carrying trade. "There was a much more effectual way of 
securing the respect of foreign nations than by building a 
Navy; this was by applying all our resources to the payment 
of our Public Debt." When this had been discharged, we
might begin to think of navies.177
With words like these coming from a list of Repub­
licans, including Nicholas, Dearborn, John Heath and, John 
Page, both of Virginia,178 and several others, the resolu­
tions were in trouble from the beginning. The House finally
17^0n 19 Jan. he had submitted information upon 
which the committee report was based. Ibid., 1913.
17&The House considered the matter on 10, 11 and 18 
Feb. Ibid.. 2111-51, 2200-08.
177ibid.. 2128-30.
17%bid.. 2116-17, 2119-21, 2123, 2133-34, 2143-47.
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decided that the frigates might be completed but not equipped 
nor manned.179 A few days later on 18 February it passed a 
bill providing the money to finish the ships and repealing 
that part of the original act concerned with their manning.180 
When the Senate returned the measure on 27 February with an 
amendment providing only for the suspension of the manning 
provision, Gallatin with the stated intent of killing the 
bill moved that further consideration be postponed to Decem­
ber. The motion was carried, forty-three to twenty-nine.181
1 7 9 l b i d . , 2147-50.
1 8 0 l b i d . . 2208.
I S l l b i d . , 1556, 1560-62, 2326, 2329.
CHAPTER V
FEDERALIST MILITARY POLICY (CONTINUED)
The Federalist Military Program of 1797 
(Fifth Congress, First Session!
Early in 1797 a new French crisis was in the making. 
The Directory had refused to receive the new United States 
minister, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and after threatening 
to place him under the jurisdiction of the police it had 
ordered him out of the country. After diplomatic intercourse 
had thus been suspended, the Directory had passed a decree 
partially contravening the treaty of amity and commerce of 
1778. It also appeared to be committed to the task of under­
mining the American government by subverting the people. 
Meantime French warships and privateers preyed on American 
shipping, French magistrates and jailors mistreated American 
citizens, and new insults and injuries occurred almost 
daily.1
On 25 March 1797, the President called a special 
session of Congress to report on the rapidly growing emergency
^This summary of the situation is based upon the 
President’s address to Congress on 16 May 1797. Annals.
5 Cong., 1 Sess., 54-56.
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and to recommend defense measures. At about the same time, 
Alexander Hamilton outlined a comprehensive military program 
in a letter to James McHenry, the Secretary of War, The 
great military planner and hobbyist recommended:
(1) That a naval force of sloops and cutters be 
provided to convoy American shipping.
(2) That merchant ships be permitted to arm them­
selves.
(3) That "a provisional army” of twenty-five thousand 
men— that is, an array to be embodied as future developments 
might require— be formed. r\
(4) That additional artillery and cavalry be raised. 
In late April when McHenry solicited his advice as to the 
content of the President’s opening address he again recom­
mended these measures and added:
(5) That steps should also be taken to fortify the 
principal seaports.3
The idea of organizing troops to be embodied at some future 
time (point 3) had been invented by Hamilton in 1794, when 
he recommended the formation of the "auxiliary” force, and
^Letter of (?), Bernard C. Steiner (ed.). The Life 
and Correspondence of James McHenry. Secretary of War under 
Washington and Adams (Cleveland. 1907), 212-13. Hereafter 
cited as Steiner, McHenry. An abbreviated version of the 
letter appears in Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), The Works of 
Alexander Hamilton (Federal ed.. New York and London, 1904), 
X, 241-43. Hereafter cited as Lodge, Hamilton. In the 
Lodge version the date is given as Mar. 22 (?), 1797.
^Letter to McHenry, 29 Apr. 1797, Steiner, McHenry. 
213-16. The President had asked the cabinet a series of 
questions concerning the address. Hamilton, after receiving 
these from McHenry, commented on most of them, and his mili­
tary recommendations constituted only a small part of the 
entire reply. In this letter he did not specifically mention
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it continued to dominate his military thinking.
McHenry, who was hardly a "military character," as 
the vernacular of the day went, relied heavily on the advice 
of his mentor. Adding a few words to Hamilton’s second let­
ter, he sent it to the President as his own report.4 Presi­
dent Adams himself, who pretended to no knowledge of mili­
tary affairs, apparently incorporated McHenry's report 
directly into the speech. Thus Hamilton’s five points became 
the backbone of the new military program the President recom­
mended to Congress on 16 May. The program also included 
three additional elements that had apparently resulted from 
McHenry’s additions ;
(6) The preparation of the three frigates for
service.
(?) The devising of some means of controlling the 
export of naval stores needed by France for the use of the 
ships preying on our commerce.
(8) The revision of the militia act.^
the provisional army, but he no doubt intended to include 
it under "arrangements which , . . will give the Government 
the prompt command of an efficacious force. . . . "  Hamilton 
wrote a second letter a few days later (date unknown but 
before 14 May) which was more detailed but which was con­
fined to non-military aspects of the speech. Ibid., 216-22.
^On 14 May 1797 McHenry wrote Hamilton that he had 
added to Hamilton’s draft but had changed nothing. The 
President’s speech, he continued, "extenuates nothing, 
recommends proper measures. . . .  It is not, perhaps, pre­
cisely such a speech as you would have written— a little 
too plain." Ibid.. 223.
Annals, 5 Cong., 1 Sess., 57-58.
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In the atmosphere of great urgency that prevailed, 
the House had no sooner wasted seventeen days and one hundred 
and seventy-five pages of the Annals arguing over its reply 
to the President’s address than William Smith of South Caro­
lina introduced eight resolutions in line with the adminis­
tration program. He left out the militia but compensated by 
breaking point number one— the provision of ships for convoys 
--into two separate resolutions. One of these provided for 
the procurement of a "further naval force" consisting of an 
undesignated number of vessels, and the other empowered the 
President to employ the entire complement of ships, frigates 
included, for convoy, duty. The resolution concerning the 
provisional army provided that it consist of an undesignated 
number of infantry regiments, one regiment of artillery, and 
one of cavalry, the troops not to be called into actual 
service until the President thought necessary.&
More than one session would be required to bring the 
fruit of this elaborate program to maturity. In the present 
session measures were presented as follows:
(a) A House bill to appropriate funds for the forti­
fication of harbors.
(b) A Senate bill "for the protection of trade" com­
prehending the proposals for the completion of the frigates, 
for the further naval force, and for the use of convoys.
(c) A Senate bill to raise additional artillerists 
and engineers (no mention being made of cavalry).
&Ibid.. 239.
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(d) A Senate bill relative to export controls. 
Meantime, the Republicans with the air of men loading a can­
non only with powder because the noise was desirable and the 
ball unnecessary came up with a defense program of their own 
based on the militia.
When the fortifications bill was under consideration 
in the House, it was suggested that two hundred thousand 
dollars be set aside for the construction of the necessary 
works.7 While a majority of members were willing to vote 
some funds for this purpose, the Republicans and some Feder­
alists, including Speaker Jonathan Dayton, fought to hold 
the appropriation to a minimum.& The economizers, assisted 
by the widespread belief that the works planned were too few 
and too weak to have any real defensive value, eventually 
succeeded in cutting the figure to $115,000.^
The passage of the measure was needlessly delayed by 
a long quarrel which pitted the union against several of the 
states. This arose when Dayton, an erratic and contentious 
man, moved that no funds be expended on sites not ceded to 
the United States. Though he admitted that the motion was
^Smith’s resolution on the subject was approved and 
referred to a select committee on 5 June. The committee 
reported the bill on 10 June, and the committee of the whole 
and the House considered the matter on 12, 13, 14 and 15 
June. Ibid.. 241, 247, 292, 299-322.
Qjbid.. 299, 300, 309, 322.
9lbid., 306-11, 313, 323.
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directed against New York, it developed that South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Massachusetts were also involved. After Galla­
tin finally pointed out that no state had ceded exclusive 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , the funds were appropriated with no state 
being debarred from the benefits. In its final form, the 
measure also permitted the states to devote money they owed 
the United States to fortifications, provided they ceded 
the sites. The vote on passage in the House was fifty-four 
to thirty-five, and the Senate approved the measure without 
a division,11
The Senate bill for the protection of trade, which 
was received by the House on 16 June, provided for completing 
and manning the three frigates, empowered the President to 
procure up to nine additional vessels (sloops) of not more 
than twenty guns each, and authorized him to use the whole 
force to convoy merchant ships and protect the harbors and 
seacoasts. The bill had passed the Senate by the close vote 
of sixteen to thirteen after motions to delete the sections 
dealing with the additional vessels and with the convoys 
had been voted down.l^
lOlbid., 299-316 passim.
lllbid.. 319-24, 24. The act became law on 23 June 
1797, Ibid.. 3687.
1 9The bill was reported in the Senate on 6 June, 
considered on 7, 8, and 9 June and recommitted on the last 
of these days. It was reported the second time on 12 June, 
considered on the thirteenth, and passed on the fifteenth. 
Ibid.. 18-22.
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The Republicans in the House objected that the use of 
convoys on the high seas might lead to war, that the addition­
al vessels were unnecessary, and that navies cost too much to
13begin with. Some Federalists agreed that the section re­
lating to the convoys should be struck. The President, they 
said, already possessed the constitutional power to determine 
how the navy should be employed, John Nicholas of Virginia 
answered that the President could only direct operations in 
accord with broad military objectives laid down by Congress. 
After a thorough discussion of this conflict of powers, the 
House by the close vote of forty-seven to forty-five re­
stricted convoy service to the territorial w a t e r s . T h e  
Republicans also succeeded--this time almost without debate 
--in replacing the section relating to the new vessels with 
one authorizing the President to employ the revenue cutters 
of the Treasury Department to protect coastal shipping.
The further history of the House amendments was 
stormy. The Senate refused to accept them, and a conference 
committee was appointed. When the committee could not agree 
to a report, the Senate withdrew its objections to all the 
changes except that placing restraints on the convoys. The





House eventually receded from its insistence upon this.^^
The act as finally passed on 29 June neither precluded nor 
authorized the employment of the frigates in escort duty, 
the supposition being that the lack of any restriction per­
mitted their use as such. The operation of the act was 
limited to the end of the next session of Congress.
The Senate bill for the additional artillerists and 
engineers, which was passed on 7 June, provided for 832 more 
of these troops for five y e a r s . T h e s e  additional men were 
intended for use in the seacoast fortifications. In the 
House the Republicans, led as usual by Gallatin, Nicholas, 
and Giles, objected to the increase because of its cost 
(three hundred thousand dollars a year by Gallatin’s esti­
mate), because it was unnecessary, because the troops in­
volved were too few to be effective in time of war, and be­
cause the militia should be used in the forts. They also 
looked upon the bill as only another effort to increase the 
peacetime establishment.After Giles remarked that the 
money might better be applied to some other object, presum­
ably to naval defense, William Smith expressed the frustra­
tion that must have affected all defense-minded Federalists
l^Ibid.. 27-31, 392-93, 407-10.
l^The act with a new title, "An act providing a Naval 
Armament," became law on 1 July 1797, Ibid., 3689-92.
IGjbid.. 16-18, 326, 342.
~^Ibid.. 325-31, 341-48 passim.
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as the session moved along:
When an increase of the navy was under consideration 
. . . gentlemen exclaimed, leave trade to take care of 
itself, and let us attend to the internal defense of 
the country; but now, when they /the House/ are prepar­
ing for that, the same men say we are about to employ 
upon this object what ought to be employed for the 
protection of commerce. . . .20
On 20 June the House rejected the bill fifty-seven to thirty- 
21nine.
nn
The Senate bill for the control of exports sailed
through the House seventy-four to eight (among them the Repub­
lican ultras Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, Nicholas, and 
Abraham Venable of Virginia but not Gallatin and Giles).
It prohibited for a limited time the export of arms and
ammunition, but it did not cover naval stores, which had
24.been the object of the President’s recommendation. Those 
parts of the original administration program calling for the 
provisional army and the arming of merchant vessels elicited
little interest. The Senate rejected a bill concerning the
25former, perhaps the most important element in the whole 
program, and the House did not act on the question at all. 
Both Houses also voted down measures to permit the arming of 
merchant vessels. The Republicans in the House again feared
% b i d .. 341-42. ^ Ibid.. 347-48.
^%bid.. 16-17. 23ibid.. 247-53, 266-67.
^^The act became law on 14 June 1797, Ibid., 2685-87. 
^ Ibid.. 23 , 25.
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that resistance on the seas might lead to war.^6
On 9 June while the Congress was busy with the mat­
ters discussed above, Thomas Blount of North Carolina sub­
mitted two resolutions which may be considered the Republican 
plan. The first of these called for the formation of another 
standby detachment of eighty thousand militia and the second 
for the purchase of an undesignated quantity of small arms 
for the use of the militia. These proposals, made at a time 
that other defensive measures were under consideration, were 
apparently intended to effect in themselves an adequate de­
fense. Blount thus said that he would vote against any navy 
increase as only "internal defense" was necessary. The de­
tachment, he continued, would provide for this, and he would 
go home satisfied that the proper measures had been taken.
The general attitude reflected by these comments was probably 
shared by the main body of the Republicans. They would pro­
pose innocuous measures and then return to the waiting arms 
of their constituents secure in the knowledge that they had 
seen their duty and done it.
Blount's remarks are interesting also for the dis­
tinction they make between internal and external (naval) 
defense. As the representative of an agricultural section, 
he did not think it desirable to extend the protection of




the Union to trade and commerce--another point of view char­
acteristic of the Republicans in general. William Smith, 
who was from Charleston, a port of considerable importance, 
was angered by such heresies. He answered sharply that the 
object at the moment was to defend commerce, even if doing 
so did cost more money than militia. The opposition, he 
said, opposed everything and proposed nothing that might
no
involve expense. °
The House approved the resolution concerning the de­
tachment and referred it to a select committee. The bill 
subsequently reported by the latter aroused little opposi­
tion. Dayton and Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts pointed out 
that the measure could not be placed in operation without 
some expense, but the Federalists in general seemed content 
to let it ride t h r o u g h . I t  would please the Republicans, 
and while it might do little good it was essentially harm­
less. The bill was passed, presumably without a record vote, 
on the twentieth, an^ ) the Senate approved it two days later.^O 
Blount’s second reso. Cion was postponed pending receipt of
31
an arms returns from the War Department. It was not acted 
upon for the remainder of the session.
28lbid.. 283-84. ^^Ibid., 284, 332, 336-39.
30lbid., 341, 23-24.
81lt was referred to a select committee on 17 June, 
and on 24 June the committee recommended that it lie over 
to the next session. It was, however, tabled on that day.
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When the session came to a close on 10 July the 
Congress had put into effect about half of the President’s 
military program;
(1) Fortification of the ports and harbors was to 
be resumed.
(2) The frigates were to be completed.
(3) They might be employed in convoy service.
(4) Controls were placed on the export of arms. 
However, it had rejected the provisional army, the additional 
artillerists and engineers, and the further naval force, 
three of the most important elements, nor had it done any­
thing about the arming of merchant ships. It had also pro­
vided for a detachment of militia, which no one seemed to 
really want but which few had opposed.
The debates in the House had been curiously subdued. 
The Federalists, who had the voting strength to do as they 
pleased, seemed apathetic and undecided. The Republicans, 
except possibly John Nicholas, who always said what he 
thought, were even less outspoken than usual. Evidence of 
the spurious amity that prevailed is to be found in the lack 
of Federalist charges of Jacobinism, in the absence of any 
hot-blooded discussions of the relative merits of militia 
and regulars, and in the failure of the Republicans to 
strongly press their economy drive of the preceding Congress,
There is no further mention of the matter in the Annals for 
the remainder of the session. Ibid., 332-33, 377-78, 466,
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Perhaps both sides were moving slowly until they saw how 
the public reaction would go.
The President himself may have been partially respon­
sible for these attitudes and for the failure of parts of his 
program. He too seems to have been undecided. Though he had 
called a special session of Congress to deal with the French 
situation, he had outlined the military program without mak­
ing its enactment a matter of real urgency. Thereafter he 
sent Congress special messages describing conditions relat­
ing to France, England, and Spain, but none of these was
accompanied by positive demands for military legislation in
32the fashion of Washington and Knox. One may wonder whether 
the President would have presented an extensive program at 
all if Hamilton had not been prodding McHenry.
The "Provisional" Army, the "Additional" Army, 
and the "Jacobins" (Fifth Congress,
Second Session)
When the second session of the Fifth Congress convened 
on 13 November 1797, the President was calmly hopeful but by
32a  report on France and Spain, consisting of mater­
ials the President had referred to in his address, was sent 
up on 19 May 1797. One describing British, French and Span­
ish depredations on the commerce of the United States was 
communicated on 22 June. This had been prepared not on the 
initiative of the Executive but in compliance with a request 
of 10 June from the House of Representatives. Another of 3 
July contained intelligence of delays in the running of the 
new boundary line between the United States and Florida and 
in the withdrawing of Spanish troops from United States ter­
ritory, and of Spanish efforts to incite the Indians against 
the United States. Ibid.. 64, 290-91, 357, 440-41. The 
texts of the several reports are in Ibid., 3057-94, 3115-27, 
and 3127-62.
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no means overly optimistic. New envoys had been sent to 
France in an effort to renew negotiations, but the outcome 
of this extraordinary mission could not be foretold. Mean­
time, he continued, there had been no changes since the ad­
journment of Congress to "render inexpedient" the program of 
defense measures he had recommended at the opening of the 
preceding session. Indeed, increasing depredations on the 
seas had made its adoption even more necessary. However, 
he did not belabor the point, nor did he suggest additional
measures except to hint that something more might be done
33to protect shipping.
Though both the Senate and the House appointed 
committees on d e f e n s e ,^4 little was done as everyone awaited 
word from Paris. Gallatin, now the acknowledged Congress­
ional leader of the Republicans, thought the session would 
move along quietly unless the French "shall treat our com­
missioners very ill." The Federalists had a slight majority 
in the House, he added, and the Republicans were weak in 
speakers. Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina, one of 
the Federalist leaders, was a "bungler . . . very good- 
hearted, and not deficient in talents," an excellent speaker 
--"but his vanity destroys him." Samuel Dana of Connecticut, 
another Federalist, was the best orator in Congress, and
S^Annals, 5 Cong., 2 Sess., 630-32.
^4jbid.. 475, 653. Both committees were appointed 
on 29 Nov.
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Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts was the "first man" in the 
Federal party.
In the days to come, the Federalist ultras, led by 
Harper, Dana, Dayton, and John Allen of Connecticut were to 
turn on the Republicans with a ferocity unparalleled in 
American political history. Though the dreaded gentlemen 
from Connecticut, Dana and Allen, had the sharpest teeth. 
Harper bit the most frequently. As Chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee and possessor of the fastest-moving tongue 
in Philadelphia, this "bungler," who began his checkered 
career in a Jacobin club and ended it writing anti-slavery 
tracts, soon held the Federalist majority in his hand and 
bent the whole House to his will. The attacks of the Feder­
alists and the disclosure of the XYZ dispatches virtually 
destroyed parliamentary opposition. Only Gallatin himself, 
Nicholas, and one or two others continued to speak out.
The quasi-optimism of November and December had begun 
to fade by the middle of January, and on the twenty-fourth 
of that month, the President, becoming increasingly appre­
hensive, asked the cabinet a series of questions concerning 
measures to be taken in case France rejected the mission.3?
S^Gallatin to his wife, 19 Dec. 1797, Henry Adams,
The Life of Albert Gallatin (New York, 1943), 188.
3&pictionary of American Biography. VIII, 285-86.
^^Letter to the Heads of Departments, Charles Fran­
cis Adams (ed.). Works of John Adams (Boston, 1850-56),
VIII, 561-62.
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Two days later McHenry as usual sent the queries on to Ham­
ilton with a request for his a d v i c e . ^8 reply Hamilton
counseled against a declaration of war, recommended a con­
tinued willingness to negotiate, and outlined another com­
prehensive defense plan.^^
The new plan contained most of the old elements—  
the arming of merchant ships, the procurement of twenty 
sloops of war, and the formation of the provisional army, 
its strength to be about thirty thousand men. It also pro­
posed several additional elements:
(1) The last three of the six frigates should be 
completed,
(2) The President should be permitted in case of 
open rupture to procure up to ten ships of the line. These 
might be acquired from Great Britain, and provisional nego­
tiations to that end might be opened now. The possibility 
of obtaining them by hiring a part of the navy, both ships 
and men, of Great Britain or some other maritime nation 
should also be considered.
(3) A force of twenty thousand regulars should be 
raised at once.
Hamilton also recognized the ineffective manner in which 
Adams had presented the defense program of the preceding 
year. "There has been latterly too much Epigram in our 
Official Stile." The new program and the related need for 
revenue, he continued, should be put forward with emphasis
^^Letter of 26 Jan. 1798, Steiner, McHenry. 291, 
^% b i d .. 291-92. Date unknown but probably before
15 Feb.
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and '‘allusions to great future possible d a n g e r s . "40 ^ 5
the past, McHenry■followed Hamilton closely in submitting 
his own reply to the President, but he reduced the strength 
of the provisional array to twenty thousand and the strength 
of the regulars to sixteen thousand.41
The storm rapidly gathered in the following month and 
a half. On 5 March the President sent Congress advance in­
formation that the French were preparing to place new re­
strictions on neutral shipping. On the nineteenth he an­
nounced that the effort to reopen diplomatic talks had failed. 
At this time he again called attention to the continued ap­
plicability of his former defense recommendations (presumably 
those of the preceding session) and exhorted Congress with a 
lack of epigram that must have pleased Hamilton to adopt the 
necessary measures to protect commerce, to defend exposed 
areas of the country, and to fill the arsenals. On 3 April 
he sent up the "XYZ Papers," which had been in the decoding 
rooms for about a month. The clouds had finally burst.
On 9 April, McHenry was ready with recommendations 
for Congress. In general these were based on his earlier 
report to the President, and hence on Hamilton’s letter, with
4Qlbid.. 292-94.
4ÏThe report was dated 15 Feb. 1798. Ibid., 293 
footnote and 295.
42-Anna^, 5 Cong., 2 Sess., 1202, 1271, 1374. The 
text of the "XYZ Papers" is in Ibid., 3322-67.
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several additions and changes. The twenty sloops should be 
procured, and the President should be given standby authority 
to acquire six ships of the line, or the same number of 
frigates, and six galleys or floating batteries. The army 
should be increased by one regiment each of infantry, artil­
lery, and cavalry, and the President should be authorized to 
form a provisional army of twenty thousand men. About a 
million dollars more should be appropriated for fortifica­
tions, and a slightly larger amount should be devoted to the
AO
stock-piling of cannon, small arms, and other materiel.
A few days after the President announced the failure 
of the negotiations, a bill to provide the sloops was intro­
duced in the S e n a t e . A f t e r  he made public the XYZ Papers 
additional measures were reported, and new ones continued to 
be brought forward well into the summer. In general these 
proposals followed McHenry’s recommendations except that the 
army increase was larger and the ships of the line were 
omitted. They included
(1) A bill to provide the galleys--introduced in the 
Senate on 25 April.
(2) A resolution to provide additional artillerists 
and engineers— introduced in the House on 9 April.
43state Papers. MA. I, 120-21.
^‘^Annals. 5 Cong., 2 Sess., 529.
45lbid.. 1312, 1383, 1384, 539, 540, 1784, 2114.
These citations are listed in the same order that the bills 
are given.
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(3) A resolution to provide funds for the purchase 
of cannon, arms, and ammunition--introduced in the House on 
9 April.
(4) A bill for the protection of ports and harbors-- 
introduced in the House on 10 April.
(5) A bill to establish the Navy Department--intro- 
duced in the Senate on 11 April.
(6) A bill to form a provisional army--introduced in 
the Senate on 13 April.
(?) A resolution to establish the Marine Corps— intro­
duced in the House on 22 May.
(8) A bill to provide an additional army of regulars 
--introduced in the House on 6 July.
The Sloops
By far the most important of these measures were those 
dealing with the sloops, the provisional army, and the addi­
tional army. The first of these proposed that the United 
States acquire sixteen vessels of twenty-two guns each, that 
$950,000 be appropriated for this purpose, and that the Pres­
ident be authorized to employ all the ships of the United 
States to convoy merchantmen. The Senate passed the bill 
almost without incident on 9 April by the heavy majority of 
twenty to s e v e n . I n  the long and bitter debate that fol­
lowed in the House^? the Republicans appear to have been 
confused and intimidated by the intelligence contained in
46%bid.. 529-30, 532-35, 537-38.
4?The House considered the bill on 18, 19, 20 and 
23 Apr. Ibid., 1440-1522.
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the XYZ dispatches. Nicholas and Gallatin carried their 
shot-riddled flag almost alone through the detonations of 
Federalist oratory with only token assistance from Macon, 
Edward Livingston of New York, and several others. The 
Republicans* main body, never very articulate, had apparently 
taken to the foxholes. The immediate issues of the debate 
were soon overtaken by the rapidly developing party conflict. 
It approached treason to oppose the bill, fulminated the 
Federalist ultras. "Suppressors of opinion," answered 
Gallatin and Nicholas.
On the first day of the debate Nicholas made a long 
general attack on the bill that outlined the arguments the 
Republicans would employ again and again. He charged that 
the use of convoys would be ineffective, that the increase 
of the naval force would be too expensive, and that efforts 
to protect shipping would lead to war. Elaborating on the 
first of these points he maintained that the ships were too 
few to afford much protection. Furthermore they would have 
no legal right to fire on marauders unless they were attacked 
first. This was apparently to say that the convoys could 
not act to prevent the seizure of their charges as long as 
the United States remained neutral.^8
He then evaluated the situation in terms of "policy." 
While the actions of the French had been onerous and insult-
48lbid., 1440-43.
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ing, it would be better to suffer these inconveniences for 
the moment than to touch off a war. So far French hostility 
on the seas had affected only our commerce. War would injure 
the whole Union. We should thus abandon the navy and make 
no effort to protect our trade. He denied that this would 
constitute submission to France. It was simply the best 
policy. He would, however, resist demands, such as those 
made by XY and Z, which required "real submission," and he 
would use the militia to defend our freedom and indepen­
dence.^9
Harper, the Federalist chieftain, refuted Nicholas’ 
contentions point by point, and ridiculed the idea that the 
convoys would be war hazards. If France should land troops 
in the United States, he said by way of comparison, any re­
sistance we put up might also result in war. It was not a 
craven spirit but a willingness to risk getting both arms 
broken in order to break one of the enemy’s that made nations 
great. Nicholas’ desire to abandon the shipowners, he con­
tinued, would be tantamount to ignoring the interests of a 
whole section of the country and might lead to disunion.
The sections of the United States that depended upon shipping 
would hardly "sit down tamely under their losses" while the 
general government refused them protection. "Such a refusal 




In another long speech Gallatin repeated most of 
Nicholas’ arguments, made much of the "policy" of avoiding 
war, and advised against resisting the captures with force.51 
By now the Federalists were becoming impatient with what 
they thought was obstructionism, and they turned on Gallatin 
like a pack of angry lions. Dayton had never heard such 
"tame and submissive language" in the House. The gentleman 
from Pennsylvania had not made himself familiar with the 
spirit of the Revolution. John Allen of Connecticut wanted 
the committee of the whole to sit until midnight so that 
members could express their indignation. David Brooks of 
New York and Samuel Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania spoke in 
equally strong terms, and Dana in a back-handed slap at Gal­
latin’s foreign birth said that he was not surprised at 
Dayton’s anger. That gentleman was a native American and 
had served as a soldier throughout the Revolution.52
The next day Allen answered Gallatin in what may 
have been the most violent speech that had ever resounded 
through the chamber of the House. His basic arguments were 
that the obstructionist minority should yield without further 
ado to the patriotic majority in matters of defense and that 
the national interest, even the national existence, required 
resistance to France. He rebuked Nicholas and Gallatin for
50l b i d . . 1446-53. 51% b i d .. 1466-72.
5 2 ibid.. 1473-74.
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putting "policy" before the rights of commerce, assailed 
both for urging submission, and read a paragraph from the 
XYZ papers in which X had boasted of the "French party" in 
the United States. He thought this explained many things 
that had transpired in the House. "Were France herself to 
speak through an American mouth, I cannot conceive . . .
/that we would hear more/ than what we have heard from cer­
tain gentlemen to effect her purposes."
On every defense measure they brought forward "Con­
stitutional questions, theories, doubts, nice distinctions, 
learned metaphysical disquisitions, and long speeches," to 
obstruct action. They chanted in our ear forever the "syren" 
song of "policy" to lull us to sleep, and "invited us to 
surrender the ocean . . . without one feeble effort of de­
fense." Allen then polished up this real tour de force of 
vitriol, invective, and threat with the charge that "there 
are men in this country, in this House, whose hatred and 
abhorence of our Government leads them to prefer another, 
profligate and ferocious as it is."^3
Harrison G. Otis of Massachusetts and Dana also at­
tacked the Republican position, the latter like Allen hinting 
at treason and submission and calling for compliance with the 




pleaded for tolerance and freedom of opinion.Gallatin in 
winding up the debate for the Republicans charged that the 
Federalists were attempting to use fear as a weapon to force
his colleagues to vote for the bill. They tell us, he con­
tinued, to show that we do not belong to the "French party" 
by agreeing to every extravagant proposition brought for­
ward, by not opposing decisions of the majority, and by not 
criticizing the administration.^^
The committee of the whole approved Republican mo­
tions to delete the section giving the President authority
to employ the navy in convoy duty and to reduce the number
57of sloops to twelve. The Federalists raised no major ob­
jection to the first of these because in their view its pri­
mary effect was to leave the matter to the decision of the
President. Harper and several other Federalists favored the
second in the belief that the smaller number would obtain 
the largest vote.^^ After the committee had rejected Gal­
latin's amendment to limit the use of the convoys to the 
territorial w a t e r s , t h e  House on 23 April passed the bill 
forty-two to t w e n t y - s i x . O n  the following day the Senate
^^Ibid.. 1494-1501. ^^Ibid.. 1508-09.
57lbid.. 1440, 1459, 1462, 1466.
S^Ibid., 1466. 59ibid.. 1466, 1519.
^^Ibid.. 1520-22.
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agreed to the amendments.
The Provisional Army
The Senate bill relating to the provisional army 
set off a debate in the House that was as long and bitter as 
any in the s e s s i o n . T h e  bill authorized the President to 
raise twenty thousand provisional troops and to accept for 
service any number of special volunteer companies or associ­
ations. The time at which these new troops might be ordered 
up was left entirely to his discretion. He could begin re­
cruiting the provisional forces whenever the public interest 
seemed to require. He could accept associations offering 
their services at any time during the three years following 
the passage of the act. He might call them to active duty 
at his discretion during the two years after acceptance.
The bill also authorized him to appoint their officers.
In the House, strong Republican objections to several 
features of the measure forced the Federalists to send it to
Gllbid., 545-47. The act became law on 27 Apr.
1798. Ibid.. 3722-23.
^^The bill from the Senate was received on 24 Apr., 
debated on 25 Apr., 8, 10, 11, 14, 16 and 17 May, and 
passed on 18 May. Ibid.. 1525-42, 1631-1707, 1725-72.
^^The contents of the bill have been reconstructed 
from the debates. Ibid., 1631, 1703, and from "Report of 
committee on bill sent from the Senate ’*An Act authorizing 
the President to raise a Provisional Army'." Folder 
5 H 2 R 86.1, Rare Book Room, Library of Congress.
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a select committee for changes.According to the amend­
ments offered by the committee on 4 May, the President should 
be authorized to raise the provisional troops only under cer­
tain well defined contingencies and their number should be 
reduced from twenty thousand to' ten thousand. The contin­
gencies included a declaration of war against the United 
States, invasion by a foreign power, or imminent danger of 
such an invasion. It would be left to the President to de­
termine when the last of these conditions existed. To bal­
ance the cut in the troops, the committee recommended a new 
section authorizing the President to call out portions of 
the existing detachment of militia for short periods of 
training. The committee also added sections permitting the 
President to lend artillery to volunteer corps for training 
and to provide arms for volunteer or ordinary militia called 
into the Federal service.
The section dealing with the provisional troops was 
unconstitutional, said the Republicans, because it delegated 
part of the military responsibilities of Congress to the ex­
ecutive. The power to determine when armies should be formed 
was a part of the general power to raise armies. Under the
G^ibid., 1525-42. The bill was committed on 30 
Apr.,.Ibid., 1561.
65%bid., 1594. "Report of committee on bill sent 
from the Senate 'An Act authorizing the President to raise 
a Provisional Army'." Folder 5 H 2 R 86.1, Rare Book Room, 
Library of Congress.
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contingency covering danger of invasion, they went on, the 
entire matter would still be left to the determination of 
the President. With heavy-handed sarcasm, Gallatin remarked 
that he expected next to hear of "provisional taxes, to be 
raised if the President shall think fit."^^ The Federalists 
pointed out that Congress had already made such a delegation 
of power in authorizing the President to call out the militia 
for frontier defense, Otis, with the air of a man not ac­
customed to splitting legal hairs or even ropes, added that 
a time of great danger was no proper time for "nice Consti­
tutional scruples," anyhow.
The Republicans thought the associations were uncon­
stitutional for a variety of reasons. As Gallatin and Joseph 
Varnum of Massachusetts noted, the Constitution named only 
two types of troops, regulars and militia, and the volunteers 
were neither. They resembled the regulars in that service 
was voluntary, in that their officers would be appointed by 
the President, and in that they would serve continuously, 
not in rotation like the militia. On the other hand, they 
resembled the militia in that they would remain unembodied 
except when they were ordered out. As in the case of the 
.provisional army. Congress would have no control over the 
time that they might be called into s e r v i c e .^8
G^Ibid.. 1526-27, 1538-39, 1638.
G^Ibid., 1637, 1644. Also 1529-30.
GBibid., 1704, 1725-26, 1742, 1737.
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The President in employing them would not be limited 
by the constitutional restrictions relating to militia. He 
could call out the associations "war or no war, insurrection 
or no insurrection, whenever he pleases." Finally, giving 
the President the authority to appoint the officers would 
greatly increase executive powers at the expense of the 
s t a t e s . T h e  Federalists let most of these arguments go 
unanswered, but many of them, preferring to fight Republican 
fears of standing armies rather than the Constitution, would 
admit when pressed that the troops were essentially--though 
not quite entirely— regulars.70
The Republicans denied that there was any military 
need for either the provisional troops or the associations.
It was absurd to think that France might invade the United 
States. That nation was too heavily engaged in Europe, its 
military and political objectives lay in Europe, and it did 
not have the means to undertake a task that had been too 
much for England, a vastly stronger maritime power. The 
associations were particularly valueless in that young men 
could tender their services by joining one of the ordinary 
independent companies.71 The Federalists pointed to the 
force the French were collecting to invade England and hinted
69lbid.. 1737, 1705, 1760.
70lbid., 1704-05, 1733.
7llbid., 1632-33, 1726-27, 1756.
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that it might be employed against the United States in event 
of an European peace, and they were practically certain that 
a French force from Haiti would be sent against the South.
As the debate revealed, the Federalists feared in­
ternal disturbances above all else. France, said Harper, 
always struck at her enemies from within and was even then 
“subverting the most ancient Governments in the world.“ 
According to Otis and Nathaniel Smith of Connecticut the 
French might attempt an invasion to foster revolution and 
the replacement of the present administration with one more 
to their liking.^3 Other Federalist fire-eaters, moving in 
to the kill after the manner of Allen in the debate on the 
sloops, criticized the "stubborn spirit of Opposition" that 
existed among the Republicans, charged that Gallatin’s prin­
ciples were identical with those of "the furious hordes of 
Democrats /the Frencty' which threatened this country with 
subjection," and pointed to the number of spies floating 
around.
On the other hand. Republican fears of suppression 
had been particularly aroused by certain characteristics of 
the associations. They thought that these units would in­
evitably be composed almost entirely of Federalists. As
7^Ibid.. 1531, 1677-78. Also 1642, 1688, 1696.
73ibid.. 1530, 1642, 1700.
'^ I^bid.. 1534, 1676-77, 1700.
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Gallatin put it, only the wealthy could afford membership 
because of the high cost of arms and uniforms. Furthermore 
the organizations would be entirely subservient to the Pres­
ident. He would appoint the officers, and he could call up 
any number of units he wished and employ them for any pur­
pose he w i s h e d . 75 Here no doubt lay the practical roots of 
the Republican constitutional scruples concerning the associ­
ations.
Gallatin also charged the Federalists with institut­
ing a "system of alarm" designed to show danger and disaf­
fection where none actually existed. Having thus created 
fears, he went on, the Federalists had then brought forward 
a whole series of unconstitutional measures, including pro­
posals for alien and sedition bills as well as the present 
bill, the purpose of all of which was to control opinion 
hostile to the majority in C o n g r e s s . T h e  Federalists did 
little to assuage these Republican a p p r e h e n s i o n s ,77 and 
Harper gave what was perhaps the strongest and clearest 
statement of Federalist intentions. Gallatin’s past experi­
ence with volunteers (in the Whiskey Rebellion), he said, 
no doubt accounted for that gentleman’s present aversions. 
Volunteers were indeed dangerous to the liberties of the
7^Ibid.. 1728-29.
76ibid., 1744-46.
77ibid.. 1738-39, 1741, 1747-51, 1758.
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seditious, and they might well put a “hook in the nose" of
T8those who wished to overthrow the government. A moment 
later, he added:
■ Whenever an Executive Directory shall be sitting, and a 
day shall have been fixed for assassinating the aristo­
crats, or all those who do not concur in the principles 
of French democracy, then he should wish this force to 
be turned against these persons. He believed, however, 
this time was far off, and he believed the formidable 
nature of this force would effectually prevent its 
arrival.79
The committee of the whole beat down by narrow mar­
gins a series of Republican attempts to kill or cripple the 
section dealing with the provisional troops. These included 
motions to strike the whole section, to strike the contin­
gency relating to invasion, and to reduce the number of men 
to five thousand. It did, however, limit the time during 
which the President might raise the troops to the recess of 
Congress. After similar attacks on the associations, in­
cluding an effort to label them as militia, had also been 
defeated, the House on 18 May passed the bill, fifty-eight 
to forty. The Senate subsequently concurred in the several
H o u s e  a m e n d m e n t s . 8 0
The act as it finally became law provided not only 
for the provisional army of ten thousand and the volunteer 
associations but also for a lieutenant general, a staff, and
7Blbid.. 1747. '^ I^bid., 1749.
SOjbid.. 1631, 1682-85, 1689, 1699, 1702-03, 1758- 
59, 1768-77, 559-61.
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a suitable number of major generals, all to be appointed 
when the President deemed it necessary.81 A supplementary 
measure passed a few days later exempted the associations 
from service in the ordinary militia, authorized the Presi­
dent to sell or lend them artillery and small arms, and 
permitted him to begin appointing officers for the provis­
ional troops.82
The Additional Army 
The additional army proposal sailed through the 
House with considerably less opposition as the Republicans 
licked their wounds and the bad news from France continued.
The new measure added two companies to each of the four 
eight company infantry regiments of the existing establish­
ment, and provided for twelve additional regiments of ten 
companies each and for six additional troops of dragoons.
This augmentation amounted to a four hundred percent increase 
in the regular infantry and a three hundred percent increase 
in the regular cavalry. Though Nicholas moved to strike the 
twelve regiments and insert eight he could carry only twenty- 
eight votes as against forty-three for the opposition. The 
bill was then passed sixty to eleven. Nicholas, Gallatin, 
and many other Republicans who had wanted only eight regiments
8lThe act became law on 28 May 1798, Ibid.. 3729-33. 
®^he act of 22 June 1798, Ibid.. 3743-44.
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now voted for the whole number. This additional army was 
to remain in effect until the differences with France had 
been settled.83
Each of the six remaining proposals in the Federal­
ist program also resulted in legislation. The Senate bill 
for the galleys, which provided ten of these floating bat­
teries at a cost of eighty thousand dollars, went through
84the House without debate or amendment. The bill for an 
additional regiment of artillerists and engineers was dis­
cussed briefly. The Republicans disclaimed the need for 
the increase, objected to its costs, and feared that the new 
troops would become a part of the permanent establishment. 
They received another few rounds of Federalist wrath for
their trouble, and the bill was approved without a roll 
85call. The measures appropriating funds for stockpiling
86
($800,000), setting aside money for the fortification of
87ports and harbors ($250,000), establishing the Navy
B^Ibid.. 2114, 2129-32, 604-05, 609, 611, 613-14.
The measure became law on 16 July 1798, Ibid.. 3785-86.
8^1bid.. 548-50, 1558, 1560, 1563, 1567. The 
measure became law on 4 May 1798, Ibid.. 3727.
85lbid.. 1383, 1402-12, 1413, 1415-25, 1427, 542-45. 
The measure became law on 27 Apr. 1798, Ibid., 3723.
S^Ibid.. 1384, 1414, 1426, 1427-40, 543, 549, 551. 
The measure became law on 4 May 1798, Ibid.. 3726.
B^Ibid.. 1384, 1394-1402, 540, 548, 550. The 
measure became law on 3 May 1798, Ibid., 3725-26.
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Department,®^ and forming the Marine Corps (with 720 pri­
vates)®^ were all passed with only brief or token discussion.
The Congress also passed a bill to provide arms for 
the militia. This measure, no doubt an outgrowth of the 
resolution offered by Blount in the first session, required 
that the federal government purchase thirty thousand stands 
of arms and that the President offer these for sale to both 
the state governments and to individual militiamen. It also 
provided that any of the arms remaining unsold at any time 
might be issued to militia called into the federal service. 
Four hundred thousand dollars were appropriated to pay for 
the arms.^^
The "Expansible" Theory and the "Eventual Army"
(Fifth Congress, Third Session)
There had been little ostensible change in the French 
problem when the third session of the Congress met on 3 De­
cember 1798. In his address the President spoke of the 
"ultimate failure" of our efforts to negotiate with that 
country. He praised the successes of the small navy, urged 
that it be increased, and called for a general build up of
®®Ibid., 539, 541, 1545-1554. The measure became 
law on 30 Apr. 1798, Ibid., 3724-25.
G^Ibid., 1784-85, 1835-36, 1855, 570, 601, 2132.
The measure became law on 11 July 1798, Ibid., 3774-76.
90lbid., 1701, 1772-73, 1877, 1927-33, 1938-39, 597. 
The House passed the measure by the overwhelming vote of 55 
to 17, and the Senate approved it without a tally. It be­
came law on 6 July 1798, Ibid., 3752-53.
237
defense measures.9^ On 18 and 21 January, he sent up com­
munications, including a report from the Secretary of State, 
which seemed to confirm the impossibility of dealing with 
France at the conference table.^2 Meantime, the clause in 
the law of the last session relating to the provisional 
troops had expired with the meeting of Congress and the law 
establishing the detachment of militia would die with the 
end of the session.
Under these dark auspices McHenry had again busied 
himself with military plans. Throughout the fall he had 
been communicating even more frequently than usual with Ham­
ilton, now the second ranking general in the provisional 
army. As in the past Hamilton was erupting ideas like grape- 
shot from the muzzle of a fieldpiece. In a letter of 9 Octo­
ber he wrote that he was working on a new system for the 
organization of the army,^^ and in December, following con­
ferences with Washington, he outlined a comprehensive military
^^Annals, 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 2420-24.
'^^erry to the Secretary'of State, 1 Oct. 1798,
Ibid., 3464-3531. (The citation includes many related docu­
ments.) The Secretary of State’s report is in Ibid., 3531- 
58. The former was transmitted on 18 Jan. 1799 and the 
latter on 21 Jan. 1799.
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Hamilton to McHenry, 9 Oct. 1798, Steiner,
McHenry, 344-45. Unfortunately the letter gives no hint 
as to what Hamilton had in mind.
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plan in two letters.94 The first of these suggested;
(1) That the wartime strengths of army units be 
fixed at figures considerably larger than the peacetime 
strengths. Thus infantry regiments should be increased 
from 600 privates to 920 privates on the outbreak of war, 
dragoons regiments from 432 to 920, and artillery regiments 
from 832 to 896.
(2) That a corps of two thousand riflemen be
raised.95
There is, of course, no way of knowing for certain whether 
Hamilton or Washington was actually the father of the expan­
sible feature in the first recommendation. However, Hamilton 
had broached a similar idea in the report of the military 
committee of 1783.^6 His mention of a new system of organi­
zation in the recent letter to McHenry (that of 9 October) 
suggests that he may have been thinking of the matter again. 
The letter was undoubtedly written long before the confer­
ence with Washington. The second of the two December let­
ters recommended:
(3) That all the officers of the additional army be 
appointed and all the men be raised without delay.
(4) That the maximum military requirement to meet 
any threat be set at fifty thousand men including forty 
thousand infantry, two thousand rifles, four thousand horse, 
and four thousand artillery.
^^Though both letters were signed by Washington, 
Lodge, the editor of Hamilton's works, attributes the drafts 
to Hamilton, and the content of each bears Hamilton's un­
mistakable imprint.
9^Washington (draft by Hamilton) to McHenry, 13 Dec. 
1798, Lodge, Hamilton. VII, 22-38.
9&See pages 46-47 above.
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(5) That arms and materiel be provided for such a 
force at o n c e , 97
In a later letter of the same month, which was ad­
dressed to James Gunn, a Senator from Georgia, and a copy 
of which was sent to McHenry, Hamilton added several addi­
tional elements to the plan:
(6) Two companies should be added to the existing 
cavalry regiment.
(?) The provisional troops should be renewed and 
increased so that they together with the regulars would 
total fifty thousand men,
(8) Plans should be made to draft the men necessary 
to complete the fifty thousand in case of i n v a s i o n , 98
It will be noted that this eight point program con­
templated no immediate augmentation other than the riflemen 
and the cavalry. Though the additional army was to be 
called up, it was already covered by legislation. All ma­
terial increases requiring legislation— points (1), (4), and 
(7)— were provisional or "eventual" in nature. The increases 
would be effective and the troops would be raised only upon 
some future contingency.
On 24 December McHenry sent the President a program 
of his own which was obviously based upon Hamilton’s sugges­
tions, The additional cavalry should be raised, the
97washington (draft by Hamilton) to McHenry, 13 Dec, 
1798, Ibid,. 6-22, The two letters bore the same date,
98Letter of 22 Dec, 1798, Steiner, McHenry. 360-61, 
This letter may also be found in Lodge, Hamilton, VII, 45-47, 
Steiner does not give the date that the copy was sent to 
McHenry, and Lodge makes no mention of the fact that it was 
so sent.
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provisional army should be renewed with its strength in­
creased to at least twenty thousand, and the organization 
of the army should be modified to provide the greater unit 
strengths in wartime. It might be desirable to raise the 
corps of riflemen. All military preparations, including 
the procurement of supplies, should "contemplate" a force 
of fifty thousand men. While he omitted Hamilton’s recom­
mendations concerning the completion of the additional army 
and the draft, he added one concerning the volunteer associ­
ations. The President should be given authority to organize 
these units into regiments, brigades, and divisions.
McHenry’s program, which the President transmitted 
to Congress on 31 D e c e m b e r , a n d  the President’s own rec­
ommendation in the address to Congress for navy increases 
formed the basis of Federalist action during the session. 
Meantime the Republicans had reformed their lines, partially 
as a result of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. They
^^Annals, 5 Cong., 3614-27. The similarity of two 
of McHenry’s recommendations--those concerning the addi­
tional cavalry and the provisional army— to Hamilton’s plan 
is obvious, but the historical connection is more tenuous 
than one might wish. It seems unlikely that Hamilton’s 
letter, written on 22 Dec., could have reached McHenry in 
time to form part of a report rendered only two days later. 
However, the two men very likely exchanged thoughts by some 
informal or unrecorded means prior to 22 Dec. In any event, 
Hamilton’s direct connection with the renewal of the pro­
visional army is implicit in the fact that Senator Gunn, to 
whom the letter was written was chairman of the committee 
reporting the relevant bill.
lOOlbid., 3614.
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were further heartened in mid-January by another resolution 
of the Virginia General Assembly attacking Federalist smear 
tactics, condemning policies that might lead to "a war of 
aggression," and inveighing against standing a r m i e s . ^01 
They countered the Federalist program with an effort to 
continue the militia detachment of 1797 and debated measures 
more thoroughly than they had in the last months of the pre­
vious session. Normalcy soon seemed to have returned when 
Gallatin again could be heard expounding the doctrine of 
economy first and defenses second.
Meantime the President reported an apparent improve­
ment in the French situation. On 18 February he told the 
Senate that France seemed to be ready to receive new American
envoys and nominated William Vans Murray as a plenipotentiary 
102to Paris. On 25 February he took an even more optimistic 
view of the renewal of negotiations and added two more pleni­
potentiaries, Oliver Ellsworth and Patrick H e n r y , ( l a t e r  
replaced by W. R. Davie.) Despite the increase in Republican 
opposition and in the President’s hopes for peace. Federalist 
voting strength was able to see most of the military program 
through Congress.
The Federalists in implementing the administration 
program brought forward measures covering the more important
^^^Resolution of 10 Jan. 1799, Virginia Acts, Dec. 
1798 Sess., 33.
^^^Annals, 5 Cong., 3558-59. "^^ I^bid., 3560.
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points:
(1) The ’’eventual army” bill, which in effect con­
tinued the provisional troops and the associations, the 
former on an enlarged b a s i s . 104
(2) A bill adding strong naval units.
(3) A bill increasing the strength of the regiments 
and adding several small units to the army.
The eventual army bill, which originated in the 
S e n a t e , w o u l d  permit the President in case of war or 
imminent danger of war to raise twenty-four regiments of 
infantry, three regiments of cavalry, a regiment and a bat­
talion of riflemen, and a battalion of artillery. The bill 
also limited the number of volunteers the President might 
accept in the associations to seventy-five thousand men, and 
apportioned them among the states, thus precluding the for­
mation of a sectional force. It further permitted him to 
organize the associations into regiments, brigades, and 
divisions and to employ them in all cases in which the ordi­
nary militia might be e m p l o y e d .
The Republicans again attacked the constitutionality 
of the volunteers and of the clause permitting the President 
to raise the eventual regiments at some future time. They 
denied that there was any military necessity for the increase,
^^"^This was the bill reported by Gunn's committee.
See footnote 99 above.
lOSAnnals, 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 2209, 2217, 2221-24.
lO^Ibid.. 2926.
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proclaimed that it would cost too much, and insisted that 
the militia was the cheapest and most effective means of 
defense. They also made much of the fact that the invasion 
prophesied in the previous session had not o c c u r r e d . T h e  
Federalists made their usual replies to these arguments, and 
on at least one occasion levied the customary charge of
treason.108
Republican motions in the committee of the whole to 
strike the sections dealing with the eventual regiments and 
the associations and to prevent the immediate appointment
of the officers for the former were voted down by sizeable
majorities. However, the committee adopted another Republi­
can amendment deleting a clause restricting the employment 
of the associations to their own and adjacent states.109 
After the committee had risen, the House approved a Federal­
ist motion to limit to three months the time that the volun­
teers could be required to serve outside their states, re­
jected another Republican motion to prevent the immediate 
appointment of the officers, and passed the bill fifty-four 
to forty-one. The Senate subsequently concurred in the 
House amendmentsJ110
10?Ibid., 3022, 3025-26, 3030-32, 3037.
lOGlbid., 3034-35.
lO^Ibid., 3022, 3077, 3038, 3042-43.
ll^ b i d ., 3043-44, 2236-37. The act became law on
2 Mar. 1799, Ibid.. 3933-36.
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The bill for the augmentation of the navy, which 
originated in the House,embraced the major naval recom­
mendations that Hamilton and McHenry had put forward in the 
previous session. It provided for the immediate building of 
six ships of the line and six sloops. The former were to be 
armed with not less than seventy-four guns each and the lat­
ter with not more than eighteen guns each. It was estimated 
that these vessels would cost a total of $2,400,000, and the 
bill appropriated $1,000,000 for immediate use. It was this 
heavy expenditure that was primarily responsible for the 
great length of the debate, which consumed three days.^^^
The discussion followed much the same pattern as 
earlier naval debates. Gallatin at his best when the dollar 
might be made the main issue painted a picture of economic 
horror in two long speeches. He cited figures to show that 
a "perpetual land tax" would be required to support and 
maintain the present navy and that any increase would have 
to be paid for out of money borrowed at eight percent. He 
then attempted to demonstrate that with the additional ships 
the excess of expenditures over revenue through 1802 would
be $17,500,000,113
He added to this drawing some depressing representa-
llllbid., 2815.




tions of defensive futility, sectional conflict, and military 
ambition. French naval losses^^^ and changes in French pol­
icy, not the efforts of the present navy, had been primarily 
responsible for the decreased attacks on our shipping. The 
new navy would be virtually useless because it could never 
expect to stand against the great fleets of England. Though 
farmers paid a large proportion of the costs of naval pro­
tection, they profited little from our carrying trade. Most 
of the gains went to Northern merchants, who first imported 
articles and then exported them to other parts of the world. 
Give the Federalists their Navy, he went on, and they will 
soon join a new coalition against France and engage in all 
kinds of international military adventures
Gallatin’s long speeches and the shorter ones of 
Nicholas and Joseph Eggleston of Virginia changed few 
v o t e s . T h e y  were answered by Harper, Otis, Samuel Smith, 
and Josiah Parker of V i r g i n i a , head of the Naval Commit­
tee, who usually voted with the Republicans on military 
measures. The committee of the whole voted down Gallatin’s 
motion to strike the six ships of the line and rejected John 
Williams’ motion to strike the sloops. The house then beat
114prQsumably a reference to the French defeat in 
the battle of the Nile, 1 Aug. 1798.
115,Annals. 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 2823-32, 2859-71. 
ll^Ibid., 2851-55, 2857-59.
ll^ibid., 2836-51, 2874-83, 2832-36, 2871-74.
246
down Nicholas’ renewal of Gallatin’s motion by fifty-four to 
forty and passed the bill by fifty-four to forty-two. The 
Senate approved the measure without amendment or division.
The last of the three bills set the war strength of 
the regiments at the figures McHenry had recommended and pro­
vided for the raising of some additional regulars--a battal- 
lion of artillery, two companies of cavalry, and a battalion 
of riflemen. Though the bill, which originated in the Sen­
a t e , r e a c h e d  the House on 11 February, it was not brought 
before the committee of the whole until 26 February, only 
five days before adjournment. In the closing rush there was 
little time for discussion, and the measure was hastily 
pushed through. The act, as it became law, omitted the 
battalion of artillery and contained Gallatin’s proviso 
precluding any actual additions of men or units until war 
should break out or Congress should specifically direct.
llGlbid., 2823, 2856, 2883, 2218, 2225. The act 
became law on 22 Feb. 1799, Ibid., 3804-05.
^^^The bill was introduced in the Senate on 19 Jan. 
1799 and passed on 11 Feb. 1799. Ibid., 2204, 2217. The 
material on the bill is meager. The strengths that it set 
for the regiments are inferred from the act and from the 
lack of any indication that the House amended these fea­
tures* The fact that the increase of the strengths of the 
regiments was to be made at a future time may be inferred 
from the short description of the bill. Ibid.. 3018. How­
ever, Gallatin’s amendment, which will be mentioned later, 
indicates that the increase as the bill came from the 
Senate was not necessarily tied to the outbreak of war.
^^^Ibid., 3018-19. The act became law on 3 Mar., 
Ibid., 3963-70.
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On 21 February, while the eventual army bill and the
bill to increase the war strength of the regulars were still
before the House, the Republicans presented a resolution to
continue in force for another year the eighty thousand man
121detachment of militia. Several Federalist leaders includ­
ing Sewall, Otis, Dayton, Dana, and Allen brought forward 
many objections to the measure. If the bills before the 
House were passed it would be unnecessary. The operation of 
the existing law had been completely unsatisfactory. No de­
tachments were required in New England, where the militia 
was always ready to march. Detachments served no purpose 
in the South, where the troops were for the most part unarmed. 
Posing as the protectors of the general militia, they also 
claimed that the detachments functioned to prevent the main 
body from holding itself in readiness and thus reduced its 
efficiency.
The question, as Gallatin and Nicholas saw it, was 
whether the associations and “eventual” regulars in the 
other bills were to replace the militia in our military 
p l a n s . A c c o r d i n g  to the Pennsylvanian, the Federalist 
claims that active militia service was a vexatious burden, 
most of the weight of which fell upon the poorer groups,
121lbid.. 2956.
^^%bid., 2975-78, 2981, 2983.
123%bid., 2975, 2979-80, 2982.
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were directed at such an end. If, he continued, they estab­
lished the opinion;
that to be a militia-man is a mere duty, and not a 
right; that it is a heavy duty, from which they might 
be easily relieved, in the first place by volunteer 
corps, in the next by regular troops. . . . they /the 
Federalists/ will in a short time, introduce a standing 
army as a substitute for the m i l i t i a . 124
The Republicans also denied that the existing detachments
had been inefficacious and declared that the strength of the
militia could be brought to bear only through the use of
such d e t a c h m e n t s . 125
After these arguments, the resolution was agreed to 
forty-eight to forty, presumably with some Federalist aid, 
and a bill was subsequently reported and passed without de­
bate. The Senate amended the measure to permit the Presi­
dent to form the detachments only in the South if he so 
w i s h e d . 1^7 As Otis explained the amendment to the House, 
the upper chamber had attempted to please both the Southern 
gentlemen, who wanted the detachments, and the Northern gen­
tlemen, who did not. The former, far from being pleased 
with either this gentle sarcasm or with the action of the 
Senate, condemned the amendment as making "an invidious dis­
tinction" between the South and other sections. The House
then rejected the amendment, and the Senate refused to
12^1bid., 2979. 125ibid.. 2977-82.
12&lbid.. 2985, 3021. 127ibid.. 2240-41.
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consider the bill further until the next s e s s i o n .
The Final Federalist Military Philosophy 
(Sixth Congress, First Session)
By December 1799 a French settlement appeared to be 
in the offing. The President with an air of cautious opti­
mism told Congress that it was yet too early to abandon the 
defense system. He did, however, suggest that economies 
might be effected in all branches of the public service, pre­
sumably including the military.Meantime, the Republicans 
in anticipation of the end of the French troubles readied an 
attack on the additional army, and not even McHenry held out 
real hopes that substantial army reductions could be avoided. 
His report of 4 January, which will be discussed below, might 
as well have been sent under a flag of truce because it pre­
saged the full surrender of the army men.
The session was marked by the resurgence of Republi­
can anti-militarism in its most virulent form. John Randolph 
of Roanoke, serving his first term in the House, made the 
sharpest doctrinaire attack on standing armies since Gerry's 
famous speech in the Confederation Congress. In return for 
his trouble, he was manhandled at the theatre the following 
night by some marine corps officers, or so he claimed. After 
a long and inconclusive investigation of this affair, the
128ibid., 3052-54, 2241.
^^^Annals, 6 Cong., 1 Sess., 188-90.
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House voted down a motion to censure the officers Michael 
Lieb of Pennsylvania, another new congressman, introduced a 
bill to curb unspecified military interferences at elections, 
and the measure actually passed the House, only to be rejec­
ted by the Senate.^^l Four Republican ultras, including 
Randolph, bitterly but unsuccessfully opposed the presenta­
tion of a medal to Captain Thomas Truxton following the action 
between the Constellation and La Vengeur, a French ship-of- 
war.^3^
McHenry’s report, which did not reach Congress until
133after the efforts to reduce the army were underway, marked 
a major turning point in the military philosophy of the na­
tionalists. Since 1783 their objective had been a large 
standing army or, after the mid-1790’s, a large provisional 
army. Now they reluctantly gave up these traditional ideals 
and adopted a new approach to the defense problem. Tacitly 
acknowledging that the anti-nationalists had vjon the long 
battle, McHenry, who usually reflected the opinions of the 
Federalist leadership in Congress, admitted that the United
130lbid., 372-73, 377-88, 426-507.
131ibid., 522-23, 527, 625-26, 108-09, 119, 151.
The text of the bill may be found in "House Bills and Reso­
lution," 6 Cong., 1 Sess., 18 Feb. 1800, in House of Repre­
sentatives Library, Washington, D. C.
132Annals. 6 Cong., 1 Sess., 640-42, 122.
133xh0 report was dated 5 Jan. 1800, and the Presi­
dent transmitted it to Congress on 13 Jan. Ibid., 370.
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States was not likely to keep up large regular forces in the 
future, presumably because of public attitudes. This being 
the case, he continued, such small forces as it maintained 
should be made as efficient as possible, fortifications with 
men to man them should be maintained on the avenues of ap­
proach, and training institutions should be established to 
make possible the rapid enlargement of the army in time of
danger.134
. . . military science, in its various branches, ought 
to be cultivated with peculiar care; in proper nurser­
ies; so that . . .  a competent number of persons ^ a y  
always/ be prepared and qualified to act as engineers, 
and others as instructors to additional troops, which 
events may . . . require to be raised. This will be to 
substitute the elements of an army to the thing itself, 
and will . . . tend to enable the Government to dis­
pense with a large body of standing forces. . . .135
To serve as this nursery he recommended the establish­
ment of a military academy conforming in organization to those 
of France. It should consist of a school of fundamentals in 
which would be taught the basic sciences necessary to the 
mastery of the military arts and three schools of practice-- 
one for artillerists and engineers, one for cavalry and in­
fantry, and one for the navy. The students should be selec­
ted from the cadets of the army regiments, from young men 
desiring military careers, and from the officers and non­
commissioned officers of the army. The length of training 
should be two years in all of the schools except that of
134ibid., 1398. 135ibid., 1398-99.
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cavalry and infantry in which it should be one year,^^^
In order to make the small army itself more effic­
ient and to insure the better defense of the seaboard,
McHenry recommended that the two regiments of "artillerists 
and engineers" (each regiment was made up of the two branches) 
be reorganized to provide a regiment of horse artillery, one 
of foot artillery, and one of engineers. The work of artil­
lerymen and military engineers was so different, he said, 
that separation was necessary to maximum efficiency. Horse 
artillery, he continued, was the weapon par excellence for 
coast defense because of its great mobility. At the time, 
highly mobile tactical horse artillery was a relatively re­
cent innovation in Europe; and, as McHenry noted, the French 
practice was to fire the pieces without detaching the
t r a i l s . 1 3 7
He also suggested that the volunteer associations be
made a permanent part of the military system, and that the
militia "be considered as an essential arm of our defense,"
1something the Federalists had not considered it. The 
long report, which contains an erudite summary of the devel­
opment of horse artillery from the time of its inception in
13&Ibid., 1399-1404. l^^Ibid.. 1404-09.
138%bid., 1409-10, 1412. In a subsequent report of 
31 Jan. (communicated to the House on 13 Feb.) he covered 
much the same subjects and commented on the difficulties of 
properly training militia and on the ineffectiveness of mil­
itia due to poor training. These last comments, which were 
not consistent with the first letter, were apparently intended 
as arguments for the military academy. Ibid., 1416-23.
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the days of Frederick the Great, bears all the marks of the 
Hamiltonian style and inspiration. It should be given its 
real place as the final military philosophy of Federalism, 
a philosophy of coast defense, "nurseries," volunteer associ­
ations, small and highly mobile regular forces, and grudging 
reliance on the militia.
On 19 March, the House committee on defense presented 
a bill to place McHenry’s recommendations concerning the 
military academy and the artillery into effect. However, 
the measure aroused opposition among the Republicans because
of its costs, and in late April it was postponed until the 
139next session. Meantime some more momentous events had 
been transpiring on the floor of the House. On New Year’s 
Day, 1800, Nicholas presented a resolution that would repeal 
the clauses of the additional army act providing for the 
twelve extra regiments of infantry and the six extra troops
of d r a g o o n s . 140
In the debate that followed, the Republicans pointed 
to the absolute need for economy and alleged that the troops 
concerned were utterly useless because their numbers were 
too few to meet any real threat. They also attempted to 
disprove the possibility that the disbandment would wreck 
the negotiations then under way in F r a n c e . 141 The Federal-
139%bid., 634, 690-91. 140lbid., 227-28.
141
Ibid.. 250, 267, 287-88, 293-94, 297-98, 321, 350.
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ists maintained that defense was more important than small 
savings, that the continuing possibility of invasion made 
the retention of the troops necessary, and that any major 
relaxation of the defensive program of 1798 would render the 
success of the negotiations doubtful. However, they early 
showed a willingness to compromise by moving to what John 
Marshall of Virginia called the "middle ground." Some of 
them at least would accept a plan whereby the additional 
troops already enrolled under the act would be retained but
n o  m o r e  e n l i s t e d . ^ ^ 2
Though Nicholas and Gallatin drew some more of their 
depressing pictures of the nation’s f i n a n c e s , ^43 the debate 
was highlighted by Republican eulogies of the militia and 
attacks on the r e g u l a r s . 1^4 previously mentioned, Ran­
dolph made the most bitter of the latter. The regulars he 
said were useless, unconstitutional, and so expensive that 
not even a nation as wealthy as Great Britain could afford 
them without sending "her laborers supperless to bed." They 
destroyed the "military spirit" of the people by reserving 
military matters for professional soldiers. They had brought 
about the downfall of every free state and "rivetted the
l^^ibid.. 252-54, 259-60, 263-64, 274, 292, 301-07, 
318-19, 323-24, 336-40, 364-65.
143%bid.. 247-49, 278-80, 358.
144%bid.. 279-80, 310-12, 321-22.
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fetters of despotism” on the people.145 jhey irritated
Americans, who
. . . feel a just indignation at the sight of loungers, 
who live upon the public, who consume the fruits of 
their honest industry, under the pretext of protecting 
them from a foreign yoke. They put no confidence, sir, 
in the protection of a handful of ragamuffins . . .146
It was these dispassionate words plus several hundred more 
like them that brought on the alleged attack in the theatre. 
The Federalist deprecated the worth of the militia and de­
fended the regulars,147 gnd Harper and James A. Bayard of 
Delaware again attacked the loyalty of the Republicans.148 
The resolution was then voted down sixty to thirty-nine.149 
The belief that a solution acceptable to both sides might 
be found apparently led some Republicans to join the major­
ity .
Following the defeat of the measure the committee 
on defense brought in a compromise bill suspending enlist­
ments under the additional army act until the next session 
unless war should break out or the President should discover 
an imminent threat of invasion. Most of the debate resulted 
from Randolph’s effort to add an amendment which would con­
solidate the .twelve skeleton regiments (only thirty-four
145ibid.. 296-300. 146lbid.. 298.
147lbid., 275, 292, 305-06, 316, 340-41.
148ibid., 257, 260, 262, 325-26, 329-35.
149ibid.. 369.
256
hundred men had been enlisted) into several full regiments 
and discharge the officers left over.^^O developed that 
the Federalists had become separated into two camps. The 
larger group, which clustered around Marshall, favored the 
bill as the true middle ground but opposed the amendment.
The latter, they thought, by discharging the officers and 
eliminating some of the regiments would prevent the rapid 
resumption of recruiting in case events took some bad 
turn.151 The second group, composed of several die-hards 
and containing none of the more influential Federalist lead­
ers, stood against any reduction whatsoever.152.
After the Randolph amendment had been voted down by 
a sizeable majority, the die-hards took their stand on a 
motion that further consideration of the bill be postponed 
until December. The motion fell by the enormous majority of
eighty-two to ten, and the House then passed the bill with- 
153out a tally. Thereafter the Senate accepted it by a vote 
of twenty-one to ten.154
By late spring, though there had been no ostensible
1 ‘=>0
^^^Tbid., 370, 375, 389. The bill was debated on 




1^ '^ Ibid.. 45. The act became law on 20 Feb. 1800,
Ibid.. 1438.
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change in the French s i t u a t i o n , ^55 many Federalists appear 
to have joined the Republicans in thinking that the addition­
al army was no longer necessary. The denouement came rapidly 
during early May. When an unimportant military bill came 
down from the Senate, Harper himself moved an additional 
section authorizing the discharge of all the extra troops 
except the engineers as soon as the French negotiations 
proved successful. This was subsequently changed by the 
Senate to set a definite date, 15 June 1800, for the dis­
bandment. The act as finally passed contained a clause 
protecting the old establishment--the first four infantry 
regiments, two regiments of engineers, and two companies of 
light dragoons--from any reduction.
When the second session of the Congress convened in 
Washington (for the first time) the President hoped, and 
apparently thought, that the efforts to reach an understand­
ing with France would be successful. The temporary army, he 
told Congress, had been discharged in compliance with the 
act of the last session. He recommended, however, that the 
navy be placed on a peace basis and maintained as a defensive
^^^The commissioners to Paris did not even open 
negotiations until 7 Apr. 1800, and their first report that 
this had been done was dated 18 Apr., hardly early enough 
to have influenced the actions of the Congress prior to 
7 May when the move to disband the troops got underway.
Ibid.. 1144-45.
IS^Ibid.. 691, 713-15, 182, 716. The act became 
law on 14 May 1800, Ibid.. 1530-31.
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measure peculiarly adapted to the American strategic posi­
tion. The House in its reply to the President's message 
agreed that the navy constituted the first line of defense 
of the United S t a t e s . B o t h  houses subsequently passed 
an act to place into effect the President's recommendation.
This measure authorized the sale of all ships and 
vessels of the navy except nine frigates, including the 
Constitution and the Constellation. It directed that six 
of the vessels retained be kept in constant service during 
peacetime and that the remainder be laid up at convenient 
ports. The act also authorized a peacetime officers' 
establishment consisting of nine captains, thirty-six lieu­
tenants, and one hundred and fifty midshipmen. The strength 
of the peacetime crews of the six vessels kept in commission 
was set at two-thirds of the present, or wartime, strengthens
inT^nnals, 6 Cong., 2 Sess., 723-24, 790.
inSibid., 1034, 1056-59, 1062, 759, 1075. The act 
became law on 3 Mar. 1801, Ibid., 1557-59.
CHAPTER VI 
THE UNIFORM MILITIA ACT
Following the adoption of the Constitution new ef­
forts were made to reform the militia. The influences that 
determined the outcome were much more complex than they had 
been in the past. The twin detriments to clear thinking-- 
the militia myth and fear of regulars— continued to play 
their customary roles, but the more complex frame of govern­
ment, the development of the party system, and the crisis in 
Europe added new dimensions to the problem. Though Congress 
passed a uniform militia act in 1792, almost everybody real­
ized that it contained many defects. As a result, the re­
formers continuously proposed amendments and new bills.
Under the Constitution control of the militia no 
longer rested unequivocably in the hands of the states but 
was shared by the general government. The arguments over 
this matter, which were to consume so many hours in later 
years, had begun in the Philadelphia Convention. One group 
had favored giving the national government complete author­
ity, another had advocated leaving full control to the 
states, and still a third had stood for some compromise
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between the two extremes. As happened so frequently in the 
convention, the moderates had prevailed, and a compromise 
solution had been adopted.^ The central government, that is 
the Congress, was empowered "to provide for organizing, arm­
ing, and disciplining /training/ the militia and for govern­
ing such part of them as may be employed in the service of 
the United States." The Congress was also authorized to 
call out the troops to "execute the laws of the Union, sup­
press insurrections and repel invasion." To the states were 
reserved the rights to appoint officers and to conduct the 
training of the militia in accordance with the regulations 
prescribed by Congress.
Questions concerning the division of authority dom­
inated almost every debate on militia matters in the early 
Congresses. From the beginning there were two interpreta­
tions of the meaning of the clauses, one favoring states’ 
rights and the other national authority. The nationalists 
assumed that the federal power to organize the militia in­
cluded the power to determine its composition and to make 
exemptions. They believed that the Congress could require
^Howard White, "Executive Influence in Determining 
Military Policy in the United States," Reprinted from the 
University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences. XII, 
Nos. 1-2 (1925), 17-18. Hereafter cited as White, "Execu­
tive Influence." See also Gaillard Hunt and James Brown 
Scott (eds.). The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 
Which Framed the Constitution of the United States of Amer­
ica, Reported by James Madison, A Delegate from the State 
of Virginia (International Ed.. New York, 1920), 421, 424- 
27, 435, 451-56, 472, 565.
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militiamen to provide their own arms and equipment and that 
federal officers might be appointed to supervise training in 
the states. They also took the position that Congress could 
delegate to the President such of its responsibilities as 
the authority to call out troops to put down insurrections. 
The anti-nationalists contested each of these stands.
Aside from the difficulties of interpretation the 
militia clauses contained several practical defects. The 
division of training responsibilities with the general gov­
ernment providing the field manuals and the state governments 
drilling the troops could hardly lead to efficiency. The 
manuals would probably be good, particularly as long as such 
capable men as von Steuben were around to prepare them, but 
the drill instructors might leave something to be desired.
In any event, uniformity of training would seem to depend as 
much upon close federal supervision of the type the nation­
alists desired as upon federal regulations.
The reservation to the states of the right to appoint 
officers had little to recommend it. Despite the criticisms 
of secondary writers, however, it is doubtful that delega­
tion of the power to the federal government would have been 
a better solution at the time. It is inconceivable that the 
understaffed War Department of Federalist and Republican days 
could have coped with the enormous task of filling the some 
twenty-five thousand appointments on the basis of merit. The 
job was too taxing for the states in their own more limited
262
spheres, and for this and other reasons many of them permit­
ted the troops to elect their own leaders. Though this 
method has been frequently maligned, it was admirably suited 
to the realities of the situation. After the old soldiers 
of the Revolution and professional competence had faded away 
together, the sole remaining criteria for officer selection 
were leadership abilities, interest in military affairs, and 
willingness to undertake the extra work and responsibility. 
These qualities were precisely the kind that the men of an 
organization were qualified to recognize and appreciate.
This is not to say that the election method was an 
ideal solution or. that it always produced good officers. It 
could have been vastly improved, for example, by a constitu­
tional provision precluding candidates from standing drinks 
on company election days. However, it was geared to the 
times and the nature of the problem. It was probably to be 
preferred to the method employed by the federal government 
when it got its chance in the Provisional Army of 1798-1800. 
One's politics rather than his military capabilities were 
apparently all that counted at that time. When the names of 
several Republicans were struck from an appointment list, 
even Hamilton was driven to complain,
We are very attentive to the importance of appointing 
friends of the government to military stations, but we 
thought it well to relax the rule in favor of particular 
merit, in a few instances. . . .  It does not seem advis­
able to exclude all hope and to give appointments too
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absolute a party feature.^
Party stands on militia matters did not become well- 
defined until some time after the Second Congress. They 
thus played little part in the passage of the federal act 
of 1792, but in succeeding years they helped determine mili­
tia policy. The federalists thought that a large standing 
army was essential to give strength and stability to the 
government. It was almost axiomatic that they should also 
stand for a strong and highly federalized militia. They 
thus consistently advocated the interpretation of the militia 
clauses in favor of the general government. However, as one 
writer has shown, they concentrated their efforts upon ob­
taining the standing army, and expanding it as needed, in 
the hope that the government would never have to rely on any­
thing else.3 As a result their many attempts to federalize 
the militia were in practice more feeble than might otherwise 
have been expected. Meantime, the inefficiency of the state 
troops provided the party with another argument for building 
up the standing forces.
The Republicans thought that it was dangerous to 
permit the general government to control any troops whatso­
ever. They had opposed the creation of standing forces and
better to James McHenry, 6 Feb. 1799, B. C.
Steiner, Life and Correspondence of James McHenry, Secre­
tary of War under Washington and Adams (Cleveland, 1907 ),
368.
^White, "Executive Influence," 91.
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now they fought against the extension of federal control 
over the militia. They necessarily took the position that 
the militia clauses should be construed so as to protect the 
powers of the states. Meantime, as advocates of the militia 
myth, they held the militiamen in high veneration and viewed 
them as more than adequate substitutes for federal troops, 
which they dreaded above all else. In the foreign crises of 
1794 and 1797, for example, they favored the raising of 
large detachments of militia as an alternative to more regu­
lars.
The Republican addiction to the militia myth may re­
quire some investigation. There undoubtedly were some Repub­
licans in Congress so doctrinaire and cotton-headed that they 
could have gone to the nearest hilltop, watched a battalion 
of regulars clean up a division of militia, and immediately 
made speeches extolling the militia as being always superior 
to regulars. However, the Republican delegations also con­
tained able and perspicacious men, such as Albert Gallatin 
of Pennsylvania and John Nicholas of Virginia, the main party 
spokesmen during the political crisis of the late 1790*s.
How could men such as these, and the moderate and reasonable 
Republicans in general, have accepted the validity of a leg­
end so fragile that it collapsed into matchsticks of wishful 
thinking and half-truths at the slightest unbiased examina­
tion? The answer may well be that they did not accept it 
but simply used it as a weapon in their struggle against
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standing troops.
By about 1794, if not earlier, the Republicans had 
become firmly identified as the party standing for economy 
in government, and this gave them additional reasons for 
favoring the militia over the regulars. The former cost al­
most nothing, and the latter had begun to absorb a heavy 
percentage of the national expenditures. At times it ap­
peared that this Republican preoccupation with economy over­
rode all other considerations. The militia was good because 
it was cheap, and the regulars were bad because they were 
expensive. Thus did the Republican military and economic 
policies support and reinforce each other.
While Federalist doctrine was unequivocal, the atti­
tudes of the Republicans contained at least one serious in­
ternal contradiction. They wanted to make the militia the 
primary if not the sole reliance in time of danger. However, 
their fear of increased federal control caused them to oppose 
every measure brought forward to improve it. It is true that 
these were all Federalist bills, but the Republicans never 
presented one of their own. Perhaps they realized that it 
was impossible to make reforms within their own terms of 
reference based on states' rights. Or perhaps their opposi­
tion to reform was due to the basic unreality of their mili­
tary thought. If the Federalists envisioned the citizen 
soldier as a kind of Cincinnatus, well-versed in fighting 
techniques, the Republicans saw him as a pink-cheeked
2 6 6
Rousseauan shepherd boy, armed for the moment with a musket 
instead of a crook. The picture would have been spoiled by 
anything so mundane as training and discipline.
As related in the last chapter, the French Revolution 
and the wars that followed dug an enormous emotional chasm 
between the two parties. In doing so they gave the Republi­
cans new reasons to favor the militia over the regulars. 
Charged with sans-culottism and silenced by the threats of 
Federalist lions such as Robert Goodloe Harper, their vague 
and doctrinaire fears that the power of the government might 
be turned loose against democrats became real and pressing. 
Such powers would be less dangerous if they rested upon the 
militia, which was partially subject to the states and which 
in some sections was composed of their own idealogical broth­
ers.
Another factor influencing Republican attitudes was 
the success of the French armies in the War of the First 
Coalition (1792-97). For the moment it seemed that the 
superiority of the militia had finally been proved for once 
and all. Had not the French militiamen swept aside the 
standing armies of Austria and Prussia and caused even the 
Hapsburg Emperor to tremble? Fortunately Harper was able to 
demolish this new-born militia myth during a debate in Janu­
ary 1800. The French, he said, actually used a system of 
conscription that was almost identical to the impressment 
employed by the British. They seized the conscript by force.
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carried him off in handcuffs if he resisted, and required 
him to serve as long as needed. Furthermore, they placed 
the men so obtained in regular regiments and subjected them 
to the most severe discipline. The French soldier as a 
result was to all intents and purposes a regular.^
Meantime, throughout the 1790’s, the indifference to 
militia activities that had been so prevalent during Confed­
eration days continued unabated. Large components of the 
troops in many states were unorganized, officers frequently 
neglected to call musters, and derelictions often went un­
punished.^ Despite these conditions, public support for 
militia reform was virtually non-existent except for a few 
months during and after military crises. Though these momen­
tary revivals of interest produced many amendatory state 
laws, they apparently did not penetrate to the halls of 
Congress.
The Knox Plan of 1790 (Second Session.
First Congress)
In January 1790 the President sent Congress a revised 
version of the Knox militia plan of 1786.^ The proposal re­
tained the characteristic feature of its prototype— the
^Annals of Congress, 6 Cong., 1 Sess., 341-42. 
Hereafter cited as Annals.
^See below pages 333-35, 392-94, 404-06.
^Letter of 21 Jan. 1790, John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), 
The Writings of George Washington (Washington, 1931-44), 
XXX, 512.
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division of the troops into the advanced, main, and reserved 
corps— but several changes had been made in the interest of 
economy. The annual encampments of the advanced corps, 
which had formerly been set at forty-two days per year for 
all men in the age group, were now reduced to thirty days 
for the eighteen and nineteen year olds and to ten days for 
the twenty year olds. The use of new and refined figures 
for the total militia population indicated that the strength 
of this corps would be about 32,500 rather than 45,000. The 
effect of the reductions in training time and in numbers was 
to lower the estimated annual cost from $735,000 to $385,000. 
The federal government, not the remainder of the militia as 
in the original plan, would bear this expense.?
The President himself had apparently suggested most 
of these revisions,® but the administration does not seem to 
have pushed the plan in the House while it languished on the 
agenda of the committee of the whole for some three months. 
Finally toward the end of April, this committee was dis­
charged from further consideration of the matter, and the 
whole militia problem was referred to the committee on na­
tional defense.9 For several years thereafter the Knox plan
^American State Papers. Military Affairs, I, 8-13. 
Hereafter cited as State Papers. MA.
®Henry Knox to the President, 18 Jan. 1790, State 
Papers. MA. I, 6.
^Annals. 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 1544.
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disappeared from Congress as interest shifted to Washington’s 
own preferred type of organization based upon the light com­
panies.
It has been said that references in the Knox plan to 
the possible use of the militia in domestic disturbances 
partially accounted for its failure in 1790.^^ This opinion 
may well be viewed with caution. Everyone knew that revolt 
would cause the government to defend iself, and only some 
three years earlier the project for federal intervention in 
Shays Rebellion had drawn widespread support. Furthermore, 
in the spring of 1790, the bitter party split and the Repub­
lican fears that force might be used against them were still 
beyond the horizon and their approach could hardly be clearly 
anticipated. Furthermore Congress was willing throughout the 
early 1790’s to vote regular troops in much larger numbers 
than had been raised by the Confederation. Though these 
troops were destined for use on the frontier, they would 
have raised more apprehensions of federal repression than a 
plan to make the militia more formidable.
In a letter of January 1790, General Benjamin Lincoln 
analyzed the reasons the plan would be opposed in Massachu­
setts:
Though it would make ours the strongest militia in the 
world, the people will not adopt it here, if I know 
Massachusetts. The expense, pay of officers, no pay of
John McAuley Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven, 
1941), 43-44.
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men, the burden on masters, calling the youth indiscrim­
inately, disfranchisement for a time in certain cases, 
officers excluded from actual service, subjection to a 
draft for a service of three years, &c., will be magni­
fied here, and damn the bill.
It will be noted that these comments contain refer­
ences to several economic features of the measure. It would 
cost too much, masters would suffer losses while their ap­
prentices attended encampments, and the men would receive 
no pay. Lincoln also hints strongly that officers of the 
existing militia--those who would be deranged into the rela­
tively inactive main and reserved corps--could be expected 
to oppose the reorganization. The reference to disfranchise­
ment apparently refers to the fact that men at the encamp­
ments might not be able to vote in certain elections. Most 
of these objections probably operated in all sections of the 
country and served to prevent action on the plan. In this 
regard one of the most important, the loss to apprentice 
masters, would have a direct counterpart in agricultural 
areas in that parents would be deprived of the use of their 
sons.
The Boudinot Bill (Second and Third 
Sessions, First Congress)
Toward the end of the second session the House com­
mittee on national defense, which was headed by Elias
llprancis S. Drake, Life and Correspondence of .
Henry Knox. Major General in the American Revolutionary 
Army (Boston. 1873). 104.
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Boudinot of New Jersey, former President of the Confederation 
Congress, reported a bill based on Washington’s suggestions 
of 1783,^^ The bill defined the militia, provided for the 
light companies, and contained several features intended to 
make the militia uniform in all the states. It also extended 
federal authority by giving the central government sweeping 
control over the training and employment of the troops.
This bill, often referred to as the Boudinot Bill, estab­
lished the line of development in the direction of Washing­
ton’s principles rather than those of von Steuben or Knox.
It provided the essential framework of the militia legisla­
tion passed two years later.
The bill^^ defined the general militia as consisting 
of all free and able-bodied male citizens of the several 
states between the ages of eighteen and fifty (later reduced 
to forty-five).it in effect divided the power to make 
exemptions between the general government and the states and 
listed those to be excused from service by the former. These 
included most members of all three branches of the govern-
^^Annals, 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 1658.
l^Except as otherwise indicated, the description of 
the bill in this and the following paragraphs is based upon 
“A Bill more effectually to provide for the national Defense, 
by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United 
States," Broadsides Portfolio 218. No. 12, Rare Book Room, 
Library of Congress. A copy of the bill may also be found 
in the Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), 29 July 1790 and 5 Aug. 
1790.
^^Annals. 1 Cong., 3 Sess., 1805.
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ments of the United States and the states; conscientious 
objectors; professors, school-raasters, and students; and 
mariners, former Continental officers, and certain post of­
fice employees. The division of the exemption power was 
contained in a clause excusing from service such persons as 
the state legislatures might wish. A surprising feature was 
that almost all persons receiving exemptions would be re­
quired to pay an annual federal tax of two dollars "to be 
applied toward the support of the civil government" of the 
United States.15 %he bill also required that all persons 
subject to service provide their own arms and equipment.
The section relating to the light companies required 
that all militiamen between the ages of eighteen and twenty- 
five be separately enrolled and organized into companies by 
themselves. These companies would constitute the light in­
fantry and riflemen (grenadiers were later added)^^ of each 
regiment or battalion. The bill also provided for the forma­
tion of at least one troop of horse and one company of artil­
lery in each brigade (later changed to d i v i s i o n ) ^ ?  but not 
exceeding one of each per regiment. All of these units—
l^The exceptions were ministers, professors and 
other teachers, students, and mariners.
^^"Amendments to the Bill, entitled, ’An Act more 
effectually to provide for the national Defense, by estab­
lishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States,’" 




light companies, artillery, and horse— would be required 
to attend six musters per year. Members of the ordinary 
militia would rendezvous only twice a year.
It will be noted that these provisions made a dis­
tinction between the light companies and the artillery and 
horse, which were the traditional special arms. The latter 
were made a part of the general militia system, of which 
they had formerly been more or less independent, and their 
proportions with respect to the ordinary militia were estab­
lished, Though there was nothing in the bill to preserve 
their customary privileges, such as the right to draw up 
regulations for their own use, their character as volunteer 
organizations was continued. Service in these corps could 
not be made obligatory until the public assumed their ex­
penses, which were much greater than those of the infantry.
The establishment of the muster requirements and the 
ages of liability were only the first steps in the effort to 
make the over-all system more uniform. Other features of 
the bill directed to the same end included provisions stan­
dardizing individual arms and equipment, setting up a stan­
dard system of tactical organization, and prescribing uniform 
court-martial procedures and penalties. While the bill did 
not specify the use of a particular training manual, as the 
completed act was to do, it required the field and staff 
officers "to introduce uniformity in the manoeuvres and 
discipline of the regiment."
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All of these provisions leading toward uniformity 
represented the extension of the federal authority. Another 
and more important extension is found in a section setting 
up federal troop inspectors. The President would appoint 
one or more of these officers for each s t a t e , a n d  the 
central government would pay their stipends. They would 
supervise training, inspect arms and equipment, prepare 
strength returns, and generally serve as super adjutant gen­
erals. Though their reports would be submitted directly to 
the President, copies would be sent to the governors of the 
states. The work of the inspectors would have brought the 
central government into direct and intimate contact with the 
troops far beyond what appears to have been contemplated by 
the militia clauses. Indeed the responsibilities of these 
officers were so sweeping that almost the only essential 
function left to the state adjutant generals was the trans­
mission of orders from the governors to the tactical units.
Even more significant was the section requiring the 
governors to order out troops on federal requisition and to 
march them wherever their services might be required. These 
provisions not only proceeded from the militia clauses them­
selves but they also dramatically illustrated the extent to 
which the Constitution had broken with American military 
tradition. In Confederation days, the Congress could do no
l^The inspectors for each state would be chosen 
from the citizens of the state.
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more than request the states to provide troops. Furthermore, 
the states had exercised the right to determine where their 
forces should be employed.
The bill had been introduced so late that it was not 
brought before the committee of the whole until early in the 
following (the third) session. At that time many of its 
provisions, including the light companies and the federal 
inspectors, came under heavy attack. The clause providing 
that the companies be composed of younger men, it was said, 
would not only work against the economic interests of cer­
tain groups, but it would also deprive the militia of the 
services of many Continental veterans. Furthermore, it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to assemble the men from 
their scattered homes to form the companies. Though the 
clause was defended by several speakers, including James 
Madison, it was finally struck without a roll call.^^ The 
companies would then be taken from the militia at large.
Strangely enough no one pointed out in so many words 
that the provisions relating to the inspectors would infringe 
the rights of the states. According to Boudinot the officers 
were nothing more than advisors to keep the President in­
formed of militia matters, an opinion hardly consistent with 
the wording of the clause. As such advisors, he continued, 
they should be federal appointees, Jeremiah Wadsworth of
19Annals, 1 Cong., 3 Sess., 1813-14.
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Connecticut, who seems to have gotten lost among the shell- 
holes of the middle ground, thought that they should be 
federal officers but that they should be governed by the 
state laws. However, the general opinion favored making 
them state officers, if for no other purpose than to avoid 
distrust on the part of the state governments, and this was 
done.
The use of the militia by the federal government 
also claimed the attention of the committee. Here two prob­
lems had to be considered: the requirement in the bill that
the states respond to federal requisitions, sending their 
troops wherever directed, and the need to add some new pro­
vision giving the President standing authority to make such 
requisitions. The requirement was struck from the bill, but 
unfortunately any discussion that may have preceded the vote 
is not recorded in the Annals. A  suggestion that the new 
provision be added met with quick and somewhat contradictory 
objections. The authority could be conferred only by special 
act of Congress, but such an act (that of 30 April 1790) was 
already in effect. Since that act pertained only to the de­
fense of the frontier, it seemed that something should be
done to cover insurrection and invasion from other quarters,
22such as Europe. But the matter was dropped for the moment.
^Ojbid.. 1818-19. ^^Ibid.. 1817.
^%b i d .. 1817, 1820.
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Unsuccessful efforts were made to change or delete 
many other clauses and sections. It was objected that the 
bill contained too many exemptions and that the charge on 
exempts was an "absolute poll tax." It was unconstitution­
al, said several speakers, because it was levied on certain
no
classes rather than upon the population as a whole. A 
motion to strike federal Congressmen from the exemption lists 
was defeated as being a threat to the independence of the. 
legislative branch. It was argued that a designing President 
might prevent Congress from assembling by calling the members 
to military d u t y . A n  amendment requiring that the federal 
government provide arms for poor militiamen was changed to 
lay the responsibility on the states and then rejected.
A motion to eliminate the federal fines was also lost.^6
When the report of the committee of the whole was 
brought before the House, the battle of states’ rights was 
fought out over the exemption clause. Though this portion 
of the debate was not clearly reported, the nationalists 
apparently thought that the power to make exemptions should 
be exercised by Congress alone and the anti-nationalists 
that it should be shared by the states. The nationalists 
argued that Congress had already in effect made exemptions 
in setting the militia ages and that this was completely
Z^Ibid., 1817-18. '^^ Ibid., 1809-12.
25ibid.. .1806-08. ^^Ibid., 1817..
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consistent with its right to organize the militia. To divide 
the power, they added, would blend and confuse the authority 
of the general government with that of the states. According 
to the anti-nationalists, the militia was— or should be— com­
posed of the men designated by the states. It followed that 
any infringement of the right of the states to make exemp­
tions would strike at their power to determine the composi­
tion of the troops. The outcome of all this talk was a minor 
victory for the anti-nationalists. The division of the power 
already in the clause was retained, and the wording was 
slightly modified in the favor of the states,2?
Another states' rights argument occurred on a motion 
to exempt militiamen from civil processes on days of rendez­
vous, This was opposed on the basis that the states had an 
"exclusive right" to regulate the times of musters and that 
Congress had no authority to determine that militiamen 
should not be liable to arrest at such times, Boudinot re­
plied that the power of Congress to discipline the militia 
included "every incidental power to carry that idea into 
effect," The motion was c a r r i e d , %he House also tenta­
tively accepted an amendment preserving the rights of
^^Ibid,, 1821-27, The modification consisted of 
the removal of state officials from the list of federal 
exemptions. This in effect permitted the states to deter­




independent companies chartered or incorporated by the 
states.29
At this stage the original bill had been thoroughly 
mangled. The provision that the light companies be formed 
of the younger men had been struck, and the federal inspec­
tors and the regulations governing federal use of the troops 
had been deleted. On 24 December, the House, having com­
pleted the last of the hatchet work, handed a new select 
committee headed by Wadsworth the job of putting the pieces 
back together.30 a  few days later several constitutional 
purists who thought the Congress had no right whatsoever to 
define the militia attempted to send some glue along in the 
form of special instructions to the committee. The bill, 
they said, should be prefaced by a clause stating that the 
militia would consist of such persons as the states might 
enroll, A motion to this effect received only eight votes.31
The Wadsworth Bill (First Session,
Second Congre s'il
On 4 January 1791 the Wadsworth committee presented 
a bill32 which appears to have incorporated the several 
changes made by the House, It also contained new provisions 
providing that the muskets of the militia be gradually con­
verted to the same caliber and that the President rather
^^Ibid.. 1828. SOlbid.
31lbid.. 1837. ^^Ibid., 1840.
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than the governors arrange the troops into divisions, brig-
OO
ades, and so on. Though the committee had returned this 
revised bill only eleven days after receiving the old one, 
the First Congress adjourned less than a month later. The 
bill was presented in substantially the same form on 21 
November 1791 to the first session of the Second C o n g r e s s . ^4 
The committee of the whole considered the bill on four dif­
ferent days between 21 February 1792 and 2 March 1792.^5 
Unfortunately the Annals report the debate in detail for 
only one of these occasions. From the limited information 
available it appears that the main arguments devolved about 
the right of Congress to define the militia, to require that 
militiamen arm themselves, and to give the President the re­
sponsibility of imposing the federal organization on the 
troops.
The clause designating those to be enrolled, said 
Jonathan Sturges of Connecticut, considers "the militia of
^^Annals. 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 421-22. Palmer writes 
that the "originals of the Boudinot Bill and the other 
bills" were destroyed by fire in 1814 but that he was able 
to find copies of them in contemporary newspapers in the 
Library of Congress. Unfortunately he does not cite the 
newspapers. America in Arms, footnote page 46. The present 
writer found an "original" pamphlet copy of the Boudinot 
Bill in the Rare Book Room in the Library of Congress (see 
footnote 13 above), but an assiduous search in the contem­
porary newspapers did not reveal the Wadsworth Bill. An 
effort has been made to reconstruct the essential features 
from the debate in the Annals.
^^Annals, 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 200.
35lbid.. 418-24, 430, 432-33.
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the several States, as the militia of the Union , , . 
the Constitution considers it as belonging to the respective 
States. . , .“ Therefore the states alone should define the 
militia and provide for exemptions, and Congress should 
limit itself to "forming, arming, and arranging in a particu­
lar way, those materials /those men/ which are furnished by 
the militia laws of the several states .A cco rdi ng to 
James Hillhouse, also of Connecticut, Sturges had gotten 
everything into reverse order. Congress was empowered to 
define the militia and to organize it into tactical units. 
Only when these functions had been completed could the states 
exercise their reserved powers.3? William Vans Murray of 
Maryland added in support of this argument that the Consti­
tution could not have referred to the existing militia, for 
many of the states had neither militia nor militia laws.38
At this point Wadsworth himself, apparently thinking 
of the mutilation of the Boudinot Bill, remarked that the 
subject had already been handled in such a manner as to pro­
vide "an inadequate, defective system" and that he no longer 
had much interest in the fate of his own bill. However, the 
nationalists were able to carry their point, for a motion to 
strike the clause was voted down without a roll call.^9 
Thus the basic question of who should designate the member-
3&Ibid., 419-20. '^^ Ibid.. 419.
38lbid.. 420. ^^Ibid.
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ship of the militia was finally resolved for all time in 
favor of the Union. This was a crucial victory, particularly 
in that the anti-nationalists may well have had the best of 
the constitutional arguments.
When the arms question was under consideration,
Thomas Sumter of South Carolina presented the most extreme 
states’ rights view of the militia yet to appear. Congress 
had no militia powers, he said, until after the troops had 
been called into the federal service. Then it might organ­
ize them into tactical units and provide them with arms. 
Meantime it had no authority to put them to the expense of 
arming themselves. The remarks of Nathaniel Niles of Vermont 
were more cogent. The requirement that the militia arm it­
self, he said, would operate as a capitation tax. However, 
it would not meet the Constitutional standards that such 
taxes be assessed "only in a certain way," that is presumably 
in an equitable way. Valid arguments such as this had no 
effect, and the attack on the most ancient of all militia 
principles failed when a motion to strike the arms clause 
was voted down.^^
The anti-nationalists followed Sumter’s line of argu­
ment in opposing the clause making the President responsible 
for arranging the militia into tactical units. He could 
exercise no such power until after the troops had been
40lbid.. 420-21.
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ordered out. The proponents of the clause argued that the 
Constitution in giving the central government the power to 
organize the troops had necessarily included the power in 
question. The clause, they also said, was necessary to uni­
formity, a rather weak argument since the bill outlined the 
type of organization to be employed in any event. A motion 
to strike was carried, and the clause was replaced by one 
leaving the matter to the state legislatures.^^
The House itself finally took up the bill on 5 March, 
removed the clauses establishing the number of musters, the
standard fines, the court martial procedures, and the money
4-2.equivalent. The following day it approved the measure by 
a vote of thirty-one to twenty-seven.^^ Two months were to 
pass, however, before the bill finally became law. On 12 
April it was back in the. House with a Senate amendment per­
mitting the President to call out the militia as he might 
think necessary to execute the laws of the Union, suppress 
insurrections, and repel i n v a s i o n s . ^4 This amendment to­
gether with the provisions of the Act of 30 April 1790 
authorizing the President to use the militia on the frontier 
would have given him standing authority to act in any con-
41l b i d .. 422-23.
42These removals may have occurred while the bill 
was still in the committee of the whole. Their deletion is 
not reported in the Annals but is inferred from a compari­
son of the bill with the act as finally passed.




A part of the House objected bitterly to the impli­
cation that it might sometimes be necessary to use troops 
against the people in putting down insurrections. The de­
bate on the amendment consequently took on a roar portending 
the discussions of later years when Harper and his followers 
were to level the big guns of Federalism on everyone in 
sight. Proponents of the amendment noted that such a power 
was already vested in the governors of the states. If this 
were proper, and no one seemed to object to it, why should 
it be highly improper to give the same authority to the Pres­
ident? Furthermore, what was a militia for, if not to sup­
port the government and the law?45
It was "an insult to the majesty of the people," said 
John Steele of South Carolina to assume "that it may be nec­
essary to execute the laws at the point of the bayonet."
The purpose of the militia, said another, was to permit the 
states to protect themselves from the encroachments of the 
central government. Elbridge Gerry, perhaps the foremost 
fearer of regular armies in all of North America, now began 
to look with apprehensive eyes at the militia. The amend­
ment lodged a dangerous and unwarranted power in the Execu­
tive, he pontificated in his usual illuminating fashion.
Murray saved the situation by pointing out that
45ibid.. 553. ^^Ibid.
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Congress might cover the matter in a separate bill. Such a 
measure, he said, should closely define the emergencies in 
which the President might employ troops, preserve the suprem­
acy of the civil power, and give the judiciary its rightful 
role. Following this sensible analysis of the problem, the 
House rejected the amendment by a thirty-seven to twenty-four 
vote, and appointed a select committee to bring in a special 
bill to replace it.^ '^  The Senate accepted this method of 
handling things, and the Wadsworth Bill with all its changes 
finally became the Uniform Militia Act of 8 May 1792.
Meantime on 17 April, three weeks before the Uniform 
Militia Act had become law, the select committee mentioned 
above had reported a bill^^ granting the President authority 
to call forth the militia:
(1) to resist invasion or threatened invasion by any 
foreign nation or Indian tribe,
(2) to put down insurrection against the government 
of any state (on request of the state legislature or in its 
recess of the governor),
(3) to combat opposition to the laws of the United 
States "by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers 
vested in the marshals . . . "
In the last case the President could not act until certain 
judicial procedures had been completed, and before sending 
troops against any domestic foes he was required first to
4?lbid., 554-55. ^^bid., 583.
49lbid., 557.
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issue a proclamation ordering those concerned to disperse 
within a limited period. Under all three of the listed cir­
cumstances troops might be sent from one state to another.
Any militiaman refusing to obey orders issued under the act 
might be fined not exceeding one year’s pay, and officers 
were also made subject to discharge. The act would continue 
in force for two years and thence to the end of the next 
session of Congress.^0
As might have been expected, the measure aroused 
much resentment, and most opposition speakers found the sec­
tion dealing with enforcement of the laws particularly ob­
jectionable. Harsh laws, said John Page of Virginia, should 
be repealed, not forced upon the people. According to Abra­
ham Clark of New Jersey the section was aimed at crushing 
all opposition to the excise law "so that if an old woman 
was to strike an excise officer with a broomstick . . . the 
militia is to be called forth to suppress an insurrection."^1
After these and other bitter words, the bill was passed with
52 53only minor modifications. It was re-enacted in 1795 and
thereafter became a permanent part of our militia legisla­
tion.
SOAnnals. 2 Cong., 1370-72.
^^Annals, 2 Cong., 1 Sess., 575.
5%bid. , 576-77, 580. It became law on 2 May 1792. 
53The Act of 28 Feb. 1795. Annals, 3 Cong., 1508-
10.
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Throughout its long legislative history, which began 
with the Boudinot Bill and ended with the passage of the 
emasculated Wadsworth Bill, the Uniform Militia Act had been 
an administration measure. However, the President’s efforts 
to preserve its more important features were hardly vigorous. 
In his first annual address to Congress (8 January 1790) he 
said only that "A free people ought not only to be armed but 
disciplined; to which end a uniform and well digested plan 
is requisite. . . ."54 His subsequent addresses before the 
passage of the act were equally vague. In none did he refer 
specifically to the bill itself, nor did he send Congress 
any special messages relating to it. As one writer has put 
it, the President’s interest in militia legislation was real, 
but it was subordinated to a greater interest in the devel­
opment of the regular establishment.^5
Nor did the debate on the act develop into a party 
struggle. This may be attributed partially to the adminis­
tration attitudes and partially to the fact that party align­
ments were still in an embryonic stage of development.
Though there is considerable disagreement as to whether the 
parties existed as such at the time, one writer has attempted 
to analyze the final vote along party lines. According to 
his findings the Republicans divided almost equally with ten
^^Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington,
XXX, 491.
55white, "Executive Influence," 87, 90.
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favoring the bill and eleven opposing it. The Federalists 
split less evenly, twenty-one for and sixteen against.56 
Such divisions would seem to indicate that either party or­
ganization or party militia doctrines had not become fixed.
The "Notorious" Uniform Militia Act of 1792
The formal title of the new act was "An act more ef­
fectually to provide for the National Defense, by establish­
ing an uniform Militia throughout the United States." In 
the entire history of American military policy no other leg­
islation has lived longer or been more thoroughly condemned. 
Between its passage and 1801 and probably for years there­
after efforts were made in almost every session of Congress 
to replace it with a more effective measure. Yet these in­
variably failed, and for more than a hundred years the act 
was the sole basis for the organization of the American 
militia.
As the act, scalped of many of its most constructive 
features, came out from under the tomahawks of the House, it
(1) defined the militia as all free, white, able- 
bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty- 
five, exempted certain federal officials and others, and 
permitted the states to exempt whomever they might wish,
(2) required each militiaman to arm himself and 
standardized arms and equipment for the entire militia,
(3) provided a standard system of tactical organi­
zation and required that the states adopt it to the extent 
that convenience permitted,
5&I b i d .. 93.
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(4) required the formation of a "light company" of 
grenadiers, riflemen, or light infantry in each battalion 
without reference to age groups or obligatory service,
(5) required the formation of volunteer companies 
of cavalry and artillery in the divisions and established 
the proportions of these units to the infantry,
(6) required the states to use a federal manual--von 
Steuben’s regulations--in the training of their troops,
(?) gave the task of supervising training to brigade 
inspectors appointed by the states, rather than to federal 
inspectors as originally proposed.57
These several features will be explained in more detail in 
the following chapter. On the debit side, the act set no 
training requirements, made no provisions for standard pen­
alties, and outlined no procedures for mobilization. Nor 
did it contain any measures for enforcement.^8 indeed, in 
this respect it resembled the legislation of the Confedera­
tion, for the states could ignore it without penalty if they 
wished.
The extent to which the act departed from Washing­
ton’s original plan for the light companies, as outlined in 
the "Sentiments" of 1783;, requires some investigation. The 
measure did not require that they be armed by the public, 
that they be organized into "particular battalions," nor 
that they undergo heavy training, all of which he had thought
57Annals, 2 Cong., 1392-95. With respect to para­
graph (4) in the text above, the act does not actually 




necessary. It did not make service in the units obligatory, 
but he certainly had not insisted upon this. On the most 
significant point of all, it did not prescribe that they be 
formed from the younger men. However, as previously rela­
ted, it is not entirely clear, that he had intended to limit 
membership to this group.^9
To view the matter in greater perspective the essen­
tial element of Washington’s original plan, and indeed of 
all the early reform plans, was that some kind of select 
corps be formed from the militia at large. This the act 
provided both in the light companies and in the formerly 
independent arms--the artillery and the cavalry— which were 
now brought into the general militia system. In practice 
the light companies frequently became elite volunteer organi­
zations and thereupon assumed much of the traditional status 
and efficiency of the artillery and cavalry. In other cases 
they either remained unorganized or took their character 
from the ordinary militia. It would seem that the main dif­
ference between what Washington had wanted in 1783 and what 
he actually got in 1792 lay in this unorganized or untrained 
component and in the lack of positive training requirements.
The unhappy results of the act^^ cast strong doubts 
on the over-all efficacy of Washington’s original plan. It
^^See above pages 104-05.
60See above footnote 5.
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seems extremely doubtful that a select force of the size and 
type he had contemplated could have been formed, trained, 
and kept up under the circumstances of the times. The pub­
lic was so indifferent and the heavy training program so 
burdensome that stronger compulsion than he or anyone else 
thought feasible would have been required. To be added to 
the difficulties was the lack of arms, which no one seems 
to have considered. A smaller select corps such as that 
suggested by Hamilton or by von Steuben might have been made 
to work.^1
Two of the most sweeping contemporary criticisms of 
the act were made by men easily competent to judge its weak­
nesses, Secretary of War Knox and Hugh Williamson of North 
Carolina, who had been active in the military deliberations 
of Congress during Confederation days. Knox in a letter to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives criticized the 
omission of penalties for men not arming themselves, the 
lack of provisions to insure that the militia responded to 
the call of the President, and the failure to bind militia 
in the service of the United States to the federal military 
code. As might have been expected he also condemned the 
failure to provide a more adequate select c o r p s . W i l l i a m ­
son called the act the "shadow of a law." Its effect, he
61see above pages 105-09.
62Letter of 10 Dec. 1794, Annals, 3 Cong., 1396-99.
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continued, was to say that the states might have a good 
militia or none at all, as they pleased.
Though Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a member of 
the Maryland Senate, did not argue the military merits of 
the select corps principle, he thought that the act compre­
hended too many men. The mustering of the entire age group 
between eighteen and forty-five would be a "serious evil" 
resulting in much wasted time and drunkenness. Good soldiers 
could not be made out of this great mass by a few days train­
ing per year, and he doubted that the act intended to prepare 
the ordinary militia for fighting. The object of Congress, 
he thought, had been to provide "fencibles" (the light com­
panies) capable of defending the nation from internal and 
external attack.
Other contemporary criticisms of the act will appear 
below in the discussion of the efforts to amend it. In later 
years military writers, particularly General Emory Upton and 
his whole school of followers, added their salvos to the 
bombardment. Upton wrote that the execution of the law "de­
pended wholly on the voluntary and concurrent action of the 
States without which a ’uniform militia throughout the United 
States’ would- be impossible." He also criticized not only
^^Annals, 2 Cong., 2 Sess., 799.
^^Kate Mason Rowland, The Life of Charles Carroll 
of Carrollton. 1737-1832. wifch His Correspondence and Public 
Papers (New York and London. 1898). II. 185, 191-92.
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the requirement that the men furnish their own arms but 
also the omission of federal penalties to enforce the re­
quirement once it had been put in the act.^^
While these objections may have been valid, Upton 
also took the position that the act intended to convert the 
militia into "an army of the first line."^^ Since he did 
not mention the light companies at all in his discussion 
and referred to the artillery and cavalry only in passing, 
it may be assumed that he had the general militia in mind.
If this were the case, his opinion did not correspond to the 
facts. All of the several reform plans relegated the gener­
al militia to a completely secondary position, and there is 
nothing to indicate that anyone, not even the Republican 
zealot with his ideal of the shepherd boy soldier, seriously 
considered making it the first line of defense.
A later writer. Brigadier General John M. Palmer, 
states that by the time the act was passed every construc­
tive feature had been cut out of it. It no longer contained 
the provisions for federal inspection and supervision, and 
the "essential principle of the separate organization and 
training of the younger men . . . /had been/ eliminated." 
Indeed he contends that the act by sanctioning the old 
"phony" militia made "our military system worse than it was
G^Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United 
States (Washington, 1917), 85.
&6lbid.. 84-85.
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before the bill was introduced."6?
Later Efforts to Reform the Militia (1792-1801)
Between 1792 and 1801 the question of further militia 
reform was considered in every session of Congress except 
one. In the two sessions following the passage of the Uni­
form Militia Act the interest of Congress in the subject was 
more or less perfunctory.By early 1795, however, the de­
fects of the act had become well known, and the military 
crises of the preceding year--the troubles with Great Britain 
and Spain and the Whiskey Rebellion--had begun to focus at­
tention on the need for improvement. Samuel Smith, who had 
commanded part of the Maryland contingent in the whiskey 
affair, charged in the House that a number of his troops had 
put the ball before the charge in loading and that some had 
not known how to "lay a gun over their shoulder." The mili­
tia of the Southern States as a group, he added, was totally 
worthless, and the officers "durst not . . . have marched 
them against an enemy, during the late insurrection, if it 
had not been for a general idea that there would be no re­
sistance."^9
In response to these dangers and weaknesses a new
G7palmer, America in Arms, 50-51.
^^Annals, 2 Cong., 2 Sess., 701-02, 708-10; Ibid..
3 Cong., 1 Sess., 527; State Papers. MA, I, 66.
Annals. 3 Cong., 2 Sess., 1069, 1214-15.
295
bill providing for the division of the militia into two 
components, one a select corps, was reported midway in the 
second session of the Third C o n g r e s s . since favorable 
action was not forth-coming, either than or later, the bill 
was reintroduced in each of the following four sessions.
The measure, which constituted a greatly simplified version 
of the Knox plan, defined the militia as comprising all men
between twenty and forty years of age and divided it into
two classes;
the select corps--those under twenty-five years
the reserve corp,s--those over twenty-five years
71The former would receive twenty days training per year, 
and it would be armed at the expense of the United States.
The usual arguments were brought forward both in 
favor of the select principle and in opposition to it. The 
Republicans thought that the measure would cost too much, 
that it would be better to have an army with some older 
heads, and that the training encampments would corrupt the 
morals of the youth. They also claimed that the militia did 
not need the special training involved. If they once got 
sight of an enemy, they would rapidly learn all they needed 
to know. The Federalists answered that the bill would
70lbid., 1214. ^^Ibid., 1214, 1219.
^^Annals. 4 Cong., 2 Sess,, 1685. The essential 
elements of the bill have been reconstructed from the de­
bates. This point appears in one of the later discussions.
296
replace the "loose, deranged, uncertain" troops with one hun­
dred thousand well-trained and well-armed young men. They 
denied that a few hours near an enemy's position would make 
good soldiers and asked the gentleman who had mentioned 
morals "whether he is more moral than he was twenty-five 
years ago? It is the old that corrupts the young." They 
also criticized the operation of the present act. Militia­
men had been observed going to musters in a most unsoldierly 
manner "with sticks, canes, and whips, and not one firelock 
among four of them."^3
After several days of such futile discussion, the 
committee of the whole was discharged from further considera­
tion of the bill,74 presumably because the session was draw­
ing to an end and because so much opposition had been ex­
pressed. The measure was also thoroughly debated in the 
second session of the Fourth Congress. The Republicans 
called the select corps unrepublican, charged that these 
units would destroy the self-supporting and thus highly de­
sirable volunteer companies, and raised the same kind of 
constitutional objections they had brought against the 
Boudinot and Wadsworth bills. Both sides also expressed
’^ A^nnals. 3 Cong., 2 Sess., 1214-20. 
74ibid.. 1236.
'^ A^nnals. 4 Cong., 2 Sess., 1679-82, 1684.
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their opinions of the efficacy of the militia under the ex­
isting law.76
All of these being familiar arguments, the debate 
was primarily interesting for the unusual proposal made by 
John Williams of New York. Since both the old act and the 
new bill were faulty, he said, an entirely new principle,
"the legionary system," should be adopted. The troops of 
each brigade district should be divided by lot into three 
classes— infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Each class should 
then be made responsible for raising, equipping, and support­
ing, a company of its own arm, and these companies should be 
combined into legions. The classes themselves would be ex­
empted from the usual musters and training. However they 
would be made subject to heavy fines for failure to keep up 
their units. In order to insure uniformity, the federal 
government might provide arms at the expense of the classes?,?
The plan may have been so novel as it appears on 
first examination. Two of the features, the legion organi­
zation and the abandonment of the universal obligation to 
serve, bore a remarkable resemblance to von Steuben’s plan. 
The original Knox plan, it will be remembered, had required 
that the members of the two corps of older men pay the train­
ing expenses of the advanced corps. Perhaps Williams had
7G%bid.. 1677-79, 1680-82, 1685.
7?Ibid.. 1688-90.
298
put together these several parts of the older schemes to 
make a new, and not unworkable, whole. But whatever may 
have been the origin of his ideas, the proposals drew little 
support.
Meantime the committee of the whole returned to the 
bill before it, struck the select corps feature by a large 
vote, and reported to the House. That body refused the 
committee leave to sit again and referred the matter to a 
new select committee.^8 For the remainder of the session 
nothing constructive was done. The bill was again reported 
in the first and second sessions of the Fifth Congress and 
apparently also in the first session of the Sixth Congress.
As in the past its proponents in the debates found themselves 
following battle trails that ended in morasses of objections 
and indifference. The bill was never brought to a vote.
78ibid.. 1690-91, 1825, 2099, 2223-24.
79Annals, 5 Cong., 1 Sess., 340-41; Ibid., 5 Cong., 
2 Sess., 785, 1384-86; Ibid., 6 Cong., 1 Sess., 523, 688.
CHAPTER VII
STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
UNIFORM MILITIA ACT (UMA)
After the passage of the federal statute, the states 
acted with unusual rapidity to implement it with laws of
their own. The legislatures of six states, Connecticut,
1 2 3Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Virginia,
passed new laws in the fall or winter sessions of 1792,
Those of four, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, and Penn­
sylvania, waited only until the spring or summer of 1793, and 
of three, Maryland, North Carolina,^ and Vermont, until the
^Kentucky passed three acts. The act of 24 June 
1792 imposed the Federal organization of divisions, brig­
ades, regiments, etc,, on the militia. That of 28 June 1792 
provided for the general regulation of the militia as thus 
organized. The latter was replaced with a new act on 10 
Dec, 1792, The discussion will be based on the first and 
the third of these,
%ew Hampshire passed companion acts also. That of 
27 Dec, 1792 organized the militia into divisions, etc., and 
that of 28 Dec, 1792 provided for its regulation. Both will 
be used in the discussion,
% e w  Jersey passed a brief act on 30 Nov. 1792 and 
a supplementary act on 5 June 1793. Both will be used.
^North Carolina passed a brief act in Dec, 1793 and 
a supplementary act on 18 July 1794. The last contains much 
more detail and will form the basis of the discussion.
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fall or winter of the same year. By the summer of 1794,
South Carolina and Rhode Island had joined the list, making 
it almost complete, Tennessee, the remaining state, followed 
the North Carolina law until it passed its own in 1798,^
While these new laws brought some sameness to the 
militia simply by imposing the federal system of tactical 
organization on the diverse systems of the states, they con­
tained wide variations in many essential features. Several 
of them did not even conform to.very explicit statements in 
the federal law establishing the ages of militia obligation. 
While some of these variations represented outright viola­
tions of the Federal statute, the greater part of them
^The acts referred to in this paragraph (and used 
as the basis of discussion throughout this chapter except 
where otherwise indicated) may be found in the session 
laws or in collections as follows:
Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut. 1792 
Oct. Sessi (date of act not given), 423-30.
Delaware Laws, 1793 June Sess. (18 June), 199-217.
Horatio Marbury and William H. Crawford (eds.),
Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia. 1775-1889 
(Savannah, 1802), 14 Dec. 1792, pp. 348-356. Hereafter 
cited as Marbury and Crawford, Digest.
Kentucky Acts, 1792 June Sess. (24 June), 37-38, 
and 1792 Nov. Sess. (lO Dec.), 5-15 (Microfilm Collection 
of State Records, Library of Congress, Kentucky, B 2, Reel 1, 
Unit 1).
William Kilty (ed.). The Laws of Maryland (Annapolis, 
1800), II, Nov. (day not given) 1793, Chap. 53.




existed within its flexible.framework. In either case they 
reflected one or another of several factors: the mild in­
sistence of the states upon what they regarded as their own 
rights, the normal historical persistence of traits of the 
old system, the variation of social organization from region 
to region, and the immediate military necessities as they 
varied from the seacoast to the frontier.
For example, at least two of the states, New York 
and Rhode Island, prefaced their laws with arguments concern­
ing the division of the militia powers between the central 
government and the states. As they put it in identical 
words, the Constitution delegates to Congress the power to
New Hampshire Laws. 1792 Nov. Sess. (27 and 28 Dec.),
436-51.
New Jersey Laws. 1792 Oct. Sess. (30 Nov.), 824-28, 
and 1793 May Sess. (5 June), 850-66.
Laws of the State of New York, 1789-96 (re-published 
by the Secretary of State, 1887), 9 Mar, 1793, Chap. 45, 
pp. 440-50.
North Carolina Laws, 1793 Dec. Sess. (Dec., date 
unknown) and 1794 July Sess. (18 July), 1-8.
James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders (eds.). The 
Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801 (Harris- 
burg, 1896-1915), XIV, 11 Apr. 1793, 454-81.
Rhode Island Acts and Resolves. 1794 Mar. Sess.
(Mar., date unknown), 14-25.
Benjamin Elliot and Martin Strobel (eds.). The 
Militia System of South Carolina, Being a Digest of the Acts 
of Congress Concerning the Militia, Likewise of the Militia 
Laws of this State (Charleston. 1833), 10 May 1794, Appendix, 
18-32. Hereafter cited as Elliot and Strobel, Militia System 
of South Carolina.
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provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia 
and reserves to the states the rights to appoint the officers 
and to train the forces according to the Congressional regu­
lations, These considerations rendered it necessary that 
the states make “provisions in the premises,*' a project that 
the two states undertook with more than a little enthusiasm.
The persistence of old traits in the state laws en­
compassed here or there almost all features of the system.
The old Connecticut law, for example, did not provide for 
separate regimental and battalion organizations, nor did the 
new one. The effects of variation in social and political 
organization can be seen in the central role delegated to 
the towns in the laws of New England, where the selectmen 
helped determine exemptions and supplied poor militiamen with 
arms. Nowhere else did civil officials exercise such impor­
tant functions in the militia life of their communities.
The influence of military necessities is found in such fea­
tures as the sectional emphasis placed on cavalry and artil­
lery. Tennessee, where the Indians were a constant threat, 
provided itself.with plenty of horse and no cannon. Along 
the coast, where seaborne attack was a possibility, most
Tennessee Acts, 1798 Dec. Sess. (10 Dec.), 3-26.
Laws of Vermont. 1792-93 Sess. (29 Oct. 1793), 19-47.
A Collection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly 
of Virginia, of a Public anc Permanent Nature as Are Now in 
Force (Richmond. 1803). 22 Dec. 1792. pp. 282-90. Hereafter 
cited as Collection of Acts (Virginia).
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states preserved a balance between the two arms.
While these several influences may account for many 
of the differences in the laws, the differences themselves 
have more interest for present purposes than their causes.
The discussion which follows will be confined to a compari­
son of the laws feature by feature in order to determine the 
range of variation in each case. Such an analysis is ren­
dered difficult by the lack of standardized terminology and 
by the problem of evaluating the significance of omissions.
In comparing certain fines relating to muskets and musters, 
for example, one comes across the following types of phrases: 
"neglecting to provide himself with arms," "appearing at 
muster without arms," "neglecting to appear at muster with 
arms." The difficulty here is that the last phrase, which 
was quite popular with the lawmakers, sometimes appears to 
cover not only the other two but also the additional offense 
of not appearing at all, arms or no arms. This is only one 
of many cases.
The question of omissions cannot be solved by assign­
ing an arbitrary conventional meaning to a term at the pos­
sible peril of a relatively inconsequential error, such as 
might be done in the example just discussed. What is to be 
understood if one of the laws mentions light infantry, gren­
adiers, and rifles but is completely silent on the subject 
of artillery and horse? In this regard it should be pointed 
out that the laws of four of the states include in their
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prefaces verbatim quotations of the federal act and that 
five more contain broad references to it. In these cases 
is it to be assumed that any omissions of the federal re­
quirements, such as those relating to artillery and horse, 
are covered by the fact that the federal act is written into 
the state law or cited by it? Such an assumption would ap­
pear more valid if the state laws in all other respects 
followed the federal act without significant deviation, 
which they do not. In the analysis which is soon to follow 
this kind of difficulty will be dealt with by adhering to 
what is actually stated in the state portion of the law.
If dragoons and artillery are not mentioned it will be as­
sumed in the absence of other evidence that they were not 
intended. And so for other omissions.
The Militia Obligation 
The federal law, it will be remembered, placed the 
militia obligation on a certain age group with the intent 
that the vast majority of the members of the group actually 
serve. While it provided for the exemption of a few, it 
did not contemplate the use of a money equivalent that might 
exempt large numbers. To have done such would have debased 
the obligation to little more than an excuse for a head tax. 
At the same time the law did not forbid the customary use of 
substitutes and fines in lieu of personal service. These 
practices, however, tended to function on a random rather
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than a systematic basis, and their high costs limited their 
application to a very small group.
While several states may have exempted larger numbers 
than the federal act intended, their fault was one of degree 
that only partially invalidated the obligation. Only one 
state. New Jersey, played so loosely with the principles in­
volved as to destroy their underlying philosophy. Though it 
tacitly placed the militia obligation on the same group as 
the federal act, its law provided first for the formation of 
volunteer companies of light infantry, grenadiers, artillery, 
and horse. Only after this process had been completed did 
it require that the general militia, the remaining part, be 
enrolled and organized into units. However, it permitted 
anyone wishing to escape service in these standing units to 
receive exemption on payment of $3.00 per year, a fee treated 
throughout as a tax, not as a militia fine.
While many with loose funds joined the expensive 
volunteer companies, particularly if they also possessed a 
martial bent, men in moderate circumstances must have found 
it desirable to take advantage of the tax feature. This can 
be inferred from a comparison of the cost of exemption and 
that of arms and equipment. A stand of arms plus the other 
articles required cost from about fifteen to eighteen dollars 
by conservative estimate. A prospective militiaman could by 
paying such an amount to the state in exemption fees escape 
all the inconveniences of service and the possibilities of
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fines for some five or six years. Men over thirty-eight 
years had everything to gain, and younger men probably found 
it easier to make the small annual payments than to put up
the larger sum at one time.
While the standing companies thus were exposed to 
blight, there are indications that the volunteer militia ef­
floresced. These are found in the fact that under the supple­
mentary act of 1793^ New Jersey’s authorized proportions of 
artillery and cavalry were exceeded by those of no other 
state.7 Such high proportions, of course, reflect large needs, 
which in turn reflect to some extent the popularity of the two 
arms. It would appear that the combined effect of the method 
of enrollment and the money equivalent was partially to shift 
dependence from the general militia to the volunteer militia.
Rhode Island also adopted the money equivalent but in 
a form that did not materially affect the over-all character 
of its forces. It listed those entitled to exemptions but 
left them off the company rolls only on the payment of an an­
nual tax of twelve shillings. Thus only a limited and speci­
fied few could take advantage of the feature, and they com­
prised a class that received outright exemptions in most states.
The Age of Obligation
Most states followed the letter of the federal law
^See footnote 3 above.
^See below page 340.
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in making the age group from eighteen to forty-five years 
subject to obligatory service, but there were several notable 
exceptions. New Hampshire in its original law specified that 
those from eighteen to forty should serve, and three years 
later it reduced the lower limit to sixteen.® Vermont speci­
fied those from sixteen to forty-five but provided that the 
name of no one under eighteen should be included on the an­
nual return, a copy of which went to the President. Several 
states that adopted the federal age range excluded certain 
age groups as a matter of exemption. Massachusetts exempted 
those over forty, and Delaware and Pennsylvania excused those 
under twenty-one from attending musters and arming themselves.
In evaluating these deviations from the ages pre­
scribed by the federal law it is necessary to remember that 
in this period of expanding population, the number in each 
age group varied inversely with the age of the group, which 
is to say, the younger the group, the more its members, and 
vice versa. Considering this fact. New Hampshire’s addition 
and subtraction probably had little effect on the total num­
ber enrolled. Vermont’s provisions, of course, added men.
The other three states lost sizeable numbers. On an unad­
justed basis, Massachusetts lost 5/27 or almost one-fifth of 
its total force as figured using the federal age limits. If 
this fraction were corrected for longevity factors (the
®New Hampshire Laws, 1795 June Sess. (18 June), 526.
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inverse proportion) it would still amount to say an eighth 
or ninth, Delaware and Pennsylvania on straight line reck­
oning lost a ninth, a fraction which would be appreciably 
increased by correction. Their case is particularly sig­
nificant because the group concerned contained those most 
fitted for training and service.
Exemptions
In the exemption lists of the states is to be found 
one of the broadest spectrums of variation in the laws. 
Considering the lists of all the states, the persons exempted 
may be arranged into some eleven main categories, such as 
state officials, local officials, essential civilians, and 
the like, comprising a total of forty-four specific occupa­
tional groups. At one end of the spectrum South Carolina 
exempted forty of these groups and New York and Massachusetts 
thirty-three each. At the other end Maryland exempted only 
three, ministers, conscientious objectors, and invalids.
The other states exempted varying numbers between these 
limits with the average for all, including those named above, 
being nineteen.^
Length of list, of course, affords no accurate
^The totals for the occupational groups are approxi­
mate. They do not include federal exemptions repeated in 
the state laws, and they have been adjusted to give the most 
valid comparisons. Thus, for example, such entries as 
"Quakers, Shakers, Moravians, and Menonists" have been 
counted as one, "conscientious objectors," rather than four.
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measure of the total number of persons involved. Some en­
tries, such as "judges of superior courts," cover only a 
few individuals, while others, such as "ministers" or "for­
mer military personnel," cover many more. Although the na­
ture of the problem makes it impossible to work out the to­
tal number of persons exempted by any single state, this 
would hardly be necessary in any event. For the totals 
represented by the exemption lists appear inconsequential 
when viewed against those involved in the age exemptions of 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, and the money 
equivalent of New Jersey. Thus in a comparison based upon 
total numbers, these states would appear at the top, and the 
remaining states would follow at a distance. In this regard 
it is estimated that tens of thousands were exempt in Massa­
chusetts and Pennsylvania and many thousands in New Jersey 
and Delaware. Those exempt in the other states, including 
South Carolina with its long list, probably amounted to only 
a few thousand each.
The distribution of exemptions by profession is in­
teresting, but since it is not particularly germane to a 
comparative analysis of the present type only a few selected 
groups will be mentioned. Ministers were exempt in all 
states, the only group to be so favored, and in most of the 
New England states other church functionaries, such as elders, 
deacons, churchwardens, and "teachers'" of the congregation, 
were also exempt though there was some variation from state
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to state. State legislators were not required to serve in 
eight states, sheriffs in eight, and justices of the peace 
in seven. College professors, college students, and school­
masters, appear on the lists of twelve, ten, and nine states 
respectively. In the military category, former officers, 
usually both Continental and militia, received exemptions 
in eight states. Iron and glass workers were exempt in New 
York; forge and furnace workers at mines in South Carolina; 
and iron workers, lead workers, and firearms manufacturers 
in Kentucky. South Carolina added the workers at the Santee 
Canal in 1795.10
Conscientious objectors, usually Quakers but some­
times including Shakers, Moravians, Dunkards, and Menonists, 
or various combinations of these, were exempt in twelve 
states. Delaware, Kentucky, South Carolina, and strangely 
enough Pennsylvania were the states that neglected to place 
them on the lists. The failure of Pennsylvania was no doubt 
related to the shifting political fortunes of the Quaker 
plutocracy, the resentment it had aroused by its failure to 
pass a universal militia act during the French and Indian 
War, and the refusal of all but a small rainorityH of the 
Quakers to serve in the armies of the Revolution. During
• ^ ^Elliot and Strobel, The Militia System of South 
Carolina. Appendix, 43.
n Allen Nevins, The American States During and After 
the Revolution. 1775-1789 (New York. 1924). 252.
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the Revolution itself the state imposed heavy taxes on
1 9Quakers in lieu of military service, and thereafter its 
militia acts were silent on the subject of Quaker exemptions.
Almost all exemptions except those of men over forty- 
five were conditional. The status of former military person­
nel usually depended upon the length of their prior service 
and sometimes upon their not being offered ranks in the mil­
itia equivalent to their old ranks. In four states the ex­
emption of conscientious objectors hinged upon the payment 
of annual taxes, in two it extended to musters but not to 
actual service, and in one it included actual service only 
if the person concerned furnished a substitute. In most 
of the New England states the exemption of one or more of 
such categories as doctors, millers, schoolmasters, and 
ferrymen was left to the discretion of the selectmen of the 
towns. In Rhode Island some groups which were exempt from 
the ordinary infantry were required to serve in "senior 
class" companies. In North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee all exempts were required to turn out in case of 
insurrection, invasion, or other alarm, and in Delaware and 
Pennsylvania those between eighteen and twenty-one had to 
attend under the same circumstances.
The matter of exemption was not the only thing that 
determined the strength of the militia, for several states
l%bid.. 254.
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required persons who were not. covered in the federal act,
or who were specifically excluded thereby, to perform serv-
13ice. Both Georgia and South Carolina subjected aliens to 
duty except when the United States might be at war with 
their countries. South Carolina, however, omitted citizens 
of France, who were exempt by treaty from all personal serv­
ice. South Carolina also required "free persons of color," 
who were not liable under the federal act, to turn out with 
the regiments as "fatigue men" and subjected them to the 
same fines as privates for failure to attend. Many states 
placed the obligation on transient citizens of other states 
provided they had resided within the state a specified period 
of time.
Maintaining the rolls and keeping track of exemptions 
were continuing functions of company commanders after the 
original enrollment had been completed. Young men had to be 
added to the lists when they reached the minimum age, and 
older men had to be dropped as they passed the maximum. Al­
most invariably the responsibility of proving age, either 
below the minimum or above the maximum, was placed upon the 
individual militiamen. Most of the laws required those mov­
ing from one company beat to another to report to the local 
militia commander within a specified period under penalty of 
heavy fines. In some states they were required to take with
13ln the supplementary act of 17 Dec. 1793, Marbury 
and Crawford, Digest, 357.
313
them certificates of service prepared by their old commanders. 
Since few or none of the laws contain similar provisions re­
lating to loss of exemption status, it was perhaps felt that 
a defeated politician, a discharged ferryman, or a recovered 
invalid would come immediately under the eyes of the company 
commander, no change in residence being involved.
Tactical Organization 
The UMA directed that the militia in each state be 
organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, 
and companies. Except for the division, it also prescribed 
the number of sub-units each of these was to contain, four 
regiments per brigade, two battalions per regiment, and 
five companies per battalion. It should be pointed out, 
however, that these proportions were not intended as absolute 
requirements but as guides to be followed as far as conven­
ience permitted. In general, the states established all 
of the several types of units required, but there were sev­
eral omissions. Massachusetts and Tennessee neglected to 
provide for divisions and Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
York, and Tennessee for battalions. The variations con­
cerning the composition of units were greater, with some 
states adhering to the standards, some neglecting to set 
requirements., and some going their own ways, as reflected 
in the following table:
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TABLE 1
VARIATIONS IN THE COMPOSITION OF MILITIA UNITS 
FROM STATE TO STATE
brigs./div. regts./brig. bns./regt. cos./bn.
UMA 4 2 5
Conn. 2 4 or 5 no bns. no bns.
Del. no data 2, 3 or 4 2 4
Ga. 2 4 2 5
Ky. 2 4 2 5
Md. no data 4 2 5
Mass. no divs. 4 no bns. no bns.
N. H. 2 4 or 5 2 5
N. J. no data 4 no data 5
N. Y. no data no data no bns. no bns.
N. C. 2 or 3 no data 2 5
Pa. no data 2 to 8 2 4
R. I. 4 3,4,7 or 8 2 no data
S. C. 4 or 5 no data 2 5
Tenn. no divs. no data no bns. no bns.
Vt. no data 4 2 5
Va. 4 or 5 no data 2 no data
(Note: two of the states having no battalions,
Connecticut and Massachusetts, placed ten companies in each 
regiment. The composition of the regiments in New York and 
Tennessee is not known.)
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It will be noted that the divisions of Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, and Virginia contained about twice as many 
brigades as those of the other states for which figures can 
be given» In the case of Rhode Island the actual difference 
in strength was even greater than this ratio suggests. That 
state contained only one division, and it consisted of the 
four brigades listed in the appropriate column. These bri­
gades and hence the division contained twenty-two regiments, 
whereas the divisions of almost all the other states con­
tained only eight, and at the most ten, regiments. Pennsyl­
vania might have had divisions more nearly comparable to 
those of Rhode Island, but unfortunately the brigade/division 
ratio for that state is not known. .
The most numerous variations appear in the regiment/ 
brigade ratio. It is likely that in the aberrant cases the 
departures were considered necessary to take care of odd, or 
left-over, regiments or to compensate for the unequal dis­
tribution of the militia population. Only the second of 
these considerations could apply to Pennsylvania and Rhode 
Island, who went the furtherest afield, and.it is doubtful 
that it justified the liberties they took. The distribu­
tion of population in, say, Georgia and Vermont probably 
varied as much or more than in the former states, and they 
did not violate the federal proportions.
The basic unit in the whole organizational system 
was, of course, the company, which according to the federal
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law was to have a strength of sixty-four privates. Eight 
states adhered to this figure. Three, Delaware, Pennsyl­
vania, and Tennessee, set minimum and maximum company 
strengths of forty and eighty privates each; and five, Ken­
tucky, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia, did not 
touch on the matter. However, Virginia in a supplementary 
law of 1793 established a requirement for not more than one 
hundred nor less than fifty rank and file.^^
Rhode Island, as already noted, established in addi­
tion to the ordinary infantry a special class of troops, the 
"senior class," composed of a portion of the infantry ex­
empts. These troops were organized into regiments and com­
panies and made subject to the same regulations as the in­
fantry, except that they were not required to meet for 
training as frequently.
The tactical units were directly associated with 
political and territorial subdivisions. Generally speaking, 
battalions and sometimes regiments were related to towns in 
New England, and regiments or brigades to counties in the 
South, depending upon the density of population. In New 
England the larger units, brigades and divisions, were 
necessarily based upon territorial subdivisions. In the 
South, several counties containing regiments were frequently 
grouped together to form brigade districts.
l^Coiiection of Acts (Virginia). 2 Dec. 1793, 
p. 307-10.
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Selection of Officers 
The UMA required that each state have an adjutant 
general, each division a major general, each brigade a briga­
dier general and a brigade inspector, each regiment a lieu­
tenant colonel-commandant, and each battalion a major. It 
further required that each company contain a captain, a lieu­
tenant, an ensign, four sergeants, and four corporals. In 
keeping with the constitutional reservations it left the 
selection of these officers and non-commissioned officers 
to the states.
With exceptions too minor to mention, the state laws 
provided exactly the same complement of officers and non­
commissioned officers as the federal act, but taking advan­
tage of the reservations they varied widely as to the method 
by which these leaders would be selected. Normally several 
different methods were employed by each state depending upon 
the type of officer involved, general officer, field officer, 
company officer, or staff officer. Since all of the laws do 
not clearly specify the method for each type, the informa­
tion as usual contains omissions.
In the states for which data is available, general 
officers and adjutant generals were almost invariably ap­
pointed by the governors or the legislatures. Brigade in­
spectors were normally designated by brigade commanders and 
regimental staff officers by regimental commanders. Field 
officers of the line were elected by either their men or
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their officers in six cases out of the ten that the informa­
tion covers and appointed by the governor or the legislature 
in the remaining four. Company officers were elected by 
their men in nine cases out of the thirteen available, and 
appointed by the governors in three. In the remaining case 
(Virginia) the selection of both field and company officers 
rested with the county courts, which were required to recom­
mend suitable candidates to the governor.
As indicated above, the method of election was con­
fined almost entirely to field officers of the line and com­
pany officers, and by no means all of these were chosen in 
this way. Some seventy out of every one hundred company 
officers, a group which comprised about eighty-five percent 
of all officers, owed their selection to the ballots of 
their men.^^ Taking all officers at large, perhaps sixty of 
each hundred were elected. These proportions hardly support 
the traditional supposition that all militia officers were 
elected.
Regimental non-commissioned officers were almost in­
variably appointed by the regimental commanders or by the
two brigade division contained approximately 295 
officers of whom about 240, or eighty percent were company 
officers. Five percent, perhaps too little, has been added 
in view of the fact that some divisions were composed of 
more than two brigades. In nine out of thirteen states on 
which data is available the company officers were elected. 
This proportion, which reduces to sixty-nine percent, or 
sixty-nine out of each hundred officers, has been rounded 
off to seventy and extended to the remaining states.
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field officers of the regiment as a group, and out of the 
ten cases available company non-commissioned officers were 
selected by the company commanders in seven, by the company 
officers in one, and surprisingly enough by election in only 
one. In the remaining case, Georgia, they were chosen once 
a year by drawing names from a hat. The unfortunate winners, 
as they must have been considered, could serve, provide a 
suitable substitute, or pay a fine of ten dollars.
Mobilization Procedures 
As previously noted, one of the primary functions of 
the militia was to serve as a system of mobilization. The 
laws in establishing the necessary procedures closely fol­
lowed colonial and Revolutionary tradition. In most states 
the governors and sometimes militia officers were authorized 
to call out troops in certain emergencies. They might do 
this in the normal case by drafting detachments from the 
militia at large or in special cases by ordering out complete 
units. There was, as usual, some variation in these provis­
ions from state to state, and some states neglected to es­
tablish any procedures whatsoever. None of the laws specif­
ically provided for the raising of men by the volunteer 
principle, a method frequently employed by the governors in 
actual p r a c t i c e . I n  some states their power to utilize 
this method was apparently comprehended in their greater
^^See below pages 355, 382-83, 390, 404-05.
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powers relating to the draft, in their constitutional powers, 
and in custom. In others it rested upon special legislation 
that had to be renewed with each emergency.
The emergencies in which troops might be ordered out 
as a matter of standard procedure included invasion, threat­
ened invasion, and insurrection or rebellion. In twelve 
states the governors were permitted to embody men under such 
circumstances; and in eight of the twelve, brigade or divis­
ion commanders, or both, were granted the same power. In 
two of the twelve, the grant was extended all the way down 
the command system to the company commanders. The governor’s 
authority in six of the twelve also included the power to 
send troops into other states facing the same kinds of emer­
gencies. In most of these last cases the laws limited the 
number of troops so dispatched to a small fraction, one-fifth 
to one-third, of the total force.
The drafting of detachments was accomplished by two 
methods, the class system and the quota system. In the for­
mer, the men in each company were divided beforehand into a 
number of classes, usually by "secret ballot," that is by 
drawing names from a hat or box. The classes were then as­
signed numbers and called up in numerical rotation when 
troops were required. The number of classes corresponded 
directly to the number of companies per regiment or in one 
case to the number per battalion. The mobilization of a 
single class would therefore provide one company from each
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regiment or one from each battalion. Delaware, Kentucky,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia utilized 
the class system.
In the other system, the governor assigned each 
division, or in some cases each brigade, its share of the 
total number of troops required. Each division commander 
broke his allocation down for the brigades, each brigade 
commander for the regiments, and so on until each company 
finally received its quota. The company commanders then de­
tailed men to fill the quotas from special rosters kept for 
the purpose. Only two states,, Massachusetts and Vermont, 
specified the quota system, but it was widely used by most 
states. The six states having draft classes found its flex­
ibility valuable when they required fewer men than were con­
tained in a single class. Many o.f the eight states that 
prescribed no draft procedures sometimes utilized it, pre­
sumably on the basis that it was authorized by custom. The 
normal tour of service for men detached, either by class or 
by quota was about two months, and troops that had been 
ordered out had to be replaced at the end of that period.
In the states utilizing the class system, the laws 
usually prescribed elaborate methods of officering the 
troops. In Delaware, for example, the first class would be 
placed under the captain of the first company of the regi­
ment, the lieutenant of the second, and the ensign of the 
fourth, and the other classes would march with similar pre-
3 2 2
established combinations of the officers. In the use of 
the quota system, higher commanders were usually required 
to detail the officers for the drafts from rosters similar 
to those kept for the men.
The method of embodiment by complete units was in­
tended to meet emergencies in which time did not permit the 
assembling of detached men from their scattered corps. The 
laws of most states authorized this method either specifi­
cally or by implication in general statements permitting the 
governors to order out "parts or portions" of the militia. 
Several went so far as to establish complete alarm systems. 
Thus in South Carolina and Tennessee, the alarm on the ap­
proach of the enemy might be given by the firing of guns, 
the beating of drums, or vocally by officers and non­
commissioned officers. Thereupon, the members of each com­
pany were required to report fully armed to a pre-selected 
rendezvous. South Carolina also required that at least one- 
fourth of the men in each unit marching out of its beat be 
left behind as "patrols" to preserve order, that is, to 
police the slaves. In most states, the period that units 
might be held in uninterrupted service was the same as for 
detachments, that is two months.
When the volunteer principle was employed, detach­
ments were usually raised by quotas. The procedure was 
exactly the same as that described above for the use of the 
quota system in the draft except that the men were encouraged
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to come forward of their own accord. Most orders for raising 
men in this way directed the use of the draft or the hiring 
of substitutes at company expense to fill deficiencies in the 
allocations. Individual volunteers were sometimes enrolled 
from the state at large to form select corps for long term 
service, but normally this required a special legislative 
enactment to cover the longer enlistment and any special in­
ducements that might be offered.
1 7Ten states, Georgia,^' Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu­
setts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, and Vermont, permitted militiamen to provide 
substitutes in lieu of serving when they were drafted for 
tours of duty. In most of these cases the substitutes had 
to be approved by appropriate commanders before they were ac­
cepted. In all of them the substitute might be called in 
his own turn, whereupon the man he was replacing lost his 
exemption. In South Carolina men furnishing substitutes 
were relieved from the detachments for which they might have 
been selected, but they were required to serve on the patrols. 
Since all of these states established fines for refusing 
tours of duty, the militiaman in effect had three choices.
He might perform his tour, hire a substitute, or pay the 
fine.
l^The use of substitutes in Georgia is mentioned in 
passing in the supplementary act of 18 Dec. 1793. Marbury 
and Crawford, Digest, 358.
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The laws varied widely in the penalties they set for 
offenses related to mobilization. The fines for refusing to 
perform tours of duty included assessments that varied from 
$12.00 in Delaware to $88.00 in South Carolina, and monthly 
payments of $10.00 and $12.00 as long as the troops were out 
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania respectively. In Georgia and 
Kentucky the penalty was forfeiture of not less than one 
month's nor more than one year's pay. In Maryland the law 
directed regimental commanders to hire substitutes for men 
refusing either to serve or hire their own and to charge the 
expense to the men concerned. The penalties for desertion 
ranged from $20.00 in New Jersey to $53.28 in Massachusetts 
and Vermont. In Kentucky the court martial might levy a 
fine of not more than eighteen month's pay and not less than 
six. It might also sentence the offender to corporal pun­
ishment, but the law does not specify the type.^^
The laws of several of the states established the 
pay scale that would go into effect upon mobilization. 
Delaware and Pennsylvania allowed privates $6.00 per month, 
Kentucky $10.00, North Carolina $16.65, and Virginia the 
same amount as received by United States troops, $3.00 per
^®Both in this paragraph and elsewhere in the pages 
that follow the fines have been converted from pounds to 
dollars as necessary. This accounts for such odd sums as 
the $88.00 for South Carolina and $53.28 for Massachusetts 
and Vermont. The value of the pound was fixed by the tariff 
law of 31 July 1789 at $4.44, a figure that was not changed 
until long after the period under consideration. The law 
may be found in Annals, 1 Cong., 2148.
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m o n t h . I n  South Carolina privates were paid $6.50 per 
month when serving within the state and the same as United 
States troops when serving outside it. In New Jersey and 
New York, the federal pay scale was adopted for service out­
side the states.
Several of the laws contained special provisions re­
lating to supply in time of mobilization. In Virginia, 
which had the most elaborate arrangement, the governor was 
given broad powers to procure and issue stores, and command­
ers of regiments were authorized to impress supplies and 
equipment, including wagons, horses, and drivers. In South 
Carolina, all field officers and company commanders were 
given essentially the same power of impressment. In both 
states the law provided for the reimbursement of the owners 
of the impressed articles. In Massachusetts and Vermont the 
initial responsibilities for supply were laid upon the mem­
bers of detachments and upon the selectmen of the towns. The 
former were required to report with provisions for three days 
and the latter to resupply the men from their towns until 
released by the appropriate commanders.
From the detailed and carefully worked out descrip­
tions, in the laws it might appear that the mobilization 
systems provided sound and efficient methods of raising men.
launder the Federal Acts of 30 April 1790, 3 March 
1790, and 5 March 1792, Emory Upton. The Military Policy of 
the United States (Washington, 1917), 75, 78, 81.
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This was actually true only in the case of the embodiment of 
complete units. The methods based on the raising of detach­
ments had already demonstrated their inefficacy on innumer­
able occasions during the Revolution. They were slow and 
cumbersome, and the men they brought together had never be­
fore functioned as units. Some of them knew neither each 
other nor their officers. Furthermore, neither units nor 
drafted detachments could be retained after their short 
tours had been completed, and volunteer detachments were 
seldom kept in service much longer than the usual two months.
In actual practice the draft was almost never em­
ployed to raise troops in large numbers. Indeed there ap­
pears to have been a reluctance on the part of many governors 
to resort to this measure, even in cases in which the militia 
was more or less anxious to serve. During the Indian trou­
bles of 1793, for example. Governor Edward Telfair of Georgia 
wrote the Secretary of War, " . . .  should a general pressure 
take place . . .  I must, in a short period, be reduced to 
the dangerous expedient of impressing, and this, in my opin­
ion, is to be avoided, as much as possible, by every govern­
ment."^® The draft was employed in the technical sense at 
least, when local commanders ordered out small bodies as 
complete units for local use, such as the pursuit of raiding 
Indians or the quelling of riots. In these cases, however,
American State Papers, Indian Affairs. I, 368.
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actual impressment was seldom involved because the men with 
their personal interests immediately at stake were usually 
ready to serve.
Arms and Equipment
The federal act required each militiaman to provide 
himself with either of two combinations of arms. The first 
included a musket or firelock, a bayonet and belt, two spare 
flints, a knapsack, a cartridge pouch, and twenty-four car­
tridges complete with powder. The second retained most of 
these components but substituted the rifle for the musket. 
The act also standardized the caliber of the musket at 
eighteen gauge and required that the muskets of all militia­
men meet this standard within five years.
The laws of the states adhered closely to the letter
of the act in setting the arms requirement. Only New Hamp­
shire, Tennessee, and Vermont, all of whom omitted the rifle 
combination, departed from the list of individual equipment
to any significant extent. All states placed the responsi­
bility upon the individual militiamen to provide themselves 
with the required articles and established penalties for 
those attending musters without them. These ranged from 
fines of $.50 per incident in Delaware and Virginia to $4.44 
in Massachusetts and Vermont. While Maryland charged infan­
trymen only one cent for the delinquency, she required ar­
tillerymen and cavalrymen to pay two-thirds of a dollar.
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Several states recognized the problem faced by men 
too poor to buy their own arms, and made special provisions 
for their relief. In all of the New England States except 
Rhode Island, the selectmen of the towns were directed to 
issue certificates confirming the indigency of such men and 
to provide them with the necessary equipment at town expense. 
In North Carolina the court-martial of each battalion was 
ordered to perform the same functions with the cost to be 
charged to the militia fund. Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsyl­
vania, and Virginia exempted poor militiamen from the fines 
for lack of equipment, and Rhode Island appears to have done 
the same, though its law is not explicit. The New Jersey 
law also provided that a small quantity of state arms, far 
from enough to go around, be distributed to the companies 
for the use of such persons. In Maryland the fine of one 
cent per day was so small as to eliminate the arms require­
ment.
Training
In order to make training uniform, the UMA required 
that the states employ "the rules of discipline adopted by 
Congress on 29 March 1779" (Steuben's regulations). In 
keeping with the Constitutional reservations, it left the 
actual conduct of training to the states. The latter speci­
fied the number of musters to be held each year and estab­
lished fines for failing to attend and other derelictions
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of duty. From the viewpoint of present day training stand­
ards the musters were in every instance absurdly few. This 
situation apparently resulted from a reluctance on the part 
of the legislators to effect more than a minimum disruption 
in the economic life of the militiamen,^ It was also no 
doubt due partially to a mistaken idea of the amount of 
training required to make good soldiers.
In order to simplify the comparison of the number of 
musters required in the several states the everyday phrase­
ology of the period, which ignored some of the distinction 
made in the laws will be followed. Thus the term "company 
muster" will refer to any company meeting, whether for 
training or review or both, and the term "general muster" 
will refer to both battalion and regimental meetings with 
the same lack of qualification as to purpose. The musters 
that regimental and battalion commanders were in some states 
permitted to call on their own initiative will be neglected. 
Few commanders were likely to impose these optional meetings 
upon their men, and the numbers of the meetings actually 
called cannot be determined in any event. It should be 
noted that in all cases law or custom limited musters to a 
single day each and that actual military exercise consumed 
only a part of that.
South Carolina prescribed more company musters than
pi
See above pages 269-70,
330
any other state, six per year, and New Jersey and Pennsyl­
vania the fewest with one each, the average for all states 
being three. Eight states required two general musters per 
year,22 seven states one per year, and one state, Vermont, 
at least one every two years. The average was about one and 
a half a year. The total number per state, including both 
types, ranged from a maximum of eight in South Carolina to 
a minimum of two in Pennsylvania. The over-all average was 
four and a half per year. In at least two states, the laws 
also provided for inspection and review by higher commanders. 
In Connecticut the brigade and division commanders were 
authorized to order out their commands for these purposes 
at such times as they thought necessary. In North Carolina 
the same commanders were required to review their commands 
by regiments at least once every two years.
In most states the fines for failing to attend were 
the same for both company and general musters. They ranged 
from $.50 per absence in Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia to 
$2.20 in Massachusetts. In New York, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee the penalty for missing a general 
muster was double that for missing a company muster, and in 
Rhode Island it was slightly greater. South Carolina’s
22Among this group Massachusetts specified one 
general muster every two years but compensated by holding 
musters of all the militia in each town (not regiment) in 
the alternate years. South Carolina required not more than 
two per year.
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penalties were based partially upon the offender's financial 
status. If he were absent at a company muster, for example, 
the forfeiture was $1.55 plus twenty-five percent of his 
last general tax. Omitting this last state the average 
penalties were $1.28 for company musters and $1.57 for gen­
eral musters.
The penalties for "disorders and contempts" at 
musters, including such things as neglect of duty and dis­
obedience of orders, were considerably more severe. Although 
most states utilized only fines, three provided for corporal 
punishment. In most cases the laws did not establish flat 
penalties but set up limits, leaving the amount within the 
limits to the determination of courts-martial. The maximum 
fines ranged from slightly less than $1.50 in Delaware and 
Rhode Island to $8.88 in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont. The average of the maximums for all 
states was $4.87. Connecticut and New Hampshire permitted 
the courts-martial to prescribe a ride on a wooden horse as 
an alternative to the fine. Virginia, which had no fines 
for these derelictions, permitted offenders to be confined 
for one day or "tied neck and heels" for not more than five 
minutes.
Privileges
Aside from pay for actual service, militiamen re­
ceived few actual rewards. Among the more fortunate in this
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respect were non-commissioned officers and privates in Ver­
mont and Connecticut and militiamen under twenty in New 
Hampshire, all of whom were exempted from the poll tax by 
supplements to the basic acts. In the first of these 
states, one horse for each trooper was also exempted from 
the tax. The value of these exemptions can be seen in the 
fact that the poll tax in Vermont in 1797 was $20.00 for 
men and $13.50 for h o r s e s . I n  a different category were 
the few meager privileges granted militiamen almost every­
where, usually more for the benefit of the state than the 
men. These included provisions that their arms not be 
seized for debts at any time nor their bodies seized for 
arrest in civil actions while they were performing their 
duties or on the way to and from them. In a few cases they 
also received free passage on toll bridges and reduced rates 
on ferries going to and from musters and alarms.
Enforcement
The enforcement of the acts rested in the hands of 
the governors and the militia officers themselves. The lack 
of rapid communications and compact organization, which made 
high level supervision difficult, placed a premium on the
^^Laws of Vermont, 1794 Oct. Sess. (29 Oct.), Sec. 
IX; Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, 1797 May 
Sess., 513; New Hampshire Laws, 1795 June Sess., 525. The 
basic act in Connecticut exempted light infantrymen and 
troopers and their horses.
24Laws of Vermont, 1797 Sess. (10 Mar.), Sec. V.
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performance of officers actually in contact with the troops, 
such as regimental, battalion, and company commanders.
These officers in the everyday performance of their duties 
carried out dozens of routine administrative functions.
They were also responsible for the assessment of fines and 
other penalties. Usually they performed this last duty as 
members of courts-martial, but in a few states, including 
Connecticut and Maryland, commanding officers as individuals 
were permitted to levy fines in some offenses.
These officers, as well as higher officers, were 
subject to heavy penalties for neglects in the performance 
of their administrative tasks. In Georgia, to take a few 
cases at random, officers failing to call company and gen­
eral musters were subject to fines of up to $30.00 and 
$100.00 respectively. In North Carolina, the fines for 
failure to make certain returns ranged from $22.50 for com­
pany commanders to $110.00 for battalion and regimental 
commanders. In Virginia, the assessments for "neglect of 
duty," which comprised a whole group of offenses, started at 
$20.00 for captains and went up to $70.00 for lieutenant 
colonels. Fines for general officers for offenses of these 
types were usually proportionately higher to correspond 
with the higher rank.
Despite these penalties, many officers were lax in 
carrying out their responsibilities. While their neglects 
probably encompassed all their duties, those involving the
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failure to enroll the men, to make strength returns, and to 
muster the units struck at the heart of the system and led 
to widespread disorganization in many states. During the 
standby mobilizations of 1794 and 1797, for example, the 
governor of more than one state hardly knew whether he had 
a militia or not, and in at least one case he was hard put 
to find out.^^ This is not to say that all officers, or 
even a majority of them, were delinquent. Large numbers, 
particularly in the volunteer units, were conscientious and 
persevering. The efforts of many officers in Virginia 
throughout the 1790’s to obtain arms for their men provide 
an excellent demonstration of this point.26
Little or no data is available as to the extent to 
which the courts-martial actually inflicted penalties on 
delinquent militiamen. It seems, likely, however, that many 
men escaped the full consequences of their neglects and
derelictions through loopholes in the laws and that in the
many disorganized units courts-martial were seldom held.
The loopholes are to be found in provisions of the law that 
permitted commanders to excuse certain types of offenses in 
advance of the court meetings and in the elastic nature of 
the fines provided. In the latter regard most fines were 
stated as scales that started at a low sum and not infrequent-
25see below pages 392-93, 405-06.
26see below pages 403-04, 417-18.
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militia of the battalion beats, presumably on an obligatory 
basis. The last two, which will be called the "brigade com­
panies," were to be formed of volunteers from the brigades 
and were to be "uniformly clothed in regimentals at their 
own expense." The act also established the proportions of 
these units to the infantry and provided that they be inte­
grated into the general militia.
These companies for reasons which will be discussed 
later formed the hard core of the militia. The artillery 
and cavalry had been considered elite troops in colonial 
days, and the law treated them as such. Initially the posi­
tion of the grenadiers, light infantry, and rifles was some­
what equivocal, for it is not clear that the law intended to 
set them apart from the general militia. However this may 
have been, they in many cases acquired the status of the 
artillery and the horse. Thus they were usually composed of 
volunteers and equipped with uniforms, and they participated 
in the extra training that was characteristic of the brigade 
companies.
Though the UMA prescribed three types of battalion 
companies, only nine of the sixteen states authorized all 
three. The remainder restricted the number of types as fol­
lows;




Light infantry and rifles only--Georgia and
New York.2^*^
(c) Light infantry only--South Carolina and Vermont.
(d) None authorized whatsoever— Tennessee.
The act required at least one company, which might 
be any of the three types, per battalion; but it set no max­
imum number, presumably because all types were foot troops 
differing from the infantry only in the details of armament. 
Ten states adopted the federal proportion, and two, Delaware 
and Massachusetts, set the requirement at one half the pro­
portion, that is one per regiment. Of the remaining four 
states, Tennessee had no battalion companies, and New York, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina failed to establish propor­
tions.
The act apparently intended that the battalion com­
panies follow the organization of the standing infantry. At 
any rate this must have been the general understanding, for 
only New Jersey and South Carolina took the trouble to es­
tablish the number of men per unit. The former set the num­
ber of privates at fifty-six, and the latter required at 
least forty.
It has been shown in the preceding chapter that the 
battalion companies as established by the act differed to
2^The rifles are mentioned in the supplementary act 
of 17 Dec. 1793. Marbury and Crawford, Digest, 357.
^^The New York act is not clear. Light infantry and 
rifles may have been authorized and they certainly existed.
3 3 8
some extent from Washington’s original plan for such units.30 
Virginia in its provisions for these organizations followed 
the plan in full detail. She provided that they be composed 
of young men from eighteen to twenty-five, that the men be 
armed and uniformed at the expense of the militia fund, and 
that service be voluntary. It was thought that the youth of 
the group would permit extra training not practicable for 
the general militia, but the law does not go into detail on 
this subject. When the men reached the upper age limit they 
were to return to their companies in the ordinary militia 
carrying their special military knowledge and martial order 
with them. This promising project to put a reasonably exact 
version of Washington’s plan into actual operation soon col­
lapsed for reasons that are unknown. In less than a year 
the provision limiting membership to the special age group 
was repealed, and the companies then reverted to the status 
of the battalion companies in other states.
The UMA provided that each division contain at least 
one company each of artillery and horse, that no regiment 
contain more than one company of each, and that the combined 
strength of the two arms not exceed one eleventh of the 
strength of the brigade. In this group of limits the first, 
the minimum requirement, is the only one that has value for 
the comparisons soon to be made. The second, the regimental
"^^ See above pages 289-90.
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proportion, was apparently intended as a distributional 
limit to preclude the concentration of all of the artillery 
and cavalry of a division in one or two regimental beats.
The third, which reduces to about six companies per bri­
gade,cannot be utilized as a maximum limit for either 
arm because it relates to the total of the two.
The states varied widely in their application of 
these elastic limits. The proportions they adopted may be 
seen from the following tabulations:
The artillery:
(1) Four states--New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Georgia--32restated the UMA limits.
(2) Seven states established limits that varied from 
one company per division in Maryland to not more than two 
companies per brigade in Massachusetts and New Jersey.
(3) Two states, Rhode Island and Tennessee, did not 
provide for artillery.
(4) Three states neglected to establish limits.
The cavalry:
(5) The same four states^^ repeated the federal
limits.
O 1
One-eleventh of the forty companies in a UMA 
brigade is 3.63. When this number is multiplied by 64, 
the number of privates in the standing companies, and 
divided by 38, the average authorized strength of the 
brigade companies, the result is six. For the average 
strength of these companies see below pages 341-42,
^^he Georgia act is not explicit but this may be 
inferred.
^^See the preceding footnote.
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(6) Eight states established limits that varied from 
one company per division in Maryland to not more than one 
per regiment in New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont.34 Note: 
the actual proportion in New Jersey was not more than four 
per brigade, but this reduces to one per regiment.
(?) One state, Rhode Island, did not provide for
cavalry.
(8) Three states neglected to establish limits.
With the exception of Tennessee and Rhode Island-- 
see paragraphs (3) and (?) above— no state violated the 
federal limits. It will be noted in this respect that the 
total of both artillery and cavalry for New Jersey was six 
companies per brigade, a proportion that just meets the 
third of the federal limits. Since the limits of the four 
states that followed the letter of the federal act are so 
elastic, they cannot be used for comparative purposes. The 
requirements of the states in paragraph (2), however, ranged 
from one to four times the federal minimum, and the require­
ments of those in paragraph (6) from one to eight times the 
minimum.
While the federal act specified the number of offi­
cers, non-commissioned officers, and specialists per company 
for the artillery and horse, it was silent as to the number 
of privates. This omission, which was no doubt intentional, 
provided a flexibility not needed for the standing companies. 
Indeed it permitted the formation of small units of artillery
O A
The Vermont data is taken from the supplementary 
act of 1794. Laws of Vermont. 1794 Oct. Sess., 76-80.
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and horse in thinly populated sections where the brigade 
districts were so large as to preclude infantry-sized com­
panies of the former in particular. More than half the 
states in failing to specify the number of privates may have 
heeded this consideration. North Carolina in establishing 
very large companies ignored it, but no record of the re­
sults is available.
Among the states that established the number of pri­
vates the range of variation was broad. In the artillery, 
Vermont at one end of the scale required only twenty-four, 
the average for the six states involved was thirty-six, and 
North Carolina at the other end required fifty-two. The 
same figures for the cavalry with seven states involved 
were thirty-two for three New England states, thirty-nine 
for the average, and sixty-four for North Carolina.
Several of the states established higher tactical 
units for the brigade companies. Connecticut,^^ Tennessee, 
and North Carolina specified that the cavalry be organized 
into regiments and Massachusetts that it be organized into 
squadrons and battalions. Massachusetts and North Carolina 
provided for the formation of the artillery into battalions
35%t has been assumed that the several figures given 
in the laws include the several types of specialists, and 
they have been corrected to obtain a uniform basis of com­
parison by subtracting the Federal complement of non­
commissioned officers where indicated.
3&In the supplementary act of 1793. Acts and Laws 
of the State of Connecticut, 1793 Oct. Sess., 467-75.
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and into brigades respectively. In all cases these new 
units were subordinated to appropriate brigade or division 
commanders. Strangely enough, while higher units were being 
built up in the above states, the cavalry regiments which 
already existed in New Hampshire were disbanded and their 
components annexed to the infantry regiments.
In order to insure that the volunteer corps be a 
part of the over-all system and not more or less independent 
of it as some of them had been in the past, the federal act 
required that new companies be formed from the enrolled 
militia of the battalion in one case and from that of the 
brigades in the other. In effect this made them organic 
parts of the infantry units from which they were drawn.
While it reserved the customary privileges of the existing 
volunteer companies, it made them subject nevertheless to 
all the duties required of the general militia. In some 
cases the states repeated the words of the federal act, and 
in others they specifically annexed both types to the regi­
ments, brigades, or divisions, or made them subject to the 
same fines, duties, and so on as the standing companies.
It was apparently anticipated that difficulties 
would be experienced in keeping the volunteer companies up 
to the proper strength and proportion, for several states 
placed special minimum limits on their enrollments, and sev­
eral provided them with special sources from which to draw 
members. Vermont, for example, required that volunteer
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companies be dissolved if they were consistently under­
strength by a specified number of men, the presumption being 
that they were moribund. Connecticut permitted the battalion 
companies and the light dragoons, a part of the cavalry, to 
enroll exempts and empowered appropriate commanders to trans­
form standing companies into battalion companies in the ab­
sence of volunteers. Massachusetts required the two stand­
ing companies commanded by the oldest captains to serve as 
light infantry in regiments without volunteer light infantry, 
and South Carolina authorized all volunteer companies to re­
cruit exempts.
However, these special sources did not include the 
ordinary militia. At least four states, Connecticut, Massa­
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, forbade officers of
volunteers to recruit from any standing company the strength
37of which did not exceed its authorized strength. Massachu­
setts prohibited volunteer companies from carrying on their 
rolls more men than the law specified. This move not only 
protected the standing companies from indiscriminate recruit­
ing, but it also struck at the custom whereby volunteer com­
panies granted honorary memberships to selected persons, a 
practice which sometimes permitted the recipients to escape 
all service.
The volunteer companies owed their superiority over
Vermont set the strength of the standing companies 
at fifty, rather than sixty-four, for this purpose.
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the general militia to their martial esprit, excellent equip­
ment, and thorough training. The first two of these factors 
resulted partially from the process of selection that deter­
mined membership. Since musters were more frequent than in 
ordinary militia, the companies attracted only those men who 
had a real and active interest in the military. The cost of 
arms, uniforms, and equipment was so high that only the rel­
atively well-to-do could even consider membership. The small 
group that satisfied both conditions drilled and paraded with 
enthusiasm and put up the money for elaborate equipment with­
out strain. Most members of the standing companies looked 
upon militia activities as a burden and many could hardly 
afford even the limited equipment required.
In general the laws did not require the extra train­
ing the companies underwent. However, the esprit of the 
members together with their right in most states to make 
"rules for their own government" resulted in many musters 
and meetings in excess of the number expected of the stand­
ing companies. The history of the Seventh Regiment of New 
York, for example, contains dozens of references that appar­
ently pertain to such training p e r i o d s . Perhaps the favor­
ite exercise was "the excursion," or practice march, which 
sometimes lasted overnight. These excursions usually led to 
a nearby town where the subject "Smithville Blues," or what-
^®Emmons Clark, History of the Seventh Regiment of 
New York. 1806-1889 (New York, 1890), I.
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ever their name might have been, were lavishly entertained 
at a "cold /and wej^ collation" by the local "Rifles." Such 
soirees, it will be readily understood, added to the zest of 
the military art and they appear to have done so without ad­
versely affecting training benefits. Another impetus to 
training was the friendly rivalry that existed among neigh­
boring units, all of whom tried to excel each other at pa­
rades and musters. In contrast the martial moments in the
lives of members of standing companies were infrequent and
barren.
With one single exception, the laws made no special
provisions for the volunteer companies with respect to train­
ing fines. The exception occurred in Maryland, where non­
commissioned officers and privates of the artillery and 
cavalry were subject to a fine of not more than two-thirds 
of a dollar for appearing at prescribed musters without the 
proper arms and equipment. The same grades of the standing 
infantry were required to pay only one cent for the same 
offense, and then only if not excused by their company com­
manders. This situation was further complicated by the fact 
that the fine for being absent was half a dollar for both 
groups. Thus it was conceivable that a dragoon or cannoneer 
might be penalized more for appearing without arms than for 
not appearing at all. The phrase "not more than," which 




After an initial shakedown period of a year, more or 
less, many states passed amendatory acts that reflected de­
fects in the militia systems provided by the basic laws.
Some of the resultant changes, particularly those that 
amounted to little more than administrative adjustments, 
have already been noted. Others which were apparently de­
signed to correct serious disorganization and disinterest 
warrant consideration now. While space does not permit an 
examination of all the measures in this group, those of 
Georgia and Virginia afford examples of the types of prob­
lems that had to be met.
The Virginia act noted that many county and corpor­
ation courts had failed to make recommendations for officers 
and that in many cases the responsible officers had failed 
to divide their counties into battalion and company dis­
tricts. The seriousness of these derelictions will be seen 
in the fact that these procedures, both required by the basic 
law, were prerequisites to the actual formation of the regi­
ments and their component units. While the amendatory act 
laid penalties on the courts, it merely extended the time 
allowed for the establishment of the districts. However, 
no doubt recognizing that the delay with respect to the 
latter, as well as many other types of delinquencies, re­
sulted from ignorance and indifference, it also required 
that the state provide all officers down to and including
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captains with copies of the state and federal militia a c t s , 3 9  
The nature of the corrections made by Georgia indi­
cate that their need probably became apparent during the 
course of her constant embodiment of small forces for fron­
tier defense. She laid heavy penalties, the forfeiture of 
up to one year’s pay, on both officers and men who refused 
to serve their tours of duty, and required that all substi­
tutes be approved by the detachment commanders concerned.
She also repealed all exemptions and permitted the formation 
of companies of horse, artillery, and rifles only when bri­
gade commanders certified that such companies belonged to 
some regiment or battalion within their commands. This last 
requirement no doubt constituted an effort to bring the in­
dependent companies more completely into the over-all
system.40
Collection of Acts (Virginia), 2 Dec. 1793,
pp. 307-10.
^^Marbury and Crawford, Digest. 17 Dec. 1793,
pp. 357-58.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ’’UNIFORM MILITIA" IN ACTION: FRONTIER DEFENSE
AND PUBLIC DISTURBANCE
During the 1790’s men were drawn from the enormous 
mass that made up the militia for a wide variety of military 
missions. They were utilized in frontier defense, in sup­
pressing rebellion and disorder, and in the stand-by detach­
ments and associations organized during the foreign crises 
of 1794, 1797, and 1798-1801. These instances of actual use 
provide the best data available for the over-all study of 
the militia system* Valuable supplementary information is 
found in the changes in the basic militia laws that were 
made from time to time. These modifications usually accom­
panied or followed the large scale mobilizations during the 
foreign crises, and more often than not they reflected the 
difficulties encountered during the raising of the troops.
In this chapter and the one following the instances 
in which the militia was called out will be grouped topical­
ly under frontier defense and the other headings mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph. In each grouping, the efficacy 
of mobilization procedures, the efficiency of the troops
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raised, the problems of supplying them with arms, and the 
general condition of the militia as revealed by the mobili­
zation will be considered. It will, of course, be understood 
that the available data will vary from situation to situa­
tion. Thus there will be little information regarding mo­
bilization in cases in which only a few troops were called 
up and little concerning efficiency when the troops did not 
take to the field. Since the lack of arms and the over-all 
condition of the system were fully revealed only in the 
large scale mobilizations, these subjects together with the 
amendatory legislation will be treated primarily under the 
stand-by detachments.
Since the lack of arms and the difficulty of their 
procurement had a profound effect upon the efficiency of the 
militia, these matters will be given a more detailed treat­
ment than might be expected. The fact that large numbers of 
men had failed to provide themselves with rifles or muskets 
became increasingly evident with each of the major mobili­
zations. While efforts to enforce the laws in this respect 
may have been feeble, the crucial fact is that the militia­
man could not walk into a store, put his money down, and 
leave with a weapon. After the outbreak of fighting in 
Europe, there was a world-wide shortage of arms, and the 
best efforts of American manufacturers did little to satisfy 
American needs.
Under these conditions the state governments, with
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an occasional assist from the federal government, gradually 
assumed part of the responsibility of providing arms for 
their troops. Their endeavors only partially alleviated the 
problem. They were able to procure only a fraction of the 
quantities required, and the supplies they did obtain were 
frequently of such poor quality as to be almost worthless.
In this dilemma such states as Virginia attempted to estab­
lish their own manufactories, but here again success was 
far from complete.
Frontier Defense
The militia, though employed in small numbers, saw 
more actual field service on the frontiers than in any other 
mission. From 1790 to 1794 it furnished complements for the 
several expeditions in the Northwest, and detachments were 
called out for service against the Indians in the states 
south of the Ohio. In the former case, the militiamen fought 
by the side of regulars in offensive operations under the 
command of federal officers. In the latter they fought 
alone under the control of the states, and it was intended 
by the national administration that they be used only in de­
fensive or protective operations. With major campaigns under 
way in the Northwest, the President preferred to rely on 
treaty-makers rather than soldiers to solve the Indian prob­
lems in the Southern regions.
While this defensive policy was received without
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major protest in Pennsylvania and Virginia, it found little 
favor in other sections. Indeed, in Georgia, Kentucky, and 
the Southwest Territory the militia activities of the period 
followed a distinctive pattern of their own. In these areas 
of bitter Indian-haters, the governing psychology had little 
patience for the type of defensive operations that Washington 
and Secretary of War Henry Knox preferred. Important lead­
ers, including Governor Edward Telfair of Georgia, sometimes 
abetted rather than controlled the aggressive tendencies 
that were predominant. However, the control of military 
operations often rested in the hands of local militia lead­
ers, who constantly embodied small groups for hot-blooded 
punitive expeditions into the Indian country. In these 
three areas the history of military affairs is dominated by 
such raids, by dreams of great armies that might crush whole 
tribes in single massive blows, and by the conflict of fed­
eral and local intentions.
Fortunately, the President possessed the ultimate 
weapon for use in the state-national controversy that arose 
over defense policies. This was the power of the purse.
Under the provisions of acts passed in 1790 and 1792 he was 
authorized to order out the militia at federal expense for 
the protection of the frontier.^ By construction, he might 
delegate this power or apply it after the fact when governors
Ifhe acts of 30 Apr. 1790 and 2 May 1792. See above 
pages 284-86.
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or militia officers called up men on their own authority.
In such cases, however, he refused to assume the responsi­
bility for troops unless they were used properly. Thus 
there was no assurance that the central government would 
pay for expeditions that violated his prohibition against 
carrying the fight into the Indian country. While governors 
and militia leaders might sometimes be willing to go directly 
to Congress for compensation, the President’s disavowal of 
their actions always resulted at the very least in years of 
delay in the payment of their claims.^ Not unnaturally even 
the rashest, such as Governor Telfair, eventually became 
more tractable. This of course is not to say that other 
considerations played no part in their change. No doubt a 
slow and grudging acceptance of the superior efficacy of the 
President’s strategy influenced many.
In the discussion of militia activities on the fron­
tier, it will not be necessary to go over the battlegrounds 
of the Northwest again. The history of the campaigns of 
Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne, all of whom commanded mixed 
forces of militia and regulars, has been told many times.3
2
For examples of these delays see the Secretary of 
War’s reports to the House of Representatives of 26 Dec.
1796 and 5 Apr. 1798, American State Papers. Indian Affairs, 
I, 585, 632. Hereafter cited as State Papers. lA.
3
An excellent account of these operations may be 
found in James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S.
Army. 1783-1812 (Princeton, 1947), Chapters 3-5, and 7.
353
The story of the militia south of the Ohio is more obscure,
and for this and other reasons it warrants particular atten­
tion here. It will begin with the defense of the Virginia 
and Pennsylvania frontiers. Thereafter the events that oc­
curred in Georgia and the Southwest Territory, including the 
operations of General Benjamin Logan and his "volunteer army" 
from Kentucky, will be taken up under the separate subtitle 
State-National Controversy.
When the flame in the Northwest began to spread to
the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania in the spring of
1790, the President first authorized the lieutenants of the 
most exposed counties to engage scouts to range out from the 
settlements and guard the avenues of approach.^ Based on a 
system long in use in Virginia, this arrangement was eminent­
ly satisfactory to the inhabitants, who had great faith in 
the experienced woodsmen selected and in the principle of 
local control. Unfortunately the cost of the scouts, about 
five-sixths of a dollar per day, greatly exceeded that of 
militia. Since Congress did not seem likely to authorize 
the extra pay, it soon became necessary to provide protection 
at the ordinary rates. New measures adopted in the summer
^Secretary of War to the lieutenants of certain 
Virginia counties along the Ohio, 23 Apr. 1790, State 
Papers, lA, I, 101. This authority was apparently given 
to the lieutenant of Washington County in Pennsylvania at 
the same time. See Secretary of War to the lieutenants of 
certain counties in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky,
17 July 1790, Ibid., 102.
354
placed matters in the hands of the Governor of the Northwest 
Territory, whose station was hundreds of miles away. As the 
need arose he was to authorize the county lieutenants to 
order out small details of militia "rangers."5
Virginia frontiersmen immediately protested that the 
great distance involved did not permit rapid and effective 
action under the new system, and the state began to embody 
large detachments of rangers on its own authority.^ The 
President, driven both by this measure and by the increasing 
activity of the Indians, finally "confided" the protection 
of the threatened counties in both Virginia and Pennsylvania 
to the states. In late 1791 he authorized the Governor of 
Virginia to raise several companies of militia for the pro­
tection of four frontier counties. Although he did not 
specify the total number of these companies, it was appar­
ently intended that the proportion be about one per county. 
Early the next year, he authorized the Governor of Pennsyl­
vania to raise 228 men, or three companies, for the defense 
of three western counties. Under the plan as outlined by 
Knox all these troops were to be used for defensive purposes 
only. The Virginia companies were to be raised for as long
^Secretary of War to the President, 5 Jan. 1791, 
Ibid., 109; Secretary of War to the lieutenants of certain 
counties in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky, 17 July . 
1790, Ibid., 102.
Gjoint memorial of delegates of certain Virginia 
counties, undated. Ibid.. 110; Governor in Council, 29 Dec. 
1790, Ibid., 111-12.
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a period as the governor thought proper and those of Penn­
sylvania for six months.7
In raising the troops neither state ordered out the 
ordinary militia, but each passed legislation authorizing 
the governors to form select corps of volunteers. In Vir­
ginia the governor directed the enrollment of five companies 
by officers especially appointed for the purpose. The term 
of service was set at eight and a half months, and the men 
were granted $2.50 per month in addition to the federal al­
lowance.® As the governor explained to Knox, the longer 
term would not only provide a more effective defense, but it 
would also eliminate the paying of two sets of men during 
the frequent rotation of personnel incident to shorter terms. 
The bonus was necessary to attract volunteers, he added in a 
later letter, so that the "disagreeable and fallacious sys­
tem of legal compulsion," that is the draft, might be avoided. 
Meantime, Knox had already declined to pay this extra ex­
pense, which was not authorized by federal law.9
^Secretary of War to Governor of Virginia, 28 Oct. 
and 17 Nov. 1791, Ibid., 220, 221. The first letter speci­
fied one company for Russell County, and the second author­
ized the governor to provide equally effectual defense for
three other counties. This seemed to imply one company for 
each of these. Secretary of War to the President, 1 Jan.
1792, Ibid.. 217-18. Secretary of War to Governor of 
Pennsylvania, 3 Jan. 1792, Ibid., 218.
®0n 17 Nov. 1791 he ordered the raising of one com­
pany and on 12 Dec. 1791 the raising of the other four.
Ibid., 221, 222-23.
^Governor Beverly Randolph to the Secretary of War,
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In Pennsylvania, the special act authorized the gov­
ernor to engage three companies of riflemen for six months, 
to organize them into a battalion, and to appoint all the 
necessary officers. It also provided a bonus that with the 
federal allowance would make the pay of privates fifty-five 
shillings ($12.00) per m o n t h . I n  ordering the county 
lieutenants to raise the men, Governor Thomas Mifflin noted 
that the numerous departures from the state’s general militia 
law were necessary in order to meet the emergency. That 
statute itself provided that such forces be drafted from the 
classes rather than raised at large and that officers be 
elected rather than appointed. It established tours of two 
months rather than six and a much lower pay s c a l e , B o t h  
Virginia and Pennsylvania thus found it desirable to abandon 
their ordinary mobilization procedures in order to meet this 
real field test.
While the history of the Virginia companies is ob­
scure, they were apparently renewed periodically through
24 Nov. 1791, Ibid., 221; Governor Henry Lee to the Secre­
tary of War, 5 Jan. 1792, Ibid., 224; Secretary of War to 
Governor of Virginia, 5 Dec. 1791, Ibid., 221.
T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders (eds.). Statutes 
at Large of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1896-1915), XIV, 196- 
98. At this time privates in the service of the United 
States received $3.00 per month. Emory Upton, The Military 
Policy of the United States (Washington, 1917), 78.
Instate Papers. lA. I, 219-20.
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1795.12 As the meager records available indicate, the com­
manders faced many difficulties. The paymaster seldom made 
his rounds, and year by year as word of this got around re­
cruiting became slower and slower. To make matters worse, 
Pennsylvania recruiters operating in adjacent areas offered 
more money for similar service.13 The supply system was so 
poor that the troops were sometimes quartered with the local 
inhabitants, who fed them at their own tables. Scouting 
parties were handicapped because they were seldom able to 
obtain provisions to take with them. As one commander wrote 
the governor, these logistic difficulties "put it out of the 
power of the most active officer to have rendered any essen­
tial service had it been wanted."14
Not the least of the problems was the shortage of 
arms and ammunition. From 1792 through 1795 the state issued 
to the militia more than two thousand muskets,1^ a large
l^Accordinq to references in W. P. Palmer and others 
(eds.). Calendar of Virginia State Papers (Richmond, 1875- 
93), VII, the companies, or some of them were in existence 
in 1793 and 1794. See pages 2, 37, 79-80, 95, 304, 366.
This source will be hereafter cited as W. P. Palmer, Virginia 
State Papers. An act of the legislature on 9 Dec. 1794 ap­
parently authorized the governor to continue the companies 
into 1795. Laws of Virginia, 1794 Nov. Sess., 35.
P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers, VII, 2, 27,
37, 79-80, 95, 304, 366.
l^ibid.. 33.
^^See below pages 403-04.
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proportion of which undoubtedly went to the western coun­
ties. Meantime, militia officers complained of the lack of 
ammunition. In early 1794, for example, Major William 
Lowther, commandant of the companies on the frontier, wrote 
that the powder available consisted of only thirteen quar­
ter casks, eight of which were unfit for use, and added that 
no lead whatsoever was on hand.^^
The troops were spread too thinly to offer effective 
protection. In 1794 one company occupied posts along a line 
that extended from county to county for a distance of one 
hundred and fifty miles. According to the commander, part 
of the line should have been taken over by a second company 
that never showed up.^^ The presence of both companies would 
hardly have completely reassured the frontiersmen. Through­
out the exposed areas, the inhabitants had begun to repair 
or rebuild stockaded stations, some dating from the French 
and Indian War and earlier t i m e s . I n  December 1793, the 
legislature, noting that it was improper for the militia of 
the frontier counties to be drawn from their dwellings during 
those dangerous days, authorized the brigade commanders to
79-80, 96.
17
l&W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VII, 73-74,
Ibid., 96.
Ray Bird C
1795, I,” in West Virginia History (Jan. 1940), 119-30.
^® ook, "Virginia Frontier Defenses, 1719-
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suspend training.With  Wayne’s victory late in 1794 the 
pressure on the inhabitants and the need for the militia 
gradually disappeared.
Pennsylvania renewed its establishment with reduced 
numbers in April 1793 and with increased strength, including 
an artillery company, in February 1794. The state does 
not appear to have experienced the recruiting difficulties 
nor the supply problems that beset Virginia. Its pay scale, 
which was based on the price of labor, attracted volun­
t e e r s , a n d  in each act for raising the troops the legis­
lature appropriated money for arms, ammunition, and provis­
ions. Until the summer of 1794, most of the troops were 
stationed along the frontiers of Westmoreland, Washington 
and Allegheny counties.^2 During these years all the Penn­
sylvania militiamen who saw service were not confined to
A Collection of All Such Acts of the General 
Assembly of Virginia of a Public and Permanent Nature, as 
Are Now in Force (Richmond, 1803), 307-10. Hereafter cited 
as Collection of Acts (Virginia).
^^Mitchell and Flanders, Statutes at Large of Penn­
sylvania , XIV, 381-83 (Act of 3 Apr. 1793) and XV, 13-15 
lAct of 28 Feb. 1794).
2^In the acts of 1793 and 1794 mentioned above the 
pay of privates was set at $6.67 per month, which was still 
high.
no
The troops were raised in Westmoreland, Washington, 
Alleghany, and Fayette counties, but the initial dispositions 
in 1792 appear to have been confined to the first three of 
these. State Papers. lA, I, 220. The acts of 1793 and 1794 
specified that they be stationed in the same three counties 
subject to changes, -if the governor saw fit.
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these long term units. In 1792, for example, the governor 
ordered out portions of the Washington and Westmoreland bri­
gades for the defense of the frontier, and the same year a 
small force of mounted volunteers was sent to drive off a 
party of Indian raiders encamped on the Muskingum.
Meantime, Pennsylvania had begun a novel experiment, 
part of the purpose of which was to protect the settlements 
beyond the Allegheny River. In April 1793 the legislature 
provided for the establishment of a town at Presque Isle on 
Lake Erie "to promote the settlement of the neighboring 
country and thereby place the frontiers of Pennsylvania in 
a safer situation." In the spring of 1794, the governor 
ordered a detachment from the select battalion, consisting 
of a company of infantry and a few artillerymen, to that 
place to protect, the commissioners sent to survey the town. 
Shortly thereafter, as the Indian danger appeared to be in­
creasing, he directed the brigade inspectors of Westmoreland, 
Allegheny, and Fayette counties to draft one thousand men to 
cooperate with the detachment. When the federal government 
protested that the project might lead to serious trouble 
with the Iroquois, both the draft and the work of the com­
missioners was halted, and in September the whole undertaking 
was temporarily shelved. Meantime, the detachment had made
^^Mitchell and Flanders, Statutes at Large of Penn­
sylvania , XV, 35-36. The act mentions these expeditions 
in dealing with pay and other matters.
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considerable progress in fortifying a position at Le Boeuf, 
the site of the French fort of earlier days. Though the 
state was willing to give up the town for the moment, it 
would not so readily part with the new fortifications,^^
The desire to retain Le Boeuf and the subsequent 
revival of the plan to build the town resulted in the per­
petuation for a time of the part of the little army, the 
enlistment term of which was rapidly expiring. The same 
act that suspended the work of the commissioners authorized 
the governor to enlist 130 men for six months to garrison 
Le Boeuf. The next year, when a new act was passed provid­
ing for not one but four towns, the 130 man force was con­
tinued for an additional eight months, and the governor was 
authorized to add a company of 65 riflemen if n e c e s s a r y . ^5
State-National Controversy 
In Georgia the breath of the fire-eaters began to 
blow hot when the first major alarms occurred in October and 
November of 1792. Here, for reasons already mentioned, the 
President hardly dared delegate the kind of authority he had 
given the Governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Instead 
his effort’s were directed at separating the Georgians and
^^State Papers. lA. I, 503-07. The federal protest 
is mentioned in letter from Governor Thomas Mifflin to the 
President, 25 May 1794, Ibid., 506.
^^Mitchell and Flanders, Statutes at Large of Penn­
sylvania. XV, 208-09, 337-46. (Act of 18 Apr, 1795').
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the Indians from each others' throats long enough for some 
kind of settlement to be made. In order to accomplish this 
he attempted to place control of such immediate defensive 
operations as might be necessary in the hands of a federal 
officer. Only in this way could the recurrent cycle of 
raids and counter-raids that had inflamed the frontier for 
years be broken.
Many Georgians thought that peace could be achieved 
only by exterminating the Indians or by removing them to 
some distant place. Since these objects could be attained 
only by war, this group looked with disdain on the adminis­
tration's effort to make peace and sometimes interfered with 
its agents. Its more rabid members made no secret of the 
fact that they preferred war to peace. Whether or not Gov­
ernor Telfair could be considered the spokesman of the anti- 
Indian faction, he too preferred war. However, he hesitated 
to take the fatal step unless he could make certain of the 
support, or at least the financial assistance of the United 
States. This despite his best efforts he was unable to ob­
tain.
When the Indian attacks began, Telfair demanded that 
Major Henry Gaither, commandant of the several companies of 
federal troops in Georgia, order out portions of the militia. 
Gaither responded to these demands during the alarms of late 
1792 by conferring with the governor, and the two agreed to
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embody certain small units.^6 the attacks grew more 
frequent in March of 1792 the governor renewed his impor­
tunities. When Gaither refused, he complained to the Presi­
dent, "The militia remaining subject to the call of the com­
mandant of the Federal troops, and not being drawn into 
service, upon pressing occasion, has abated the confidence 
of the people in Govt. . . . Several facts point to the 
probability that no formal arrangement had been made giving 
Gaither the authority Telfair seemed to think he had. In 
the incident of 1792 the major handled the problem such that 
the ultimate responsibility apparently remained with the 
governor. Meantime the question of Gaither’s relationship 
to the militia was not mentioned in letters from the War 
Office until 29 April 1793. At that time Knox authorized 
him only to request the governor to order out troops when 
the need arose.
If Governor Telfair had any special object in at­
tempting to pass the responsibility to Gaither it no doubt 
concerned federal liability for the expense of the units 
called up. Telfair favored offensive operations against the 
Indians, and any claim for such services that the state 
might put forward would be greatly strengthened if a federal
^^Major Henry Gaither to the Secretary of War, 28 
Aug. 1793, State Papers. lA, I, 424.
^"^Letter of 3 Apr. 1793, Ibid., 368.
28ibid., 367.
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officer had sanctioned the raising of the troops involved. 
Gaither himself seems to have viewed things in this light.
In early April he wrote Knox that Telfair frequently called 
upon him to order out troops following alleged attacks. In 
many cases there was no real evidence that the forays had 
actually occurred as claimed. He had not complied, nor did 
he intend to "unless I know them to be within our limits, 
and in force. . . Gaither found his position even more
trying due to the belief among the people that he had the 
power to call the militia out for their protection.30
Following Gaither's refusals, Telfair himself began
O 1
to embody troops in such numbers that Washington seemingly 
became alarmed. In an effort to regain control of the situ­
ation, the President warned the governor to avoid offensive 
operations in the Creek country and devised a plan whereby 
the additional troops obviously required by the emergency 
could be made subject to federal control. He thus on 30 May 
suggested that the governor place under the command of Major 
Gaither one hundred horse and a like number of foot raised
^^Ibid.. 417.
30
Gaither to the Secretary of War, 23 May 1793, 
Ibid., 421.
31
Report of the Secretary of War, 16 Dec. 1793, 
Ibid., 362.
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from the militia of the s t a t e . A  few days later on 10 
June, learning that Telfair had ordered up six more troops 
of horse and had begun establishing an infantry encampment 
at Shoulderbone, the President urged him to conform to the 
authorization of 30 May as soon as the immediate danger 
passed.33 Meantime, acting on the representations of several 
Georgia Congressmen, he requested the Governor of South Caro­
lina to assist Georgia in case the letter’s frontiers were 
over-run by large bodies of I n d i a n s . 34 While he limited 
this assistance to defensive measures, he had made a mistake 
that he was soon to regret.
Telfair had no intention of either reducing his grow­
ing army or placing Georgia troops under a federal officer. 
Throughout the summer and fall he.permitted raids across the 
frontier, kept swarms of militia under a r m s , 35 and planned 
to raise thousands more for an all out invasion of the Creek
32Ibid., 364. The horse were to be embodied under 
the federal act of 5 Mar. 1792, which gave the President 
special powers relating to the cavalry. The foot, however, 
were to be called into service ’’according to the general 
course of the militia law.”
3^Governor of Georgia to Secretary of War, 8 May 
1793, Ibid., 369; Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, 
10 June 1793, Ibid., 364-65.
r^A
Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, 9 Mar, 
1793, Ibid., 363; Secretary of War to Governor of South 
Carolina, 10 June 1793, Ibid.. 366.
35>The number was never less than about seven or 
eight hundred. Gaither to Secretary of War, 20 July 1793, 
28 Aug. 1793, and 3 Sept. 1793, Ibid., 422, 424-25.
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country to begin about 15 October, On 8 August following a 
council of war with his generals he outlined this last pro­
ject in a letter to Knox. The operation would require five 
thousand militiamen for sixty days, the cooperation of the 
federal troops in Georgia, and support from South Carolina, 
which should undertake to provide part of the militia.^6 
The governor obviously believed that the President had given 
his carte blanche with regard to the use of South Carolina 
troops.
As soon as Secretary Knox partially recovered from 
the initial shock engendered by this gargantuan proposal 
that dwarfed the plans for the Northwest, he began to receive 
alarming reports from federal officials in Georgia. On 28 
August, Major Gaither wrote that Telfair was preparing for 
the expedition or that he was pretending to do so, an alter­
native that hardly relieved the Secretary's apprehensions. 
Early in September, James Seagrove, an agent sent to the 
Creeks to settle certain controversies, reported that Telfair 
had called on the Governor of South Carolina for fifteen 
hundred to two thousand men. He added that Georgia had also 
made a contract for five hundred thousand rations. When he 
had questioned the governor as to these matters, he was told 
that the expedition had been "determined on." Constant Free­
man, Jr., United States Paymaster in Georgia, wrote in similar
% b i d . . 3 7 0 - 7 1 .
367
vein.37
Knox was able to gather some comfort from the 
thought that he had already taken the precaution of again 
warning Telfair against any kind of offensive operation. 
Freeman, himself, who had only arrived in Augusta about 4 
September, was the bearer of this admonition, which had been 
written long before intelligence of the impending attack had 
reached the War Office. It had the desired results, for 
Freeman immediately wrote the Secretary that Telfair had 
put a stop to all further preparations for the expedition.38 
Meantime, on 5 September, Knox had gotten off another warn­
ing even more to the point. Though this second advisory 
apparently reached the governor after the decision to drop 
the operation had been made, it reflects the seriousness 
with which the administration received Telfair’s plan. The 
President "utterly disapproved" the measure, it said, "as 
being unauthorized by law, as contrary to the present state 
of affairs, and as contrary to the instructions heretofore 
given on the subject."39 Knox also hastily advised the 
Governor of South Carolina to refrain from lending assistance
3?Ibid., 424, 408, 425.
38gecretary of War to Governor of Georgia, 19 July 
1793, Ibid., 365; Freeman to Secretary of War, 11 Sept.
1793, Ibid.. 426.
39Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, 5 Sept. 
1793, Ibid., 365; see also Report of Secretary of War,
16 Dec. 1793, Ibid., 362.
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to the expedition.40
As the great army faded away like a figment, Major 
Gaither found that part of his mission was also composed 
largely of the same kind of dream-stuff. As early as July 
he had begun to doubt that the one hundred horse and one 
hundred infantry would ever materialize. The militia offi­
cers, he wrote Knox, would oppose the raising of the troops 
because they thought the size of the detachment was too small 
and objected to the command being given to a federal officer. 
On 3 September he reported that despite repeated urgings 
Telfair had made no effort to provide the men.^^ Four days 
later he sent the governor a letter demanding a decision.
The latter answered curtly that the critical situation did 
not permit any departure from the arrangements then in ef­
fect.42 The matter seems to have rested at this stage, for 
by the middle of October the governor had taken no action.43 
The admonitions from the War Office did not put an 
end to the punitive raids into the Indian country. The 
largest of these expeditions, consisting of seven hundred 
men, went out in June 1793. After a respite during the days
of the grand army, at least three more crossed the borders
in September and October. It is not clear as to whether
40letter of 5 Sept. 1793, Ibid., 366.
% b i d .. 422 , 425. ^^bid., 424-25.
Gaither to Secretary of War, 11 Oct. 1793,
Ibid.. 425.
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Telfair specifically sanctioned these forays. However, he 
did report the first two to the Secretary of War, and some­
time prior to 8 September he authorized the frontier com­
manders to pursue and destroy hostile Indian parties when­
ever they might be found, crossing the line if n e c e s s a r y . 44
The commanders of the several expeditions gave little 
thought to the difference between good and bad Indians. One 
of the expeditions fell upon "Little Oakfuskee," perhaps the 
most friendly of all the Creek towns, killing six warriors 
and taking eight prisoners. According to Seagrove, who had 
the best facilities for knowing, the town had not been in­
volved in the depredations, mainly horse stealing, which 
gave rise to the r a i d . 45 The commander of another of the 
forces told him "that he would destroy all Indians he came 
across, whether friend or foe; and that he was opposed to 
peace."46
The temper and actions of the Georgians put impedi­
ments in front of every step that Seagrove took along the 
path toward peace. He complained to Knox that the frontiers­
men opposed every measure leading to a settlement and that
44Report of Secretary of War, 16 Dec. 1793, Ibid.,
362; Seagrove to Secretary of War, 9 Oct. 1793, Ibid.,
411; Buckner Harris to Seagrove, 2 Oct. 1793, Ibid., 413.
4^Report of Secretary of War, 16 Dec. 1793, Ibid.,
362.
46seagrove to Secretary of War, 9 Oct. 1793, Ibid.,
411.
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they were pointedly disrespectful to all who served the 
federal government. In September 1793 tnese aversions may 
have taken the form of an effort to remove him from the 
scene. Rumors filled the air that a party of militia in­
tended to waylay and kill him as he rode from Augusta to a 
conference with some Creek leaders on the Oakmulgee. The 
officers at Fort Fidius, a nearby federal station, became 
so alarmed that they sent a detachment to escort him to the 
post. The apparent danger from the frontiersmen together 
with the attack on "Little Oakfuskee" and similar raids then 
underway caused the agent to postpone the plans for the meet­
ing. He might have requested Telfair, he said, to put a 
stop to these raids, but he was convinced by the governor’s 
prior conduct that no attention would be paid to his appli­
cation.^7 A few days later in a more sanguine mood he did
48write the governor, but the raids continued.
An incident at Fort Fidius in May of the next year 
brought another climax to Seagrove’s tangled affairs. When 
some friendly Indians visited him at the fort, they were 
attacked by a large party of militiamen. The victims con­
sidering themselves to be under the protection of the United 
States fled to the safety of the stockade. When Major
47Seagrove to Secretary of War, 17 Sept. 1793, Ibid.. 
409-10 and enclosures pages 410-11; Report of Secretary of 
War, 16 Dec. 1793, Ibid.. 362; Seagrove to Secretary of War,
9 Oct. 1793, Ibid., 411.
48Letter of 22 Sept. 1793, Ibid.. 411.
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Richard B. Roberts, commandant at the fort, did not immedi­
ately surrender them the senior militia officer threatened 
to "advance to the mouth of the cannon and take them." Be­
fore this threat could be carried out Roberts succeeded in 
spiriting the Indians across the r i v e r . T h e  worst thing 
that could have happened, a clash between state and federal 
troops, had been averted by the narrowest of margins.
His endless patience for once exhausted, Seagrove 
got off a hot letter to Governor George Matthews, who had 
succeeded Telfair. The persons who had committed the out­
rage were militia officers of the state, he wrote, and some 
of them had been guilty of similar acts in the past. What 
good did it do for government agents to attempt to make 
peace when such officers embodied their men at will and 
destroyed those under the protection of the public? Peace 
had been completely restored, and now Georgia must punish 
its citizens who had so wantonly violated it. Otherwise she 
must prepare for a war with the entire Creek nation. 
Fortunately the Indians were not as anxious for war as he 
thought, and within a year the President had nominated three 
commissioners to meet with them. The resulting treaty of
Freeman to Secretary of War, 10 May 1794, Ibid., 
483-84; Major Richard B. Roberts to Secretary of War, 10 
May 1794, Ibid.. 483; Report of Dr. Frederick Dalcho, 10 
May 1794, Ibid.. 484.
^Letter of 16 May 1794, Ibid.. 487.
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Coleraine of 29 June 1796 brought peace to the frontier.
During this period there was a shortage of arms in 
Georgia that paralleled that in Virginia. Several of the 
Georgia congressmen brought this fact to the President's 
attention as early as March 1793.^2 Later in the spring 
Gaither furnished arms to many frontiersmen who were "forted 
on their own soil." In June, Seagrove found that at least 
one-third of the men in the vicinity of St. Mary's had no 
guns and that Captain John F. Randolph's troop of horse, 
which had been mustered in the same locale, was badly in 
need of swords and pistols.During the late spring and 
early summer, the federal government in order to alleviate 
this situation established a small arsenal at Augusta. By 
10 June, fifteen hundred muskets had been shipped to this 
place, and it was planned to send five hundred more. They 
were to be issued on the order of the governor in case of 
invasion or other emergencies affecting the interests of the
States.54
Information upon which to judge the quality of the
51lbid.. 560, 586.
5^ecretary of War to Governor of Georgia, 9 Mar. 
1793, Ibid.. 363.
5^Gaither to Secretary of War, 23 May 1793, Ibid., 
421; Seagrove to Major General James Jackson, 12 June 1793, 
Ibid.. 393.
Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, 9 Mar., 
23 Apr., 30 May, and 10 June 1793, Ibid., 363-64.
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Georgia militia is meager. Despite the bravado that sur­
rounded the several major frontier expeditions, the partici­
pants did little fighting. Some of the parties never en­
countered the Indians, and the only one to actually reach 
its goal shot up and destroyed a friendly town. According 
to Seagrove, the June expedition, which was one of those 
turning back, was badly planned, incapably led, and poorly 
provisioned. It returned, he added, when a "mutinous spirit 
took possession of a majority of the officers and men." A 
similar fate overtook one of the groups that went out in 
the autumn. After a short march, a discussion took place 
between the commanders "as usual," and the party began to 
retrace its steps.^5 while some officers in sponsoring such 
operations may have created much difficulty for Seagrove, 
their fault lay more in recklessness than in insubordina­
tion. Usually they considered their most flagrant actions 
to be consistent with the governor’s instructions.
In the Southwest Territory the frontiersmen were 
just as turbulent as in Georgia, but Governor William Blount, 
a Presidential appointee rather than an elected official, 
did his best to control them. He rigorously suppressed 
every effort of self-embodied groups to cross the Tennessee 
into the Indian country for the kind of punitive raids that 
were occurring in Georgia. For the most part he was able to
^^Seagrove to the Secretary of War, 6 July and 22 
Sept. 1793, Ibid.. 394, 410.
374
insure that the large bodies of militia he called out, an 
entire brigade on one occasion, were not employed for the 
same purpose. He failed in this endeavor only when his sub­
ordinates had the hardihood to disobey his orders.
Both the temper of the frontiersmen and the effect 
of his policies can be seen in several examples. In January 
1793 about a hundred angry frontiersmen gathered at Gamble’s 
Station to plan a retaliatory attack on the Cherokees, and 
others were expected to arrive momentarily. Blount issued 
a proclamation forbidding the project, sent a special offi­
cer to read it to the crowd, and ordered the use of military 
force if these measures did not succeed. Though a company 
of militia was alerted, the party wisely dispersed after 
hearing the proclamation.^7
Somewhat later, militia leaders in Kentucky attempted 
to lead parties from that state across the Southwest Terri­
tory to attack the lower Cherokee towns. Blount received 
the first intelligence of these activities in the spring of 
1793. It was reported that General Benjamin Logan was rais­
ing men for the enterprise and that Major William Whitely 
had already departed with an advance party.^8 Blount
5^William Blount to Secretary of War, 27 Sept.
1792, Ibid.. 292.
5?Ibid., 434-35.
^^Information of William Macklin, 12 Apr. 1793,
Ibid., 448.
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immediately protested to Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky 
and instructed General James Robertson of Miro District to 
stop the force if it got that far.59 Shortly thereafter 
Shelby assured him that the operation would not material­
i z e . T h e  rumors were back again in the fall of the next 
year and this time they were accompanied by troops. Whitely 
with about one hundred men slipped quietly into the Territory 
following a party of Indians that had been operating on the 
southern frontier of his state. He reached Nashville at a 
very opportune time, for General Robertson was preparing to 
send out a large force against the Creeks and Cherokees. 
Robertson willingly attached Whitely and his men to the ex­
pedition,^^ and they got in their blow, as will be seen 
later.
Meantime Blount had been receiving reports that 
Logan was again recruiting. On 31 October he also learned 
that Whitely, now back from the Indian country, had passed 
by Knoxville on his way to join the general. The governor 
acted rapidly to head off the intended operation. He wrote 
Whitely, questioning the authority by which the troops had 
been raised and ordering him to desist, sent off a special 
messenger with similar orders for Logan, and warned the
^^Blount to Governor Isaac Shelby, 12 Apr. 1793,
Ibid., 448-49; Blount to General James Robertson, 14 Apr. 
1793, Ibid., 452.
GOjohn McKee to Blount, 9 May 1793, Ibid.. 451.
GlRobertson to Blount, 8 Oct. 1793, Ibid., 530.
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Indians of their danger. To make quadruply sure he had the 
warning published in the Nashville Gazette. A l l  of these 
precautions, together with the fact that Logan was having 
difficulty raising men, put a stop to the affair. It ends 
with Robertson’s report that a small party of Logan’s army 
(undoubtedly Whitely's group) had obeyed the orders to turn 
back.G3
The first of the major cases in which Blount’s sub­
ordinates violated their standing instructions involved a 
company of mounted infantry which Blount himself ordered out 
after some raiding Indians in May 1793.^^ The company, 
which was commanded by Captain John Beard, crossed the Ten­
nessee "in defiance of orders," attacked the village of 
Hanging Maw, a friendly Cherokee, and killed thirteen people. 
Daniel Smith, acting governor in Blount’s absence, wanted to 
court-martial Beard, but decided not to do so at the moment 
in view of the popular sympathy which lay with the captain. 
This affair and several similar "outrages," as Knox called
G^Blount to Colonel William Whitely, 1 Nov. 1794, 
Ibid., 533; Blount to General Benjamin Logan, 1 Nov. 1794, 
Ibid., 533-34; Blount to Secretary of War, 3 Nov. 1794,
Ibid.. 531.
63Colonel James Winchester to Blount, 9 Nov. 1794 
Ibid.. 540; Robertson to Blount, 15 Nov. 1794, Ibid.. 542.
64Blount to (?), 28 May 1793, Ibid.. 455.
^^Report of Major King and Daniel Carmichael, 12 
June 1793, Ibid.. 459; Report of Secretary of War, 16 Dec. 
1793, Ibid., 363; Daniel Smith to Secretary of War, 22 June 
1793, Ibid., 460.
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them, resulted in a new war along the border and the calling 
up of masses of troops.
In September of the same year, Smith still acting as 
governor, ordered John Sevier and his command of about five
(sihundred men to pursue and punish a party of Indians, a 
project which Sevier accomplished with his usual success.
The Secretary of War refused to compensate the members of 
the expedition for their services because it had been under­
taken in violation of the President’s orders "for the avowed 
purpose of carrying the war into the Cherokee country."^8 
A year later. General Robertson sent a large force commanded 
by Major James Ore and reinforced by Whitely and the Ken­
tuckians across the Tennessee to destroy the lower Creek and 
Cherokee towns. When Blount learned that Ore had devastated 
two villages, he wrote Robertson for an explanation. That 
doughty Indian fighter replied that he considered the opera­
tion to have been defensive in character. It had been
^^Report of Secretary of War, 16 Dec. 1793, Ibid.,
363.
^^Smith to John Sevier, 30 Sept. 1793, Ibid., 458; 
Smith to Secretary of War, 1 Oct. 1795, Ibid., 586. Though 
the orders to Sevier as given in the first of these letters 
were not explicit', it appears by the second that Smith had 
intended the general to carry the fight into the Indian 
country. And Sevier apparently so understood it.
"Report of Secretary of War to House of Representa­
tives, Ibid.. 585.
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intended, he explained, to forestall a rumored invasion.
The Tennessee militia was probably the most efficient 
of the Southwest, if not the entire nation. This superiority 
was due partially to the superior leadership of such seasoned 
campaigners as Robertson, Sevier, and others and partially 
to military habits that were a heritage from the Franklin 
days. The militiamen were fine marksmen, very steady under 
fire as one of Sevier’s units demonstrated so clearly in a 
river crossing during the campaign of 1793, and seldom if 
ever mutinous. Though fewer expeditions than in Georgia 
crossed into the Indian lands, none turned back.
Sevier’s "unauthorized" campaign of 1793 was a model
of well-conducted militia operations, if his own report is
any indication. With his mounted infantrymen he pursued the
Indians, beat off four attacks, fought a hot skirmish at a
fording place on the Hightower River, and destroyed several
towns. It was in the Hightower affair that a company in
crossing the river was "received . . . furiously at the
rising of the bank but rallied to drive off an enemy that
70outnumbered it four to one." A few years later Andrew 
Jackson reported to the House of Representatives that the 
campaign had put an end to Indian excursions on that part of
^*^General Robertson’s order to Major Ore, 6 Sept. 
1794, Ibid., 530; Robertson to Governor Blount, 8 Oct. 1794 
Ibid., 529-30.
70Sevier to Blount, 25 Oct. 1793, Ibid., 469-70.
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the frontier.
Blount himself summarized the qualities of the Ten­
nessee militia and the value of its leadership in a letter 
to Knox, He boasted that in case of a general Indian war he 
could raise in Washington District five hundred horsemen, 
"the best marksmen in the world, armed with good rifles," 
within thirty days or even within fifteen. The men would 
turn out to a certainty, however, only if the top command 
were given to General Sevier and all other positions to 
their own militia officers. The abilities of the latter, he 
added, were equal to those of any other group of officers
in America.72
In the Southwest Territory the troops that were 
called up from time to time were almost always formally em­
bodied by the governor himself or by high commanders pur­
suant to his specific instructions. This forms a sharp 
contrast to the case in Georgia, where local commanders 
embodied their units at will, as Seagrove put it. It also 
appears that the arms shortage was not as serious in the 
Southwest Territory as in Georgia. It did, however, exist 
to some extent, particularly in Miro District.73
7^Report of Committee of House of Representatives on 
the petition of Hugh Lawson White, 17 Jan. 1797, Ibid., 623.
7^Blount to Secretary of War, 8 Nov. 1792, Ibid..
327.
7^Secretary of War to Blount, 14 May 1793, Ibid..
430.
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Rebellion and Public Disturbance
An equally important use of the militia came at 
times of public disturbances. It was utilized by the Federal 
Government under the act of 2 May 1792, which authorized the 
President to call out the militia to execute the laws and to 
suppress insurrection, in both the Whiskey Rebellion and 
Fries' Rebellion and by the states in all kinds of disorders. 
As in the case of frontier defense, the number of troops 
involved was usually small, though substantial forces were 
employed in the Whiskey Rebellion.
During the Whiskey Rebellion, Maryland, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia were called upon for a total of 
12,950 men.^^ The quota of each as assigned by the President 
on 7 August 1794 included detachments of infantry and caval­
ry, and all except Virginia were also to furnish a few ar­
tillerymen. Since the rebellion was to some extent a popular 
movement, the states had to contend with varying amounts of 
opposition in raising their contingents. Though there was 
some disaffection in Maryland and a little in Virginia, 
these states together with New Jersey were able to use the
"^ A^ copy of the order may be found in William P. 
Clarke, Official History of the Militia and the National 
Guard of the State of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1910), I, 
159. Hereafter cited as W. P. Clarke, Official History.
75james Monaghan, "Opposition to Involuntary Mili­
tary Service in the United States" (unpublished Master's 
thesis. Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 
1918), 11-12. Hereafter cited as Monaghan, "Involuntary 
Military Service."
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mobilization procedures provided by their militia acts. In 
Pennsylvania, where disaffection was widespread and virulent, 
the draft system did not function, and special measures had 
to be devised to deal with the resulting emergency.
In the first three states, the governors issued calls 
in the normal way, setting quotas on the divisions and auth­
orizing the use of the draft if necessary. In Maryland, 
while the turnout may have been somewhat slow in the western 
counties, it was apparently heavy in Baltimore, Annapolis, 
and throughout the eastern s e c t i o n s . I n  Virginia a brigade 
commander in Surrey County reported a mutiny in his brigade, 
but this apparently involved only one company in which the 
men attempted to prevent the captain from drafting his quota. 
In the same brigade district "An Old Soldier" posted a letter 
highly critical of the draft and the short notice with which 
it was put into effect. However, his concern lay more with 
the anticipated hardships of the campaign than with the fate 
of the Whiskey Boys. Though such minor incidents as these 
did not materially affect the success of the Virginia mobil­
ization, most of the detachments that went forward from the 
rendezvous at Fort Winchester were greatly understrength. 
Thomas Matthews, who appears to have been some kind of camp 
manager, attributed the deficiencies to "a want of energy"
76lbid., 11-12.
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in the militia law.^? In New Jersey, the draft hardly had 
to be resorted to. In some instances men who were not in­
cluded in the quotas attempted to buy the places of those 
selected, and at one place ten times the quota turned out.78 
In Pennsylvania opposition to the call brought about 
the complete collapse of ordinary mobilization procedures.
On 8 August, the day after the President’s order was received. 
Governor Thomas Mifflin issued a directive to the divisions, 
giving each its quota. By the tenth of September it was 
clear that the attempt to use the regular draft had failed. 
Heroic measures were required, and Mifflin and the legisla­
ture responded to the challenge. After an address by the
governor, the senate called for a full report on the status 
79of the troops, and a few days later on the nineteenth both 
houses passed an act authorizing the executive to enlist 
volunteers at large.^0 The effect, of course, was to abandon 
the draft as in the earlier case of the frontier companies.
The report, which was prepared by Secretary of State 
A. J. Dallas, presented a picture even more discouraging
77James A. Bradley to the Governor, 12 Sept. 1794, 
and enclosures, W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VII, 
307-08; Thomas Matthews to Lt. Governor Wood, 12 Oct. 1794, 
Ibid., 343.
78Monaghan, "Involuntary Military Service," 11.
7%. P. Clarke, Official History. I, 161-62.
^^Mitchell and Flanders, Statutes at Large of Penn­
sylvania. XV, 195-97.
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than had been expected. In Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, 
and Delaware counties the men drafted had refused to turn 
out. The city of Philadelphia, and Lancaster, Yorks, Berk, 
Franklin, and Northhampton counties had not even made their 
returns. Only in Dauphin and Montgomery counties, where the 
draft had proceeded without undue incident, were the quotas 
ready to march.
Meantime, Mifflin, armed no doubt with foreknowledge 
of the form the new act would take, went to the hustings in 
an effort to point out the urgency of the situation and 
overcome the reluctance to serve. On 10 September, the same 
day as his speech to the legislature, he told the officers 
of the brigade of the City and County of Philadelphia that 
“unless we can supply the deficiency by voluntary enlist­
ments the honor of the Militia will be tarnished and the
op
peace of the Commonwealth perhaps destroyed." A few days 
later when he addressed a large group of militia assembled 
near Philadelphia, several uniformed companies offered their 
services and other volunteers began to come forward in large 
numbers. On a subsequent tour through the sections in which 
the draft had been ignored his temperate and convincing 
speeches proved increasingly effective. By the time the 
act which legalized all this had been passed he was able to
P. Clarke, Official History, I, 162-63.
8%bid., 162.
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put in the field at least 4590 men, about eighty-eight per­
cent of those required.83
The Pennsylvania quota as finally formed contained 
a heavy proportion of uniformed organizations. Among the 
first units to take up the march for Carlisle were three 
troops of cavalry, a company of light infantry, several com­
panies of artillery, a mixed regiment of grenadiers and 
light infantry, and the famous McPherson’s Blues, which 
were originally organized for this campaign. While enroute, 
the Blues with the addition of several companies of rifles, 
artillery, and infantry were organized into a regiment. 
McPherson’s name was retained and he was elected c o l o n e l . ^4
In Fries’ Rebellion, the President directed New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania to hold certain organizations in 
readiness, but he actually ordered into the disaffected area 
only a few of the Pennsylvania units together with a few 
regulars. This time the difficulties that had been exper­
ienced by Pennsylvania a few years earlier did not arise. 
This may no doubt be attributed to the restricted scope and 
appeal of the rebellion, the small number of men employed, 
and the type of units that were selected. In the last re­
gard, the force sent to the field consisted of two troops 
of "volunteer" cavalry and two troops of "militia" cavalry, 
all from Philadelphia. The adjectives were apparently used
B^Ibid., 163-64. ^^Ibid.. 163.
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in a special sense to distinguish between units that had 
volunteered for the Provisional Army and units that had not. 
The former were no doubt considered elite organizations by 
the administration because they were thought to be composed 
primarily of men holding Federalist principles. The latter 
were actually volunteer companies in the general sense in 
which the term has been used in this study and presumably 
possessed the high quality usually attributed to such or­
ganizations. Both were in the highest state of preparation 
for action. The remainder of the Pennsylvania readiness 
group was composed of other similarly qualified horse troops 
from Philadelphia and the counties.^5
General William McPherson, formerly of the Blues, 
was given command of this tiny operational force of 240 men. 
It is interesting to note that he was designated by the 
President, that is by Secretary of War McHenry, rather than 
by the Governor of Pennsylvania. To cover McPherson's move­
ment a company of artillery at Carlisle was ordered to Read­
ing and another such company at Fort Mifflin was alerted to 
march to the same place on the shortest notice. McPherson 
was also directed to assume command of the regulars, two 
companies of artillery from New York and about thirty infan-
85secretary of War to Governor of Pennsylvania,
20 Mar. 1799, Annals of Congress, 6th Cong., 1302; Secre­
tary of War to General William McPherson, 21 Mar. 1799,
Ibid.. 1302-04.
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try recruits from New Jersey, when they reached the rendez­
vous point. He was further authorized to call up the readi­
ness force in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey if conditions
warranted.86
State Use
The employment of the militia by the states in time 
of public disturbances seldom involved more than a few com­
panies. A few examples will serve to illustrate the wide 
variety of tasks these troops were called upon to perform.
In New York on one occasion units were called out to prevent
an anticipated disturbance at an execution, and in another
8Vto suppress a prison riot. In Norfolk, Virginia, during 
the foreign crisis of 1794 a small guard was ordered out to 
prevent a clash between rival groups of F r e n c h m e n , and in 
Philadelphia during the French crisis of 1798 troops were 
sent to protect public buildings and patrol the streets 
following disorders created by men wearing the French cock­
a d e .  89 In Norfolk County, Massachusetts, a detachment was 
employed to conduct Jason Fairbanks, a convicted murderer,
86$ecretary of War to General McPherson, 21 Mar. 
1799, Ibid., 1302-04.
87Emmons Clark, History of the Seventh Regiment of 
New York. 1806-1889 (New York, 1890), I, 38.
88W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VII, 12, 13.
89j. Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History 
of Philadelphia. 1609-1884 (Philadelphia, 1884), I, 493.
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who had once been rescued by a mob, to his hanging.90 in 
Virginia,91 and no doubt in many states, detachments were 
posted in time of epidemic to prevent intercourse between 
infected and healthy sections.
In the South the militia was the primary tool for 
the control of refractory Negroes. During slave rebellions, 
such as the abortive Gabriel uprising in Virginia in 1800,9^ 
large detachments were ordered out to restore order. For 
routine day-to-day policing of the blacks most Southern 
states required the militia to maintain patrols. Local 
militia officers, company or battalion commanders, were re­
sponsible for appointing these groups, which usually con­
sisted of an officer and several men. In Virginia the law 
specified that the patrols be sent out at least once a month 
to visit all Negro quarters and other places "suspected of 
entertaining unlawful assemblies of slaves, servants, or 
other disorderly persons.” It also required that the patrol­
lers check the passes of any Negroes moving about from one
90Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto; or. Early 
American Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel 
Ames, 1758-1822 (Cambridge. 1931). 127-33, 139-42.
P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VII, 35,
40-42, 43, 57-58,
9% bid., IX, passim.
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plantation to another.93 The provisions of the Kentucky 
act were almost identical.94
9^A Collection of Acts (Virginia), 22 Dec. 1792.
94Kentucky Acts. 1792 Nov. Sess. (10 Dec. 1792). 
Microfilm Collection of State Records, Library of Congress, 
Kentucky B 2, Reel 1, Unit 1.
CHAPTER IX
THE "UNIFORM MILITIA" IN ACTION:
THE DETACHMENTS
The military mission of the detachments of 1794 and 
1797 and the associations of 1798-1801 was to prevent war by 
demonstrating to Great Britain in the first case and to 
France in the other two that the United States was prepared 
to resist both threats and the use of force. In each case, 
special organizations were formed from the militia at large 
and alerted for instant action. Since the troops were never 
actually called into the field, the several mobilizations 
represented little more than paper arrangements. Neverthe­
less, in each period fear of aggression was so intense among 
many people that real efforts were made to enroll the men, 
arm them, and prepare them for fighting. These efforts re­
vealed manifold deficiencies in the militia systems of many 
states.
The Detachment of 1794 
The first detachment was formed under the Act of
389
390
9 May 1794,^ which authorized the President to require the 
several states to place a total of eighty thousand men in a 
status of readiness. It was no doubt anticipated that the 
larger part of these would be taken from the standing com­
panies, but the law also provided that independent corps of 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery might volunteer their serv­
ices as units. The law itself established the allocations 
of the states, and by about 19 May these had been transmit­
ted by the Secretary of War to the governors.^
Most states for which data is available utilized the 
volunteer principle and the quota system in the mobilization, 
Only four, Connecticut, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and
3
New Jersey, passed special laws, and those of the first two 
contained little of interest. That of Rhode Island called 
for a special enrollment of the militia before the unit 
quotas were assigned. It allowed forty days for the comple­
tion of this time-consuming process and the preparation of
^See above page 177.
copy of the Secretary of War’s letter transmit­
ting the law to the states and giving instructions concern­
ing the raising of the quotas may be found in W. P. Palmer 
and others (eds.). Calendar of Virginia State Papers (Rich­
mond, 1875-1893), VII, 145-46. Hereafter cited as W. P. 
Palmer, Virginia State Papers.
^Connecticut, Journal of Lower House. 30 May 1794 
(Microfilm Collection of State Records, Library of Congress, 
Connecticut, A l b ,  Reel 3); New Jersey Laws, 1794 June 
Sess., Chap. 483; North Carolina Laws. 1794 July Sess.,
Chap. 3; Rhode Island, Acts and Resolves. 1794 June Sess., 
22-23. A search of the session laws has failed to reveal 
acts for states other than those mentioned.
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the resulting returns. That of New Jersey set up novel pro­
cedures for filling deficiencies in the company quotas when 
sufficient volunteers did not come forward. It directed 
the company commanders to divide all property holders^ over 
eighteen years of age living in their districts into as many 
classes as there might be men deficient, to call upon each 
class to furnish a man, and to hire men for classes not com­
plying within ten days. They were then to assess the class­
es concerned for the expense of the men hired. In order 
that the assessments be equitable the law also provided that 
the classes be so arranged as to represent equal aggregates 
of wealth and that the individual members of each class be 
charged in proportion to their worth.
Several states, including Delaware, Massachusetts, 
and Virginia, encountered real difficulty in complying with 
the requisitions. In each of these cases the trouble arose 
not so much from failure in the mobilization system as from 
widespread disorganization among the troops. Similar dis­
organization probably also existed in Rhode Island, which 
had found it necessary to undertake a preparatory enrollment 
before the actual enlistment began. In Maryland the quota 
was not raised," or so Samuel Smith, a congressman from that 
state, reported in a House debate a few years later.^ If
^The law specified "all the free white male Inhabi­
tants and others holding property."
^Annals of Congress. 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 2982.
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this were the case, no information is available as to the 
reason.
In Delaware, eight months after the President’s 
requisition had been received, the governor told the legis­
lature that he had been unable to organize the state’s quota. 
He blamed the lack of arms and the inadequacies of the mili­
tia law. "To detail its defects," he said, "is, perhaps un­
necessary; they have been experienced in almost a similar 
degree in the several counties and of course must be gener­
ally known." A legislative committee appointed to consider 
the governor’s remarks reported that difficulties multiplied 
every day in the execution of the law. Its defects were so 
numerous and so difficult to remedy, the report continued, 
that another special committee should be appointed to recom­
mend the necessary changes.&
In Massachusetts the authorities found that in some 
towns the militia had not been organized, and the General 
Court had to take strong action to insure that the quotas be 
filled. The resulting resolve required the selectmen of such 
towns to forthwith enroll all persons subject to militia duty 
and to detach their full quotas from the new rolls. Towns 
in which the selectmen neglected to comply were made subject
Delaware, Journal of the Senate. 12 Jan. 1795, 
7-8, 12. (Microfilm Collection of State Records, Library 
of Congress, Delaware, A l a ,  Reel 1, Unit 3).
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to a fine of ten pounds for each man they failed to furnish.^
Before issuing the divisional quotas, the Virginia 
authorities made a survey of the status of the troops. It 
was found that only some thirty-five of the one hundred and 
one regiments were completely organized. In most of the re­
mainder the officers, or some of them, had been appointed 
but apparently had not yet formed their units. About fif­
teen of the regiments had neither officers nor men and thus 
existed only on paper.® The report attributed the deficien­
cies to several factors, the most important of which was the 
failure of the county courts to recommend officers as re­
quired by the general act of 22 December 1792. Others in­
cluded faulty recommendations by the courts, disorganization 
created by the recent division of several counties into two 
regiments,9 and in one case disputes over rank among the 
officers.
The general character of the report leaves some 
doubt as to whether it made conditions appear as unsatisfac­
tory as they ^actually were. For example, it does not list 
the number of men actually enrolled in the regiments but 
only those sixteen years of age and over living in the
^Massachusetts Resolves. 19 June 1794.
®Samuel Coleman to the Lt. Governor, 2 June 1794, 
W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VII, 161-67.
^An amendatory law had thus created nineteen addi­
tional regiments. Ibid., 78.
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regimental districts. Furthermore, it seems to be based 
upon the assumption that any unit having officers was per se 
completely organized. These considerations lead one to be­
lieve that it may have been compounded from the census tables 
and the imaginations of the adjutant general and his assist­
ants rather than from actual returns. If this were true 
then things were dark indeed, for the lack of returns was 
one of the most accurate indicators of disorder. At any 
rate, the failure of the courts to make their recommenda­
tions for officers, the main cause of the trouble, was an 
old problem which the legislature had already tried to cor­
rect.
While several of the other states may have encoun­
tered difficulties it is likely that few if any had to deal 
with such major problems as the three just discussed. In 
Vermont, for example, after a months delay for the calling 
of a special meeting of the council, the governor issued his 
orders and the enrollment was promptly completed.^ In New 
Jersey the adjutant general warned that the militia law 
would be rigidly enforced,but there may have been little
lOgee above pages 346-47.
l^Eliakim Persons Walton (ed.). Records of Governor 
and Council of Vermont (Montpelier, 1876), IV, 483.
l^Harry L. Harris and John I. Hilton, A History of 
of the Second Regiment. N. G., N. J.; Second N. J. Volun­
teers, Spanish War; Fifth New Jersey Infantry; Together with 
a Short Review Covering Early Military Life in the State of 
New Jersey (Paterson. 1908). 43-44.
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need for either this admonition or for the special law al­
ready discussed. The detachment appears to have been more 
or less completely organized by August when the President 
called for troops for the Whiskey Rebellion. In both of 
these states, promises of extra pay for men called into 
actual service may have helped overcome whatever reluctance
existed.
In some states unnecessary delays resulted from the 
failure to utilize the mobilization procedures set up in 
advance. These occurred as a matter of form in the four 
states that took the time to pass special acts and in states 
such as Vermont that waited to convene their councils. Thus, 
though the requisition was received in mid-May, Connecticut 
did not get its law through until 30 May, New Jersey until 
20 June, Rhode Island until some time in June, and North 
Carolina until some time in July. In Vermont the council 
did not meet until 21 June.
Another type of delay resulted as the governors and 
the division, brigade, and lower commanders leisurely broke
l^on 21 June the Governor and Council of Vermont 
recommended such pay and on 30 October the Legislature 
authorized it. Walton, Records of Governor and Council of 
Vermont. IV, 483 and footnote 483. The act provided that 
the state add to the Federal allowance of privates and NCOs 
a sum which would make the total for privates L2 per month 
and slightly larger amounts for NCOs, Laws of Vermont. 1794 
Oct. Sess,, 123-24, The New Jersey law that set up the 
class system of filling deficiencies also provided NCOs and 
privates $3.00 a month in addition to what they received 
from the United States plus a bounty of $2.00 for enrolling. 
New Jersey Laws. 1794 June Sess., Chap. 483.
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down their quotas for the use of subordinate units. The 
experience of Virginia shows how rapidly the time lost in 
this way mounted up. That state received the requisition 
from the President in the middle of May, waited until 2 June 
for the preparation of returns, issued an initial mobiliza­
tion order on 20 June, and apparently followed it with an­
other about 30 June. Only by 4 July was one division begin­
ning to get orders to its b r i g a d e s . I t  is a safe assump­
tion that another week or two was lost while the quotas 
languished in lower headquarters on their way to the compan­
ies. Even though the last estimate is conservative, this 
adds to a total elapsed time of some two months.
The corrective legislation accompanying and follow­
ing the mobilization reflected other problems and weaknesses 
that had become apparent as the foreign threat developed and 
the detachments were raised to meet it. The most important 
of the shortcomings thus revealed concerned the volunteer 
companies. Several states discovered the need for more ar­
tillery and cavalry and for the organization of these arms 
into higher tactical units. Other defects that appeared 
included the lack of non-commissioned officers in one state 
and the lack of trained officers in another.
l^Simon Morgan (Adjutant General) to the Generals of 
Division, 20 June 1794, W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. 
VII, 191; "Rough General Orders," 30 June 1794, Ibid.. 202- 
03; "Division Orders," 4 July 1794, Ibid.. 204.
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New York, with its great port to protect, took the 
lead in the building up of the artillery. In 1795 in an 
effort to increase enrollments it excused artillery non­
commissioned officers and privates from jury duty, deducted 
the first two hundred dollars from their property taxes,
and exempted those who had served nine years from all further
15militia duty except in invasion or insurrection. Vermont 
took steps to increase its cavalry to the maximum proportion 
authorized by the basic act, one company per regiment, and 
empowered brigade commanders to recruit the required men 
from exempts.Virginia organized its cavalry and artillery 
into regiments and battalions, and prescribed that all types 
of independent companies be called into service by complete 
units rather than.mobilization c l a s s e s .
The problems concerning officers and non-commissioned 
officers occurred in South Carolina and Virginia. The former 
laid a fine of four pounds on men appointed as sergeants who 
refused to serve but added that no one should be required to
l^Act passed 10 Apr. 1795, Laws of the State of New 
York, 1789-96 (republished by the Secretary of State, Albany, 
1887), 594.
^&Act of 29 Oct. 1794, Laws of Vermont, 1794 Oct. 
Sess., 80.
^^Act of 24 Dec. 1795, A Collection of All Such 
Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of a Public and 
Permanent Nature, As Are Now in Force (Richmond. 1803), 
331-41. Hereafter cited as Collection of Acts (Virginia).
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perform this distasteful duty more than one year at a time.^® 
Virginia, apparently finding that many of its officers were 
not familiar with their duties, required that those of each 
regimental district meet once a year for four days’ training 
under the supervision of the brigade i n s p e c t o r s . %t may 
be noted in passing that the reluctance to serve as non­
commissioned officers was probably more prevalent than the 
laws indicate. It appears to have stemmed from the time- 
consuming administrative duties, such as notifying the men 
of drills, that went with the position.
During 1794 and 1795 the militia was also employed 
by several of the states to enforce the embargo and to pre­
vent violations of the neutrality of the ports and harbors. 
One of the better known incidents of the period arose when 
the British ship of the line Africa boarded the packet Medusa 
in Rhode Island waters in an effort to seize the French min­
ister, Fauchet. Although the Africa had gone to much trouble 
for nothing, Fauchet having quit the packet, the affair 
caused great indignation both in Rhode Island and the nation­
al capitol, and anger continued to grow as the Africa over­
hauled other American ships and impressed American seamen.
^®Act of 19 Dec. 1794, Benjamin Elliot and Martin 
Strobel (eds.). The Militia System of South Carolina, Being 
a Digest of the Acts of Congress Concerning the Militia, 
Likewise of the Militia Laws of this State (Charleston.
1833), 38. Hereafter cited as Elliot and Strobel, Militia 
System of South Carolina.
l^See footnote 17 above.
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Finally, under the direction of the Secretary of War, Gover­
nor Arthur Fenner ordered out portions of the militia to 
exclude the personnel of the British vessel from the shores 
of the state. With bayonets bristling at every possible 
landing spot, as one writer put it, the militiamen kept the 
enemy, if that term may be used, at a distance.^0
In Virginia details were ordered out from time to 
time at Bermuda Hundred, Norfolk, Portsmouth, and one or two 
other places. They mounted cannon to prevent the sailing of 
unauthorized vessels, took charge of others that had aroused 
suspicion, and manned a small schooner to give chase to one 
which had already departed. In the last case, which occurred 
at Portsmouth, the sea-going militiamen caught their quarry
p]
and took possession of it. The size of the details varied 
from a few men to a company, and they were embodied by local 
militia commanders.
In evaluating the results of the mobilization it 
must be noted that the data upon which the study is based 
does not disclose a single case, with the possible exception 
of the Massachusetts towns, in which it was found necessary 
to resort to the draft. The fact that the troops could be 
raised by voluntary enrollment, of course, indicates the
^^Octavius Pickering and C. W. Upham, Life of Tim­
othy Pickering (Boston, 1867-73), III, 232, 238-39, 241.
P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers, VII, 97-99, 
103-05, 125-26, 219.
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absence of any widespread opposition to the purpose for 
which they were to be utilized. The main difficulties arose 
from the failure of the militia laws to provide a sound 
structure from which the quotas could be drawn. The exper­
iences of some states also showed that the mobilization pro­
cedures were slow and cumbersome and that the laws did not 
always provide the type of force required.
The conditions that made the structure unsound may 
be attributed partly to the recent reorganization of the 
militia under the new state laws that followed the Uniform 
Militia Act and partly to indifference at all levels. Since 
conditions improved little with the passage of time, as the 
mobilization of 1797 made clear, the latter was probably the 
more important. The lack of interest might have disappeared 
in the face of more energetic leadership, more easily obtain­
able arms, better enforcement of the regulations, and stiffer 
fines. However, none of these factors appears to have been 
within reach except in isolated cases.
A part of the time lost in placing the mobilization 
procedures into operation may be charged to poor communica­
tions and to the lack of a more urgent and concrete military 
threat. On the other hand, the raising of the men was car­
ried out under almost ideal outward conditions. There was 
no enemy on the shores to disrupt the roads and create fear 
and confusion. One may doubt whether the presence of both 
such an enemy and the telegraph, too, would have speeded
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events. The central fact seems to be that the quota system 
was by nature more time consuming than the system by which 
whole units were ordered out. Thus the Virginia commanders 
at the ports got their men almost immediately when they em­
bodied companies or parts of companies. The only advantage 
possessed by the quota system lay in the fact that it dis­
tributed the duty among a larger group of men.
Aside from weaknesses in punitive features, the de­
fects in the laws were to be expected. To a large extent 
they reflected the emergence of a new kind of military prob­
lem, the defense of the coasts. The solution required long 
range striking power and mobility, that is, artillery and 
cavalry, in larger proportions than the land fighting to 
which the militia was more accustomed. Throughout the 1790’s 
the states continued to attempt to increase their strength 
in these two arms.
The Arms Problem in 1794
By 1794 the fact that many militiamen had failed to 
provide themselves with arms was no secret to the authori­
ties. Throughout that year and for years thereafter Virginia
militia commanders reported the lack of small arms and cannon
92and requested that the state supply both. While most of 
these requests came from company and regimental commanders, 
one brigade commander wrote that fifty well-armed men could
^%bid., VII and VIII passim.
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hardly be mustered in his county.^3 As already noted, a 
major reason that Connecticut was unable to organize its 
detachment lay in the lack of arms and equipment.
That this famine of muskets extended to most, if not 
all, states appears to have been well known to the adminis­
tration. When the President sent the states their quotas 
for the detachment he earnestly requested the governors to
take immediate measures to insure that the whole militia be
94-properly armed and equipped. A few months later, when he 
called on Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New Jersey 
for the Whiskey Rebellion troops, he asked that the states 
furnish arms to men unable to provide their own. If the 
stocks of the states should prove inadequate, he continued, 
the federal government would open its own arsenals .L ate  
in the year, Secretary Knox reported that two-thirds of the 
men sent to Western Pennsylvania had to be issued arms from 
the public stores. At the same time, he also estimated that 
only 100,000 of the 450,000 men liable to militia duty were 
armed with the types of weapons required by the federal law. 
Though noting that the penalties in the state laws were some-
^^John A. Bradley to the Governor, 12 May 1794, 
Ibid., VII, 141-42.
^^Ibid., VII, 145-46. See footnote 2 above.
^^A copy of the order calling for the troops may be 
found in William P. Clarke, Official History of the Militia 
and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania (Phila­
delphia, 1910), I, 159.
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times inadequate, he attributed the deficiency primarily to 
the general shortage of arms. This shortage, he went on, 
could not be made up by imports as long as Europe was at 
war.^G
While the administration fretted, at least two of 
the states took measures of their own to provide small arms 
and cannons for the use of their troops. New York in 1794 
appropriated $75,000 for the purchase of field artillery, 
small arms, and accoutrements.Meantime, Virginia had 
issued a total of 2146 muskets to its troops between 1792 
and 1795.28 Late in the last of these years the Virginia 
legislature, watching the stocks dwindle, authorized the 
governor to procure four thousand stands of small arms and 
accoutrements each year. These arms were to be distributed 
to the militia according to need when it was called into 
actual service. The same act also authorized the governor 
to issue one field piece to each company of artillery as 
long as the supply lasted.29 in December 1796, Virginia 
also began planning the construction of a "manufactory of
2&Knox to Speaker of the House, 10 Dec. 1794,
Annals. 3 Cong., 1396-99.
27Act passed 24 Mar. 1794, Nev; York Laws, 1794 Jan. 
Sess,, 15-16.
28w. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. IX, 31-32.
29Act passed 26 Dec. 1795, Virginia Acts, 1795 
Nov. Sess., 17.
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arms."30 was one thing to plan such programs as these 
and another to implement them, as will be shown later.
The Detachment of 1797
The second detachment was raised under the act of
24 June 1797, which like that of 1794 called for eighty
thousand men to be held in readiness and authorized the
acceptance of independent corps that might volunteer their
services. Only Rhode Island appears to have passed special
31legislation to raise its quota, and this was almost identi­
cal with its act of 1794, which has been discussed. The re­
maining states presumably made use of procedures similar to 
those they had followed in 1794.
At least two states, Kentucky and New Hampshire, 
experienced severe difficulties in raising their quotas. On 
28 August, almost a month after the receipt of the initial 
order from the Secretary of W a r , 32 the governor of the former 
called on the adjutant general for a complete troop return.
By 14 September it had become clear that this official was 
unable to provide the required information, and the governor, 
abandoning the normal military channels, directed the secre­
tary of state to write the several brigade commanders for
3®W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VIII, 406. 
3^Rhode Island Acts and Resolves, 1797 Oct. Sess.,
25-27.
32xhe order was dated 1 Aug. 1797. A copy may be 
found in W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VIII, 441.
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full reports covering the strength of their regiments and 
the actual state of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. On 
25 October, no replies having been received, the governor, 
growing somewhat impatient, issued his quotas and ordered 
the several brigadiers “to take the most effectual measures" 
for raising them.^^ Although no data is available as to the 
outcome, the lack of returns was no doubt as usual a certain 
indication of disorder.
New Hampshire also had to deal with a certain degree 
of disorganization, or so it would seem from an act passed 
by the legislature in December 1798. Under the measure, 
complaints against company commanders who had failed to call 
their units together for training might be directed to higher 
commanders for investigation and prosecution. The law also 
attacked the problem of nonexistent companies. Thus in 
cases in which there was a shortage of personnel in the 
company beat, it required the field officers to annex per­
sons liable to duty to a contiguous c o m p a n y .34
In February 1799, the value and effect of the federal 
act setting up the detachment were reviewed during the Con­
gressional discussion of a Republican motion to continue the 
measure for another year. The debate provides some informa-
^^Kentucky, Executive Department Journals, 1797, 
pp. 128, 130, 134 (Microfilm Collection of State Records, 
Library of Congress, Kentucky, E 1, Reel 1, Unit 1).
4^-Act passed 27 Dec. 1798, New Hampshire Laws, 1798 
Dec. Sess., 527-28.
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tion as to the implementation of the act in several other 
states. However, since the matter had become for the moment 
a party question, the opinions of the speakers can hardly be 
accepted at face value. Speaker Jonathan Dayton, a Federal­
ist, called the act "a pompous nullity." In some states, he 
went on, it had been carried into effect, and in some ig­
nored. In others the members of the militia itself were not 
even listed.^5 Samuel Dana of Connecticut, one of the Fed­
eralist ultras, maintained that the detachment constituted 
no more than a roster of names on paper. In an earlier de­
bate he had charged that the men detached did not even know 
their officers and that less than three-fourths of the mem­
bers of the detachments could be found, if they were called 
upon.36
Several Republicans, each describing the status in 
his own state, took a different view. In Maryland the de­
tachment had been formed and was being held for service, and 
the entire division to which Samuel Smith, one of the state’s 
representatives, belonged had offered its services. In 
Massachusetts the detached units were as ready as any stand­
ing army, and in New York, North Carolina, and Virginia the 
required number of men had come forward voluntarily. In
^^Annals, 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 2977.
36ibid., 2978; Annals, 5 Cong., 2 Sess., 16 May
1798, p. 1751.
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Pennsylvania many independent corps and individuals had 
volunteered, and the remainder of the quota, presumably a 
small fraction, had been supplied by draft.3?
The mobilization, like that of 1794, was accompanied 
and followed by many corrective state laws. These continued 
the trend toward building up the cavalry and artillery and 
providing better training for officers. Vermont increased 
the maximum strength of its artillery companies from twenty- 
four to thirty and of its cavalry troops from thirty-two to 
fifty.38 Mew York cut the term of artillery service required 
for permanent militia exemption to four years, added four 
companies to the New York City regiment, increased the num­
ber of training days per year to a maximum of eighteen, and
39began to provide training ammunition.
Connecticut authorized the commanders of cavalry, 
artillery, light infantry, and grenadier companies to recruit 
from the "battalion companies," presumably meaning the stand­
ing companies in this context, provided that they maintain
37samuel Smith of Maryland, Annals, 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 
2982-83; Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts, Ibid., 2977-78; 
John Williams of New York, Ibid., 2984; Joseph McDowell of 
North Carolina, Ibid., 2977; W. C. C. Claiborne of Virginia, 
Ibid., 2980-81; Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, Ibid., 2979.
38Act of 10 Mar. 1797, Laws of State of Vermont Re­
vised and Passed by the Legislature in 1797 (Rutland, 1798), 
431-46.
3^Act passed 27 Aug. 1798, Emmons Clark, History of 
the Seventh Regiment of New York, 1806-89 (New York, 1890),
I, 37. Hereafter cited as E. Clark, Seventh Regiment.
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the appropriate balance of numbers between the two types.
In order to preserve the strength of the independent corps, 
it also prescribed that men joining them not return to the 
standing militia throughout the remainder of their service.40 
South Carolina formed its cavalry and artillery into higher 
units and made efforts to bring the former to full strength 
by permitting troop captains to recruit from exempts.41
Georgia noted that many officers had not been "suf­
ficiently instructed in the practice of discipline prescribed 
by Congress," and required that field officers undergo a two 
day training period once a year and company officers twice 
a year. It also directed that the company officers train 
their non-commissioned officers and privates in the Congres­
sional discipline.42
In addition to bolstering its artillery and cavalry, 
Vermont created an entirely new type of unit that in some 
respects resembled the "senior class" militia of Rhode Is­
land. It authorized exempts to voluntarily form themselves 
into companies, incorporated these into the regiments from
40Acts of May and Oct. 1797, dates not printed.
Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, 1797 May Sess., 
464, and 1797 Oct. Sess., 476.
4lAct of 16 Dec. 1797, Elliot and Strobel, Militia 
System of South Carolina, Appendix, 45-46.
42Act of 2 Feb. 1798, Horatio Marbury and William 
H. Crawford (eds.). Digest of the Laws of the State of 
Georgia, 1775-1800 (Savannah, 1802), 360-61. Hereafter 
cited as Marbury and Crawford, Digest.
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which they were raised, and subjected them to the same duties 
and regulations as the regular militia. Once having joined 
such companies, members under the age of forty-five were per­
mitted to withdraw only with the special permission of their 
regimental commanders.^3
The over-all results of the mobilization correspond 
closely to the results in 1794: some states experienced
difficulty, and some did not. The comments of the Federal­
ists, who doubted that most of the detached companies ever 
met for organization and training, may probably be taken 
at face value. The mobilization again disclosed widespread 
disarrangement in some states and the need for more artillery 
and cavalry. It also revealed the increasingly critical 
nature of the arms problem.
More Troubles Concerning Arms (1797-1801)
During the crisis of 1797 several other states came 
to grips with the arms problem. In March the legislature of 
Pennsylvania directed the governor to immediately purchase 
ten thousand stands wherever he could find them and to con­
tract with American manufacturers for a second ten thousand, 
the whole to be of the Charleville pattern used by the United 
S t a t e s . I n  Delaware, the legislature authorized the
^^Act of 7 Nov. 1798, Laws of Vermont, 1798 Sess., 
Chap. 103, p. 81-84.
^^Act passed 28 Mar. 1797, James T. Mitchell and 
Henry Flanders (eds.). Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania
410
Governor to purchase slightly more than one thousand stands 
of the same pattern.^5 gy February of 1799, Pennsylvania 
had arranged for the first ten thousand muskets and some 
were being d e l i v e r e d . A t  about the same time the Governor 
of Delaware reported that he had been unable to find a sup­
plier. Even if he had been able to locate the weapons, he 
continued, the price he was permitted to pay, $12.00 a 
stand, would not have bought them.^^
Virginia’s program, which called for the purchase of 
four thousand stands per year, one of the largest undertaken 
by any state, provides a graphic illustration of the diffi­
culties and pitfalls involved in the procurement of arms 
during this period. The state, having also adopted the 
Charleville musket, established specifications that called 
for an exact copy, even to the details of appearance, the 
last being an unwise requirement that was to delay procure­
ment. By the spring of 1795 no contracts had been let, but 
offers were being received from many small manufacturers,
(Harrisburg, 1896-1915), XV, Chap. MGMXL, 524-27. This act 
was suspended for two years on 11 Apr. 1799, but the con­
tracts already made were to continue in force. Ibid.. XVI, 
Chap. JVMXCIII, 349.
^^Act passed 27 Jan. 1798, Delaware Laws. 1798 Jan. 
Regular Sess., 42-43.
46prom a speech by Gallatin in Congress on 23 Feb. 
1799. Annals, 5 Cong., 3 Sess., 2979.
47oelaware, Journals of House of Representatives. 4 
Jan. 1799, p. 12-13 (Microfilm Collection of State Records, 
Library of Congress, Delaware, A l b ,  Reel 2, Unit 2).
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the majority being local shop or mill owners.48 John Strode 
of Culpepper, for example, wrote that he would manufacture 
four thousand stands complete, including bayonet, cartridge 
box, pan wiper, and picker for the touch-hole at $15.00 a
stand.49
The governor apparently either doubted the ability 
of these small firms to fill large orders or thought that 
their prices were too high. At any rate in the summer of 
1796, he sent an agent named Dawson to New England, the 
center of the American firearm industry, to investigate the 
possibility of arranging a contract there. In September, 
Dawson wrote from Boston that muskets were not available at 
the prices the General Assembly had contemplated. However, 
he suggested that James Swan of that city might be able to 
procure the arms in Europe at suitable prices.^0
Thus began what was certainly one of the most arduous 
commercial operations in our history. Swan, who had been 
directing the financial activities of the French Republic 
in the United States, was thought to be particularly quali­
fied for the project because he had many business connections
P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers, VIII, 363,
403, 423, 506; IX, 12, 49.
49%bid.. VIII, 357, also 430, 447.
50T. Dawson to the Governor, 22 July and 11 Sept. 
1796, Ibid., 380, 387.
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in England and on the Continent.After long negotiations, 
he undertook in May 1797 to deliver four thousand stands 
within fifteen months at $13.00 a stand.52 By subsequent 
contracts of January and April 1798 he agreed to furnish 
two additional units of four thousand each, the last at a 
price of only $10.00 a stand.53
Soon thereafter Swan went to Europe to purchase the 
arms. During the next three years he engaged in such an 
energetic buying search from country to country that he must 
have become as familiar to the frontier guards as their own 
officers. He could not obtain export permits from Holland 
and Great Britain. He had the muskets in his grasp at Liege, 
but France also refused the needed permit. As the time for 
the initial delivery approached in 1798 he obtained an ex­
tension and immediately asked for another. A few months 
later, he asked for a third.54 By April 1799 some eight 
months after delivery should have been made, he had pur­
chased the first unit of four thousand in Denmark and Ger­
many, and twelve hundred had been transported to Hamburg for 
shipment. Due to the rigors of both the winter and the
387.
5lDawson to the Governor, 11 Sept. 1796, Ibid..
52ibid., 388-89, 419, 435-36.
53ibid., 460, 470, 473-74.
54James Swan to the Governor, 22 May and 11 Dec. 
1798, Ibid.. 485, 531-32.
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European war he did not think the remainder of the unit 
could be shipped until after the first of July.55 Another 
year passed before he was able to write from the same place 
that the second of the three units was ready for shipment. 
Much time had been lost, he complained, because in order to 
meet the specification as to appearance he had been forced 
to have the locks manufactured separately.
Meantime, as the shipments began to arrive, Robert 
Pollard, Swan's agent, found that his troubles were just 
beginning. Virginia refused to accept the first four thou­
sand at the agreed price because of their poor quality. 
Pollard dropped the price to $11.00 and then to $10.00 with 
no results.57 The arms were then evaluated by a commission 
representing both sides, but the governor refused to approve 
the findings.58 Though an agreement was finally reached,59 
this controversy over quality and price dragged on as new 
shipments were received until May 1801 when Swan sold his 
interest in the contract.50
55swan to Robert Pollard, 28 Apr. 1799, Ibid., iX,
21.
55swan to Pollard, 12 Apr. 1800, Ibid.. 106-07. 
"^Pollard to the Governor, 21 Oct. and 21 Nov.
1799, Ibid.. 51, 58. 
58Ibid., 71, 99, 100-01. 
59lbid., 109.
50lbid., 206 and passim.
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As soon as it became apparent that the Swan arrange­
ment left something to be desired, Virginia began to search 
for new sources. In May 1798 it again sent an agent to the 
East, but he was unable to find a s u p p l i e r . In April of 
1800 the state finally made a contract for four thousand 
stands with Robert McCormick of Richmond, but for a long 
time this promised as much excitement and no better outcome 
than the Swan a g r e e m e n t s T h e  results of the five year 
effort can be seen in a treasury report of March 1800. Out 
of a total of $199,000 appropriated for arms the state had 
been able to actually spend only slightly more than $55,000.^^
Progress on the planned arsenal or manufactory of 
arms was not much more rapid. Months were consumed in the 
selection of a location, and more were lost while the archi­
tect and designer, John Clarke, went east to inspect Spring­
field and other arsenals. Finally in January 1798 the leg­
islature authorized the project, and in July of the same 
year Clarke was ready with drawings and cost estimates. A 
year and a half had passed since the undertaking had been 
initiated, and though construction was soon begun it too 
went slowly.
Gllbid.. 468-69.
G^ibid., 111 and passim.
63lbid., 203.
64ibid., VIII, 455-57, 466-68, and passim. Act 
passed 23 Jan. 1798 (Section VIl), Virginia Acts, 1797 Dec. 
Sess., 12.
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As fear of war reached a peak in 1798, the federal 
government took steps, though they were hardly sufficient, 
to cope with the lack of arms. The Provisional Army Act of 
28 May 1798 authorized the President to lend cannon to 
militia units desiring to become artillery men and all types 
of equipment, including field pieces, small arms, and ac­
coutrements, to any part of the militia called into the 
federal service. In order that cavalrymen might be supplied 
under the latter provision, the act also authorized the 
President to buy headgear, sabres, and pistols to equip four 
thousand troopers. The supplementary act of 22 June 1798 
permitted him to lend both artillery and small arms to the 
associations for use in training.
While none of these provisions helped to put arms 
permanently into the hands of the militia at large, the act 
of 6 July 1798 was directed to this end. It authorized the 
government to procure thirty thousand muskets for sale to 
the states or directly to their militia and required that 
the arms be deposited at convenient places to make such sales 
easier. It also permitted the President to issue the arms 
remaining unsold at any time to militia units called into 
actual s e r v i c e . T h i s  act hardly resulted in immediate 
benefits. By December 1800, according to a charge made in




the House of Representatives, not a single stand had reached 
the hands of the troops.
During and after 1798 several other states joined 
the list of those taking measures of their own to provide 
arms. The Georgia legislature provided for the purchase of 
one thousand muskets and bayonets, five hundred pairs of 
horseman’s pistols, and five hundred swords, all to be sold 
to militiamen at cost plus c h a r g e s . I n  New Hampshire, 
after the Governor reported a severe shortage of fieldpieces 
among the artillery companies,the legislature resolved 
that the state provide each such company with at least one 
cannon.Meanwhile, Virginia, no new hand at the business, 
began to lay in cavalry equipment for six hundred men and 
attempted to purchase cannon from the United States. The 
Secretary of War refused to sell the wanted pieces, but he 
did offer to assist in their purchase from manufacturers.71
07prom Samuel Smith’s speech on the reduction of the 
artillery, 17 Dec. 1800, Annals, 6 Cong. 2 Sess., 832.
O^Act of 18 Feb. 1799, Marbury and Crawford, Digest,
363.
69New Hampshire, Journal of House of Representa­
tives , 1798 June Sess., 2Î1 (Microfilm Collection of State 
Records, Library of Congress, New Hampshire, A 1 b, Reel 3).
7^Act of 21 Dec. 1799, New Hampshire Laws, 1799 Dec. 
Sess. , 547.
"^ "Act passed 23 Jan. 1798 (Section VIII ), Virginia 
Acts, 1797 Dec. Sess., 121, James McHenry to the Governor,
3 Aug. 1798, W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers, VIII,
507.
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Maryland in establishing heavy penalties for attending mus­
ters without arms, an offense formerly subject to a fine of 
only one cent, made a sweeping change that recognized the 
arms problem.7^
In Virginia, for which the data is most complete, 
the Governor between 1798 and 1801 received some thirty re­
quests for arms. These came from units of all sizes and all 
types, including volunteer organizations.^^ Some of the 
letters were impatient:
The imbecile situation of the company of militia under 
my command for want of arms . . . induces me to apply 
to your excellency for as many firelocks . . .  as will 
be sufficient to arm my company, which consists of 85 
men. There are not more than half a dozen firelocks 
belonging to its members which are fitted for warlike 
operations; many are totally destitute of any sort of
gun,
In response to such requests as these, the state
distributed 1558 muskets in 1798 and 1799.^^ In 1800 dis­
tribution on a much larger scale was begun when the legisla­
ture took a hand. Until this time the matter had been han­
dled on a more or less haphazard basis with the governor ap­
proving or disapproving the requests as he saw fit. Under
^^Act of Nov. 1798, William Kilty (ed.). The Laws of 
Maryland (Annapolis, 1800), II, Chap. C, Section XV.
P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. VIII and IX
passim.
^^William Ludwell Lee to the Governor, 9 July 1798, 
Ibid.. VIII, 497.
"^ '^•Statement of Public Arms,” 22 June 1799, Ibid., 
IX, 31-32.
418
the new act, he was required to deliver to the regiments in 
proportion to their strength two-thirds of all small arms on 
hand and under procurement. The act also established a uni­
form system of accountability using receipts and provided 
heavy fines for the embezzlement of state-owned weapons.
Since the state had almost eight thousand weapons in 
stock in April 1 7 9 9 , before the first Swan shipment ar­
rived, and orders that totalled sixteen thousand under the 
Swan and McCormick contracts, the numbers involved far ex­
ceeded those of earlier issues. Reflecting both the magni­
tude of the logistical problem and the delay that always 
characterized militia affairs, work lagged and the distribu­
tion was not completed until November 1 8 0 1 . It appears 
that arms were not sent to all regiments as the law seemed 
to require but only to those in selected counties.
The "Associations" of 1798-1801
In 1798 the President began to accept on a readiness 
basis the services of special volunteer companies or "associ­
ations." The question as to whether these units were regular 
troops or militia had brought on hours of argument in the
^^Act of 28 Jan. 1800, Virginia Acts, 1799 Dec.
Sess., 26-27.
^^Quarterly return of arsenal at Point of Fork,
W. P. Palmer, Virginia State Papers. IX, 15.
TGlbid.. 219. ^^Ibid.. 122-23.
419
H o u s e . W h i l e  theoretically they may have been a kind of 
hybrid, they will be treated here as militia on the practi­
cal consideration that they were not constantly embodied 
like regulars. They would constitute a fighting force only 
when specifically called out.
The President’s authority with regard to these units 
was defined by the Provisional Army Act of 28 May 1798 and 
the supplementary act of 22 June of the same year. Under 
these measures he was permitted to accept such units during 
a period of three years after 28 May 1798 and to call any of 
them to active service during the two years following accep­
tance. Thus a unit accepted on 28 May 1801 might be called 
up as late as 28 May 1803. The President was also author­
ized to appoint the officers of these corps, prescribe rules 
and regulations for their government, and lend them federal
O]
arms for use in training. Under the Eventual Army Act of 
2 March 1799, he was empowered to organize them into regi­
ments, brigades, and divisions and to employ them under the 
same circumstances that he might use the ordinary militia. 
This last act also limited the number of the volunteers he 
might accept to seventy-five thousand and apportioned them
®^See above pages 229-230.
®^Act of 28 May 1798, Section 3, and Act of 22 June 
1792. With regard to equipment, the first of the two acts 
required that the men arm, uniform, and equip themselves. 
See above pages 227-28, 233-34.
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among the states and t e r r i t o r i e s .
While the law had specifically referred to companies 
of volunteers "who may associate and offer themselves," it 
was silent as to how the resulting "associations" were to be 
formed. On 1 November 1798, the War Department published a 
circular to clarify this and other practical questions that 
had arisen. This document interpreted the law to imply that 
the companies follow the federal tables of organization for 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, as the case might be. It 
advised that the members of each unit sign articles of as­
sociation, which would form "the essense of the engagement 
with their country." The articles would thus bind each man 
to accept the rules and regulations prescribed by the Presi­
dent and to serve when called upon. In order to avoid the 
possibility that disaffected persons might offer themselves, 
it further required that each company provide itself with 
certificates "from prominent and known characters, setting 
forth the principles of the associates, those of the Officers 
elect especially." With this proof, the company’s choice of 
officers, the circular continued, would generally be respec­
ted. Companies having complied with all these requirements 
might formally offer their services to the President.^3
It will be seen that both the law and this circular
^%ee above page 242.
B^Letter, War Office of the United States, 1 Nov. 
1798, Broadside Collection. Portfolio 224, No. 7 c. Rare 
Book Room, Library of Congress.
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placed the associations under complete federal control.
They were to be raised without the intervention of the 
states, they might be called into service without the con­
sent of the states, and the President was the sole judge of 
their qualifications for acceptance. Furthermore, he was to 
appoint their officers, provide them with arms as required, 
and devise their regulations.
Unfortunately most of the War Department records re­
lating to these companies were destroyed by fire in 1800.®^ 
The limited data available from less comprehensive sources 
indicates that the mobilization was successful and that its 
history was deeply entangled in the political passions of 
the day. The series of events that occurred in Philadelphia 
beginning as early as 1797 provide the best illustration of 
the latter point. When the adjutant of certain city units 
ordered a parade to welcome the President on his return to 
the city in the fall, the Aurora published letters objecting 
to the display and charging that an effort was being made to 
convert the militia into "servants in livery." Although it 
was planned that about one thousand men participate in the 
event, the Aurora reported that less than one hundred actual­
ly turned out, some companies having less than ten men.
84a  search of the material in the Old Army Section, 
National Archives, revealed practically nothing for the per­
iod prior to 1801. The fact that the records concerned were 
destroyed by fire is clearly implied in letter. War Depart­
ment, Office of the Secretary, to Joseph C. Boyd, 19 Feb; 
1802, "Military Book I A, 1800-03," MS, Old Army Section, 
National Archives.
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Though this report must be evaluated for bias, it reveals 
that many militiamen had begun to put their political feel­
ings ahead of their militia responsibilities. As time passed 
the internal split that this produced became more pronounced, 
and by May 1798, the month in which the Provisional Army Act 
was passed, the First Light Infantry was openly described 
with the phrase sans-culottes in recognition of its pro- 
Republican and pro-French sympathies.85
Soon after the passage of the federal act when Gover­
nor Mifflin called upon the officers of the militia to sup­
port defense measures, the officers of the city brigade im­
mediately adopted resolutions assuring the governor of their 
complete cooperation. The officers of the county brigade 
were neither as prompt nor as enthusiastic in their reaction. 
Though they finally agreed by a heavy vote to comply with 
the governor’s request, they also accepted an address criti­
cizing overly hasty action and expressing gratitude to France 
for her assistance in the Revolution.&&
The formation of the associations during the summer 
of 1798 reflected the deepness of the split that had devel­
oped. McPherson’s Blues, composed primarily of Federalists 
and strengthened by several new companies, immediately volun­
teered its services. Several other organizations that were
85j, Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History 
of Philadelphia 1609-1884 (Philadelphia, 1884), I, 490, 493.
86%bid.. 493-94.
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probably dominated by Federalists, including Lieper's Light 
Horse, the Philadelphia Blues, the First Green Infantry, the 
Germantown Infantry Blues, and the Northern Liberty Blues, 
also e n r o l l e d . ^ ?  Meantime, in order to counterbalance 
McPherson’s Blues and the other Federalist units in the 
city, the Republicans formed a military association of their 
own» Known as the "Militia Legion of Philadelphia," it was 
composed of all the uniformed companies that were essentially 
Republican in membership. Since these several units were 
apparently already in existence, there is more than a sug­
gestion that men of a feather had been flocking together for 
military purposes for some period of time. On the other 
hand, the possibility that Republican purity had resulted 
from the gradual withdrawal of non-Republleans cannot be 
completely ignored. All members of the "Republican Legion," 
as the organization was more popularly known, were required 
to subscribe to a kind of test oath signifying their devo­
tion to Republican principles and their determination "to 
support the laws and republican institutions of the general 
and state governments,"®®
That the partisan quarrels of the time should have 
split the militia is hardly a matter for wonder. The Feder­
alists themselves had opened the way for the prevalent emo­
tions to penetrate and divide the troops. In the volunteer
B^ Ibid.. 494-95, ^^ Ibid,, 495.
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associations they had intended to create a distinctly parti­
san force, and the ultras in Congress, such as Robert Goodloe 
Harper, had hardly disguised this fact. The War Department 
circular with, its requirements that practically excluded 
non-Federalists from the associations did little to allay 
Republican apprehension. In the face of these circumstances 
and rising fears of suppression, the Republicans in Phila­
delphia, the center of partisan strife, had reacted in the 
only way that seemed open to them.
This side-by-side existence of rival military units 
may provide one of the darker pages of the peacetime history 
of the militia, but its significance must.not be misinter­
preted. While the members of the two sides may have jeered 
at each other, there is not the slightest indication that 
they intended matters to come to blows. In this respect, 
the Republican Legion, which is known to have been active 
and influential in public a f f a i r s , probably assumed more 
the character of a political action group than that of a 
private army. The public attitude toward the associations 
appears to have been dependent upon one’s political persuas­
ion. Thus when riots occurred at Northampton, Massachusetts, 
during Fries’ Rebellion, ”a Dedham High Federalist" gleefully 
remarked that McPherson’s Blues would "soon dish . . . up" 
the troublemakers. Dr. Nathaniel Ames, the "Jacobin" zealot.
G^Ibid.
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overhearing this, referred to the associations as ”a stand­
ing army of m e r c e n a r i e s . "90
Despite the strong feelings that the associations 
aroused in many people, they appear to have been formed in 
sufficient numbers to satisfy the expectations of the admin­
istration. In a letter to the President on 5 January 1800, 
Secretary of War McHenry wrote that they provided a valuable 
reserve for reinforcement of the regular army. When com­
pletely organized into higher units, he added, they would 
also serve as forces around which the militia could rally 
in times of great emergency. He was so impressed by their 
efficacy and low cost that he thought the system which pro­
vided them should be made a permanent feature of our military 
arrangements.91 The associations actually attained a certain 
continuity during the three years they were authorized. By 
the fall of 1800 the President had begun to renew his ac­
ceptance of companies whose initial terms had expired. At 
least one such company, the Portland Volunteers, served out 
two terms and, volunteered for a third. Companies were still 
requesting renewals in February 1802, nine months after the
90Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto; or Early 
American Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel 
Ames. 1758-1822 (Cambridge. 1931). 125.
^^American State Papers. Indian Affairs. I, 137. 
The same letter also appears in Annals. 6 Cong., the rele­
vant material being on page 1409.
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legal acceptance period had expired.9^
McHenry's comments as to the general excellence of 
the associations appear to have been substantially correct. 
Unlike the detachments of previous years they constituted 
something more than a mere list of names on paper. The pro­
cedures by which they were raised, as outlined in the War 
Department circular, insured that they be completely organ­
ized. The fact that they were composed of men living in the 
same neighborhood or locality permitted them to function as 
units. The detachments, formed under less effective regula­
tions and composed of men living in different places, were 
denied both these advantages.
In further assessing the efficiency of the associa­
tions the questions of federal control, arms, and partisan 
character must also be considered. The first of these was 
partially responsible for the superior organization of the 
units, and it probably cut weeks from the time that would 
have been required to embody them for action. Indeed these 
troops reflect many of the advantages that might have been 
obtained from a national militia. While no data is avail­
able as to the way in which they were armed, it should be 
remembered that their members came primarily from upper
Department letter, 18 Nov. 1800, file copy un­
signed, to Joseph Coffin Boyd of the Portland Volunteers. 
"Military Book 1 A, 1800-1803," MS, Old Army Section, Na­
tional Archives; War Department letters. Office of the 
Secretary, to Jonathan Winslow and to Joseph C. Boyd,
18 Feb. 1802 and 19 Feb. 1802 respectively. Ibid., 152-53.
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economic groups and that the President was permitted to lend 
them arms. These considerations point to the probability 
that they were much better equipped than the detachments 
had been. The partisan enthusiasm of the men was undesir­
able, but it was not without some value. It no doubt lent 
the associations the interest, unity, and stability that 
accounted for the numerous instances of re-volunteering.
During this period the states did not neglect the 
militia simply because the associations had been formed.
As usual in times of real or assumed danger, they made ef­
forts, as reflected in the many amendatory laws, to improve 
the efficiency of their troops and prepare them for possible 
action. In most cases the new acts indicated the continuing 
need for more artillery and cavalry and the prevalence of 
the same kind of disorganization that had existed in 1794 
and 1797. Among the states attempting to bolster the two 
special arms were New York and Virginia. The former in­
creased the tax exemption of artillerymen to five hundred 
dollars, and the latter in order to stimulate enlistments 
in all volunteer corps provided that no one enlisting in 
such units be held to a longer term of service than five 
years.93
In South Carolina, if the supplementary militia act
9%. Clark, Seventh Regiment. I, 36; Virginia Acts. 
1799 Jan. Sess., 3-4.
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of 20 December 1800 is any indication, disorder and dis­
interest had eaten away at the efficiency of the system 
like the rust on a typical militiaman’s rifle. The act 
pointed to the prevalent lack of "due subordination and 
obedience to orders" and prescribed corrective measures for 
such infractions as disobedience by officers, refusal of 
householders to give information for the military census, 
neglect of company commanders to muster their units as re­
quired by law, and refusal of companies to elect officers. 
Other corrective provisions of the act indicate that many 
volunteer companies were moribund, that fines were not al­
ways being collected, and that men not members of companies 
were voting in company elections.^4
Georgia reorganized and consolidated the company 
and battalion beats,95 and North Carolina made increases 
that ranged from two hundred to almost five hundred percent 
in its fines for failing to attend musters and attending 
without arms. It also established a fine of twenty-five 
percent of the last public tax paid by the offender for 
failure to turn out on alarms. This new fine, which was 
substituted for the old flat charge of two pounds, would
^^Eiiiot and Strobel, Militia System of South 
Carolina, Appendix, 52-54.
05
Marbury and Crawford, Digest, 362-63.
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of course, cost some offenders less and some more than they 
formerly would have been required to pay.9&
9&The act was passed in 1800, James Iredell, The 
Public Acts of the General Assembly of North Carolina. 
Containing the Acts from 1715 to 1803, Revised and Published 
under the Authority of the Legislature (Revised by Francis___________________________________ j________
Xavier Martin; Newbern, 1804), II, 159-65.
CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The struggles over American military policy between 
1783 and 1800 must be viewed as a part of the general con­
flict between the nationalists and the anti-nationalists.
The former in their continuous efforts to obtain relatively 
large federal armies and to bring the militia under greater 
federal control provided the central themes. Their oppon­
ents saw in these themes serious threats to their determina­
tion to preserve unimpaired the powers of the provincial 
governments. On their part, these advocates of the rights 
of the states favored more or less complete reliance on the 
militia with only token standing forces.
It was under great disadvantages that the national­
ists tried to strengthen the army. Their opponents had en­
circled a military philosophy of doubtful value, since it 
assigned fictitious merits to the militia, with ramparts 
made of two kinds of almost impenetrable masonry, the militia 
myth and the fear of regular troops. From time to time, par­
ticularly during Confederation days and from 1794 on, they 
also pointed to the high costs of standing troops with great
4 3 0
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effect, and throughout the period under consideration they 
brought forward many subordinate arguments. The national­
ists were able to break through these formidable defenses on 
only a few occasions, as in 1792 following St. Clair’s defeat 
and in 1797-1800 during the French crisis. Their gains at 
the end of the period were minor. They were little, it any 
more successful in reforming the militia, though they did 
put through the Uniform Militia Act of 1792.
These failures meant that the military lessons of 
the Revolution made no lasting imprint on American military 
policy. The old dual system with its inadequate numbers of 
regulars and its variegated, inefficient militia continued 
to live out its useless life. However, it should be empha­
sized that the nationalists never attempted to destroy the 
system as such. Their purpose was to perfect and balance 
its two components. In view of the Revolutionary experience, 
one might wish to criticize them for not trying to abolish 
the militia, thus doing away with the dangerous and wasteful 
dualism. This, however, would have required constitutional 
changes that could not have been obtained; and, if this con­
sideration were not enough, such action would have been im­
possible for other reasons.
It would have gone far beyond the best military ad­
vice available. It would also have had to overcome in a 
moment the great weight of more than a hundred years of 
tradition concerning both the value of the militia and the
432
rights of the states. Furthermore, it would have been nec­
essary to find the funds to support many times the few fed­
eral troops that otherwise seemed to be sufficient. This, 
of course, would have been a manifest impossibility. A 
single system based on regulars may be better than a dual 
one when no special historical conditions must be considered 
as a part of the problem. Unfortunately, such considerations 
usually form the essence of the question. The nationalists, 
though they made no effort to abandon the militia entirely, 
knew that regulars were superior to militia. They also knew 
that a military system must be acceptable to tradition, to 
the pocketbook, and to political realities. All of this is 
to say that the efficacy of military policy must be evaluated 
in the context of its era.
The Military Policy of the Confederation 
After the Revolution the military problems of the 
United States consisted primarily of the defense of the 
frontier and the preservation of public order. Although 
they might have been substantially solved by the establish­
ment of an army of about three thousand, men, as Washington 
and other military leaders recommended. Congress seemed to 
be incapable of any firm action at all. It was handicapped 
by constitutional reservations, by the growing fear of stand­
ing troops, and by the lack of funds. To further burden 
those who wanted sizeable federal forces, the voting rules
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of the Confederation sometimes permitted the anti-army 
minority to have its way.
The constitutional issue concerned the question of 
whether or not Congress had the authority to raise troops in 
time of peace. Hamilton in the report of the military com­
mittee of 1783 resolved the two conflicting opinions in 
favor of the Union. However, his arguments, which proceeded 
from logic as much as from sentiment, had no more effect upon 
the essentially emotional attitudes of his opponents than an 
arrow fired into the stockaded walls of Fort Harmar. Consti­
tutional scruples at this time appear to have been more prev­
alent in New England than elsewhere. The historian is at a 
loss to get at the reasons for this, but he may suspect the 
sincerity of the Puritanical conscience. It may be more than 
coincidence, for example, that constitutional reservations 
and opposition to the half-pay and commutation acts were both 
centered in New England. Nor did that section have to face 
the Indian problem that existed in many of the other states.
The fear of standing armies may have been tradition­
al, but it certainly fed and grew upon some of the incidents 
of demobilization. The rebellious activities of the officers 
at Newburgh, the mutiny of the Pennsylvania recruits, and the 
formation of the Society of the Cincinnati seemed to indicate 
that armies really were threats to liberty and republican 
government. The commutation act and the claims of the sol­
diers for back pay proved that they were also threats to the
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pocketbook. All of this made a powerful combination that 
influenced American military policy for years. However, 
both the average American and the doctrinaire army-hater 
reserved the right to choose between dangers. When the In­
dians raised his tomahawk on the Northwest frontier and 
Shays poised his men for a foray on Boston, few people were 
in doubt as to where the most clear and imminent danger lay.
The financial problem was not susceptible to solu­
tion by any such easy means. It was frightened away neither 
by the Shawnee nor by the regulator, and the efforts of na­
tionalists like Hamilton and Madison to obtain independent 
funds did not cause it to disappear. While the minds of men 
might change, the empty treasury seemed to go on forever. 
Without money, armies of the size necessary could not be 
raised. Delegates to the Congress may have argued about 
the constitution and about standing armies, but these argu­
ments affected only the control of the troops. Lack of 
funds set the number.
However, the main apparent issues varied from year 
to year. Constitutional scruples determined the military 
policy in 1783 and 1784, and as a result no real federal 
forces were raised. In 1785 the expectation that sales of 
the Northwestern lands might bring coins to the coffers in­
duced Congress to order the enlisting of a few federal 
troops. In 1786 the rebellion in Massachusetts dictated 
the raising of some reinforcements. From 1787 to the end
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of the Confederation’s stormy life the lack of money was the 
main factor. During this last period the financial pinch 
was so severe that enlistments were stopped, and it became 
necessary to think in terms of militia rather than additional 
federal regiments when the Indian troubles became more ser­
ious in the Northwest, the primary arena of the Congressional 
troops in service.
The voting rules of the Confederation required nine 
votes to pass any measure of importance, including most mil­
itary measures. Since more than ten or eleven states were 
seldom present, such a majority was almost impossible to 
attain, and as a result the real sentiments of Congress were 
sometimes obscured. In 1784, for example, a majority of the 
states favored the raising of a federal army by requisition. 
Since,they were never able to muster the nine votes, Elbridge 
Gerry and the New England bloc with its three or four votes 
prevailed. Gerry on one occasion even utilized the rules to 
strike out a provision by moving that it stand. The provis­
ion could be defeated by three votes through the use of this 
strategem, whereas a move to strike would have required nine. 
The minority and not Congress as a whole should be blamed, 
to the extent that blame is due, in this case and most others 
for the failure of the Congressional military policy.
Such measures as Congress did take to provide federal 
troops were poorly executed. The system by which the states 
themselves actually enlisted the men precluded rapid action.
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Delays were experienced while the legislatures passed special 
laws and tried to find the money for recruiting expenses.
The lost time was particularly great in the many cases in 
which the legislatures did not happen to be in session at 
the moment. Nor were the states always able to raise their 
full quotas. Only 580 of the 700 men authorized in 1785, 
and only 510 of the 1340 voted in 1786, were ever enlisted. 
The failures resulted from lack of funds, from the failure 
of the legislatures to pass the required laws, and from the 
difficulty of finding men willing to fight Indians in Ohio 
without the positive assurance that they would receive their 
pay.
The truly national force disappeared when the army 
was discharged in 1783. Thereafter the few troops under 
federal control were provided by the states of the North­
east. Nor were they employed on a nationwide basis. While 
their numbers may have been too few to permit their disper­
sion all along the frontier, it is also true that Congress 
never seriously considered the raising of troops for use 
anywhere except in the Northwest. It was no coincidence 
that this was the only territory owned by the nation as a 
whole. Congress would look after its own frontier areas, 
from which money might be obtained, and the states could 
look after theirs.
Following the Revolution most Americans put aside 
whatever interest they may have had in the militia. As a
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result the wartime organization, such as it had been, vir­
tually disappeared in many states. One of the most compe­
tent military observers of the day attributed these condi­
tions to defects in the laws, to the lack of enforcement, 
and to the losses of income suffered by militiamen attending 
musters. These factors, however, did not operate on the 
frontier, where the Indian was a constant danger, and in a 
few other places, such as New York City, where enthusiasm 
ran high for the moment.
Into this atmosphere of indifference, reformers in­
troduced new plans for the radical reorganization of the 
militia by the national government. All of these plans were 
based on a new understanding of the militia problem. The 
experiences of the war had indicated that a small, highly- 
trained select corps was preferable to great masses of un­
trained troops. Each of the plans provided for such a 
corps, and all except one relegated the general militia to 
reserve status. That one (von Steuben's) dispensed with it 
entirely. The plans suggested three different principles 
by which the select corps might be set up:
(1) By the organization of a Continental militia 
(von Steuben).
(2) By the establishment of a military class com­
posed of young men between eighteen and twenty (Knox).
(3) By the formation of special units--"light com­
panies" or "trainbands"— in the militia at large (Washington 
and Hamilton).
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Other features of the plans may be seen in the fol­
lowing tabulation:
TABLE 2
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3-7 yrs. 12-25 ---- — 40,000
Hamilton none volun. 8 yrs. 24 $ 60,000 8,000
Von Steuben 18-24 volun. 3 yrs. 31 $315,000 21,000
Knox 18-20 oblig. 3 yrs. 42 $735,000 45,000
The Congress failed to adopt any of the plans. The 
public was uninterested, the estimated costs were high, and 
there was no immediate military threat to make reform either 
desirable or imperative. The fact that the plans all called 
for national action might have been expected to bring down 
the denunciations of the anti-nationalists, but they too 
appear to have been slumbering in the bivouac of indiffer­
ence. If they had been more awake they might have pointed 
out that the powers of Congress relating to the militia were 
practically non-existent. It might have recommended one of
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the plans to the states, but it could not force them to ac­
cept it.
The frontier south of the Ohio was under almost con­
stant Indian attack from 1783 to 1789. The failure of North 
Carolina and Virginia to send military aid to their colonists 
in East Tennessee, Kentucky, and Cumberland resulted in sep­
aratist movements in all these areas. In East Tennessee the 
military state of Franklin arose, fought innumerable engage­
ments with the Indians, skirmished with the North Carolina 
Loyalists, and disappeared, leaving nothing behind except 
the incomparable legend of its fighting men. The history 
of Franklin affords one of the rare demonstrations of the 
fact that militiamen can be good soldiers. The excellence 
of its troops rested upon good leadership, plenty of fight­
ing, and the military esprit that comes from a tradition of 
victory.
A neglected aspect of the history of the militia 
during the Confederation is the role that it played in the 
land conflicts and new state movements of the period. Such 
conflicts occurred in Franklin and also in the Hampshire 
Grants and in the Wyoming Valley. Each case had its own 
distinguishing features. In Franklin the militia was the 
fountainhead of the separatist movement and the pillar of 
the new state. In the Hampshire Grants the troops of New 
York and Vermont came to blows in the pursuance of the for­
mal policies of the two governments. In the Wyoming Valley
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a land company organized its own private militia to protect 
its claims against Pennsylvania, which had employed force.
The use of the militia by Pennsylvania, however, appears to 
have been a phenomenon of the power of land speculators in 
the legislature, and it was brought to a halt when other 
elements of the government protested.
These troubles pointed to certain dangers inherent 
in the existing military system. Although Congress could 
have prevented the states from raising standing armies, it 
had no control over their use of their own militia forces.
Nor could the provision of the Articles that forbade the 
states to make war be conveniently invoked, for the old 
states looked upon the conflicts as insurrections, not as 
wars. Indeed, Congress, far from being able to interpose 
its power to stop the fighting, might be called upon to help 
put down the "revolt." This happened in the Wyoming troubles 
in 1788, and only the general sympathy for Vermont both in 
New England and in the federal army prevented its happening 
in the Hampshire Grants. Shays Rebellion, in which the 
militia organization of Massachusetts provided fighting men 
for the insurgents, again showed that the central government 
could be forced to pit its armies against provincial troops.
Federalist Military Policy
The new Constitution greatly increased the military 
prerogatives of the central government. It vested the command
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of the federal troops in the President, gave him the right 
to select the officers, and provided the means whereby funds 
could be raised for the maintenance of armies. Despite 
these steps in the direction of central control of military 
affairs the conflict between the nationalists and the anti- 
nationalists continued without diminution. As in the past, 
the former pressed for large standing forces and the feder­
alization of the militia. The latter opposed both of these 
objectives and insisted that every military threat be met 
with large bodies of militia.
During the first four Congresses the nationalists 
(or the Federalists after about 1793) met with some success 
in their constant effort to augment the regular forces.
Under the pressure of the Indian threat in the Ohio Country, 
they put through army increases each session until the Legion 
of the United States was finally formed in 1792. The legion’s 
victory at Fallen Timbers in the summer of 1794 resolved the 
Northwestern Indian problem for the moment. However, new 
dangers appeared as England preyed on American commerce, and 
the military situation was complicated by an increase in the 
activities of the Algerian corsairs. The Federalists de­
manded and got a navy for use against the latter. They also 
proposed large additions to the army, which were defeated by 
the Republicans in the House on three different occasions in 
the spring and summer of 1794. However, the Congress did 
place a detachment of eighty thousand militia in readiness.
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There is more than one reason to believe that the 
Federalist insistence upon more regular troops during part 
of this period was based to a large extent upon domestic 
considerations. The Federalists wanted no war with Great 
Britain, but they did fear the Jacobin clubs that had ap­
peared in many cities and the general leveling influences of 
the French Revolution. They were also aware of the growing 
resistance to the excise tax in Western Pennsylvania and a 
few other places. They appear to have looked upon the troops 
that might be raised to counteract such disturbances as a 
final safeguard, a dernier resort. The greatest paradox of 
early American military history lies in the fact that Repub­
lican fears of suppression and federal military intervention 
were attached to the regulars but that the militia was in­
variably utilized for such purposes, as in the Whiskey Re­
bellion.
Republican arguments against military increases were 
usually based upon such fears. They ceaselessly put forward 
the militia as a substitute for more regulars in times of 
danger and stress. This made it necessary that they develop 
a whole series of arguments pointing not only to the superior 
desirability of the militia but also to its greater effici­
ency. It was composed of a better class of men, it knew the 
terrain, it knew the Indians, it had a long history of suc­
cesses both in the Revolution and in Indian campaigns, and 
so on. After 1794 the primary emphasis of Republican
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objections on occasion shifted to the question of costs. 
Regulars were too expensive, no money was to be had to sup­
port them, and militia cost almost nothing. The increasing 
prominence of arguments based on costs did not, however, mean 
that the fear of regulars no longer clutched Republican 
hearts. This fear and the complementary preference for the 
militia were like two good soldiers that never deserted.
At the height of the Indian trouble in 1792 the army 
had been built up to a total of five regiments of infantry 
(four of twelve companies each and one of eight). one bat­
talion of artillery, arid four companies of cavalry. During 
the British crisis in 1794 three battalions of artillery were 
added. By the mid-winter of that year most of the military 
threats, both on the frontier and on the seas, were disappear­
ing. Though the Federalists were able at first to fight off 
Republican demands for military reductions, they finally gave 
way in the spring of 1796. At that time the strength of the 
army was set at four small regiments of infantry (eight com­
panies each), the four battalions of artillery, and two com­
panies of cavalry.
These reductions of force, however, were only tempor­
ary. Trouble with France on the seas, the growing Federalist 
fear of insurrection, and the XYZ incident brought new mili­
tary increases during the Fifth Congress. These consisted of 
several small, immediate additions to the regulars, a provi­
sional army, some volunteer associations, and an additional
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army of twelve regiments, only a fraction of which was ever 
raised. They also included a measure to expand the unit 
strength of the regular regiments in case of war. When the 
provisional army expired in less than a year it was renewed 
as the eventual army. Navy increases including six ships of 
the line and numerous smaller vessels were also authorized.
As in the past the military estimates of the administration 
were frequently pared down to meet Republican objections.
President Adams, who wanted no war with France, did 
not push military legislation with the same fervor as his 
predecessor. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton through his influ­
ence on Secretary of War McHenry and on many Federalists in 
Congress appears to have been the driving force behind most 
military legislation. He also suggested most, if not all, 
of the military programs that the administration presented 
to Congress. Some of his suggestions, particularly the pro­
visional army and the expansible army, which first appeared 
in his committee report of 1783, were original and advanced. 
He thus emerged as the leading organizational theorist of 
the era.
Viewed in the perspective of the present day, the 
provisional army was in effect a federalized volunteer mili­
tia very similar to the current national guard. At the time, 
the Republicans were extremely doubtful of the constitution­
ality of such a force. During the debate on the measure they 
properly treated the troops as militia and pointed out that
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the federal government could not legally appoint their offi­
cers. The Federalists avoided a show-down by maintaining 
that the provisionals were essentially regulars. The legis­
lation, which was fabricated in the same arsenal as the alien 
and sedition acts, reflected the Federalist impatience with 
constitutional niceties.
Though no effort has been made in the present study 
to evaluate the ultimate political significance of the mili­
tary measures of the Fifth Congress, they undoubtedly had an 
effect on public opinion similar to that of the alien and 
sedition acts. In all likelihood the role that is usually 
assigned to the latter measures as causes of the Federalist 
decline in 1800 should be shared on an equal basis by the 
provisional and additional army acts. In the provisional 
troops, the volunteer associations, and the army increases, 
these acts provided the largest peacetime federal force that 
had ever been authorized up to the moment. Fearers of feder­
al encroachment, military suppression, and dictatorship 
hardly failed to take notice, particularly in that Robert 
Goodloe Harper and other Federalist ultras had made no secret 
of their intention to use the troops to suppress trouble­
makers if necessary.
The Republicans in opposing the acts made use of most 
of their traditional arguments. They emphasized costs some­
what less and the lack of any real need for military in­
creases somewhat more than usual. Basic in their strategy
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was an effort to substitute for the Federalist program a de­
fense plan which called for a large detachment of militia 
similar to that of 1794, The Federalists, who saw no harm 
in the proposal, allowed it to ride through Congress and 
continued to enact their own measures providing federal or 
federalized troops. When the detachment expired, the Feder­
alists in the Senate refused to permit its renewal.
In the Sixth Congress, rising public revulsion against 
the Federalists and the possibility of a settlement with 
France resulted in a return to peace establishments for both 
the army and navy. The few troops that had been raised for 
the additional army were discharged, and the navy was cut 
back to six frigates. Since the eventual army had expired 
with the close of the first session of the Congress, the army 
reverted to its strength under the act of 30 May 1796--four 
regiments of infantry, four battalions of artillery, and two 
companies of dragoons. With this disappearance of much of 
its army, the Federalist Party abandoned its military preten­
sions in favor of a new program calling for a small force of 
regulars, a military academy, and a better type of artillery.
The efforts to reform the militia that had been cut 
off by an indifferent Congress in 1783 were resumed in early 
Constitutional days almost as though there had been no in­
terruption. The passage of a few years, however, had brought 
new complications to the problem. Formerly the federal gov­
ernment had possessed no constitutional powers relating to
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the militia. As a result, the question of states' rigfights 
had been an absorbing but essentially abstract consldetisration. 
Under the Constitution, on the other hand, the militisfia powers 
of Congress were real and extensive. The states, or s some of 
them, were alarmed by the implications.
Unfortunately these powers were not well definSned in 
the militia clauses. The general statements delegatinfing cer­
tain functions to Congress and reserving others to thierte states 
were subject to two widely variant interpretations. A Accord­
ing to one, they permitted Congress to enter into "theirte 
minutiae of the matter,” even to the extent of supervlwising 
training in the states. According to the other, Congjgress 
could do no more than lay down the most general reguLsfiHatiens. 
Extremists went so far as to claim that 'it had no powewers 
whatsoever except over troops called to the federal se&service.
Disagreements arising from the two incompatibZc&le in­
terpretations dominated debates on militia matters. 7 The most 
important subjects of conflict included the right of 0 Congress 
to determine the composition of the militia and to aeoeoquire 
that militiamen provide their own arms. The authorit'^ hty of 
Congress to delegate to the President some of its resg&sponsi- 
bilities, such as the power to call out the troops in *n mili­
tary emergencies, also brought on bitter words. Theses: se 
Congressional battles represented only one phase of a 6; a general 
war that was fought over the interpretation of almost i"t every 
part of the Constitution.
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Militia legislation during the early Constitutional 
period was also affected by a variety of other factors.
These included such traditional shibboleths as the militia 
myth and the fear of regulars and such new influences as the 
rise of the party system and the success of French troops in 
Europe. Though the parties did not play an important role • 
in the passage of the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, their 
militia policies became increasingly important as time passed. 
The French victories resulted for the moment in the addition 
of a new chapter to the militia myth, but fortunately for 
American military affairs the Federalists were able to tear 
the new pages from the book during a House debate.
All of the factors mentioned above were incorporated 
into the militia doctrines of the two sides. The national­
ists (and their counterparts the Federalists) advocated the 
maximum possible extension of the federal militia powers.
They thought the general government should define the mili­
tia, directly supervise its training, prescribe the arms 
requirements, and enter into the detail of every aspect of 
the militia life of the nation. The anti-nationalists (and 
their counterparts the Republicans) stood for the strict 
limitation of the federal militia powers in all of these 
respects and extolled the virtues of the existing or unre­
formed militia organization. Though they thought that the 
United States should rely only on the militia, they opposed 
the suggested reform bills because of their federalizing
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features.
The era produced no new theories of militia organi­
zation. Though von Steuben’s ideas had been discarded, bills 
were brought forward based upon the plans of Knox and Washing­
ton. In 1790 a fairly exact facsimile of the Knox proposals 
of 1786 drew little interest. During the same year a version 
of the Washington plan of 1783 was introduced as the Boudinot 
Bill. After it had been shorn of many of its most signifi­
cant features, such as the federal inspectors, the segrega­
tion of the younger men in the light companies, and the pro­
visions for federal use, it was reintroduced as the Wadsworth 
Bill, which was eventually passed to become the Uniform 
Militia Act of 1792.
The new act was severely criticized from the begin­
ning. In the main, as the efforts to use the militia proved, 
it did not produce well-trained soldiers and an efficacious 
mobilization system. According to commentators, both con­
temporary and recent, it did not provide an adequate select 
corps, its requirement that all militiamen arm themselves was 
either unrealistic or ineffective, and it contained no en­
forcement provisions. In the last respect its execution 
was permitted to rest in the hands of the states, and the 
formation of an effective and uniform militia system depended 
upon their concurrent action. The act did, however, contain 
several constructive features, such as the uniform system of 
tactical organization, the incorporation of the independent
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companies into the general militia, and the requirement that 
all states use von Steuben’s training manual. Be all these 
facts as they may, the act was a product of the times. It 
was neither more nor less than the current states’ rights 
influences, public indifference, and financial considerations 
permitted it to be.
From the passage of the act of 1792 to the end of 
the Federalist administrations in 1801, some effort was made 
in almost every session of Congress to further improve the 
militia. In January 1795 a bill containing a simplified 
version of the Knox plan was brought forward. It soon became 
standard and was reintroduced in session after session. It 
was rejected to the end. It seems to have failed as a result 
of the operation of the same factors that had determined the 
ineffectual form, of the act of 1792.
Although the objective of the federal act as indi­
cated by its title was to establish a "uniform militia," the 
laws the states passed to implement the act hardly achieved 
this end. Their provisions varied widely with respect to 
almost every requirement of the act. These variations in 
most cases reflected one or another of such influences as 
the persistence of characteristics of the old laws, regional 
differences in social organization, and so on. While the 
last named of these influences produced a few minor sectional 
patterns, it did not result in anything approaching sectional 
uniformity.
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The more significant variations may be summarized as
follows :
(1) Age of. obligation. Five states departed from the 
standard, and in three of these large groups were excused 
from service as a result.
(2) Exemptions. Out of a total of some forty-four 
occupational groups, one state exempted three groups, one 
state forty, and the average for all states was nineteen.
(3) Tactical organization. Two states neglected to 
specify divisions and four left out battalions; the number 
of brigades per division was four or five in some states and 
two in others; the number of regiments per brigade varied 
from two to eight; and there was some variation in the number 
of companies per battalion.
(4) Selection of officers. Almost invariably general 
officers, adjutant generals, brigade inspectors, and regi­
mental staff officers were appointed. Field officers of the 
line were elected in six cases out of the ten available and 
appointed in the remaining four. Company officers were 
elected in nine of twelve cases and appointed in three.
(5) Mobilization. Though some states neglected to 
establish procedures, twelve authorized the governors to call 
out troops in time of emergency, at least eight prescribed 
draft procedures, and most permitted the embodiment of com­
plete units in time of sudden danger. Many also permitted 
the use of fines and substitutes in lieu of service.
(6) Training requirements. The number of musters 
per year varied from two to eight with the average being 
four and a half.
(?) Punitive features. Almost all states utilized 
fines rather than corporal punishment, and these varied 
widely from state to state for all offenses.
(8) Volunteer companies. Eight states required all 
five types of units, seven omitted one or more of the bat­
talion types, and two omitted one or more of the brigade 
types. Ten states followed the standard proportions for the 
battalion companies. Four states adopted the standard pro­
portions for the brigade companies; but among the remainder 
seven set limits for artillery that ranged from one to four 
times the federal minimum, and eight set limits for cavalry 
that ranged from one to eight times the federal minimum.
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Few of these variations represented outright violations of 
the federal act. It should be remembered that the act left 
the questions of exemptions, number of training days, and 
selection of officers to the states. It was silent on the 
matter of penalties and mobilization. Furthermore, its re­
quirements as to the composition of units permitted some 
latitude, and those governing volunteer companies were quite 
elastic. However, the differences do reflect the fact that 
the federal law permitted too much leeway in too many places.
Though the UMA failed to provide a uniform militia, 
it did result in some gains. More states adhered to the 
standards than violated them, and thus a certain measure of 
order was brought to the disparate establishments that had 
previously existed. While the President in ordering up troops 
might not get the same number of men in each brigade, he 
would obtain more brigades of the same size than he could 
have hoped for in the past. He would find that more of them 
contained the same types of sub-units and the same comple­
ments of officers and men. He would also find that the 
individual equipment and the training of the men were more 
uniform. In a word though the units might not be identical 
they would be considerably less non-descript than a few 
years earlier.
The Militia under the UMA
In the 1790's the militia was called out for a vari­
ety of purposes including frontier defense, the suppression
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of public disturbances, and the discouragement of aggression. 
To give it its just due, it always straggled on to the field 
and stumbled through its duties. But this is about the best 
that can be said. Mobilization was frequently slow and cum­
bersome, the troops were usually poorly armed and poorly 
trained, and they sometimes contained too few artillerymen 
and cavalrymen. In many cases, the militiamen proved to be 
highly susceptible to the partisan passions of the day. To 
make matters worse, the federal government was sometimes un­
able to control their use by the states, and frequently the 
states found that actual control was in the hands of local 
commanders. Many of these defects pointed to deficiencies 
in the federal and state acts.
The draft system of mobilization provided by the laws 
of many states was seldom utilized. Virginia and Pennsyl­
vania in the defense of their frontiers formed select corps 
of volunteers to serve for relatively long terms. In Georgia 
and the Southwest Territory complete units were frequently 
ordered out for short tours. When large numbers of, troops 
were required for the detachments of 1794 and 1797, most 
states established unit quotas to be filled by volunteers. 
During the crisis of 1798-1801 special associations of vol­
unteers were organized under federal supervision.
When the method of embodiment by volunteer quotas 
was employed in 1794 and 1797 many states encountered extreme 
difficulty in raising their men, and the mobilization
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procedures that were part of the method proved to be inef­
ficient. Many of the difficulties may be attributed to the 
general lack of organization among the troops of the states 
concerned. This condition resulted from failures to enforce 
the militia laws in such matters as the appointment of of­
ficers, the enrollment of the men, the holding of musters, 
and the making of returns. Neglect went so far in some 
states that it was hardly known whether or not the militia 
actually existed.
The procedures were so slow that months sometimes 
passed before the detachments were formed. While part of 
the delay was due to poor communications, and the lack of an 
immediate military threat, much of it resulted from the 
leisurely attitude of commanders, who seldom hurried to as­
sign quotas to their subordinate units. Once the names of 
the volunteers had finally been listed on paper, the mobili­
zation was considered to be complete. It is doubtful that 
the detachments were ever brought together to form companies 
and higher units.
The method of embodiment by complete units functioned 
much more satisfactorily. However, in the cases in which it 
was employed only a few men were involved. Furthermore, it 
was used for the most part only on the frontier, and in a 
few exposed coastal cities, where the militia was generally 
well organized and the emergencies were immediate and real.
A large scale effort to raise troops by the method in other
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areas might not have been so successful, particularly if the 
danger had been distant and illusory as it was in the years 
of the detachments.
In the most important case in which the draft was 
employed, that of Pennsylvania in the Whiskey Rebellion, t^ 
failed miserably. The state found itself forced to depend 
upon the persuasive powers of the governor and a special 
militia act permitting the enlistment of volunteers at large. 
The experience of Pennsylvania reflected two things, the 
political involvement of the militiamen and the lack of en­
forcement features strong enough to cause them to go against 
their political inclinations.
The lack of arms severely limited the effectiveness 
of the militia every time it was utilized. In 1794, accord­
ing to the Secretary of War's estimates, only about one-fourth 
of all the militiamen in the country were properly armed.
The experiences of the Whiskey Rebellion, during which two- 
thirds of the troops mobilized had to be supplied from the 
public stores, almost justified the Secretary's estimates.
The shortages disclosed during the raising of the detach­
ments of 1794 and 1797 made them appear overly optimistic.
The states took measures of their own to supply the 
needed weapons. Virginia, which had the most extensive pro­
gram, issued large numbers of muskets to her troops from its 
existing supplies and entered into contracts to purchase four 
thousand new ones per year. This program failed, as did
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those of other states, because of the worldwide shortage.
In 1798, the federal government attempted to make arms avail­
able for sale to the militia, but by 1801 its measures had 
not delivered a single musket.
In judging the efficiency, or the state of training 
of the militia, one must distinguish between the cases in 
which it actually fought the enemy and those in which it did 
not. Disregarding the Northwest, the former are limited to 
the Indian campaigns south of the Ohio. Among the soldiers 
of this area, the Georgia militiaman spent much of his time 
marching part of the way to his objective, pausing to think 
things over, and then marching back home. Though he encoun­
tered the enemy on a few occasions, he had a tendency to find 
him in friendly villages rather than in his own more heavily 
defended lairs. The Tennessean, that is the militiaman of 
the Southwest Territory, appears to have been an entirely 
different article. Steady and resolute, he completed the 
campaigns he started, and he did not hesitate to search the 
enemy out. His superior qualities reflected good leadership 
and years of constant Indian fighting.
In the other cases there was little or no fighting. 
The huge force raised during the Whiskey Rebellion overawed 
the insurgents by mere weight of numbers. The Pennsylvania 
troopers sent after Fries did little more than scour the 
countryside for the rioters. The special units formed in 
1794 and 1797 were not actually embodied, and the volunteer
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associations that came later were never called into service. 
However, circumstances surrounding the raising of most of 
these forces, as reflected in corrective legislation, point 
to the conclusion that they could hardly be considered highly 
trained troops.
In the general case, whether on the frontiers or in 
the East, training deficiencies resulted primarily from the 
inadequate provisions of the state laws, which seldom required 
more than three or four muster days a year. In some states 
it was due also to the failure of the company officers to 
assemble their men even at these times. It may also be at­
tributed in other cases to the inertia and disinterest that 
pervaded the troops. While a few states attempted to correct 
these last two conditions, primarily by instituting special 
short courses for the officers and by attempting to improve 
discipline, most did nothing. None attacked the main problem 
by doubling or tripling the number of training days.
Although many writers, including this one, consider 
the volunteer companies to have been the backbone of the 
militia system, their restricted opportunities during this 
period did not permit them to demonstrate their capabilities. 
The mounted companies that were used to the almost complete 
exclusion of other types of troops in Georgia and the South­
west Territory may have been composed of volunteers, but they 
did not constitute volunteer units in the sense that the term 
has been used throughout this study. In the Whiskey Rebellion
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volunteer companies were the first to offer their services 
in Pennsylvania, and they made up a large fraction of the 
contingents of several states. However, since no fighting 
occurred, there is little basis for a judgment as to their 
efficiency. Volunteer cavalry did good work in Fries Re­
bellion, but again there was no fighting.
The disproportion between the infantry on the one 
hand and the cavalry and the artillery on the other resulted 
partially from the failure of the states to organize and 
maintain at full strength the quotas of the two rn%- ial arms 
as provided by their militia acts. Even though this were the 
case, a new threat, the possibility of coastal landings, 
which could be effectively countered only with heavier fire­
power and greater mobility, increased the requirements beyond 
what the laws provided. Many states, led by New York, at­
tempted to add new units of artillery and horse and to bring 
the existing ones up to their authorized strengths.
The fact that militiamen should have been stirred by 
social, economic, and political currents is hardly surprising. 
The Republicans were fond of referring to them as citizen- 
soldiers, and with so few muster days a year it is only nat­
ural that they should have been more of the former than the 
latter. The call of the trumpet hardly had the magical power 
to reverse these proportions with the first blast or even the 
tenth. That the carry-over of civilian opinions often consti­
tuted a danger, or at the least a major inconvenience, to
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established government, there can be no doubt. The failure 
of the Pennsylvania draft in the Whiskey Rebellion amply il­
lustrates this. The result could have been so serious that 
the lesson was not soon forgotten. In Fries’ Rebellion a 
few years later the central government was careful indeed 
in the selection of the units it sent into the field. The 
lesson, however, was misapplied in the principles upon which 
the associations of 1798-1801 were formed. In deliberately 
creating companies of a certain political alignment, the 
Congress made inevitable the political split that occurred 
in the Philadelphia militia. That this did not produce 
serious consequences was due more to level heads on both 
sides than to lack of opportunity.
Nor was it surprising that in such places as Georgia, 
Kentucky, and the Southwest Territory the problem of control 
should have arisen. The general philosophy of the militia 
system itself was little help in this respect, nor were the 
poor communications that made it necessary to leave the ulti­
mate authority to embody men in the hands of local commanders. 
The Constitution and the laws contemplated that the troops 
should serve the states on some occasions and the federal 
government on others. However, they neglected the equally 
important point as to whether the federal government could 
restrain or veto state use. Although the President might 
attempt to exercise such restraint by withholding funds, this 
expedient, in the initial stages at least, could be applied
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only after the damage had been done, and it was always sub­
ject to nullification by a sympathetic Congress.
Local commanders paid little attention in many cases 
to higher policy in exercising the enormous powers that were 
necessarily delegated to them. While one may sympathize 
with the sufferings of the frontier settlers, he must con­
clude that the small raids so often employed in retaliation 
did little to alleviate the situation. Frequently directed 
against friendly villages, they solidified the opposition 
and brought counter raids in their turn. On the other hand, 
it must be admitted that large scale, well-conducted opera­
tions, such as John Sevier’s campaign of 1793, could produce 
beneficial results.
It will be noticed that some of the defects discussed 
above were hardly susceptible to correction for practical 
reasons. Arms simply could not be obtained whether or not 
the militiamen were willing to buy them. The training days 
could not be increased beyond a certain total, probably not 
a great deal greater than that already in the laws, without 
seriously affecting the economic life of both the men and 
their communities. Nor could federal control over operations 
be expanded to any appreciable extent if the militia’s essen­
tial character as state troops was to be retained, as the 
spirit of the time dictated.
There were two ways in which the arms problem might 
have been alleviated to some extent. The federal government
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or the states might have bought up all the muskets in sight, 
grouped them into pools in the various communities, and per­
mitted the several local units to use them in turn. Though 
there was little practice at targets, some such solution as 
this would have familiarized the men with the mechanisms of 
the weapons and the manual of arms. The other possible solu­
tion involves the reduction of the number of militiamen to 
parity with the number of arms. This would have required 
the abandonment of the principle of universal service in 
favor of complete reliance on some kind of strong select 
corps. It would also have necessitated the redistribution of 
the available arms, probably through public ownership as in 
the first case. Unfortunately no such solutions as these 
were politically feasible if for no other reasons than the 
shortage of money and the general animosity toward public 
ownership of anything.
The efficiency of the militia could have been im­
proved through better use of the training days available.
It should also have been possible through legislation and 
top-level supervision to correct the conditions that had led 
to disorganization in many states. While such legislation 
was passed by some states, it is doubtful that the necessary 
supervision accompanied it for any length of time. The con­
trol question might have been worked out in several ways. 
Congress might have made the reimbursement of militia that 
had engaged in campaigns completely dependent upon the
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President's approval and stuck by its decision in the face 
of all importunities from frontier heroes. Closer liaison 
between the central government and the states concerned might 
have been equally effective. The Georgians, for example, 
might have learned that they were not considered orphans and 
outcasts at the same time that the United States went to the 
assistance of the settlers in the Northwest. Best of all, 
and of course completely unfeasible, would have been the 
exclusive use of federal troops on all frontiers.
A Requiem for Federalist Military Policy
Though the Federalists had enjoyed transitory suc­
cesses, usually under the auspices of some severe military 
threat, their military program failed in the end. The militia 
act of 1792 did not provide a completely uniform militia nor 
even a reasonably efficient one as the experiences of the 
remainder of the decade showed. The military cuts made by 
the Sixth Congress left the regular forces with an authorized 
strength of 5038 enlisted men.^ The fact that this was ap­
proximately six times the number inherited from the Confeder­
ation meant little. The addition of little more than four 
thousand men was a small gain for twelve years of hard effort.
A kind of requiem for Federalist military policy was 
intoned in December 1800 during the second session of the
^Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United 
States (Washington, 1917), 89.
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Sixth Congress. It was Harrison G. Otis who said the last 
words and laid to final rest in the swashbuckling past all 
the ghostly array of federalized militiamen, provisional 
armies, additional armies, eventual armies, volunteer associ­
ations, and seventy-four gun ships of the line. In the de­
bate on a typically prosaic Republican resolution to fix the 
strength of the second regiment of artillerists and engineers 
at three battalions instead of four, he urged his friends to 
oppose measures betraying "regret and contrition for the past" 
and hoped that they "would do nothing that should be construed 
into a death-bed repentance of a conduct which constituted 
their glory and their pride." It was a fitting salute that 
the Republican motion should have been rejected.^
Within a few weeks the Federalists themselves joined 
the dead symbols of their military might, never to return to 
power again. Their departure left the army that they had 
cherished and the navy that they had nurtured to the sharp 
hatchets and dour oratory of the Republicans. With them too 
went much of the color and excitement of the military scene.
No longer, for good or bad, would it be enlivened by the 
imaginative organizational projects of Hamilton, the lionlike 
roars of John Allen, the mercurial virtuosity of Harper, and 
the matchless sarcasm of Dana. In the next years all of this 
would be replaced by the matter of fact monologues of the
^Annals, 6 Cong., 2Sess., 821, 829, 836.
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economizers, who smelled mustily of receipted bills stuffed 
in safes, cannon rusting in arsenals, and frigates laid up 
in mothballs. But this too would pass, for time was to 
prove that Hamilton and his colleagues were right--as to 
military theory, at least. They would have looked with 
familiar affection upon the regular armies and the highly 
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